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This report is submitted in compliance with DR-4 of Contract NAS8-39207, Advanced
Transportation System Studies for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, George
C. Marshall Space Flight Center. The report describes the results of Rockwell International's
work for the analysis of Manned Launch Vehicle Concepts for Two Way Transportation
System Payloads to LEO during the Basic Contract and the Option 1 Contract period of
performance (February 15, 1992 through December 15, 1993).
This report is organized in three volumes; an Executive Summary, a Final Report, and a Cost
Estimates Report.
The Executive Summary_ is a condensation of the study's major findings and a summary of
results for the several study activities. The findings and results are current with the study
progress as of December 10, 1993.
The Final R¢oort volume is an in-depth description of work performed during the study, with
accompanying illustrations of briefing charts and other documents which were generated
during the course of the study. This volume is organized by subject matter and includes an
appendix with research reports of detailed analyses on selected special topics. Sufficient data is
presented in this volume to reveal the depth of work performed and to provide data which
supports the findings presented in the Executive Summary.
The Cost Estimates Report is a compilation of the Work Breakdown Structure and cost
estimating techniques which were used to evaluate the several booster concepts during the
course of the study. A summary of data used and generated during the evaluation of each
booster type (or family of boosters) is provided. The data is organized by booster types which
represent unique cost estimating conditions, such as the reusable Space Shuttle, the proposed
low cost NLS family, existing expendable launch vehicles, and the Russian (C.I.S.) launch
vehicles.
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The purpose of the Advanced Transportation System Study (ATSS) Task Area 1 study effort is
to examine manned launch vehicle booster concepts and two-way cargo transfer and return
vehicle concepts to determine which of the many proposed concepts best meets NASA's needs
for two-way transportation to low Earth orbit. The study identified specific configurations of
the normally unmanned, expendable launch vehicles (such as the National Launch System
family) necessary to fly manned payloads. These launch vehicle configurations were then
analyzed to determine the integrated booster/spacecraft performance, operations, reliability, and
cost characteristics for the payload delivery and return mission. Design impacts to the
expendable launch vehicles which would be required to perform the manned payload delivery
mission were also identified. These impacts included the implications of applying NASA's
man-rating requirements, as well as any mission or payload unique impacts.
i
The booster concepts evaluated included the National Launch System (NLS) family of
expendable vehicles and several variations of the NLS reference configurations to deliver larger
manned payload concepts (such as the Crew Logistics Vehicle (CLV) proposed by NASA
JSC). Advanced, clean sheet concepts such as an F-1A engine derived liquid rocket booster
(LRB), the Single-Stage-to-Orbit rocket, and a NASP-derived aerospace plane were also
included in the study effort. Existing expendable launch vehicles such as the Titan IV, Ariane
V, Energia, and Proton were also examined.
Although several manned payload concepts were considered in the analyses, the reference i
manned payload was the NASA Langley Research Center's HL-20 version of the Personnel
Launch System. A scaled up version of the PLS for combined crew/cargo delivery capability, '
the HL-42 configuration, was also included in the analyses of CTRV booster concepts.
In addition to strictly manned payloads, two-way cargo transportation systems (Cargo Transfer
& Return Vehicles) were also examined. The study provided detailed design and analysis of
the performance, reliability, and operations of these concepts. The study analyzed these
concepts as unique systems and also analyzed several combined CTRV/booster configurations
as integrated launch systems (such as for launch abort analyses). Included in the set of CTRV
concepts analyzed were the Medium CTRV, the Integral CTRV (in both a pressurized and
unpressurized configuration), the Winged CTRV, and an attached cargo carrier for the PLS
system known as the PLS Caboose.
ii
V.
1.1
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
1.2
1.2.1
1.2.2
1.2.3
1.2.4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Volume I Executive Summary
Introductign
Si_ificant Achievements
Manned Booster Studies
Cargo Transfer & Return Vehicle Studies
Launch Abort Studies
SSTO MPS Operability Studies
Summary. of Resd_
Manned Booster Studies
Cargo Transfer & Return Vehicle Studies
Launch Abort Studies
SSTO MPS Operability Studies
I-1
I-4
1-5
I-7
1-9
1-11
1-13
1-13
1-29
1-56
1-67
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.1.5
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.4
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.5
A.
B.
C.
D.
Volume II Final Report
Manned Booster Studie_
Man-rating Requirements Analysis
Performance Analysis
Cost Analysis
Launch Processing Analysis
Reliability Analysis
Cargo Transfer & Return Vehicle Studies
PLS Caboose Concept
Medium CTRV Concept
Integral CTRV Concept
Winged CTRV Concept
Launch Abort Studies
Abort Studies Approach
Abort Coverage of Selected Boosters
Abort Studies Findings
SSTO MPS Operability Analyses
Operations Simulation Analysis
SSTO Engine Throttling Studies
SSTO MPS Design Layout
Aooendices
Structural Analysis of CLV on NLS-2
Structural Analysis of PLS with CRV on NLS-2
Man-Rating Requirements Report (Rev. A)
Learning Curve Analysis of Shuttle Processing
11-1
II-2
11-17
II-31
11-44
11-52
11-67
11-71
II-81
11-110
11-129
I/-161
II-161
I1-165
/1-183
n-185
II-185
11-206
11-219
I/-224
V
iii
1.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
Volume HI Program Cost Estimates
[h-o_m--amCost Estimates Document
Scope
Background Information
Manned Booster Cost Estimates
WBS and Dictionary.
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
WBS Dictionary
Launch Vehicle Segment
Transportation Node Segment
Test Segment
Operations Segment
Software Segment
Ground Segment
Program Segment
1
2
5
 _p.22AJ.f192 
1
3
4
9
9
10
12
12
14
V
iv
jL
1.0 Introduction
The ATSS Task Area i team has conducted studies for the design,
performance, and evaluation of a number of expendable booster concepts
currently being considered for the launch of reusable (manned or two-way
cargo) spacecraft. These analyses were performed to determine which of
the many proposed booster concepts best meets NASA's needs for two-
way transportation to low Earth orbit. Detailed design and analysis of the
two-way cargo spacecraft were also performed under the study. Analysis
of the integrated configurationsof these boosters and spacecraft revealed
an improved understanding of the strengths and limitations of each
element. Integrated booster/spacecraft analysis were performed for
launch vehicleperformance and controllability,reliability,cost,launch rate
capabilityand facilityutilization,and launch abort. Additional analyses of
the launch vehicle ground processing activitieswere also performed to
identifymeans of improving the operabilityof any launch vehicle concept,
new or old. The product of these studies isa betterunderstanding of the
roles which both the booster and the spacecraft play in achieving
improved access to space.
Manned Booster Studies
The study identified specific configurations of the normally unmanned,
expendable launch vehicles (such as the National Launch System family)
necessary to fly manned payloads. These launch vehicle configurations
Were then analyzed to determine their performance, operations, reliability,
and cost characteristics for the manned payload delivery mission. Design
impacts to the expendable launch vehicles which would be required to
perform the manned payload delivery mission were also identified. These
impacts included the implications of applying NASA's man-rating
requirements, as well as any mission or payload unique impacts.
Booster concepts evaluated included the National Launch System (NLS)
family of expendable vehicles, several variations of the NLS reference
configurations, and the ESA Ariane V. Advanced, clean sheet concepts such
as an F-1A engine-derived Liquid Rocket Bosoter (LRB), the Single-Stage-
to-Orbit rocket, and a NASP-derived aerospace plane were also included in
comparisons of the several candidate booster configurations. Existing
expendable launch vehicles such as the Titan IV and the Russian Energia
and Proton launch vehicles were also compared to the proposed new
booster designs.
I-1
..j"
Although several manned payload concepts were considered in the
analyses, the reference manned payload was the NASA Langley Research
Center's HL-20 version of the Personnel Launch System (PLS). Other
concepts such as the Crew Logistics Vehicle (CLV) proposed by NASA JSC
and a scaled-up version of the PIS for combined crew/cargo delivery
capability (the HL-42 configuration) were also included in the analyses.
These concepts could be used in either the manned mode or an unmanned
mode for delivery and return of cargo (such as for the Space Station cargo
resupply mission).
Cargo Transfer & Return Vehicle (CTRV) Studies
A wide range of concepts for the delivery and return of cargo payloads to
low Earth orbit (LEO) were designed and analyzed during the study. These
concepts are generally referred to as Cargo Transfer and Return Vehicles
(CTRV). These concepts include vehicles which deliver crew or cargo
separately as well as those vehicles which deliver combined crew and
cargo payloads. Combined crew/cargo delivery vehicles evaluated in the
study included LaRC's scaled-up version of the Personnel Launch System
(HL-42) and JSC's Crew Logistics Vehicle (CLV). Variations of all three
vehicle concepts were created during the study to provide varying payload
delivery and return capabilities. The CTRV, PLS, and CLV concepts,
combined with appropriate launch vehicle(s), formed the architectural
framework of NASA's Access to Space, Option 2 study. Identifying
competitive design configurations of the CTRV to support the Access to
Space study objectives was a principle activity of the study.
Launch Abort Studies
Trajectory analyses were performed to determine the ability of a variety
of expendable boosters to provide a mission abort capability for the HL-42
and CLV-P crew/cargo vehicles during the ascent mission phase. The
analysis was performed for several Access to Space study boosters
(Boosters 2A', 2C, and 2D for the HL-42, and Booster 2B for the CLV-P).
Specific design characteristics of the booster concepts were provided by
NASA MSFC. The HL-42 and CLV-P design data were provided by NASA
LaRC and JSC, respectively. The abort modes considered in the analysis
included; Return To Launch Site (RTLS), Trans-Atlantic Abort (TAL),
Engine Out (EO), Abort To Orbit (ATO), and Abort Once Around (AOA). A
North America Landing (NAL) abort mode was added for the Booster 2D
concept to compensate for this two-stage (series burn) booster design.
I-2
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SSTO MPS Operabili W Studies
An investigation into means of achieving high operability in any new SSTO
concept was accomplished by evaluating an SSTO main propulsion system's
flight operations, ground operations, and design configuration
characteristics. All of these aspects of a system design interact to produce
a launch vehicle's net reliability and maintenance performance. Methods
used for improving aircraft operability were adapted for the ATSS study to
analyze the operability characteristics of SSTO concepts defined by NASA
in their recently completed Access to Space study, Option 3. The method
used simulation models to provide detailed assessment of the SSTO
propulsion system components and checkout activities and also provide a
system-level simulation of the SSTO launch rate capability, facility
requirements, and resource utilization needs. The simulations included
component level reliability and maintainability data as determined from
actual Space Shuttle MPS processing history. The MPS serves as a useful
benchmark for comparing the operability of the many competing SSTO
concepts.
The investigation included the evaluation of optimum SSTO main engine
operating techniques for maximizing both engine reliability and life, while
also providing adequate abort coverage. Variations in engine throttle
profiles and shutdown sequences were performed to find the minimum
engine operating times, the minimum engine operating time at 100%
throttle level, and the maximum engine out abort capability. Additionally,
a design study for an SSTO MPS aft fuselage was used to rigorously apply
the MPS design groundrules which were identified in the Operationally
Efficient Propulsion System Study (OEPSS) by NASA KSC and Rocketdyne.
k._j
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1.1 Significant Achievements
The ATSS Task Area 1 study has examined a wide range of launch sys terns
for two-way space transportation payloads. Launch vehicles for future
NASA spacecraft such as the PLS and CTRV concepts have been analyzed to
determine which boosters best meet NASA objectives. Impacts to these
boosters to perform manned payload missions have also been identified,
including the implications of NASA's man-rating requirements. Design and
analysis of several CTRV concepts which would compliment the PLS system
were also provided to support the NASA Access to Space (Option 2) study.
The ability to provide launch abort coverage for the return of reusable
systems was also examined, for both expendable launch vehicles and for
fully reusable SSTO concepts. The significant achievements and findings
reached during the conduct of these studies should be of value to NASA
and contractor engineers as plans for the next generation of manned
launch vehicle concepts are developed.
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The ATSS contract has studied a number of booster concepts currently
being considered for the launch of reusable (manned or two-way cargo)
spacecraft. Analyses were performed to determine which of the many
proposed booster concepts best meets NASA's needs for two-way
transportation to low Earth orbit. The study identified specific
configurations of the normally unmanned, expendable launch vehicles
(such as the National Launch System family) necessary to fly manned
payloads. Design impacts to the expendable launch vehicles which would
be required to perform the manned payload delivery mission were also
identified. These impacts included the implications of applying NASA's
man-rating requirements, as well as any mission or payload unique
impacts. The booster Concepts evaluated included the National Launch
System (NIS) family of expendable vehicles, the ESA Ariane V, the Titan
W, and the Russian Energia and Proton launch vehicles. Advanced, clean
sheet concepts such as an F-1A engine-derived booster (LRB), the Single-
Stage, to-Orbit rocket, and a NASP-derived aerospace plane were also
included in comparisons of the several candidate booster configurations.
A review of current and past NASA man-rating requirements was
performed and a compilation of these requirements documented in a single
reference report. The requirements were summarized and translated into
functional design requirements which would have to be added to an
otherwise non-manxated launch vehicle. The study also identified design
impacts to an expendabIe launch vehicle which are associated with the
induced aerodynamic loads produced by PLS (winged) types of payloads.
Structural (weight) impacts for these increased aerodynamic loads were
calculated for the NIS-2 booster.
The study evaluatedseveral manned booster concepts and found that the
NLS-2 family of launch vehicles is an excellent booster for NASA's next
manned spacecraft concepts (PLS or CLV systems). Although somewhat
overpowered (excess lift capability) for these payloads, the NLS-2 provides
a highly reliable and safe launch system and can be operated in a mixed
fleet mode with the current Space Shuttle system during a manned
transportation system transition period. The variable cost per launch
estimates for all of these PLS/ELV systems was found to be greater than
the current demonstrated cost per flight of the Space Shuttle system.
Significant reductions in fixed costs over the current Space Shuttle (by
nearly an order of magnitude) will be required by these new systems in
order to be cost effective.
I-5
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1.1.2 Car_o Transfer and Return Vehicle Studies
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The study examined a number of Cargo Transfer and Return Vehicle
(CTRV) concepts in support of the NASA Access to Space (Option 2) stud),.
Concepts ranging from small ballistic re-entry systems to large payload
capacity, winged systems were designed and analyzed. These CTRV
designs were an integral part of NASA's Access to Space Option 2
evaluation of candidate launch system architectures. Although the design
concepts were not selected in the final architecture definition, they
provided highly competitive options to the HL-42 and CLV concepts.
The study provided improved design definitions for several CTRV concepts,
including the Medium CTRV, the Integral CTRV, and Winged CTRV
concepts. A detailed analysis of the Medium CTRV concept was performed,
including design layouts and Finite element stress analysis of the structural
design. Aerodynamic, aeroheating, and trajectory analyses were
performed for all CTRV designs, from the hypersonic re-entry to
touchdown. Parachute landing system design and analysis was conducted
for the non-winged CTRV concepts. Reliability, maintainability, and ground
operations analyses were also provided for each of the CTRV concepts,
including launch processing sequences, ground processing timelines,
maintenance and spares requirements, and facility/resource utilization.
Significant differences were found in ground operations requirements
between the Medium and the Integral CTRV concepts.
CTRV Impacts to Space Station
The study found that a CTRV-based logistics system would cause both
flight and ground operations changes to the Space Station program. The
extent of the operations impacts will be determined by the CTRV concept
selected - Medium, Winged, or Integral CTRV. All CTRV concepts will
result in a greater amount of time spent by the Space Station crew in
logistics operations (rendezvous and docking, transfer of payloads). The
CTRV concepts also provide a reduced capability for the transfer (delivery
or return) of large Space Station ORUs. A CTRV system would also cause
changes to Space Station payload integration operations and facilities at
KSC. Impacts to other KSC facilities related to launch and/or payload
processing of Space Station elements and cargo would also be expected.
I-7
_ J
I-8
1.1.3 I a_nch Abort Studies
The study evaluated several launch vehicle concepts to determine the level
of launch abort capabilities they could provide for two-way transportation
systems (high value payloads such as reusable CTRV, CLV, and HL-42 cargo
carriers, astronauts (when aboard), and even the reusable booster itself).
Abort Coverage Capability
The study provided a comparison of the launch abort capability of several
manned booster concepts, including both expendable and fully reusable
systems. Of all the expendable booster concepts studied, only one
provided abort coverage during the entire launch trajectory. All other
expendable booster concepts exposed the reusable spacecraft/crew to a
water ditching option for large portions (4096 to 6096) of the launch
trajectory. Surprisingly, even some fully reusable (SSTO) concepts
provided insufficient abort coverage. The tri-propellant propulsion SSTO
design based on three Russian RD-701 engines provided only 9096 abort
coverage of its launch trajectory.
Launch Vehicle Design for Abort Coverage
The study found that for all of these expendable boosters, the second stage
(or core stage) design was the key to providing abort coverage. Full
coverage usually was available during all of the first stage flight, but
rarely during second stage flight. This is principally due to the number of
engines in the vehicle's second stage design. Two stage boosters (serial
burn) have additional abort coverage issues related to their second stage
engine ignition. For SSTO concepts, the number of engines and their thrust
levels were the key abort coverage factor.
I-9
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1,1.4 SSTO MPS Operabili .ty Studies
The study examined the operability of Single Stage To Orbit concepts to
determine the relative impacts which new technologies would have on the
current state-of-the-art for reusable launch vehicles. The Space Shuttle's
current level of operability does not meet SSTO objectives, but it does
provide the benchmark to measure how much improvement is needed.
Detailed operations simulations at the Main Propulsion System (MPS)
component level were performed to determine the integrated effects that
flight hardware and test technology improvements would have on SSTO
operability.
Achieving High Flight Rates
The study found that achieving high flight rates with SSTO concepts is
readily achievable with existing hardware if the vehicle ground processing
schedules can approach SSTO program goals (subsystem checkout times
reduced to about 28 shifts (14 workdays) and the launch pad time kept to
2 shifts). The Space Shuttle MPS component current reliability and
maintenance levels are sufficient to satisfy the SSTO schedule objectives
(but not the cost objectives). The key to a highly operable SSTO from a
flight rate standpoint is ground test technologies.
Achieving Low Operations Costs
The study found that significantly reduced flight hardware failure rates
are required to reduce the overall maintenance costs of an SSTO concept.
Shorter subsystem checkout times are the most significant factor for
achieving reduced net hardware failure rates. Improved hardware
reliability and maintainability design will also help reduce the SSTO
maintenance demands. Significantly reduced component removal/retest
times (from days to hours), and to a lesser extent increased mean time
between failure (+ 50%), wiU greatly reduce the maintenance burden on a
reusable SSTO. The key to a highly operable SSTO from a cost standpoint is
lower maintenance levels. Highly accessible MPS components can have an
appreciable effect on improving maintenance times. Design layouts with as
many as seven SSME engines in an SSTO aft fuselage region were achieved
without having to locate one engine in the middle of the compartment.
I-ll
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1.2 Summary of Results
1.2,1 Manned Booster Studies
The ATSS contract has studied the performance of a number of expendable
booster concepts currently being considered for the launch of reusable
(manned or two-way cargo) spacecraft. Analyses were performed to
determine which of the many proposed booster concepts best meets
NASA's needs for two-way transportation to low Earth orbit. The study
identified specific configurations of the normally unmanned, expendable
launch vehicles (such as the National Launch System family) necessary to
fly manned payloads. These launch vehicle configurations were then
analyzed to determine their performance, operations, reliability, and cost
characteristics for the manned payload delivery mission. Design impacts to
the expendable launch vehicles which would be required to perform the
manned payload delivery mission were also identified. These impacts
included the implications of applying NASA's man-rating requirements, as
well as any mission or payload unique impacts.
The booster concepts evaluated included the National Launch System (NIS)
family of expendable vehicles, the ESA Ariane V, and several variations of
the NLS reference configurations to deliver a variety of manned payload
concepts, Advanced, clean sheet concepts such as a F-1A engine-derived
Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB), the Single-Stage=to-Orblt rocket, and a NASP-
derived aerospace plane were also Included in comparisons of the several
candidate booster configurations, Exis_ng expendable launch vehicles such
as the Titan IV and the Russian Energia and Proton launch vehicles were
also compared to the proposed new booster designs.
Although several manned payload concepts were considered in the
analyses, the reference manned payload was the NASA Langley Research
Center's HL=20 version of the Personnel Launch System (PLS). Other
concepts such as the Crew Logistics Vehicle (CLV) proposed by NASA JSC
and a small cargo carrier to be launched with the PLS for combined
crew/cargo delivery capability (the PIS Caboose configuration) were also
included in the comparisons of booster configurations, The reference
mission used in the analyses was the Space Station crew/cargo resupply
mission.
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1.2.1.1 Effects of Manned Payloads on ELVs
The impacts of launching a manned payload on an otherwise unmanned
launch vehicle were analyzed from both a man-rating requirements aspect
and from a flight performance aspect. In addition to the expected high
reliability parts, redundancy levels, and traceability requirements, the
analysis identified additional functional design requirements which the
booster will have to perform.
Man-rating Requirements
Analysis of NASA's man-rating requirements from current and previous
man-rated launch vehicle programs were condensed down to a small set of
functional requirements which any new booster would have to provide.
Essentially, these functions indicated that the booster will have to provide
a direct two-way communications link between the booster and the
manned payload (crew). The booster must monitor and provide status of
its critical systems to the crew and must also permit manual crew override
of certain critical booster functions. The level of detail to be provided in
the status indication is a subject of great debate, as is the level of active
crew intervention in booster functions. An approach was suggested in
which the launch vehicle is only required to achieve a hierarchy of
primary and secondary (abort) mission MECO targets during a launch. The
only booster to crew communication would be notification of which target
(if any) was achievable, and if there was an immediate safety hazard.
M..z'
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Figm'e 1.2-1 Booster to Spacecraft Interfaces
f Emergency Detection System
.., A. Monitor critical systems for out-of-limits conditions or failures
B. Make decisions for any corrective actions required and issue
corrective action commands as required
- to protect crew safety
- to accomplish primary mission
C. If decision reached that primary mission cannot be met
- maintain vehicle within crew safetylimits
- select alternate mission and issue required commands
- notify crew of decision reached
If decision reached that alternate missions cannot be met
- maintain vehicle within crew safetylimits
- notify crew of decision reached
If decision reached that crew safety cannot be maintained
- notify crew of decision reached
- Issue automatic crew escape commands
= crew input capability (manual override)
-, D.
•.., E.
J
The objective of the EDS is to detect malfunctions and provide
commands to maintain the maximum mission completion capability
while always maintaining the vehicle within crew safety limits
Figure 1.2-2 Booster Emergency Detection System Functions
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Aerodynamic Launch Loads
Aerodynamic analysis of several manned spacecraft concepts found that
such winged or lifting body payloads will cause significantly higher
bending moments in the launch vehicle structure. A detailed stress
analysis of the NLS-2 booster was performed to determine the impact of
these higher loads for both on-pad and in-flight loads conditions. The
analysis indicated that a structural beef-up will be required in certain
sections, adding 4,000 lbs to the launch vehicle weight. Structural beef-up
of the Titan IV and the Ariane V launch vehicles would also be expected to
perform the PLS launch mission. The analysis also indicated that these
winged payloads are not expected to exceed booster aerodynamic control
capabilities during either liftoff or maximum dynamic pressure conditions.
Max
Q
(psf)
NLS PLS CLV
728 705 777
E-HLLV
656
 en°,n0Moment (_ EDGEWISEBROADSIDE
(ft-lb x 10"6)
Figure 1.2-3 Aerodynamic Loads of some Manned Payloads
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Figure 1.2-4 Booster Stresses at Max Q
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1.2.1.2 Comparison of Manned Booster Concepts
A number of existing and planned launch vehicles were analyzed to
determine their suitability for launching either the PLS or the CLV manned
payload concepts. The boosters were analyzed from a performance, cost,
reliability, and launch processing perspective. The significant findings
from these analyses are summarized below.
Performance Analyses
The NLS-2 1.5 Stage launch vehicle was found to be over-sized for launch
of the PLS spacecraft and undersized for the CLV concept. The addition of
approximately 15,000 to 20,000 pounds of mission equipment could be
added to the PLS mission manifest to provide a better payload match for
the NLS-2 booster. Use of the NLS booster to launch the CLV concept will
require a two-stage version of the NLS-2 launch vehicle. Resizing of the
ET-core based flu'st stage and/or the STME thrust level is recommended to
reduce high acceleration levels experienced in first stage flight of these
configurations. A booster based on a Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) concept
utilizing a single F-1A engine in the first stage and a single J-2S engine for
the second stage is a slightly better performance match for the PLS
payload than the current NLS-2 booster configurations.
Launch of the PLS on existing expendable launch vehicles such as the Titan
IV and the new Ariane V were found to generate high dynamic pressures.
The effects of the PLS wings, as well as the implications of satisfying
NASA's man-rating requirements, wiU have considerable design impacts on
these boosters. Launch of the PLS on either of these boosters is not
recommended.
_...J
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NLS-2
1.5 STAGE (6/2) j
Payload Options
Booster Descrlptlon
f a_ster
Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2
Engines STME (4) STME (2)
Thrust (Ibf) 650 K 650 K
Isp (sec) 428.5 428.5
Englne out capab. Yes Yes
GLOW (Ib) 78,312 1,877,641
Dry Weight (Ib) 70,700 127,550
Length (ft) 34 179
Diameter (ft) 27.5 27.5
J
Figure 1.2-5 NLS-2 1.5 Stage (6/2) Description
Booster Maximum Performance (to 15 x 220 nmi.)
Maximum Dynamic Pressure (psf) 731.75
Maximum ACceleration (g's) 4.00
Booster Separation:
Time (sec) 161.50
Altitude (ll) 245903
Relative Velocity (fpa) 9031.30
MECO:
Time (sec) " 338.29
Weight _bs) - 219,055
_-xcesa v'ropellant (Ibs) 10,477
Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs) [62_
m
Annual Flight Rate = 10
Launch Cost = $100 M
Booster Payloads to SSF Orbit
• Maximum payload to SSF transfer
orbit satisfies engine-out at liftolf
requirement (*except the CLV payload)
PLS.Caboo_ CLV* S_PLS PL,S 1
73,173 75,680 73,018 72,621
53,800 75,677 53,954 33,800
19,373 3 19,064 38,821
MECO Weight (Ibs)
Gross Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)
Margin (Ibs)
Figure 1.2-6 NLS-2 1.5 Stage (6/2) Performance
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I Scaled HL-20 ]1
• Resized HL-20 to carry
- 2 less passengers
- plus 4 SSF racks
• Launch wt. = 53,954 lbs
1.5 Stage NLS /
• 6 STME ET core
• 4 STMEs staged
• 10' slretched ET
I Two Stage NLS t
• 4 STME ET core
• 1 J-2S upper stage
• standard ET
Crew Logistics
Vehicle (CLV)
• Modified STS Orbiter
- 10 crew/passengers
- 15,000 Ibs payload
(pressurized)
• Launch wt. = 53,954 Ibs
I Two Stage NLS |
• 2 F-1 LOX/RP core
• 1 J-2S upper stage
• 21 ft diameter
Figure 1.2-7 Booster Options for PLS & CLV
Scaled HL-20
Recommend 1.5 Stage NLS booster
- Performance margin is good
- Loads issues can be accomodated
- Booster control authority is adequate
2 Stage NLS boosters have excessive performance
capacity
CLV
Recommend 2 Stage NLS (STME) booster
Significant performance margin
Loads issues can be accomodated
. Booster control authority is adequate
F-1 based NLS booster is acceptable alternative
1.5 Stage NLS booster has no performance
margin
Figure 1.2-8 Recommended Boosters for HL-42 & CLV
1-20
Gross Liftolf Weight (Ib)
1st stage propellant
2nd stage propellant
excess propellant
Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ib)
Thrust-to-Weight (g)
Pre-staging
Post-staglng
Insertion
Maximum
Max Dynamic Pressure (psf)
Engine throttle - 1st stage
- 2nd stage
1.5 Stage NLS
6 STME
2,009,907
1,788,657
2 Stage NLS
4 STME/1 J-2S 2 F°I/1 J-2S
1,776,716 2,933,622
1,310,119 2,387,695
N/A
19,356
53,954
4.00
1.86
2.07
4.00
795
4 @ 70%
2@70°,1off
219,084 288,366
49,031 56,545
53,954 53,954
3.90
0.88
2.02
4.00
554 677
4 @ 70% 2 @ 75%, 1 olf
ROBe none
2.78
0.71
1.87
4.00
Figure 1.2-9 Booster Performances for HL-42
Conditions at:
Liftoff
alpha (°)
gimbal reqd. (°)
CM (Kft-lb)
margin (°)
Max Q
alpha (°)
glmbal reqd. (°)
CM (Kft-lb)
margin (°)
Notes
1.5 Stage NLS 2 Stage NLS
6 STME 4 STMF_/1J-2S 2 F-l/1 J-2S
9O
-0.1
-161
3.9
6.6
3.0
210
1.0
90 90
_.2 0.04
-410 290
3.8 3.9
5.4 4.7
0.6 1.0
-7,459 18,450
3.4 3.0
Available engine gimbal control assumed = 4°
CM = Control moment required at 6° alpha for computed C.G.
Gimbal requirements Include effects of throttled engines
Figure 1.2-10 Booster ControUability with HL-42
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Gross Liftolf Weight (Ib)
1st stage propellant
2nd stage propellant
excess propellant
Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ib)
Thrust-to-Weight (g)
Pre-staging
Post-staging
Insertion
Maximum
Max Dynamic Pressure (psf)
Engine throttle - 1st stage
- 2nd stage
1.5 Stage NLS
6 STME
2,031,630
1,788,657
2 Stage NLS
4 STME/1 J-2S 2 F-l/1 J-2S
1,798,815 2,956,650
1,309,968 2,387,695
N/A
0
75,677
4.00
1.86
2.05
4.00
85O
4 @ 70%
2 @70%,1off
219,589 288,544
30,334 36,479
75,677 75,677
3.72
0.82
1.97
4,00
536 659
4 @ 70% 2 @ 75%,1 olf
none none
2.67
0.67
1.83
4.00
Conditions at:
Liftoff
alpha (°)
gimbal reqd. (°)
CM (Kft-lb)
margin (o)
Max Q
alpha (°)
gimbal reqd. (o)
CM (Kft-lb)
margin (_)
Figure 1.2-11 Booster Performance for CLV
1.5 Stage NLS
6 STME
9O
0.4
2,100
3.6
5.9
2.5
84O
1.5
Note_
Available engine gimbal control assumed = 4°
CM = Control moment required at 6° alpha for computed C.G.
Gimbal requirements include effects of throttled engines
2 Stage NLS I
4 STMF_J 1 J-2S 2 F-l/1 J-2S
90 90
0.1 0.3
560 970
3.9 3.7
5.5 4.8
0.6 0.9
-8,006 16,880
3.4 3.1
Figure 1.2-12 Booster Controllability with CLV
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Cost Analyses
Analysis of the recurring launch cost of a PLS/expendable launch vehicle
booster system found that it will at best match the current Space Shuttle
variable launch cost. The keys to achieving a cost effective PLS/ELV
system will be the availability of a very low cost, man-rated booster, and
the ability to eliminate the large fixed costs (standing army) currently
absorbed by the Space Shuttle program. The Russian (C.I.S.) launch
vehicles currently being offered for launch were analyzed and are believed
to be offered at prices well below their true cost. As free market forces
bring the C.I.S. economies into equilibrium with the rest of the world's
launch businesses, the prices for launch vehicles such as the Zenit and
Proton will approach the prices for similar boosters from American and
European launchers. It is estimated, however, that the C.I.S. launch prices
will stabilize at the 1-sigma lower band limit of Western launch prices as
there will be insufficient market forces to drive them above that point.
The Soyuz booster is projected to stabilize at a 2-sigma lower band limit of
Western launch prices because of its significant rate and learning curve
advantages over any other launch vehicle system.
Manned Module CPF SM
Integrated Operations
additional CPF
hardware & operations
Manned Spaceflight Awareness
mission control
Launch Veh_e CPF SM
NOT MAN.P, A TED
$M / crew 15.6
$M / KIb cargo ...
25
8 crew
OK_
4 crew
4 KIb
32.5
32.5
m
25
BIIIIII
15K1
,g
?
?
15.1
8.3
30
._, 8crew
?
?
?
?
15.6
15.6
Figure 1.2-13 Launch Cost Comparisons for Selected Manned Payloads
1-23
o.
8
3
J;
Figure 5. Competition Ensures That CIS Costs (& Prices ?) Will Climb Toward Market Levels
9-;:"..o i .... !
0_ @
[]...........::::::::::::::::::::®G
..- rate aOv_ntage
so'_
@
I I i I
competitionfor facto_ wiMlead to "margbal cosl +"prk:ing
... labor wages, "brain drain"
... rawmatotial$, free rnatketsworld-wide
... {ac_/fes& equ/pment, po#_e.a/r/sksto cap/tar
I I I I I
Figure 1.2-14 Estimation of True Russian Booster Launch Costs
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Reliability Analyses
Reliability analysis of the PLS on a NLS-2 booster found that this particular
combination should prove to be an exceptionally reliable and safe launch
system. A highly reliable STME, a single engine out capability in the NLS,
and the PLS-provided escape system all combined to provide high mission
success rates and improved crew safety. A booster's engine out capability
was found to be less a factor in comparing manned booster concepts
reliability than is individual engine reliability, engine burn times, and
number of stages employed by the boosters. Comparisons of crew safety
levels on several manned booster concepts was most strongly governed by
the crew escape system (escape motors), which is provided by the PLS
system for the booster concepts studied.
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Reliability assessment of the NLS 1.5 Stage vehicle's Propulsion
system reveals potential for exceptional reliability
Feasible levels of reliability based on "real" engine operational
failure histories
NLS PROPULSION SYSTEM RELIABILITY
4 BOOSTERS & 2 SUSTAINERS
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Figure 1.2-15 NLS-2 Propulsion System Reliability
.....--
1-25
LAUNCH RELIABILITY VERSUS STME MTBCF
0.990
0.980
0.970
"1
- 0.960
I.,U
"I"
u 0.950 "_
Z
5
0.940 "
0.930
20000
! I"i i
I
I
!
I
!
i
j-
r:
i ]
1 i
I I
I I
I
i I
! i
30000
I
I
I
i
m _
_J|
ii
J
I1! I
40000
iL
J
i .....
i
I
50000
STME MTBCF(SECONDS)
NLS-2
NLS (4 ENGINE)
NLS-3
Figure 1.2-16 NLS-2 Launch Reliability vs. STME Reliability
Reliability was estimated on MTBCF basis
Key parameter is assumed MTBCF for STME (24,650 sec)
System En.gine Run Time Failures MTBCF
Atlas boosters 60,758 7 8,679
sustainer 55,594 8 6,949
Delta sustainer 35,095 3 11,698
Shuttle SSME 66,240 1 66,240
Calculation:
- booster engines (3 @ 195 sec.)
- sustainer engine (1 @ 455 sec.)
- avionics
- other (tanks, mech...)
Reliability
.9765
.9817
.9999
.9886
[ Total System .9478 ]
Figure 1.2-17 NLS-2 and other Booster Engine Reliabilities
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Launch Processing Analyses
Launch processing analyses of the combined PLS/NLS launch system were
performed with software simulation programs. The simulations revealed
that the combined effects of these two systems utilizing NASA KSC facilities
can achieve the desired 10 flights per year launch rate with planned NLS
and PLS program assets. Operation of mixed launch vehicle fleets (such as
PLS/NLS and Space Shuttle) at KSC is considered achievable because of the
low utilization rates of key facilities by concepts such as NLS. The mobile
launch tower was consistently found to be the limiting resource of launch
vehicle flight rate capability for all of the booster concepts analyzed.
Analysis of the Space Shuttle system found that it has demonstrated a
launch processing learning rate curve of 79% in the post-Challenger era.
this learning curve effect should be included in ground processing analyses
and flight rate planning of future launch systems.
DESERVICE & SAFING
K_ CORE ASSEMBLY
._. FACILITY (CCAF,S)
VAB
Figure 1.2-18 NLS-2 Launch Processing Diagram
\
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Throu_ohput Capacity:
Launch System Design Max
Target (Derated to 80%)
6-Month Surge Capability
13.4 flights/year
10.7 flights/year
7 flights
Facility/Resource Capability:
Name HPF VAB-4 CA/PF MLT
Location KSC KSC CCAFS KSC
Status New Modified New New
i Design Max Utilization 23% 37% 22% 100%
Pad
KSC
Modified
31% I
Throughput Capacity:
• Planning @ 80% (flows/yr) 46.8 28.6 48.4 10.7
• Max @ 100% (flows/year) 58.5 35.8 60.6 13.4
34.3
42.8
• MLT is the constraining resource
• Low utilization of KSC facilities
Figure 1.2-19 NLS-2 Launch Facility Utilization
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1.2.2 Car_o Transfer & Return Vehicle Studies
w
The Cargo Transfer and Return Vehicle Concept, referred to as the CTRV, is
a system for performing the mission of cargo delivery and return to low
Earth orbit (LEO). As originally envisioned, this system would operate in
conjunction with a crew delivery/return system (such as the PLS). The
CTRV concept, together with a PLS concept and an appropriate launch
vehicle(s), form the architectural framework of the Access to Space, Option
2 study. Identifying the specific configurations of the CTRV, PLS, and
launch vehicles which best satisfied the Access to Space mission
requirements was the principle objective of the study.
Design and analysis activities identified several CTRV configurations in
response to key design issues for these systems. The PLS Caboose concept,
and several larger CTRV concepts were developed. These concepts started
with the Medium CTRV and Integral CTRV concepts (originally conceived of
by MSFC and General Dynamics), and evolved into several versions of a
Winged CTRV configuration. Payload volume and mass requirements
associated with the Space Station logistics elements (which were designed
for the Space Shuttle payload bay) placed the greatest constraint on the
overall CTRV configurations. Aerodynamic stability and heating
constraints during re-entry imposed design constraints which led to large
aerodynamic control surfaces and limited the options for internal payload
bay and subsystems layouts due to CG limits.
1.2.2.1 PIS Caboose Concept
The excess lift capability of the NLS-2 launch vehicle for the PLS payload
led to an examination of synergistic systems which could utilize this
additional lift capacity with the PLS system. The concept of a PLS Caboose
(a mini-CTRV which operates attached to the PLS until SSF docking)
evolved from this effort.
It was found that a cargo payload of 8,000 pounds (eight equivalent Space
Station standard racks) could be delivered with each PLS mission to Space
Station by utilizing the PLS caboose concept. Most of the mass of the PLS-
to-booster adapter was converted to useful payload by integrating the
adapter into the caboose structure. The PLS escape motors were also
converted into useful payload mass by utilizing them for the orbital
transfer maneuvers of the combined PLS/caboose mass. Use of this
caboose concept with each PLS launch would reduce the number of annual
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launches required to deliver pressurized payloads to Space Station by one
per year compared to separate CTRV and PLS launches.
A hot structure thermal protection system (TPS) approach was used on the
caboose concept. This approach resulted in a TPS/structure combined
weight which was 1.36 times the weight of an equivalent (conventional)
tile/aluminum cold structure approach. The projected cost savings of this
approach, however, was dramatic. The hot structure TPS fabrication and
installation cost is estimated to be $40/ft 2, significantly lower than the
$16,000/ft2 for tile installation costs currently being experienced on the
Space Shuttle. The combination of limited cross range and a low cost
thermal protection system make this design approach a particularly good
solution for water landing type systems.
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Figure 1.2-20 PLS/Caboose/NLS-2 Launch Configuration
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JFigure 1.2-21 PIS Caboose StressesDuring Re-entry
1-31
1.2.2.2 Medium CTRV Concept
A detailed design study of the Medium CTRV concept was performed to
obtain a better understanding of the CTRV design requirements and to
improve the design definition for this concept. The design effort included
trajectory analysis, thermal analysis, detailed structural design layouts and
stress analysis, and parametric analysis of the CTRV landing system
options (parachutes). Key results and findings from these analyses are
provided below.
Structural Design and Analysis
Detailed structural design of the Medium CTRV was performed to obtain
better weight estimates of this concept and to also determine dynamic
responses of this structure approach to flight loading conditions. Structural
design layout drawings were first prepared of the Medium CTRV (C23LNF
configuration) to better define the structural design. Analysis of load
paths to carry flight loads through the structure resulted in some changes
to the baseline structural concepts and in more detailed structural
definition. Computer (CAD) drawings of the design and layout were
utilized for the revised structural definition and stress analysis models
were developed from the CAD drawings for use in the structural analysis.
A finite element model of the Medium CTRV structure design was
completed which includes all structural elements and major subsystems.
The model was used to determine stress levels for several flight load
conditions: maximum acceleration (3.2 g's at MECO); maximum structural
bending loads (aerodynamic loads at max Q); and landing loads (29 ft/sec
vertical landing velocity). The analyses generally showed that the skin,
frame, and longeron thicknesses can be reduced. The bulkhead structures
at the forward and aft ends of the payload bay were found to require some
stiffening for the high axial acceleration launch conditions (MECO & max Q).
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Figure 1.2-22 Medium CTRV Structure Design & Stress Analysis
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Thermal Analysis and TPS Sizing
The TPS sizing analysis indicated that the required TPS thicknesses are
actuaUy slightly thinner than would be seen on a Shuttle for equivalent re-
entry heat loads. The reason for the thinner tiles is the lower initial
temperatures found on the CTRV structure and tiles. The Shuttle tiles
were sized for a mission which required re-entry immediately after
launch. The CTRV has no similar mission (or any equivalent abort
missions) and temperatures are allowed to stabilize to orbital conditions
prior to entry. Initial temperatures for the tiles and underlying structure
were calculated for on-orbit solar heating conditions and allowed a 12 hour
thermal conditioning period to lower the temperatures prior to entry.
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Figure 1.2-23 CTRV TPS Tile Sizing Analysis
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Landing System Design
Landing system designs were based on a design approach which called for
a supersonic deployment (Mach 1.4) of a drogue chute and parachute
deployment loads under 4 g's. Trade studies of parachute sizing and
deployment options, system cost and weight impacts, and parachute
deployment loads were performed to determine an appropriate landing
system design for the CTRV. The parachute system selected for the CTRV
is an eight chute cluster of 137 foot parachutes. This main chute system
results in a terminal descent rate of 28 ft/sec velocity. The total weight
for the CTRV parachute system is estimated at 5,865 lbs, requiring a
stowage volume of 140 cubic feet.
250
200
150
3.00
5O
0
Estimated flight
parameters for
key events
(Klb)
.... _5'0 ....... @, '
mape,d _ (,_)
Event Time All VII Math q Chute Accel
{ram) (ft-MSL) (fl_) No. (psf) Lc_d(Ib) (G)
Drogue Pilot Modar Fire 0.0 878"/2 1376 1.4 55.1 0 1.0
Drogue tM Peak L(md 2.3 84714 1356 1.38 61.9 80291 2.18
Oroguo Dllmef 5.S _ 1281 1.29 85.6 57367 134
Orogue 2nd Peak Load 8.3 79534 1223 1.25 04.8 131890 2,91
Drogue Retueueand 144.0 16000 2M 0.3S SI.S 73010 1.0
Main PUo! Morlar Fire
Main lid Peak Load 147.0 14831 254 0.34 48.4 234580 3.10
Main Oisnml 152.0 14183 122 0,11 11.6 88585 1.3
Mldn 2rid Peak Loed 152.4 140N NI 0.09 7.48 207505 2.77
Steady Descent 160.0 13800 33 0.03 0.83 74N3 1.0
Touchdown _ 0 27 0.0_ 0.83 74945 1`9
o
14_a :lml P_k L._41
• Refined information required
for subsequent iterations:
• Cd profile of CTRV
(Su per,Trans,Sub-sonic)
• Angle of attack profile for CTRV
under the influence of inflated drogue
chute
Pioneer Aerospace Corporation
Figure 1.2-24 CTRV Parachute Landing System Performance
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Figure 1.2-25 CTRV Parachute Weight Estimates
Launch Processing Analyses
Analysis of the CTRV ground (launch) operations was completed with a
simulation of the combined Medium CTRV, PIS, and their launch vehicle
(NLS-2 type) systems launched over a ten year period. The CTRV systems
were modeled at the subsystem level to identify the payload integration
differences between the Medium and the Integral CTRV concepts. The
analysis demonstrated that the planned flight rates for PLS/CTRV to
support Space Station Freedom logistics missions can be achieved when
using the subsystems processing times as projected by the PIS program.
The STARSIM analysis also demonstrated that at the anticipated mission
reliability levels for this CTRV, a 90% Probability Of Sufficiency (POS)
spares level will be satisfactory for this system. This translates into a
mean ground processing delay period of just over five days.
M_Y
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1.2.2.3 Integral CTRV Concept
The Integral CTRV concept was developed to reduce the packaging
overhead of Space Station logistics cargo payloads. Rather than load the
logistics payloads into a pressurized module which is then loaded into the
unpressurized payload volume of the CTRV, the Integral CTRV payload bay
itself is pressurized and the payloads can be installed directly into the
CTRV. The Integral CTRV thus directly replaces the Space Station
Pressurized Logistics Module and remains at the Space Station for several
months duration before returning to Earth. Space Station unpressurized
logistics payloads are similarly delivered in an unpressurized version of
the Integral CTRV. The Integral CTRV is a ballistic type re-entry vehicle
(parachute landing) but the aft payload bay location requires large fins for
aerodynamic stability during re-entry. The fins also served as CTRV
orbital propulsion subsystem pods, leaving a clear opening for the end-
opening payload bay door. Analysis of the Integral CTRV concept included
trajectory analysis, aerodynamics and thermal analysis, preliminary
structural design in the area of payload retention and deployment, and
parametric analysis of the CTRV landing system options (parachutes).
Figure 1.2-26 Integral CTRV Concept
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Aerodynamic Analyses
Analysis indicated that an entirely new aerodynamic approach than that
used for the Medium CTRV concept would be required for the Integral
CTRV in order to arrive at acceptable structural weight fractions, The
aerodynamic configuration for a low cross range version Integral CTRV was
developed by performing a sensitivity study of lift (CI) and drag (Cd)
coefficients from a general ballistic re-entry CTRV configuration, POST
computer simulations were used to optimize re-entry trajectory
performance, The resulting preferred configuration was a basic cylindrical
mid fuselage, a forward fuselage consisting of a 20" cone with 5 foot radius
sphere nose, and a 20" flared skirt at the aft fuselage, A pair of large fins
(not wings) were added to the cylinder/skirt to move the aerodynamic
center of pressure aft for hypersonic flight stability and CG considerations,
Trajectory Analyses
Trajectory analyses with the selected Integral CTRV configuration showed
that it could be flown to a maximum cross range of 70 Nmi without
violating structural and thermal loads constraints. The trajectories were
flown at a 7.5" to 15" angle of attack to minimize heat load to the TPS
system. Because the vehicle is not flown at a high angle of attack (40" or
higher like the Medium CTRV), there is not a large surface area which
requires TPS tiles (a design goal). The majority of the outer surfaces could
be covered by TPS blankets, rather than tiles.
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Figure 1.2-2 7 CTRV Aerodynamic Configuration Optimization
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Thermal Analysis and TPS Sizing
The TPS sizing was based on flying a low angle of attack (7.5 °) trajectory,
as demonstrated in POST trajectory analyses of the selected configuration.
These trajectories resulted in low heating rates to most of the surfaces and
much lower total heat loads than as seen in the Medium CTRV trajectories.
The total heat load for the Integral CTRV trajectory is less than 20,000
BTU/ft 2, compared to 50,384 BTU/ft 2 for the Medium CTRV (C23LNF). The
thermal protection system (TPS) concept for the Integral CTRV was
modified to avoid the problem of bonding TPS tiles to a pressure vessel
(severe technical design issues related to tile gaps and on-orbit/re-entry
structural temperature limits would be encountered). A debris shield will
be used as an intermediate structural shell for attaching the tiles.
Significant operational efficiencies may also be realized by this
configuration as the tiles can be installed or maintained off the vehicle by
removing the debris shield panels.
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Reliability Analyses
A reliability analysis was performed using the MAtrix model for the
Integral CTRV configuration to determine reliability levels and
maintenance requirements down to the subsystem and major components
level. With the Integral CTRV's long mission duration of 4320 hours (6
months), the analysis revealed a reliability of .969 and 25 unscheduled
maintenance actions per mission. This low predicted reliability is due to
the long operating period for the on-orbit needed systems during the 6-
month mission. It is expected that better definition of actual component
redundancies would improve the predicted reliability for the Integral
CTRV concept.
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Launch Processing Analyses
Launch processing analysis of the Integral CTRV was performed similar to
the Medium CTRV analysis. The CTRV was modeled at the subsystem level
to permit expendable vs. reusable evaluations to be made at the total CTRV
system level or at the individual subsystems level (such as propulsion,
avionics, TPS/heat shield). Payload integration activities and propulsion
systems were different from the Medium CTRV analysis. Integral CTRV
propulsion system processing was performed off the vehicle and payload
integration was performed on the vehicle, just the opposite from the
Medium CTRV concept.
The Integral CTRV concept must fly up to 11 flights per year (versus 4 to 6
flights per year for the Med. CTRV). The launch processing simulation
demonstrated that this higher flight rate can be achieved with the planned
facilities and resources. A much higher manpower consumption is caused
by the high flight rates, however. The Integral CTRV concept used almost
twice as many hours of touch labor (direct "technician-hours") to
accomplish the same SSF logistics supply mission as the Medium CTRV
concept.
Of particular importance for the Integral CTRV processing analysis is the
constraints imposed by the Space Station elements and payloads. The
pressurized version of the Integral CTRV would be required to utilize the
Space Station payloads processing facilities for integration of the payloads
(Space Station racks) into the Integral CTRV payload compartment. This
will require the propulsion systems for this CTRV to be either new
(unflown) or removed and processed separately from the rest of the
vehicle.
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Figure 1.2-30 Integrated Launch Processing Approach
ThrgLlahout CaPacitY:
PLS Launch
CTRV Launch Rate
Avg. Time In System
Avg. Time Between Launches
Touch Labor Estimate
4 flights/year
6 - 11 flights/year
49 days
26 days
1,178 - 1,967 k-hours/year
Facility/Resource Ca Dablllty:
Name SSPF HPF VAB Pad MLT
Servers 2 2 2 2 3
Location , KSC KSC KSC KSC KSC
Status New Existing Modified Modified Modified
(Intgrtn. (SAEF-2 (MLP)
Cells) or PHSF)
Utilization 2% 8% 19% 36% 86%
J• MLT is the constraining resource ]
Figure 1.2-31 Integral CTRV Launch Facilities Utilization
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CTRV Implications for Space Station
An assessment of the impacts that a CTRV system would have on the Space
Station interfaces, and its flight or ground operations, was performed for
both the Medium CTRV and the Integral CTRV concepts. The most
significant differences noted between the current Space Shuttle based
logistics system and a CTRV based system are listed below.
Space Station Flight Operations
The CTRV concept provides limited capability for delivery/return of large
Space Station ORUs, severely restricting payload return mass and volume.
The Space Station logistics mission will require a greater number of
rendezvous and docking operations because of the smaller payload
capabilities of some CTRV concepts, increasing SSF crew activity and
training to support these functions (especially with no crew aboard the
incoming element). The un-pressurized integral CTRV configuration will
also provide much reduced visibility and access to payloads in its cargo
bay, limiting flexibility in payload deployment and transfer operations.
Space Station Ground Operations
Integration of Space Station logistics racks into the pressurized Integral
CTRV payload bay will require payload installation to be performed in the
Space Station Payload Processing Facility (as does the PLM). This will
necessarily demand that some Integral CTRV post-flight turnaround and
maintenance operations will also have to be performed in this facility.
Integral CTRV concepts also provide no capability for late access (on the
launch pad) to install special handling (refrigerated or live) payloads.
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1.2.2.4 Winged CTRV Concept
As the analysis of Integral CTRV and Medium CTRV concepts progressed, it
became apparent that the operating costs of these systems would not meet
the goals of the NASA Access to Space study. A precision (runway) landing
version of the CTRV concept was recognized as a key requirement for
minimizing operations costs. This requirement led to the Winged CTRV
concepts, which started with small payload capabilities (22,000 lbs),
evolved to larger payload versions, and eventually to combined
crew/cargo concepts. The Winged CTRV, the CLV, and the HL-42 concepts
all became competitors for the crew/cargo element of a launch system
architecture based on expendable launch vehicles. The definition of the
Winged CTRV concept evolved as the NASA Access to Space study (Option
2) continued to refine the design requirements. The Winged CTRV concept
evolved from the (original) small Winged CTRV, to a larger payload version
(the Medium Winged CTRV), and finally to a combined crew/cargo version
similar in function to the HL-42 but with a larger payload volume and
weight capability (the Single Development Winged CTRV).
Figure 1.2-52 Winged CTRV Concept
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Figure 1.2-34 CTRV Functional Requirements Flowdown
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Aerodynamics Analyses
Modifying the Integral CTRV into a runway landing system required
sufficient low speed lift to counter the high drag caused by the wide and
short fuselage. The Winged CTRV aerodynamic design was achieved by
adding just enough wing area and stretching the fuselage just enough to
reach the desired subsonic L/D ratio of 4.0. The aerodynamic
characteristics of this configuration were calculated with the APAS analysis
tool at both hypersonic and sub-sonic speeds. Trade studies of the
configuration found the pitch stability to be very good, and the wing
loading was found to be low compared to the current Space Shuttle design.
Analysis of the aerodynamic loads caused by the Winged CTRV (and by the
other competing concepts) on the launch vehicle was also performed. The
analysis evaluated the booster bending moments and static stability
margins at maximum aerodynamic pressure (max Q) conditions (an NLS-2
booster was used for the launch trajectory conditions). The analysis
showed that Winged CTRV concepts produced only low aerodynamic
moments because of their relatively low-lift wings and a low normal force
coefficient at the 5 ° angle of attack condition at max Q_ The Winged CTRV
wings were designed expressly to minimize the booster's max Q loads. The
HL-42 concept produced only moderate launch vehicle bending moments
at max Q, but the CLV concept imposed very high launch vehicle bending
moments with associated large booster engine gimbal offsets.
Aerodynamic stability analysis of the Winged CTRV was performed to
determine directional stability characteristics. A combination of various
winglet sizes, nose cone shapes and vertical stabilizer sizes were evaluated.
The results showed that retaining the initial winglet size and adding a
vertical stabilizer of approximately 100 square foot area would provide a
positive stability margin (Crl[5= 0.008/deg at M=0.3).
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Figure 1.2-35 Winged CTRV Hypersonic Aerodynamic Characteristics
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Figure 1.2-36 Winged CTRV Landing Characteristics
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Trajectory Analyses
Trajectory analyses were performed for all versions of the Winged CTRV
configurations and included the complete re-entry trajectory, from entry
interface (400,000 ft altitude) down to the runway threshold. Improved
re-entry trajectory simulation techniques from those used in the Medium
CTRV analyses were required to more accurately predict the heating
environment for CTRV's wings. A bank angle steering guidance mode was
added to the CTRV's 3-DOF trajectory simulation. This permitted both
angle of attack and bank angle profiles to be optimized by POST for a
minimum heat rate trajectory. Maximum heating rates for the wing
leading edges were reduced by a factor of almost two with these
trajectories. The improved trajectory analysis eliminated the need for a
re-design of the CTRV wing based on heating rates.
An analysis of the impact footprint for an uncontrolled CTRV re-entry was
also performed to deterrrdne just how large an area of populated land mass
might a re-entry vehicle such as the CTRV pose a danger to if system
failures occurred during the entry phase of flight. This analysis showed
that the potential debris impact footprint included most of the United
States (from Hawaii to San Francisco, Chicago, Washington DC., and Florida)
and the entire upper half of Mexico. This result indicates that a CTRV
concept must have sufficient redundancy in flight critical systems to
ensure that the vehicle can be guided to a controlled impact area in the
event that primary or secondary landing sites cannot be reached due to
system failures.
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Aeroheating Analysis and TPS sizing
Sizing of the Winged CTRV thermal protection system (TPS) was calculated
from heating rate distributions over the vehicle based on flying a
moderate angle of attack (25 °) trajectory, as demonstrated in POST
trajectory analyses. The CTRV thermal protection system (TPS) weight was
determined from TPS tile thicknesses as sized from the calculated heating
rates.
A shock layout (position vs. mach number) for the Winged CTRV
configuration showed that the bow shock wave would not reach the wing's
vertical stabilizers (tip f'ms) until after maximum dynamic pressure (Mach
S.0). The shock position during maximum heating was well inboard of
these surfaces.
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Figure 1.2-40 CTRV Wing Leading Edge Heating Rates
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Subsystems Design
Achieving commonality of the Winged CTRV's Orbital Maneuvering System
(OMS) and Attitude Control System (ACS) with the PLS represented a
significant design trade study between the CTRV's hypergolic propellants
and alternative propellants such as the hydrogen peroxide/RP-I
propellants of the PLS, An assessment of the launch processing impacts
resulting from hypergolic propellant systems servicing based on actual
Shutde processing of OMS and RCS systems revealed that hypergolic
systems processing typically resulted in six shifts of serial, hazardous
operations (Actual servicing of the Shuttle hypergolic system components
is performed off-line in a controlled facility removed from the main
system processing),
Impacts to KSC operations of the proposed hydrogen peroxide system were
identified based on the special characteristics of H202. It was found that
there are currently no production facilities in the United States or Europe
for propellant grade H202 and there are no storage facilities at KSC or
CCAFS for any quantities of this propellant.
• MONOMETHYLHYDRAZINE(MMH)
- CAUSTIC, LOCALLYDAMAGING TOXIC AGENT &
HIGHLY FLAMMABLE .
- PROVEN WELL UNDERSTOOD SAFETY
PROCEDURES IN PLACE
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DRIVES "CLEAR" AREA
- EVACUATE OPF BAY ( 100 - 200 PEOPLE)
- UP TO 1/2 SHIFT CLEAN-UP,"SCAPE" CREW
• OPP: MAJOR SPILL (> 1/2 CUP)
- EVACUATE OPF BAY 1 &2 ( 200 - 400 PEOPLE)
- EVACUATE ANNEX OFRCES (- 100 PEOPLE)
- UP TO 2 SHIFT C.I._=AN-UP'SCAPE" CREW
• N204 REQUIRES SAME PROCURES,
DIFFERENT SPILL KIT
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- STRONG IRRITANT
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SMALLER AREA? FEWER PEOPLE?
- WATER DELUGE CLEAN-UP
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BREATHING APPARATUS
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NOT IN PLACE
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SCAPE" SELF CONTAINED ATMOSPHERIC PROTECTIVE ENSEMBLE
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Figure 1.2-41 Hypergolic vs. Hydrogen Peroxide Propellant Trade Study
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Reliability and Maintainability Analyses
Reliability and maintainability analyses of the Winged CTRV concept were
performed to reflect the subsystem design changes (including the addition
of the CTRV's wings and aerodynamic control surfaces). The effect of these
relatively more complex subsystems of the Winged CTRV (than the
Medium CTRV concept) had a strong effect on the launch operations
simulations. The increase in subsystems complexity resulted in an
increase of predicted in-flight failures from 2.1 to 6.5. This produced a
logistics delay factor of 21 times the Mean-Time-to-Repair (MTTR), a
significant increase from the 8X factor associated with the earlier Medium
CTRV reliability estimates. It was further found that a spares level of 95%
would be required to meet the CTRV and PLS launch rates (rather than the
90% level required for the Medium CTRV).
Analysis of uncertainty in the predicted Winged CTRV and PLS subsystems
turnaround processing times was also examined with the STARSIM model.
The CTRV and the PLS subsystems were analyzed using both PLS-
predicted fast processing timelines and using current Shuttle subsystems
processing timelines. The desired flight rates were found to be still be
achievable even with the Shuttle processing times. The effect of the longer
subsystems processing timelines was not as significant as the effect of
longer maintenance delays for spares! This demonstrated that the CTRV
(and the PLS) reliability and maintainability parameters are at least as
important as the launch processing times.
Comparison of manpower expenditures for both the fast (PLS-predicted)
and Shuttle processing times showed only minor differences. A manpower
consumption of 1.60 million man-hours per year required to process the
9.5 flights/year with the PLS timelines increased only to 1.69 million
man-hours for the Shuttle timelines. This small difference is due to the
low average utilization rates of several key facilities when the faster
processing times are simulated. This demonstrates an important
observation about launch processing costs: reducing launch processing
timelines does not directly reduce launch processing costs. A better means
of reducing direct (and even indirect) labor costs is to reduce the number
of processing facilities required (e.g. high utilization of fewer facilities).
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WINGED CTRV SPACECRAFT
SOURCE: WCTRV WEIGHT STATEMENT OF 614/93
ATrmJDE REACTION CONTROL & OMS
.(_ UNIT WT(Ibs)
I
TANK (MMH + NTO) 2 502.50
THRUSTER (FORWARD) 1 8 6.10
THRUSTER (AFT) 1 8 6.10
PLUMBING 1 I --80.00 -- __
THRUSTER (OMS) 1 35.00
PLUMBING_ VALVES, ETC. 1 258.00
AVIONICS " I
GUIDANCE= NAVIGATION AND CONTROL
IMU_ HEXAD 1 55.00
GN&C COMPUTER 2 10.0(
GPS RECEIVER/PROCESSOR 2 9.00
FLOODMGHT_ Frz 2 S.00
CAMERA, Fq-Z 1 78.00
CONTROLLER, GIMBAL DRIVE i 25.00
CONTROLLER= RCS 1 33.00
CONTROLLER, ACTUATOR 1 40.00
ALTIMETER 2 5.00
RF ASSEMBLY= MSBLS 2 7.00
RECEIVER/DECODER, MSBI.5 2 21.00
TRANSDUCER 9 AiR DATA 21 19.00
sE.soR,A .DATA 2! 25.001
i
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
TOTALW_; _,u, l "_ J
(Ibs) . ! (Fit Hrs) I sPARES QTYJ (pos ,- 0.9O)
........ I
!
I
1598 NO I 58 N/A
I
1005 NO I 3mQ27 NIA
110 YF.S I 176 3
11o YES ] _TS 3
80 __NO_ _9_68 NtA
35 YES 552 3
• 258 NO 300 N/A
695 NO 361 H/A
435 NO 497 NIA
55 YES 59231 1
20 YES 17=134 1
18 _ 191037 1
12 YES 999 1
78 YES 4,393 1
25 YES i 61_965 1
33 YES t 46,942 140 YES 38,723 1
10 Y".-_ i 34,267 1
14 _ t. 249479 1
42 YES j 8,159 1
38 YES 9,018 1
50 YES 6=853 1
260 NO i 1,318 N/A
• --. i
POWER AMPLIFIER, RF I 2; 6.00i 12 YES i 29,557 1
Figure 1.2-42 Winged CTRV Spares O_uanti W Recommendations
Turnaround Times
Aircraft-like
Operations
Shuttle-like
Operations
I CTRV Time in System (Work-Days)
PLS Time in System (Work-Days)
Launch Interval (Work-Days)
44.4 86.7
58.8 101.0
26.4 26.4
Manpower Requirements
Annual Touch Labor (Million Hours) 1.512 1.690
Facility Utilization
Landing Facility Utilization 0.042 0.042
HPF Utilization 0.326 0.857
VAB Utilization 0.648 0.935
Launch Pad Utilization 0.389 0.394
MLT Utilization 0.694 1.000
Crawler-Transporter Utilization 0.028 0.375
Figure 1.2-43 CTRV Launch Processing Manpower Utilization Analysis
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1.2.3 Launch Abort Studies
An important element of manned launch systems is the ability to safely
perform a launch abort in the event of a failure in a critical system
component. This launch abort capability is vital to crew safety
considerations and is also a major cost factor for un-manned but fully re-
usable launch systems in which the reusable element represents a
significant financial investment. The abort analyses performed in this
study were conducted during the NASA Access to Space Option 2 study
period and utilized launch vehicle and manned element concepts as
defined in the NASA work. These launch abort studies directly contributed
to the NASA study effort.
1.2.3.1 Abort Analysis Approach
Launch abort analyses were performed to determine the ability of four
launch vehicles to perform a mission abort during the launch portion of the
nominal mission (ascent trajectory phase). The analysis was performed for
each Option 2 booster as def'med by NASA (Boosters 2A', 2C, and 2D for the
HL-42, and Booster 2B for the CLV-P). The abort trajectory analyses were
performed with POST for both the ascent and re-entry/landing conditions
of the reusable spacecraft. No predictions of booster stage impact points
were attempted during these analyses. The launch abort modes
considered in the analysis included; Return To Launch Site (RTLS), Trans-
Atlantic Landing (TAL), Engine Out (EO), Abort To Orbit (ATO), and Abort
Once Around (AOA). For those periods of the trajectory where above
described intact abort modes are not available, the HL-42 would perform a
water landing which would permit a safe recovery of the crew or cargo.
The CLV-P would descend to a stable, low altitude/velocity condition for
the crew bail out.
k_.."
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1.2.3.2 HL-42 on Booster 2A'
The abort analyses performed using the HL-42 on Booster 2A', a 1.S-stage
booster for the Option 2 architecture, showed this configuration to be
particularly effective for manned flights. The abort analysis revealed that
100% of the launch trajectory has an intact abort mode coverage for the
HL-42 (rio water ditching required). The EO and RTLS abort mode periods
overlap, thereby providing full abort capability during the entire first
stage flight.
During second stage flight, the abort modes available are the TAL, ATO,
and EO aborts. These abort modes are available through the use of excess
core stage propellant (since there are two engines in the core stage). At no
time during the launch is the HL-42 exposed to a water landing
contingency. An EO abort capability (that is, successful completion of the
mission after suffering the loss of a single engine) exists for 31% of the
trajectory and the alternate landing site exposure (TAL) is only 30% (48%
and 26% for 28.5 ° trajectories).
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Figure 1.2-44 HL-42 Abort Coverage on Booster 2A'
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1.2.3.3 CLV-P on Booster 2B
Abort analyses were next performed for the CLV-P on Booster 2B, a 2-
stage, parallel burn booster for the Option 2 architecture. The abort
analysis revealed that a large percentage (43%) of the launch trajectory
has no abort mode coverage for the CLV-P (requiring a crew bailout over
water and loss of the vehicle and payload). During first stage flight, the
RTLS abort mode is provided only after a minimum of 20 seconds after
liftoff from the launch pad and until 200 seconds into the launch. Also
during fin-st stage flight, ff a booster engine fails late in the burn duration
(last 95 seconds), either an ATO or an EO abort option can be flown. The
ATO, EO, and RTLS abort mode periods overlap, thereby providing some
abort capability during all but the initial 20 seconds of first stage flight.
During second stage flight, the only abort mode available is the TAL abort,
available only for the last 17 seconds of flight time. The booster second
stage flight during this 198 second time period, an engine failure would
force the CLV-P to perform a water ditching (and crew bailout if manned).
The Booster 2B configuration was found to provide only limited abort
coverage for the CLV-P. During the launch, the CLV-P (and crew) is
exposed to a water ditching/bailout contingency for 43% of the trajectory.
An EO abort capability exists for 23% of the trajectory and the alternate
landing site capability (TAD is only 4% (24% and 10% for 28.5 ° inclination
trajectories), This level of abort coverage is not considered acceptable for
a new manned launch system,
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1.2.3.4 HL-42 on Booster 2C
Abort analyses were also performed for the HL-42 on Booster 2C, a 2-stage
parallel burn, hybrid booster for the Option 2 architecture. Because the
booster stages are large thrust, single engine stages (nearly 1.5 million lbs
thrust each), loss of one booster stage will require shutdown of the other
booster stage to maintain control of the launch vehicle. The abort analyses
revealed that a large percentage (66%) of the launch trajectory has no
abort mode coverage for the HL-42 (requiring a water landing/ditching).
During first stage flight, the RTLS abort mode is provided from the launch
pad until 130 seconds into the launch, at which time the vehicle is too far
downrange for the HL-42 to return to KSC. No EO abort capability exists
for flu'st stage flight, and since the ATO capability is so limited, the RTLS
abort is the only practical option available during flu'st stage flight.
During second stage flight, the only abort mode available is the TAL abort,
available only for the last 37 seconds of flight time. During this 365
second time period, an engine failure would force the HL-42 to perform a
water ditching.
The Booster 2C configuration was found to provide only limited abort
coverage for the HL-42. During the launch, the HL-42 (and crew) is
exposed to a water landing contingency for 66% of the trajectory. No EO
abort capability exists for the trajectory and the alternate landing site
capability (TAL) is only 6% (7% and 11% for 28.5" inclination trajectories).
This level of abort coverage is not considered acceptable for a new manned
launch system.
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1.2.3.5 HL-42 on Booster 2D
The abort analysis performed for HL-42 using the Booster 2D, a 2-stage
booster for the Option 2 architecture, was particularly interesting. This
booster first stage uses three Russian RD-180 engines (LOX/RP 1st stage
propellant), and the second stage uses a single J-2S engine. Because the
HL-42 configuration weight is well below the maximum payload capability
of this launch vehicle, there is considerable excess propellant in the
booster second stage (assuming the tanks are filled to capacity for the
launch). This excess propellant is valuable for abort capabilities when
recovering from first stage propulsion failures.
The abort analysis revealed that a large percentage (53%) of the launch
trajectory has no abort mode coverage (other than the water ditching) for
the HL-42. During first stage flight, the RTLS abort mode is provided from
the launch pad until 185 seconds into the launch. Also during first stage
flight, if an engine fails late in the burn duration (last 58 seconds), either
an ATO or an EO abort option can be flown. Both of these abort modes
utilize propellant margins in the second stage to make up the velocity
shortfall of the first stage failure. The ATO and RTLS abort mode periods
overlap, thereby providing some abort capability during the entire first
stage flight.
During second stage flight, the only abort modes available are the TAL and
engine out (EO) aborts. The TAL abort mode is available for the last 65
seconds of flight time and the second stage EO abort mode (a short
duration of just 8 seconds) is enabled only by use of the HL-42 abort
motors, The booster second stage flight is thus found to have no abort
coverage from its single engine start until the last 65 seconds.
Of particular concern for this launch vehicle was the impact of a failure to
start the second stage engine (generally regarded as a high risk event).
Because of the HL-42 vulnerability to this risk (a water landing), a
determined effort was made to find a means of performing a runway
recovery for the HL-42 for this condition. Specifically, a North America
Landing (NAL) abort mode was devised to protect the system from failure
of the Booster 2D second stage engine (a J-2S) to ignite. No other intact
abort modes were available to the HL-42 for this failure event (too far
downrange for RTIS, not enough downrange for TAL).
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Figure 1.2-47 Second Stage Engine Ignition Failure Effects
To achieve the NAL abort, the Booster 2B must be flown with off-loaded
second stage propellant in order to increase the staging velocity, A
propellant off-load of 116,050 Ibs in the second stage is possible, resulting
in a faster and longer first stage trajectory. Operation of the booster in this
fashion increased the staging velocity by 3,000 feet per second and thus
created enough energy at staging that the HL-42 can reach landing sites in
New England and Canada should the J-2S engine fail to start. The RTLS
capability was reduced by 29 seconds and the EO and ATO capabilities
were completely eliminated. The total exposure to water landing,
however, was reduced significantly; from 297 seconds during second stage
flight to only 55 seconds during first stage flight, The booster second stage
propellant load was found to play the deciding role in the HL-42 abort
capabilities on this launch vehicle. Excess propellant in the second stage
was the key parameter for extending the coverage of the RTLS, ATO, and
EO aborts. Removal of this excess propellant, on the other hand, was
required to protect against failure of second stage engine ignition. The
significantly reduced HL-42 exposure to water landing (from 5396 to only
1396 of the trajectory) was noted as a key factor favoring the off-loaded
propellant approach.
k,=.... J
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1.2.3.6 Launch Abort Findings
Only the 2A' booster configuration has sufficient intact abort coverage to
completely eliminate the spacecraft water landing exposure. For manned
spacecraft flights, the Booster 2A' configuration is clearly superior to the
other booster configurations analyzed.
For booster configurations 2B, 2C, and 2D, the analyses showed that a large
percentage (generally 40 to 60%) of the launch trajectory has no intact
abort mode coverage. This is caused by the single engine operation of
these designs during second stage flight. During f'trst stage flight, the RTLS
abort mode is generally provided from the launch pad until approximately
200 seconds into the launch. The ATO and EO abort mode periods usually
overlap with the RTLS abort mode, thereby providing some abort
capability during the entire first stage flight. During second stage flight
(post booster or engine staging), the only intact abort modes available are
the TAL, ATO, and EO aborts. Where there is only a single engine in the
booster's second (or core) stage, these abort modes are available only at
the very end of the trajectory.
The booster second (or core) stage was clearly found to play a crucial role
in the HL-42 and CLV-P abort capabilities on these launch vehicles.
Utilization of this stage's engine and propellant plays a significant role in
late RTLS capabilities. A second engine on these stages (available only on
the Booster 2A' configuration) provides a much needed extended intact
abort coverage.
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Mission Success
after Failure (%)
28.5 °
51.6 °
Alternate Landing
Site Exposure (%)
28.5 °
51.6 °
rWater Landing
[ Architecture 2A' I [ Architecture 2B ] [ Architecture 2C I [ Architecture 2D ]
48 24 2 7
31 23 2 0
28 10 11 12
30 4 6 49
Exposure (sec)
28.5° I 0 | 156 304
51.6° Lm_J 181 328 55
Figure 1.2-49 Summary of Launch Abort Analyses
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1.2.4 SSTO MPS Operabili _ty Studies
The principal objective of all proposed SSTO launch vehicle concepts is a
dramatic improvement in vehicle operability. Regardless of which SSTO
design concept is eventually selected for development (VTOHL or VTOVL,
LOX/LH2 or U-i-propellant, etc.), all concepts must achieve significant
reductions in ground processing timelines and the supporting workforce in
order to meet the proposed cost benefits of an SSTO program. Under the
ATSS study, a method which was flu-st used in the design of the Lockheed
L-1011 aircraft was adapted for analyzing the operability characteristics of
the reference SSTO concept as defined by NASA in their recently
completed Access to Space study, Option 3.
"
1.2.4.1 Operability Analysis Approach
The operability approach used is one in which the vehicle flight and
ground operations are analyzed by computer simulations. The simulations
include the flight operation and both scheduled & unscheduled
maintenance operations for all vehicle components. The components'
performance is determined from current (or projected) component
reliability and maintainability histories. The SSTO Main Propulsion System
(MPS) was selected for this operability analysis. The MPS is not only a
critical subsystem of any SSTO concept, but it is, historically, one of the
most difficult to process. Differences among the several SSTO concepts are
clearly reflected in their MPS designs, so this subsystem also serves as a
useful benchmark for comparing the operability of competing concepts.
The source of component reliability and maintenance data to support the
simulation models was obtained from the Space Shuttle program. The
Space Shuttle program's PRACA database was used to collect all problem
reports (PRs) on the MPS components since the Challenger accident.
Simulation models for analysis of the SSTO MPS ground processing were
developed from RocloNeU's SIMr.rix and STARSIM computer codes. The
SIM_ix model analyzes reliability, maintainability, and logistic parameters
to determine the effects of unscheduled maintenance on the planned SSTO
MPS ground processing estimates. The STARSIM model was used to
analyze the SSTO launch rate capability and launch facility
needs/urAlization based upon data provided by the SIMr.rix model. This
model operates at the system level, but accepts data at the subsystem
level (such as from SIMtrix) for calculating the total vehicle ground
turnaround timelines. The SSTO ground processing timeUnes were based
on the Access to Space Option 3 study's SSTO groundrules.
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SIMtrix
STARSIM
Monte Carlo simulation of scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance & repair activities for
specified ground processing sequences and
timelines
includes: - component MTBF, MTBM
- component MTTR
- spares POS and RTAT
- undetected failures
Probabilistic simulation of launch systems and
facility/resource utilization for specified launch rates
and launch processes
Includes: - launch vehicle subsystems
- payload integration
- facility constraints
- manpower allocations
Figure 1.2-S0 Operability Analysis Software Tools
Functional Failures:
Inspection Defects:
Component fails to perform to specified levels during
ground processing (e.g. leaks, valve fails to open, ...)
Component has been improperly installed or damaged
(e.g. scratched, dented, contaminated, misaligned, ...)
Shuttle MPS Component PRs
Funct. Defect Total
Valves 81 91 172
Lines & manifolds 39 313 352
Helium tanks 41 54 95
Regulators 47 21 68
Disconnects 44 201 245
Filters (He system) 0 0 0
Sensors (temp, press) 46 24 70
Total 298 704 1002
Figure 1.2-51 Shuttle MPS Component Maintenance Record
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1.2.4.2 MPS Operability Analysis Results
The SIMtrix model was first checked against the actual Shuttle experience
as a benchmark test. The simulation predicted Space Shuttle MPS mean
down time and a mean unscheduled maintenance manhour requirement
which correlated reasonably close with the actual Shuttle experience. The
SIMtrix model of Shuttle's MPS ground processing provides a good
representation of the current state of the art (SOA) for reusable MPS
hardware. When the scheduled ground test time for the SSTO's MPS was
reduced from 700 to the specified 40 hours, the PRs dropped to 19 per
flow. This resulted in a mean downtime of only 160 hr's, and only 1,323
unscheduled maintenance manhours, less than half of what was estimated
for the Space Shuttle today. This significant improvement in required
maintenance is an indicator of how much of the Shuttle MPS hardware life
is being consumed by ground testing.
The SIMtrix analysis identified the time to perform the subsystem test and
checkout as the most important factor for reducing turnaround times and
costs. By drastically reducing the test time of flight hardware, equipment
operating times are reduced and the number of failures (PRs) decrease
accordingly. The next most significant factor was the reduction of time to
remove and replace (or just to repair) a defective component. This factor
directly reduces the maintenance time (MDT) and labor (UMMHR) to return
the vehicle to an operational condition. These two factors both result in
shortening the total time the SSTO is in the processing facility.
The total time the SSTO is in its processing facility was the most important
factor in achieving high flight rates. The effect of maintenance down periods
(OMDP) was found to not be a strong factor in achieving high flight rates, but
it did affect the SSTO operations costs. Significant variations in both the
frequency and time to perform OMDP maintenance can be tolerated without
reducing the annual flight rates. The additional labor required to perform the
maintenance, however, is directly related to the time and frequency of these
events.
Comparison of a U-i-propellant propulsion system concept with the
reference (LH2/LOX propulsion) SSTO found that either concept can
achieve the SSTO flight rate objectives, but higher maintenance costs
should be expected with the tri-propeUant design. Even with the 3-engine
RD-701 concept, higher maintenance costs were found than the 7-engine
SSME concept.
k...)
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x._j Extraoolation from Shuttle Technology to SSTO Technoloev
PRs MDT UMMHR Total HPF
# (hrs) (hrs) Time (hrs)
Shuttle Reference with 7 SSMEs ]
60 499 4,493 539
IVHM to checkout subsystems in 40 hrs. ]
19.4 160 1,323 200
Improved designs to reduce remove/repair times (MTTR) to 6 hrs I
19.6 55 600 95
Improved component reliability (MTBF or MTBM) by 50% ]
16.5 51 535 90
Flight
Rate
7 ,+
43 ÷
51
Figure 1.2-52
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The STARSIM model was used to perform a basic sensitivity analysis of the
annual SSTO flight rate capability. The model varied several operational
parameters such as the interval and duration of the SSTO Operational
Maintenance Down Periods (OMDP), fleet size (number of SSTO vehicles),
and the mean Horizontal Processing Facility (HPF) turnaround time. The
sensitivity analysis showed that the planned SSTO flight rate (43
flights/year) is easily achievable under the current groundrules. The
effects of a wide range of OMDP variables was found to have a weak effect
on the SSTO annual flight rate. The results indicate that considerable
margin exists in this scenario for scheduled depot maintenance and/or
modification for the SSTO vehicles. The resulting cost per flight (as
measured in direct labor manhours per launch) of these OMDPs was more
significant, however. The SSTO cost per flight varied by +45% to -20% over
the range of the OMDP variables.
,._./
The effect of a longer than ground ruled HPF processing time had a direct
and strong effect on the SSTO flight rate capability and on the manhours
per flight. The flight rate correlation with HPF processing time was not
linear, and the rate did not drop below 50 flts/yr until the HPF time
increased to 120 hours. The planned 43 flts/yr was not met when HPF
times increased to approximately 220 hours. The effect on per launch
manpower (cost) was very strong, but also not linear. The processing
times increased by a factor of 12 in the worst scenario, but the manpower
per launch only increased by a factor of 2.5. This effect is caused in part
by the reduced number of OMDPs performed each year (from 2.5 to 1)
because of the reduced flight rate.
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Figure 1.2-54 SSTO Flight Rate vs. HPF Processing Time
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1.2.4.3 SSTO Engine Throttling Analyses
A key factor in any SSTO launch vehicle's maintenance characteristics is
the amount of time the main propulsion system engines have to operate on
each mission. An analysis was performed to determine what engine
throttling and shutdown schemes might be devised to minimize total
engine operating time and engine operating times at full throttle for a
reference SSTO concept. Several engine operating schemes were
investigated for the 7 SSME SSTO concept, each evaluated for total engine
operating time, time at full and reduced power levels, payload impacts,
and also for single or two engine out abort capability. The tri-propeUant
RD-701 propulsion system SSTO concept was also evaluated for comparison
with the reference SSTO configuration.
Throttle prof'fle variations produced little change in payload performance
and all resulted in the eventual shutdown of five engines to meet the 3 g
acceleration limit. A range of 400 seconds from maximum to minimum
total operating times was found over the nominal 2200 sec. total engines
operating time. This is not a great variation for a single mission, but when
applied to a planned 20-mission life between engine removals, this
translates to an equivalent of two additional missions before planned
removal of the engines, which is a significant maintenance improvement.
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Figure 1.2-55 SSTO Engine Throttling Options
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1.2.4.4 SSTO Engine Out & Abort Analyses
Engine out and abort analyses were also conducted for these engine
throttling techniques to determine if they would improve (or reduce) the
SSTO abort capabilities. The asymmetric throttle profile produced the best
results for a single engine out (EO) abort. For 2 engine out conditions, the
"no throttle" scenario proved best. These EO and RTLS abort analyses
produced the similar results as was found in the Access to Space Option 3
study. The combined RTLS and engine out capability of this 7 SSME SSTO
vehicle provides full abort coverage. That is, a runway landing option is
available over the entire launch trajectory.
RTLS |
TAL ..... /
f
1-Engine
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2-Engine
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//
A_tllude
3._K"
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to 13x74nmitransferorbit Mission Elapsed Time. MET (seconds)
Figure 1.2-56 SSTO Launch Abort Coverage (7 SSME)
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Trajectory and launch abort analyses of a tri-propellant SSTO propulsion
system utilizing three Russian RD-701 engines were also performed. The
analyses were similar to those performed for the seven SSME engine
propulsion concept for SSTO. The fewer number of engines, coupled with
their dual thrust level, was found to eliminate the need for engine
throttling studies as was performed for the SSME concept. What was
discovered, however, was that this concept has very limited engine out and
RTLS abort capabilities. A single engine out capability was not achievable
until 310 seconds into the trajectory (nominal MECO occurs at 373 sec.).
Two engines out could not be tolerated at any time. The RTLS capability
was greatly reduced by the significant thrust loss of an engine early in the
trajectory. The RTLS could not be performed for an engine failure any
earlier 37 seconds nor any later than 189 seconds after lfftoff. An ATO
abort is required to cover the gap (121 seconds) between RTLS and EO
aborts. A single engine failure can not be tolerated early in the trajectory
and a two engine failure cannot be tolerated at any time. The combined
RTLS, EO, and ATO abort capabilities for this concept result in less than full
abort coverage (90%). This level of abort coverage is only marginally
acceptable for a fully reusable launch vehicle.
The same tri-propellant SSTO concept with seven, single-nozzle engines
was also performed (the RD-704 engine concept). This version of the tri-
propellant engine SSTO design produced a much improved abort
performance. The RTLS capability was extended back to Uftoff and out to
198 seconds. A single engine out capability was achievable at 262 seconds
into the trajectory, and two engine out abort capability was achievable at
265 seconds (nominal M_CO occurs at 390 seconds). An ATO abort mode
was still required to span the gap (64 seconds) between RTLS and EO abort
coverages. The EO abort performance of this concept is not as good as the
7 SSME propulsion system (33% vs. 64% of the trajectory), but at least this
configuration achieved the full abort coverage which the RD-701
configuration could not.
These findings demonstrate the key engine parameters which determine
the SSTO vehicle's abort coverage. Not only the number of engines, but
also the thrust levels (especially for the dual thrust-level tri-propeUant
engines), determine the abort capability of the SSTO concept. The engine
throttling/shutdown sequence and the vehicle aerodynamic characteristics
(e.g. lift/drag ratio) have only secondary effects.
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1.2.4.5 SSTO MPS Design Layout
A key aspect of ground processing is access to MPS components to perform
necessary maintenance and inspections, A design concept for an open
boattail was initiated to support the SSTO MPS ground processing study,
Many MPS design groundrules were identified in the Operationally
Efficient Propulsion System Study (OEPSS) by NASA KSC and Rocketdyne
were incorporated, The design concept is similar to that employed on the
Saturn S-II and S-IVB stages in which the engine thrust structure is
integrated with the tank lower bulkhead, The design also includes
modular engine assemblies which integrate the engine with the TVC
system and portions of the thrust structure, No closed compartments exist
in the propulsion system region and considerable access is provided for
engine and feedUne maintenance, A three-point structural attachment was
developed for the engine module to accommodate rapid engine
replacement,
A rocket propulsion based SSTO(R)
Access to Space Option 3
• VTHL
• LOX/LH2 propellants
• 7 evolved SSME engines
• Forward LOX tank with two
19" feedlines, toroidal manifold
• LH2 tank with spider manifold
• Electromechanical actuators
• Hot gas tank pressurization
Figure 1.2-59 SSTO MPS Design Layout per OEPSS Guidelines
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Additional Information
More in-depth discussions and more detailed information regarding the
study findings which have been presented here may be found in Volume
II and Volume III of this Final Report. Volume II contains additional
information on the technical aspects of manned booster and cargo transfer
vehicle concepts which were examined during the study. Volume III
contains cost data and estimating techniques used for these concepts.
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This report is submitted in compliance with DR-4 of Contract NAS8-39207, Advanced
Transportation System Studies for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, George
C. Marshall Space Flight Center. The report describes the results of Rockwell International's
work for the analysis of Manned Launch Vehicle Concepts for Two Way Transportation
System Payloads to LEO during the Basic Contract and the Option 1 Contract period of
performance (February 15, 1992 through December 15, 1993).
This report is organized in three volumes; an Executive Summary, a Final Report, and a Cost
Estimates Report.
The Exequtive Summary is a condensation of the study's major findings and a summary of
results for the several study activities. The findings and results are current with the study
progress as of December 10, 1993.
The _ volume is an in-depth description of work performed during the study, with
accompanying illustrations of briefing charts and other documents which were generated
during the course of the study. This volume is organized by subject matter and includes an
appendix with research reports of detailed analyses on selected special topics. Sufficient data is
presented in this volume to reveal the depth of work performed and to provide data which
supports the findings presented in the Executive Summary.
The Cost Estimates Report is a compilation of the Work Breakdown Structure and cost
estimating techniques which were used to evaluate the several booster concepts during the
course of the study. A summary of data used and generated during the evaluation of each
booster type (or family of boosters) is provided. The data is organized by booster types which
represent unique cost estimating conditions, such as the reusable Space Shuttle, the proposed
low cost NLS family, existing expendable launch vehicles, and the Russian (C.I.S.) launch
vehicles.
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The purpose of the Advanced Transportation System Study (ATSS) Task Area 1 study effort is
to examine manned launch vehicle booster concepts and two-way cargo transfer and return
vehicle concepts to determine which of the many proposed concepts best meets NASA's needs
for two-way transportation to low Earth orbit. The study identified specific configurations of
the normally unmanned, expendable launch vehicles (such as the National Launch System
family) necessary to fly manned payloads. These launch vehicle configurations were then
analyzed to determine the integrated booster/spacecraft performance, operations, reliability, and
cost characteristics for the payload delivery and return mission. Design impacts to the
expendable launch vehicles which would be required to perform the manned payload delivery
mission were also identified. These impacts included the implications of applying NASA's
man-rating requirements, as well as any mission or payload unique impacts.
The booster concepts evaluated included the National Launch System (NLS) family of
expendable vehicles and several variations of the NLS reference configurations to deliver larger
manned payload concepts (such as the Crew Logistics Vehicle (CLV) proposed by NASA
JSC). Advanced, clean sheet concepts such as an F-1A engine derived liquid rocket booster
(LRB), the Single-Stage-to-Orbit rocket, and a NASP-derived aerospace plane were also
included in the study effort. Existing expendable launch vehicles such as the Titan IV, Ariane
V, Energia, and Proton were also examined.
Although several manned payload concepts were considered in the analyses, the reference
manned payload was the NASA Langley Research Center's HL-20 version of the Personnel
Launch System. A scaled up version of the PLS for combined crew/cargo delivery capability,
the HL-42 configuration, was also included in the analyses of CTRV booster concepts.
In addition to strictly manned payloads, two-way cargo transportation systems (Cargo Transfer
& Return Vehicles) were also examined. The study provided detailed design and analysis of
the performance, reliability, and operations of these concepts. The study analyzed these
concepts as unique systems and also analyzed several combined CTRV/booster configurations
as integrated launch systems (such as for launch abort analyses). Included in the set of CTRV
concepts analyzed were the Medium CTRV, the Integral CTRV (in both a pressurized and
unpressurized configuration), the Winged CTRV, and an attached cargo carrier for the PLS
system known as the PLS Caboose.
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2.1 Manned Booster Studies
The ATSS contract has studied the performance of a number of expendable
booster concepts currently being considered for the launch of reusable
(manned or two-way cargo) spacecraft. Analyses were performed to
determine which of the many proposed booster concepts best meets
NASA's needs for two-way transportation to low Earth orbit. The study
identified specific configurations of the normally unmanned, expendable
launch vehicles (such as the National Launch System family) necessary to
fly manned payloads. These launch vehicle configurations were then
analyzed to determine their performance, operations, reliability, and cost
characteristics for the manned payload delivery mission. Design impacts to
the expendable launch vehicles which would be required to perform the
manned payload delivery mission were also identified. These impacts
included the implications of applying NASA's man-rating requirements, as
well as any mission or payload unique impacts.
The booster concepts evaluated included the National Launch System (NLS)
family of expendable vehicles, the ESA Ariane V, and several variations of
the NLS reference configurations to deliver a variety of manned payload
concepts. Advanced, clean sheet concepts such as a F-1A engine-derived
Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB), the Single-Stage-to-Orbit rocket, and a NASP-
derived aerospace plane were also included in comparisons of the several
candidate booster configurations. Existing expendable launch vehicles such
as the Titan IV and the Russian Energia and Proton launch vehicles were
also compared to the proposed new booster designs.
Although several manned payload concepts were considered in the
analyses, the reference manned payload was the NASA Langley Research
Center's HL-20 version of the Personnel Launch System (PLS). Other
concepts such as the Crew Logistics Vehicle (CLV) proposed by NASA JSC
and a small cargo carrier to be launched with the PLS for combined
crew/cargo delivery capability (the PLS Caboose configuration) were also
included in the comparisons of booster configurations. The reference
mission used in the analyses was the Space Station crew/cargo resupply
mission.
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2.1.1 Man-rating Requirements Analysis
NASA's current man-rating definition is based on JSC-23211, "Guidelines
for Man-rating Space Systems", prepared by NASA/JSC. The JSC-23211
man-rating guidelines are broken down into eight major topics, which
constitute the major facets of a man-rated space program. These topics are
consistent with a well-balanced and effective man-rated space program.
Man-rating guidelines and functions were extracted from this and several
other documents which address man-rating requirements for previous
man-rated launch systems. Four of these documents are requirements
documents, several of which are currently in effect for the Space Shuttle
program. The other four documents provide useful perspectives on the
subject of man-rating and how it has been applied on various programs.
Guidelines and requirements are entered at the appropriate sub-topic level
(where applicable). Man-rating philosophies which have been employed
almost universally on all man-rated vehicles include the following:
• Keep designs as simple as possible.
• FoUow proven, well-established design standards.
• Base design factors on industry standards.
• Provide redundancy for all single failure points. Where redundancy
is impractical, provide a conservative safety factor to that point.
• Use proven technology. If advanced technology is required, a
technology development program should precede any preliminary
design phase.
• Effective unmanned testing of actual systems should be required
prior to any manned tests. Testing should prove that such features
perform as required.
• Safety decisions have precedence over other programmatic
requirements.
• The assurance of man-rating guidelines/features should be
constantly monitored at all management levels throughout the
program.
• Risk assessments should be performed to determine the impact on
the system from cost, manpower, and scheduling, and to identify
areas susceptible to undue safety hazards.
• Hardware and processes with unresolved anomalies should not be
used. All anomalies, failures, etc., should be reasonably understood
and corrective measures verified prior to approval for use.
• Safety criteria and practices should be applied to all system elements
and mission phases with equal rigor.
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X-15 a rocket powered airplane
MERCURY - REDSTONE escape system, emergency detection, manual
abort
MERCURY-ATLAS fully automatic flight & abort
GEMINI - TITAN II redundancy & malfunction detection,
manual abort
APOLLO / SATURN multiple redundancy, high reliability, malfunction
detection & correction, auto & manual aborts
SPACE SHUTTLE multiple redundancy, high reliability, malfunction
detection & correction, intact abort
• ,, ??
Figure 2.1-1 Evolution of Man-rating Requirements
2.1.1.1 Requirements Analysis
To determine how these requirements would affect a new manned launch
vehicle, the guidelines and requirements from the selected reference
documents were separated into design guidelines and functional
requirements. The functional requirements are of the greatest impact to
the design of the launch system elements. Next, all of the identified
functional requirements were converted into functional flow diagrams.
This process permitted functional interactions among requirements to be
identified. ALlocation of these functions to selected system elements was
then performed. This allows for a direct comparison of man-rating
requirements (function flows) to the function flows of proposed man-rated
launch vehicles. A software tool (System Architect) automated the process
of generating, manipulating, organizing, and managing system functional
requirements diagrams. This tool was used to store and analyze the man-
rating requirements and to perform the process of allocating requirements
among system elements.
II-3
JM.2
This system engineering process resulted in the condensation of a great
number of disparate requirements down to a short list of functional design
requirements for an otherwise unmanned launch vehicle, In addition to
the expected high reliability parts, redundancy levels, and traceability
requirements, the analysis identified those functional design requirements
which the booster will have to perform to launch manned payloads, The
functional design requirements were ultimately able to be grouped into
two basic functions which the booster must perform: provide two-way
communications between the booster and the crew, and provide the
capabili W to perform alternate missions in a single launch,
The fli'st added design function is the requirement to establish a two-way
communications link with the manned capsule. The booster's
communication link must transmit the status of critical booster systems to
the manned payload (crew) and at all times protect the crew from
catastrophic failure of these critical booster systems. This protection of the
crew from booster equipment malfunctions includes the issuance of
automatic escape commands to the payload's escape system. The booster
must also provide a means for the crew to directly communicate with the
booster and issue commands to override certain booster functions. For
example, shutting down the booster engines to permit the escape system
to separate with sufficient velocity for a crew initiated abort. Together,
these communication channels must provide the crew with the capability
of safely separating from the booster under all flight conditions.
The second added design function is the requirement to perform alternate
missions during the launch phase, The alternate missions can be expressed
as alternate main engine cutoff (MECO) targets for the booster, These
targets represent mission abort and crew escape scenarios which the
booster must be capable of providing, The mission abort targets normally
would represent flight conditions which permit the payload (crew
capsule/system) an opportunity to perform one of several abort
maneuvers (listed in order of priority):
2.
3.
4.
S.
Abort to orbit (at reduced velocity or altitude)
Trans-Atlantic abort (e.g. African landing site)
Return-to-launch-site abort
At-sea abort (water ditching)
Escape (immediate separation from the booster)
Execution of these alternate missions would require changes to some of the
booster hardware and software systems. The booster must be capable of
executing one or more of these missions at all times, including while on the
II-4
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launch pad. The goal would be to maintain the highest level mission
capability for the maximum amount of time. The booster must have
sufficient computational power to calculate the current mission MECO
target capabilities and to choose the highest priority target.
The determination of just which data and commands are to be transmitted
between the booster and the crew is a key design trade for which there
are many solutions (as seen in previous man-rated programs) and even
more opinions, A suggested list of data which should be monitored has
been generated based on current definitions of the NLS booster design.
These data would be monitored by the booster Emergency Detection
System (EDS), but few if any would need to be actually transmitted to the
crew.
ADVANCED TRANSPORTATION sySTEM STUDY
/denned Launch Vehicle Concll_tl far Two Way
Trlmaportllflon Syutem Payloede to LEO
LAUNCH VEHICLE MAN-RAT1NCI REQU_REMENT_
REVISION A
September, IM2
Con_r IK_ NA58-39207
R_kvmll Intematlond
Symml O_den
H_nlwde O_S0el
SS_ _ Dr_e
_, AL 35_4
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3. Reliability
2. Design Practices
1. Design Criteria
1.1 Environmental Condition
1.2 Escape System
1.3 Failure Tolerance
1,4 Hazard Detection and Sating
1.5 Structural Crltarla
1.6 Redundancy
1.7 Materials
1.8 Displays and Controls
1.9 Aborts
Figure 2.1-2 Requirements Based on JSC-23211
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1.2 Escape System:
Guidelines:
Provisions should be made fore viable means
of escape from the system in the event of an
impending catastrophe, In situations where
immediate and complete escape may not be
feas_le, an alternative approach can be
considered if it can be proven reliable.(1)
The flight crew must be provided with a viable
means of escape from the space vehicle in the
event of an impending catastrophe. In siluations
where tmrnediale escape from the space system
may not be feas_e, alternate approaches such
as a safe haven may be considered if such can be
provided to be viable,(4)
Functional Requirements:
Crew to be provided abort sensing and implementation
data upon which to base an abort decision.O)
Emergency considerations have become a distinguishing
characteristic of man-rated systems; the resulting vehicle
system changes end additions provide for emergency
detection, control, and/or escape of the crew.(2)
The provision for a safe landing area for the spacecraft
and the surrounding facilities is required.(2)
An escape system has the attendant requirement for
providing the crew with abort sensing and implementation
data upon which to base an abort decision,(4)
• Guidelines and their associated
functional requirements are extracted
from various man-rating documents.
• Guidelines and functional requirements
are segregated in order to quickly
identify requirements for FFBDs.
• Man-rating document sources are
identified by the number in brackets.
Figure 2.1-3 Man-rating Guidelines and FuncUonal Requirements
Desicjn Criteria
• Launch systems must be designed for alternate missions
(abort missions added to design mission)
• Provide provisions for crew to escape from vehicle
e.g. - Emergency Detection System, crew commanded controls
Redundanqy
• Redundant flight control & electrical systems are required
• Redundant sensor outputs are required
to preclude sensor malfunctions from causing switchover to redundant
systems
• Systems shall not be less than Fail-Safe
except primary structure, pressure vessels, & TPS which are designed
for no failures (design margins required)
Figure 2.1-4 Man-rating Guidelines for Boosters
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Reliability
* Reliability history required for all subsystems/components over their
complete life
from qual test, acceptance test, to ground & flight operations
- all failures exhaustively investigated (from start of development)
• FMEA required to support safety analyses
Test & Verification
• All redundant design features must be completely demonstrated
during tests
• Astronauts must be tralned In all aspects of the system
including man-in-the-loop simulation testing
Management Practices
• Management assessment & review of man-rating criteria
• Verification of flight readiness required
disposition of any failed equipment
• All documentation under strict management control
extensive procedural documentation for QC during fabrication and
production (e.g. serial number traceability)
Formal test & verification program
J
Figure 2.1-5 Man-rating Guidelines for Boosters
• Provide fault detectioN, _, and r.g.g_0_V.gJ_systems to address problems In critical and
non-critical systems over which the crew has control. Critical systems status shall be displayed as
to prevent misinterpretation. Fire suppression capability should be provided, and may either be
automatic or manual depending on the risk. (1)
• Provide a caution and warnlna system for the crew to identify equipment failures, fire, or other
potential emergency situations. (4)
System
Interfaces
(input)
SystemDatabase
Status Critical 1
_|Syatem ]
Anomaly ] Critical
Detected | Fault
Signal
System f
Reqmte [Caution and[
[WarningLS--j
I Anomaly Status
Critlcal 1 Automatic [
Hazard andi Response ]
Sating J _[
Crew 1 Manual Response
Monitoring|
and [
Evaluation J
f
System
Interfaces
(output)
Figure 2.1-6 Man-rating Functional Diagrams
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PLS
manned
spacecraft
LOX/LH2
2nd stage
LOX/LH2
1st stage
STME
engines
t Display
BOOSTER ENGINE
1 2 3
0 0 0
Booster
Subsystems
STATUS
CONTROLS
j Emergency Detection System
DATA & COMMAND
PROCESSING ALGORITHMS
I engines, __]
tanks,...
I I
Figure 2.1-7 Booster-to-Crew Communications via EDS
Minimize reliance on crew for booster system corrective actions
- Allow only sufficient controls for implementing alternate missions
selection and abort/escape functions.
and manua/ override of cfitica/ functions ?
i Crew Commands
• Execute alternate mission command
• Execute abort mission command
• Execute escape command
Minimize Information flow to crew
- Data to crew presumes (invites) a crew response.
Avoid information overload to crew.
i Booster Data Provided j
• Feedback response to commands Issued by crew (see above)
• Notify crew of EDS decision to execute alternate missions
• Notify crew of EDS decision for crew to escape
K-.,,.._j _
Figure 2.1-8 Booster-Crew Communications Rules
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f Booster Functions
A Get crew capsule to selected mission MECO target
& notify crew if unable to perform this mission
91 Get crew capsule to alternate mission MECO target
& notify crew if unable to perform this mission
92 Get crew capsule to abort mission MECO target
& notify crew if unable to perform this mission
C1 Notify crew of inability to achieve any mission MECO target
C2 Notify crew of immediate escape requirement
r Crew Functions
1. Select an alternate mission MECO target
2. Select an abort mission MECO target
3. Issue escape command
Figure 2.1-9 Booster & Crew Functions
J
/- Emergency Detection System
A. Monitor critical systems for out-of-limits conditions or failures
B. Make decisions for any corrective actions required and Issue
corrective action commands as required
- to protect crew safety
- to accomplish primary mission
-- C. If decision reached that primary mission cannot be met
- malntain vehicle within crew safetylimits
- select alternate mission and issue required commands
- notify crew of decision reached
•-, D. If decision reached that alternate missions cannot be met
- maintain vehicle within crew safetylimits
- notify crew of decision reached
•- E, If decision reached that crew safety cannot be maintained
- notify crew of decision reached
- Issue automatic crew escape commands
= crew input capability (manual override)
I The objective of the EDS is to detect malfunctions and provide
commands to maintain the maximum mission completion capability
while always maintaining the vehicle within crew safety limits
Figure 2.1-10 Booster EDS Functions
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Emergency Detection System
Crew Commands to Booster
Engine
manual engine cutoff
engine shutdown override/inhibit
manual engine throttle
Propulsion
engine prevalves
MPS fill/drain valves
LH2 ullage flow control valves
LH2 feedline relief isolation valve
LOX feedline relief isolation valve
Hydraulics (if applicable)
"rvc enable (hydraulics isolation valves)
Helium
engine/manifold pressurization (isolation valves)
Avionics
engine controller power
attitude rate override
FCS (TVC) channel overdde
TVC channel disable
Mechanical
manual stage separation
Other
manual abort initiation
Emergency Detection System
Booster Data to Crew Capsule
Engine
HPOTP temperature
HPOTP pressure
combustion chamber pressure
Propulsion
LOX manifold pressure
LH2 manifold pressure
LH2 tank ullage pressure
LOX tank uIIage pressure
Hydraulics (if applicable)
engine hydraulic Iockup
Helium
helium (tank) pressure
engine (regulated) helium pressure
pneumatic valves (regulated) helium pressure
Avionics
engine data channel loss
engine command reject or channel loss
electronic hold (no throttle)
FCS bypass (to TVC)
power supply voltage status
vehicle roll rate (pitch, roll. yaw)
Mechanical
stage separation
Other
auto abort initiation
Figure 2.1-11 EDS Data & Command Monitor List
MAN-RATING REALLY MEANS:
Bring 'em back ALIVE!
Figure 2.i- 12 The Man-rating Bottom Line
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2.1.1.2 Booster Design Impacts
Manned payloads generally, but not always, have wings or lift generating
body shapes. These manned payload design characteristics are another
source of design impacts for a launch vehicle, Unmanned launch vehicles
usually encase their payloads in a shroud which is axisymmetric and
generates some nominal aerodynamic loads during launch. When a winged
or lifting body shaped payload is installed on top of the launch vehicle
instead of this shroud, significantly higher aerodynamic loads will be
experienced by the booster. The magnitude of these loads were
determined for a typical NLS-2 booster. Both the PIN HL-20 configuration
and the much larger CLV configuration were analyzed to determine the
effects of their large wings on the NIN-2 design, Detailed aerodynamic
loads were calculated for both PLS/NLS-2 and the CLV/NLS-2
configurations. A finite-element model of the NLS-2 launch vehicle was
then analyzed to determine the structural loads imposed by these
payloads. It was found that the winged payloads induced significantly
greater bending moments into the booster structure than normally
encountered during ascent. A stress analysis with the NLS-2 structural
model revealed that the increased bending loads would require a
structural strengthening which would add approximately 4,000 pounds to
the launch vehicle weight. Static control moment analysis of these manned
payload configurations was also performed to determine if the booster
could control the aerodynamic loads caused by the winged payloads. The
analysis indicated that adequate control moment authori W existed in the
launch vehicle thrust vector control systems during both liftoff and
maximum dynamic pressure conditions.
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Figure 2.1-13 CLV Mounted on NLS Booster
V
Figure 2.1-14 CLV & NLS Finite Element Model
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i J Figure 2.1-15 Booster Stresses at Max O_
Figure 2.1-16 Booster Deflections at Max Q
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Figure 2.1-17 Comparison of Max 0 Airloads
Figure 2.1-18 Booster Stresses, On-Pad Winds
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Figure 2.1-19 Booster Deflections, On-Pad Winds
\ ?
Figure 2.1-20 Booster LOX Tank Stresses (On-Pad)
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Q
(psf)
Bending
Moment
(ft-lb x 10'6)
NLS
728
PLS CLV
7O5 777 656
EDGEWISE
BROADSIDE
Figure 2.1-21 Comparison of Payload Induced Loads
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2,1,2 Performance Analysis
A number of candidate manned booster concepts were evaluated to
determine their suitability for launching either the PLS or CLV manned
payload concepts. In general, it was found that the payload performance
of most of the current set of planned NLS launch vehicle configurations
were not particularly well matched to either manned payload. The PLS
and CLV system launch weights used for the analyses were 33,800 lbs ,and
75,700 lbs, respectively. The NLS-2 class of booster concepts analyzed
generally optimized for payload masses in the range of approximately
60,000 to 65,000 lbs(1.5 stage versions of NLS-2), or in the range of
105,000 to 115,000 lbs (two stage versions of NLS-2). The manned
payload masses fell considerably below the payload capabilities of either
range. The boosters were thus somewhat overpowered for either the PLS
or the CLV. This situation does, however, provide considerable room for
weight growth in the booster to allow for manned mission trajectory
options and additional systems necessary for satisfying man-rating
requirements.
Existing expendable launch vehicles were also not well sized for these
manned systems. Although their payload mass delivery capabilities
(48,000 to 52,000 lbs to LEO) were closer to the PLS launch weight, some
of these vehicles generated high dynamic pressures during launch which
will cause significant structural modifications to these boosters. The
Ariane V and the Titan IV generated max O2s of 835 psf and 925 psf
during launch, respectively. While these pressures are within the normal
operating limits for these vehicles, they will result in extremely high
bending moments in the booster which are not within the normal
booster limits (as we found in the case of NLS-2 boosters due to the high
aerodynamic loads from the PLS payload).
A "clean sheet" concept utilizing the Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) for
launching the PLS payload was found to be a better performance match
than the NLS-2 configurations. The LRB configuration included a single F-
1A engine for the first stage and a single J-2S engine for the second stage.
The LRB concept defined by MSFC as a Space Shuttle SRB replacement was
used as a starting point for the first stage propellant sizing. A Saturn S-
IVB stage was used for second stage sizing. This configuration provided
lower payload mass capabilities (by 8,000 lbs) and equivalent dynamic
pressures compared to the NLS-2 1.5 stage concepts. Compared to e.,dsting
ELV boosters, this concept provided slightly more payload capability
(2,000 lbs), and significantly lower dynamic pressures.
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The ability to complete the PLS delivery mission with an engine out (from
the launch pad) provides a booster with a slightly higher probability of
mission success. For the NLS-2 1.5 stage booster, this increase amounted
to approximately one percentage point (from 0.981 to 0.989). The
individual engine reliability, and their burn duration and throttling
requirements, play a stronger role in determining the various boosters
reliability than the engine out capability. As will be seen later in this
report (in the Reliability Analysis section), the number of engines, the
number of stages, and the stage burn times span a wider range of
variability among the several boosters analyzed than the effect of an
engine out capability or not. These engine number and burn time
characteristics were thus compared for each of the manned booster
concepts. (This information will be of further utility during future
analyses of abort mission capabilities of the various booster concepts.) A
probability of mission success range of 0.917 to 0.989 was determined for
the several booster concepts analyzed. This range is much greater than the
effect of engine out capability as noted above.
_...#
The measure of crew safety for the manned booster comparisons is also
influenced by the engine reliability and engine out capabilities (again, by
the same relative strength levels). The overriding factor for crew safety,
however, was the PLS provided escape capability. This capability was
equally available for all the booster concepts. Crew safety levels were thus
found to be only weakly influenced by the engine out capability (or lack
thereof) for any of the manned boosters.
Performance of the several manned booster concepts at higher launch
inclinations was determined to assess the effect that a Space Station orbit
of 51.6" might have on the ability to launch PLS to the Space Station. The
boosters' payload launch capacity at this orbit inclination was generally
reduced by 6,000 to 8,000 lbs. This reduced payload capability did not,
however, change any of the findings concerning which of the boosters was
best suited to launching either the PLS or the CLV payloads. Because all of
the boosters analyzed had significant performance margin for these
payloads, the effect of a higher inclination orbit only reduced the excess
lift capacity. All of the boosters recommended for the PLS or CLV systems
still had excess lift capacity at this higher inclination orbit.
Comparison of the several boosters for manned payload (PLS) delivery
missions led to a recommendation of either the NLS-2 1.5 stage booster (in
the 4/1 STME configuration) or the F-1A based LRB for the PIS payload.
Both of these boosters are somewhat overpowered for this payload, but the
excess lift capacity may be used for mission flexibility (abort coverage),
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weight growth margins, or additional payload options. From among the
concepts analyzed to date, the only recommended booster for the CLV
payload is a two stage version of the NLS-2 (4 STME first stage, 1 J-2S
second stage). This booster is also very overpowered (by > 30,000 lbs) for
this manned payload, but the excess capacity may be useful for other
considerations. A better matched launch vehicle than this NLS-2 two stage
can be defined by modifying the engine and tank sizing to other than NLS
constrained levels.
NLS-2 NLS-2 NLS-2 NLS-2 LRB
1.5 STAGE (6/2) 1.5 STAGE (4/1) 2 STAGE (STME) 2 STAGE (F-l) 2 STAGE (F-l)
Figure 2.1-22 NLS Boosters Evaluated
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A
I
Ariane V
Hermes
t
Titan IV Proton Energia
Soyuz Buran
Figure 2.1-23 Existing ELVs Evaluated
PLS (HL-20)
i! 10 man payload (2+8)
- 2,100 Ib
No cargo payload
AdaptodLES expended at
MECO
- 8,314 Ib
Total launch wt. = 33,800 Ib
PLS with Scaled HL-20 Crew Logistics Vehicle
Caboose (CLV)
,.lO...,o..,,.8,, ..m.n,. ., .lom .p.,,o..
" 2'100=" I I . 2,10o_ II:o - 3.ooo_
8 SSF rack cargo payload I ] " 4 SSF rack cargo payload 15 - rack cargo payload
.8.ooo_ II - 4.0oo_ - lS.0OOO)
AdaptorlLES integrated I I • Adaptor/LES expended at Adaptor/LES expended at
into caboose I I MECO MECO
- 20,000 _ I - 12,351 O - 12,078
Tota aunch wt. = 57,180 b . Total launch wt. = 53,954 Ib Total launch wt. = 75,677 Ib
Figure 2.1-24 Booster Payload Options
H-20
SSTO
Rockwell Concept
• J_ASP Derived
Single Stage to Orbit
Figure 2.1-25 Advanced Boosters Evaluated
NLS 1.5 Stage (6/2)
NLS 1.5 Stage (4/1)
NLS 2 Stage (STME)
NLS 2 Stage (F°I)
Ariane V
Energla
Proton
EBB (F-1A)
Titan IV
Max Payload Max Q Max Accel Comments
to LEO (Ib) (psf) (g)
62,600 732 4.0 Engine out
61,800 529 4.0
107,100 " 524 4.0 \
113,800 649 .4.0
48,900 835 4.2
227,300 800 4.4 Engine out
48,100 691 3.4
54,423 725 4.0
51,939 925 3.4
Figure 2.1-26 Booster Maximum Performance (with PLS Payload)
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Booster PLS PLS Scaled CLV Other
+Cab. HL-20
NLS-2 1.5 (6/2) v' _¢ _" X
NLS-2 1.5 (4/1) _ v' v'
NLS 2stg (STME) X X X *
NLS 2stg (F-l) X X X X
Ariane V V'
Proton v'
Energia
LRB (F-1A) .
Titan IV V'
SSTO
NDV
_r
_r
_r
= Recommended
v' = Acceptable
X = Not recommended
k._j
Figure 2.1-27 Recommended Boosters for Manned Payloads
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NLS-2
1.5 STAGE(6/2)
Payload Options
Booster Description
f Booster Core
Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2
Engines STME (4) STME (2)
Thrust (Ibf) 650 K 650 K
Isp (sec) 428.5 428.5
Engine out capab. Yes Yes
GLOW (It)) 78,312 1,877,641
Dry Weight (Ib) 70,700 127,550
Length (It) 34 179
Diameter (ft) 27.5 27.5
J
Figure 2.1-28 NLS-2 1.5 Stage (6/2) Configuration
Booster Maximum Performance (to 15 x 220 nmi.)
Maximum Dynamic Pressure (psf) 731.75
Maximum Acceleration (g's) 4.00
Booster Separation:
T me(sec) 161.50
Altitude (It) 245903
Relative Velocity (fps) 9031.30
MECO:
Time (sec) • 338.29
Weight (/.bs) . 219,055
Excess _ropellani (Ibs) 10,477
Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)
Annual Flight Rate = 10
Launch Cost = $100 M
Booster Payloads to SSF Orbit
• Maximum payload to SSF transfer
orbit satisfies engine-out at liftoff
requirement (*except the CLV payload)
CLV* _ealed PLS PLS |
73,173 75.680 73,018 72,621 153,800 75,677 53,954 33,80019,373 3 19,064 38,821MECO Weight (Ibs)Gross Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)Margin (Ibs)
Figure 2.1-29 NLS-2 1.5 Stage (6/2) Performance
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NLS-2
1.5 STAGE (4/1)
Payload Options
Booster Description
Booster Core
Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2
Engines STME (3) STME (1)
Thrust (Ibf) 650 K 650 K
Isp (sec) 428.5 428.5
Engine out capab. No No
GLOW (Ib) 62,878 1,714,809
Dry Weight (Ib) 55,266 105,434
Length (It) 34 172
Diameter (ft) 27.5 27.5
Figure 2.1-30 NLS-2 1.5 Stage (4/1) Description
Booster Maximum Performance (to 15 x 220 nmi.)
"Maximum Dynamic Pressure (psf) 528.83
Maximum Acceleration (g's) 4.00
Booster Separation:
Tlme(sec) 196.03
Altitude (It) 238025
Relative Vek city (fps) 9291.59
MECO:
Time (sac) 461.07
Weight (Ibs) 185,105
Excess Propellant (Ibs) 0
Payload to Transfer Orbit (Iba)
J
Annual Flight Rate = 10
Launch Cost = $90 M
Booster Payloads to SSF Orbit
I MECO Weight (Ibs)
Gross Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)
argin (Ibs)
PLS + Caboose _ PLS II
61,474 61,351 60,407 153,800 53,954 33,8007,674 7,397 26,607
Figure 2.1-31 NLS-2 1.5 Stage (4/1) Performance
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NLS-2
2 STAGE (STME)
J
Payload Option s
Booster Description
f __r Core
Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX]LH2
Engines STME (4) J-2S (1)
Thrust (Ibf) 650 K 265 K
Isp (sec) 428.5 436
Engine out capab. No No
GLOW (Ib) 1,475,766 246,996
Dry Weight (Ib) 165,647 27,912
Length (ft) 167.3 71.7
Diameter (if) 27.5 21.0
k,.j
Figure 2.1-32 NLS-2 2 Stage (STME) Description
Booster Maximum Performance (to 15 x 220 nmi.)
'"'Maximum Dynamic Pressure (psf) 523.86
Maximum Acceleration (g s) 4.00
Booster Separation:
Time(se< ) 225.07
Altitude (t t) . 296773
Relative_ t'elocity (fps) 12087.89
MECO:
Time (sec) 580.55
Weight _bs) 138,079Excess i-'ropellant (Ibs)
Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)
Annual Flight Rate = 10
Launch Cost = $120 M
Booster Payloads to SSF Orbit
100,642 103,474
53,954 75,677
46,688 27,797
MECO Weight (Ibs)
Gross Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)
Margin 0bs)
Figure 2.1-33 NLS-2 2 Stage (STME) Performance
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NLS-2
2 STAGE (F-l)
Payload Options
Booster Description
Booster Core
Propellant Type LOX/RP LOX/LH2
Engines F-1A (2) J-2S (1)
Thrust (Ibf) 2,025 K 265 K
Isp (sec) 305 436
Engine out capab. No No
GLOW (Ib) 2,559,969 320,059
Dry Weight (Ib) 172,274 31,693
Length (ft) 151.6 71.7
Diameter (ft) 21.0 21.0
,,,..j
Figure 2.1-34 NLS-2 2 Stage (F-I)Description
Booster Maximum Performance (to 15 x 220 nmi.)
f
_ Maximum Dynamic Pressure (psi) 649.06
Maximum Acceleration (g s) 4.00
Booster Separation:
Time(sac) 205.32
Altitude (It) 311721
Relative Velocity (fps) 10859.59
MECO:
Time (sac) 674.35
Weight (Ibs) 148,853Excess Propellant (Ibs)
Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)
J
Annual Flight Rate = 10
Launch Cost = $140 M
Booster Payloads to SSF Orbit
I ,_r,at_LP_L_
MECO Weight (Ibs) 107,535
Gross Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)
Margin (Ibs)
110,055
53,954 75,677
53,851 34,378
_.._j
Figure 2.1-35 NLS-2 2 Stage (F-l) Performance
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Ariane V
Payload Options
Booster Description
f Booster Core
Propellant Type Solid LOX/LH2
Engines P230 HM60
Thrust (Ibf) 1,430 K 225 K
Isp (sec) 273 430
Engine out capab. No No
GLOW (lb) 1,166,000 375,000
Dry Weight (Ib) 154,000 33,000
Length (ft) 98 95
Diameter (ft) 9.9 17.7
J
Figure 2.1-36 Ariane V Description
Booster Maximum Performance (to 50 x 220 nmi.)
f_Maximum Dynamic Pressure (psf) 835.00 _
Maximum Acceleration (g's) 4.17
Booster Se )aration:
Time eCte 123.07Altituc (f 201331Relative_ Ioclty (fps) 6928.92
MECO:
Weigl"Time"e' !S)p_ 648.9383,945i- ellant 0E: cce.¢.
Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)
J
Annual Flight Rate = 10
Launch Cost = $90 M
Booster Payloads to SSF Orbit
r Hermes PLS,__? 1
MECO Weight 48,945
Gross Payload to Transfer Orbit 48,500 33,800
Margin 445
Payload to SSF Orbit 47,088 24,689
Figure 2.1-37 Ariane V Performance
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Proton
Payload Options
Booster Description
f 2nd Stage 3rd Stage
Propellant Type N204/UDMH N204/UDMH N204/UDMH
Engines RD-253 RD-xx RD-xx
Thrust (Ibf) 368 K 135 K 142 K
Isp (sec) 316 322 442
Engine out capab. ? ? No
GLOW (Ib) 1,004,000 365,000 123,000
Dry Weight (Ib) 100,000 35,000 13,000
Length (ft) 66.3 45 30
_.Diameter (ft) 24 13 13 J
=_ j
V
Figure 2.1-38 Proton Description
Booster Maximum Performance (to 30 x 220 nmi.)
Maximum Dynamic Pressure (psf) 691.38
Maximum Acceleration (g's) 3.42
Booster Separation:
Time(so '.) 129.38
Altitude t) 131,266
Relative relocity (fps) 4964.71
MECO:
Time 661.07
_=) - lantWeiant I 73,999
Pxces5 ; ropu
Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)
J
Performance:
• Launch Site - Baikonur
Booster Payloads to SSF Orbit
EMECO Weight (Ibs)Gross Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)Margin (Ibs)
Annual Flight Rate = 10
Launch Cost = $140 M
46,789
33,800
12,989
Figure 2.1-39 Proton Performance
II-28
Energla
Payload Options
Buran
Booster Description
f Booster Core
Propellant Type LOX/RP LOX/LH2
Engines RD-170 RD-xx
Thrust (Ibl) 1,777,000 441,000
Isp (sec) 336 452.5
Engine out capab. Yes Yes
GLOW (Ib) 3,031,932 1,982,901
Dry Weight (Ib) 366,400 176,000
Length (ft) 131 197
Diameter (ft) 12.8 26
J
Figure 2.1-40 Energia Description
Booster Maximum Performance (to -38 x 220 nmi.)
Maximum Dynamic Pressure (psf) 800.00
Maximum Acceleration (g's) 4.37
Booster Separation:
Ttme(sec) 136.67
Altitude (`'_' 261273
Relative Velocity (fps) 6444.22
MECO:
Time (sec). 463.61
Weight _l:is) 403,227
I=xcess P'ropellant (Ibs) 0
Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibs)
J
Performance:
• Launch Site - Baikonur
Annual Flight Rate = 1
Launch Cost = $350M
Booster Payloads to SSF Orbit
MECO Weight (Ibs) 227,300
Gross Payload to Transfer Orbit (Ibe) 227,300
Margin (Ibs) 0
PLS + Caboose
Figure 2.1-41 Energia Performance
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Booster Maximum Performance (to 15 x 220 nmi.)
f
Maximum Dynamic Pressure (psf)
Maximum Acceleration (g's)
Booster Separation:
Time(sec)
Altitude (ft)
Relative Velocity (fps)
MECO:
Time (sec)
Weight (Ibs)
Excess Propellant
Payload to Orbit (Ibs)
J
Annual Flight Rate = 80
Launch Cost = $5.4M
($55.8M at min rate).
Booster Payloads to SSF Orbit
IMECO WeightGross Payload to Transfer OrbitMarginPayload to SSF Orbit 21,100
I
II_-H-t
",,._tl
Figure 2.1-42 SSTO Performance
Booster Maximum Performance (to 15 x 220 nmi.)
fMaximum Dynamic Pressure (psf)
Maximum Acceleration (g's)
Booster Separation:
Tlme(sec)
Altitude (ft)
Relative Velocity (fps)
MECO:
Time (sec)
Weight (Ibs)
Excess Propellant,
Payload to Orbit (Ibs) I 26,50_
Performance:
• Launch Site - Holloman AFB
Annual Flight Rate = 50
Launch Cost = $3M
(est. $50M at min rate
Booster Payloads to SSF Orbit
IMECO WeightGross Payload to Transfer OrbitMarginPayload to SSF Orbit 18,200
Figure 2.1-43 NDV Performance
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2.1.3 Cost Analysis
Cost analyses of all manned boosters were performed using an agreed
upon Work Breakdown Structure which would be consistent with other
space transportation studies being conducted under the ATSS contracts.
Results of the recent Space Shuttle Zero-Base Operations Cost Study
(completed by NASA in June, 1991) were updated to reflect the costing
assumptions and WBS structure for this ATSS study. This Space Shuttle
data was used as the current point of reference for comparison of all
manned boosters. Both fixed and variable operating costs were identified
to permit comparison among the many potential manned booster concepts,
some of which are reusable like the Shuttle (AMLS, SSTO, NASP-derived,
etc.), and some of which are expendable, such as NLS and ELV boosters for
the PLS.
f01_1¢051
peryear
$Af93
3,500
message: it costs nearly $2B to fly it once a year,
every flight after the first one is a bargain
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
fixedcost 1,000
peryear
$M93
0
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Space Shuttle fllghls per year
_¢_lrL't_ dat._ Sp.lce S/,JINo Zolo B,Tso Opdr,m.;,._ C_f S_ldy, ,_mo f_T
I
I::1. I
Figure 2.1-44 Space Shuttle Total Cost vs Flight Rate
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variable cost
per flight
SM 93
25O
flights #8, #9, & #10 (& subsequent ?)peryear average ~$105M'93 each
2OO
150
IO0
5O
• w,M
o,,
t 2 3
J.
4 5 6 7 8 .9 tO
increment Space Shuttle flight rate to flights per year
source data: Space Shuttle Zero.Base Operations Cost Study, June t99 f
Figure 2.1-45 Space Shuttie Variable Cost vs. Flight Rate
Cost estimates of the NLS family of boosters were extremely sensitive
during the course of this study. To avoid causing interference in the active
cost estimating activities on-going in the NLS program, the NLS-2 booster
costs were pegged at a per launch cost of $100M (FY93). This number was
consistent with the published NLS-2 booster cost per flight goal. The cost
of any alternate configuration NLS-2 booster was calculated as a ratio of
this reference cost. The cost ratio for alternate NLS-2 booster
configurations was determined by identifying the relative hardware and
operations complexity differences between the reference NLS-2 booster
(1.5 stage, 6 STMEs) and the alternate. An analytical hierarchy process
(AHP) analysis was used to determine relative weighting factors among the
booster configurations. The AHP analysis compared relative differences in
development, production, and operational complexities between the
reference NLS-2 booster and the alternative configurations. The criteria
used to gauge differences in the booster complexities included first and
second stage technical characteristics, structural and propulsion systems
test requirements, facility requirements or impacts, ground operations,
logistics, and flight operations.
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$M93
1,400
1,200
1,000
8O0
60O
400
2OO
0
1 3 5 7 9
PLS Acquisition + Operations + ALS Launch Costs, $M'93
uululililnlilll
8 flights per year @ ~ $77M'93 intl -
is treatedas an element of recurringCos F_ F_h,L_lt_-J}l Itl lt[--ItLJtt tI t1--1t
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31
years after PLS program "go-ahead"
v
$M'93
per year
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
8OO
6OO
400
2OO
0
Figure 2.1-46 PLS Launch Costs with ALS Booster
PLS baseline mission model averages 8 flights per year
1 3 5 7 9 11
Figure 2.1-47
13 15 17 19 21 23 25
years alter PLS program "go-ahead"
PLS Launch Costs with NLS
27 29 31
II-33
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launch vehicle estimates based on I$100M NLS-2 Cost Per Right GOAL
1
$100MQoAI.CPF _
-i
I launch vehicle estimates based on ]GLOW & payload capa ility
I
_ Energla
SL-17
developed CER ,fi
CPF=f(payload, GL_...) •
In(CPF) / ,i"
S"q
In(payload,GLOW, ...)
Figure 2.1-48 NLS costs are not directly comparable to other ELVs
hardware complexit,/ 0.82 1.16 1.27
operations complex=ty 0.95 1.18 1.48
hardware % 58 82 90
operations % 18 22 28
reserves % 8 12 13
relative % 85 116 132
1.00
1.00
71
19
10
100
$I00M CPF
QOAL
"_..j/
Figure 2.1-49 NLS booster costs were factored from a cost baseline
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-245'
-170 '
interstage
fwd skirt
L02 tank
intertank
LH2 tank
aft skirt
interface
propulsion
module
- '6 STMEs
207,550 Ibm ._iii!!,
vehicle inert ,iiii!ii
iiiiiiii
_,iiiiiii!il;iii
,2,5oo,= i  iiiiil
shroud& iiiiii!!iiiiiiiil
separation
195.050 Ibm
core inert
(reference)
11,400 Ibm
2,700 Ibm
20,250 Ibm
7,800 Ibm
37,650 Ibm
7,000 Ibm
1,800 Ibm
51,850 Ibm
54, 600 Ibm
140,450 Ibm F
core inert
w/o STMEs
new $29.7
new tanks &
structure
existing =
existing $.6.2
5' stretch awontcs
II
$2.0
vehicle
integration
II
$5.6
shroud& Cost Per Flight $M'91
adapter (if goals achieved)R
s63.4 _ vehicle $ 71
core operations 12
support 7
reserves 10
@ 25th unit ? $100
new
new
new
new
$27.5
6 STME
NLS-2 - 207,550 Ibm
payload -50,000 Ibm
Wp - 1,662,000 Ibm
GLOW - 1,919,550 Ibm
,,..j
Figure 2.1-50 NLS-2 6/2 Cost Baseline Breakdown
Manned Module CPF SM
Integrated Operations
additional CPF
hardware & operations
Manned Spaceflight Awareneas
mission control
Launch Vehicle CPF aM
NOT MAN.RA TED
25
25 j,.,_=
8 crew 8 crew
OKlb 15 KIb
30 30
4 crew /i_ 8 crew
?
?
?
?
aM crew 15.6 32.5 15.6 15.6
32.5 8.3 15.6aM / KIb cargo ...
_...J
Figure 2.1-51 NLS-2 Baseline with Alternate Manned Payloads
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NLS-2 6/2
140,450 Ibm DEVELOPMENT COMPLEXITY
core inert
w/o STMEs Airframe V_rlthout Engines
Sustainer or 2nd Stsge
structures except tanks
prope_ant tanks
Booster or 1st Stage
structures except tanks
propellant tanks
Slructurel Tests
Propulsion Tests
Other DDT&E
FACILmES & EQUIPMENT
VEHICLE ACQUISITION COST
Airframe Without Engines
Suetainer or 2nd Stage
Booster or 1st Stage
Main Engines
Other
OPERATIONS & SUPPORT
Intsg, Assy & Checkout
Logistics
Right/Mission Success
NL S-2 4/1
124,300 Ibm
core inert
w/o STMEs
4 IllBb
NLS-2 4It SOMEWHAT EASIER to develop & test
... lighter, less complex propulsion _ule
... single engine sustainer (no engine out)
,.. three engine booster (no engine out)
._ slightly less complex
,.. somewhat less complex (fewer engines)
NLS-2 4/1 SLIGHTLY SIMPLER facilities & equipment
NLS-2 4/1 SOMEWHA T LESS EXPENSIVE fight hardware
._ lighler & simpler, slightly lower cost airframe
._ lighter, simpler sustainer thrust structure & feedlines
... lighter, simpler booster thrust structure & feedlines
._ lower engine cost, 2 fewer engines
NLS-2 4/t SOMEWHAT EASIER to operate & support
... fewer elements, slightly simpler IACO
... fewer engines, slightly simpler logistics
... somewhat less reliable, no engine-out capability
Figure 2.1-52 NLS-2 4/1 Cost
MannedModu_ CPF$M
Integrated Operations
additional CPF
hardware
operations
mission control
Launch Vehicle CPF SM
NOT MAN-RA TED
25 30 25
8 crew 4 crew _ 8 crew
0 Klb 4 KIb AItI_KIb
,' t\
?
$M / crew 14.4 30.0 14.4
30.0 7.7SM / KIb cargo ...
3O
8 crew
8 KIb
15.0
15.0
Figure 2.1-53 NLS-2 4/1 Cost with Alternate Manned Payloads
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J
140,450 Ibm
core inert
w/o STMEs
-170 '
f.Pt-PP
|
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEXITY
Airframe Without Engines
Sustainer or 2nd Stage
structures except tanks
propellant tanks
Booster or 1st Stage
structures except tanks
propellant tanks
Structural Tests
Propulsion Tests
Other DDT&E
FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT
VEHICLE ACQUISITION COST
Airframe Without Engines
Sustainer or 2rid Stage
Booster or 1 st Stage
Main Engines
Other
OPERATIONS & SUPPORT
Intog, Assy & Checkout
Logistics
Right/Mission Success
153,359 Ibm
inert w/o engines
t
24,112 Ibm
inert
+ I J.2S
II
"1
129,247 Ibm
io.rt IlL
2 stage STME/J-2S MORE DIFFICULT to develop & test
._ somewhat heavier, somewhat more complex airframe
,,. new stage, S.IVB legacy, vendor status ?
... staging & airstart, known (out of production) J-2S
._ cryogenic tanks, common bulkhead (?)
,,, less comptex propulsion module, "standard" ET
... does not require boosterlsustainer separation
... somewhat more difficult mated vehicle testing
,.. more diWcult propulsion testing (2 engine types)
2 stage STME/J-2S SIGNIFICANTLY MORE facilities & equipment
2 stage STME/J-2S MORE EXPENSIVE fight hardware
.. heavier, 2 stages, 2 contractors ?
... cryogenic upper stages have never bean 'inexpensive"
._ 1st stage thrust structure & feedlines are llghtar, simpler
... booster engine separation through plume nol required
_. - same engine cost, 2 fewer STMEs, but 1 J-2S
2 stage STME/J-2s SOMEWHATHARDER to operata & support
... 2 stages, 2 engine types, quite a bit more complex lACe
... 2 stages, 2 engine types, more complex logistics
... coasiderably less reliable, eirstart, no engine-out capabtTfty
_,,,=,,j¢"
140,450 Ibm
core inert
w/o STMEs
-170"
" I
:11 I
IIIIt
lib....
Figure 2.1-5 4
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEXITY
Airframe Without Engines
Sustainer or 2nd Stage
slructures except lanks
propellant tanks
Booster or 1el Stage
structures except tanks
propellant tanks
Structural Tests
Propulsion Testa
Other DDT&E
FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT
VEHICLE ACQUISmON COST
Airframe W'llhout Engines
Sustainer o¢ 2nd Stage
Booster or 1st Stage
Main Engines
Other
OPERATIONS & SUPPORT
lnteg, Assy & Checkout
Logistics
Flight/Mission Succe_
Figure 2.1-5 5
L
24, f 12 Ibm
Inert
+ 1 J-2S
NLS 2 Stage (STME) Cost
162,935 Ibm inert w/o engines
2 stage F- 1/J2S MORE DIFFICULT to develop & test
,,. a lot heavier, somewhat more complex airframe
... new stage, S-It& S-IVB legacy, vendor status ?
... staging & airstad, known (out of production) J-2S
... cryogenic tanks, common bulkhead (?)
... new stage, RP.I/1.OX, long & thin
... does not requite boostar/sustainer separation
... signif'mantly more difficult mated vehicle testing
... a bitch for propulsion testing (2 engine types, 2 fuels)
135,042 Ibm
Inert
+2F-I
2 stage F-1/J.2S SIGNIFICANTLY MORE facilities & equipment
2 stage F.1/J-2S MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE fight hardware
... heavier, 2 stages, 2 conlraclors ?
... cryogenic upper stages have never been "inexpensive"
...1st stage thrust structure & faed]ines heavy, but simple
._ lower engine cost, if F-Is & J-2S bought as advertised
2 stage F-f/J-2S A LOT HARDER to operate & support
... 2 stages, 2 engine types, 2 fuels more complex lACe
... 2 stages, 2 engine types, more complex logistics
... somewhat less reliable, airstad, no engine-out capability
NLS 2 Stage (F-l) Cost
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2 Stage F-1 & J-2S Is Most Costly Launcher Exar_ned
25 _ 30 II_lr_ 25
_ 4 Klb 8 crew
_ O K/b
Manned Module CPF SM A
Integrated Operations 1
additional CPF
hardware
operations
mission control
Launch Vehicle CPF $M
NOT MAN-RA TED
?
?
?
?
140
30
8 crew
15 Klb _"_'__ 8 K/b
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ?
140 140 140
$M / crew 20.6 42.5 : 20.6 '1
SM / Kfb cargo ... 42. 5 f t.0 [
Figure 2.1-56 NLS 2 Stage with Alternate Manned Payloads
Results of the AHP process identified the NLS-2 4/1 configuration to be the
cheapest NLS-derived booster capable of launching the PIS payload, at a
cost ratio of 0.85 relative to the NIS-2 reference (or $85M per flight). The
two stage versions of NLS-2, which were required to launch the CLV
payload, were similarly estimated at $116M (STME first stage) to $132M
(F-1A first stage) per flight. The higher two stage booster launch costs
were highly influenced by the required operations costs associated with an
additional stage andan additional engine to produce and process for each
launch. These additional element's operations costs more than offset the
fewer number of engines required per launch by the reference NLS-2.
Cost estimates for the C.I.S. launch vehicles is a highly judgmental exercise
given the volatile economic and political conditions in that country.
Nevertheless, a reasonable estimate was made of what these boosters
might cost in the future, when economic equilibrium is reached between
the C.I.S. and the Western markets. A fairly good cost per launch and
booster payload capability correlation exists for all Western launch
vehicles (often expressed as cost per pound to LEO). A 1-sigma error band
on this cost correlation captures virtually all of the free world launch
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vehicles. If one assumes that the C.I.S. boosters have no technical
advantage over the Western boosters, the economic forces should
eventually drive the C,I.S. boosters into the 1-sigma error band. A check
of C.I.S. booster technical capabilities showed no great advantage, but their
boosters were in the upper range of performance comparisons with
equivalent Western boosters. One cost advantage which the C,I.S. boosters
do have is the benefit of a significant rate and learning curve advantage
with the Soyuz launch vehicle. This factor has a direct influence on the
abiliW to reduces launch costs, and the Soyuz is in a class by itself in this
category. The Soyuz booster was therefore predicted to reach an
equilibrium price below the current cost per pound error band. A price at
the 2-sigma lower error band is predicted for the Proton launch vehicle,
which equates to a per launch cost of $140M ('925), assuming
uninterrupted operations at the Baikonur (Tyuratam) launch site,
A cost estimate for the LRB concept was prepared based upon a
combination of historical costs (for the F-1A and J-2S engines, as well as
for the Saturn S-IVB second stage), and projected costs for a new LOX/RP
booster first stage. The actual cost data which exists for three of the four
elements of this booster concept was used for estimating production costs
of these elements. Development costs for these elements was estimated
from the percentage of new design, additional testing, and new or modified
tooling which would be required to build and re-certify the systems for
flight.
A point to remember concerning these manned booster cost estimate
comparisons is that only the Titan IV and the Space Shuttle costs are real.
Most of the booster concepts examined in this study are only paper
systems, Their cost estimates are based on assumptions and often
optimistic forecasts. Even the C.I.S. launch vehicle cost estimates are based
on assumptions and favorable economic forecasts. The paper systems (and
even the C.I.S. boosters) should therefore be compared only among
themselves, as a class separate from the Shuttle and Titan IV launch
systems,
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Cost Estimates Do NO'#" Include
... extra costs to MAN-RATE launch vehicle
... extra costs to operate In Manned Spaceflight Awareness environment
Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM), parametric CER (SEE ~+- 20%)
... estimates in constant-year 1992 US$, commercial equivalent launch, circa 1998
... Arlane 5 development (DDT&E)
... Arlane 5, Proton & Energla cost per flight
Consistent With Level of Design Definition
... launch vehicle
... payload capability (maximum) at launch site latitude
... gross lift-off weight
... stage level data incomplete, Inconsistent
Foreign Currency Exchange Rates
Primary Sources of Data
... International Reference Guide To Space Launch Systems, AIAA
... Soviet Year In Space, TRW
... Aviation Week & Space Technology
... anecdotal, US DoC
I Estimates Are _O_" _P,_/t.E To NLS-Based Estimates I
Figure 2.1-57 Cost Estimates for Foreign Launch Vehicles
MethodologyData Base Limitations
i Exchange RatesForeign Productivity (man-year equivalent)
ONL Y SOYUZ Has Actually Launched Crew
European Space Agency (ESA) & Arlane
* Commercial Operations
i Exchange RatesHermes De-Sc0ped (unmanned X2000)
Ariane 5 Man-Rating ?
Commonwealth Independent States (ClS) & Soyuz, Proton & Energia
* Political Stability
* Launch Rates
* Free-Market Economics (labor/factor mobility)
Productivity
Exchange Rates
%_./
Figure 2.1-58 Considerations for Unique Foreign Boosters
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I @I_IilHI_i lib
NLS-2 inert -208 K/b
GLOW ~ 1,920 KIb
l : i 11II
l,b,.,I,g
@ tt!'i# -_g'
f
- }6'_
I I
Upper Composite ~ 29 KLb
Lower Composite
A5 core inert - 33 KIb
Wp LO2/LH2 - 342 KIb
2 P230 SRBs ~ 1,166 K/b
GLOW ~ 1,570 KIb
Upper Composite
faidng
L 7 upper stage
vehicle equipment bay
Lower Composite
H 150 core
inert - 33 KIb
w HM60 Vulcaln
2 t>230 SRBs
@ 583 Kb gross
1HM60 Vulcain
LH2/L02 e/ngine
Specific Ariane 5 Groundru/es
* commercial launch circa 1998
* "90-'91 average exchange rates
* 50-70 unit producfion lot buy
* ESA productivity.., capital/labor sprit
* annual fight rate... 8 to 12
* profit (loss) Incentives
Development Cost $M'92 $ 5,412
DDT&E 4,326
N/R Production 347
Construction of Facilities 739
Cost Per Flight $M'92 $ 90
launch vehicle 66
operations 6
profit (support) 6
reserves & other direct costs 12
Cost Per Flight estimate based on
gross lift-off weight, payload capability & other data sources
NOI'¢OmlJAP.t_LIfTONLB-BIUlF.D_TIM4TI_I
,,,_j
Figure 2.1-59 Ariane V Cost
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Figure 2.1-60 Estimating Russian Launch Vehicle True Costs
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_r B
Jiil'i;i
NLS-2 inert -208 lob
GLOW- 1,920 lob
j, "_r
-197'
-141 '
Stage 3 inert - 100 lob
Stage 2 inert 35 KIb
Stage 1 inert 13 Klb
payload - 44 lob
shroud & other - 14 KIb
Stage 3 Wp - 110 lob
Stage 2 Wp - 330 lob
Stage I Wp - 904 lob
GLOW - 1,550 KIb
3rd stage
1RD-??
UDMH/N204
2nd stage
1 RD- ??
UDMt-YN204
1st stage
6 RD-253
UDMI-YN204
Specific SL-13 (D-l) Proton Groundrules
* 3-stage SL-13 (D-1) launch circa 1998
* pofitical stability (no counter-revolution)
* continued movement toward free market
* labor ($10,000 per man-year) mobility
* exchange @ 150 to 200 rubles per dollar
* 10 to 13 launchesperyear, SL-13 & SL-12
Operational since 1970
... SL-13 (D(D-1)three-stage LEO- 12
... l-e) four-stage GEO
... 187 cumulative launches through "90
... 2 operational Baikonur (Tyuratam) pads
Cost Per Flight $M'92 $140
launch vehicle 126
operations 14
Cost Per Flight estimate based on
gross lift-off weight & payload capability
N#ffOOMPJ_ABLE__mlllBL4Tml
-245'
l :!lii,'m
NLS-2 inert -208 lob
GLOW- 1,920 lob
-170'
Figure 2.1-61 Proton Cost
Payload
Retro & Correction
4 Zenit 1stage
Energla core
GLOW
-1 ;7'
LH2./L 02
COt8
4 new
LH2./LOX
8ng[rle$
- 194 lob
- 37lob
- 3,132 lOb
- 1,995 lob
- 5,358 K_
Specific SL- 17 Energia Groundrules
* baseline SL-17 w 4 strap-on boosters
* annual fight rate ... 1
* assume program not cancelled
* only flown twice, once with Buran
* does not Include Buran or crew ops
4s1_pon [ Development: reported to have cost [• z_t_t- 10 to 15 billion rubles ver 15 years
1st stage I
RD-170
Cost Per Flight $M'92 $ 516
launch vehicle 413
opera tions 103
Cost Per Flight estimate based on
gross lift-off weight & payload capability
NOltCOMP, UMdlUW TO NLS-BASI_ lrtlBC4Tml
Figure 2.1-62 Energia Cost
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Booster
NLS-2 1.5 (6/2)
NLS-2 1.5 (4/1)
NLS 2stg (STME)
NLS 2stg (F-l)
Ariane V
Proton
Energla
LRB (F-1A)
Titan IV
SSTO
NDV
Cost per pound delivered to LEO ($K/lb!
S$ PLS
(M)
1O0 2.94
85 2,50
116
132
90 2.65
140 4,t2.
516
244 7.16
180 5.29
5.4 it(, _.:_)
3 (t_-50i
PLS Scaled CLV
+ Cab. HL-20
Other
t ,85 1.85 1,32
1.57 1,57
2,15 1,53
2.44 t.74
9.56
4.52
6.79
Figure 2.1-63 Net Payload Delivery Cost Comparisons
k..j
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2,1,4 Launch Processing Analysis
A launch operations analysis was performed on most of the manned
booster concepts evaluated during this study. Insufficient data was
available to fully analyze the C.I.S. Proton launch vehicle or the Ariane V
launch vehicle. Launch processing flow diagrams and facility/resource
scheduling networks were, however, prepared for these two vehicles. As
data becomes available concerning these boosters, an analysis of their
launch processing characteristics can be performed. All other manned
booster concepts were fully analyzed to determine the facility and
resource requirements needed to meet their design launch rate
capabilities. The analyses were performed using the STARSIM model
which simulates the booster's interactions with launch facilities and all
required system elements. The model can be used to determine specific
resources required to meet a given flight rate, or it can be used to
determine the system's maximum flight rate given a specified number of
resources. The model includes the scheduling constraints and algorithms
needed to accurately predict launch processing capabilities at the NASA
KSC facility.
Application of this simulation model to the Space Shuttle system revealed
that the Shuttle currently has the capability to fly as many as 10 flights
per year with existing assets and launch processing efficiencies
(turnaround processing times). The design maximum flight rate for the
Shuttle system is 12 flights per year, with a surge capability (6 month
maximum rate) of 7 flights. The mobile launch platforms were the limiting
resources for Space Shuttle flight rate capacity, with a utilization rate of
95%. Utilization of the OPF and ET checkout cells were also high (about
85%), but the launch pad utilization was less than 50%.
Similar analyses of the NLS-2 boosters revealed that these systems also
were constrained by the mobile launch tower, of which the NLS program
had planned only one. The NLS booster, operating with a parallel PLS
launch processing system, was able to achieve a flight rate of 10 flights per
year. The NLS-2 booster design maximum flight rate was determined to
be 13 flights per year, with a surge capability of 7 flights in six months.
Utilization of KSC facilities which would be shared with the current Shuttle
systems (the VAB and launch pads) was very low at these maximum flight
rates, 37% and 31% respectively. This implies that a mixed fleet of Shuttle
and NLS-2 launch systems is feasible with the existing KSC facilities. An
actual mixed fleet analysis has not been performed with the STARSIM
model yet, but the low utilization of facilities indicates that this scenario
can be implemented at projected NASA flight rate planning levels.
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Analysis of the other NLS-2 configurations (2 stage versions) revealed that
a flight rate of 10 per year was common to all the configurations and in all
cases the mobile launch tower was the constraining resource,
MJ
An analysis of the effects of launch processing delays on achievable annual
flight rates was also performed with the NLS-2 booster. This analysis was
performed to determine what levels of system availability would be
required to achieve a desired flight rate of 8 flights per year. The model
simulated system stand-down periods of up to 100 days and at varying
levels of probability of incurring the stand-down (0, 5, 10, and 20 %). This
analysis revealed that the NLS-2 booster is highly tolerant of launch
processing delays. The desired flight rate of 8 per year could be achieved
with launch processing delays of up to 75 clays with a 20% probability of
occurrence. At a 10% probability of occurrence, delays of up to 100 days
could be accommodated and still meet the 8 flight per year goal. As a
point of comparison, the NLS-1 booster (an ET-based core with 2 Shuttle
solid rocket boosters) was also modeled under similar conditions (a flight
rate of 5 per year was the goal). This system was found to be very
sensitive to launch processing delays. A 5% probability of just a 20 day
delay was sufficient to reduce the flight rate by 1 per year. Any delays (>
5% probability) greater than 50 days would reduce the annual flight rate
by two. This strong sensitivity to system availability is attributed to the
NLS-1 solid booster's high utilization rate of the mobile launch platform.
An analysis of launch processing learning curve effects on the ability to
meet flight rate goals was also performed. This analysis was based on data
from the Space Shuttle program and attempted to determine if continued
learning (as already demonstrated in the 50+ Shuttle flights to date) would
permit higher flight rates to be achieved in the future. This analysis
provides insight into whether a booster system is process limited or
resource limited in its launch rate capability. The analysis identified that a
79 % learning curve has been established for launch processes on the Space
Shuttle program in the post-51L era. Although many launch processes
were lengthened following the Challenger accident, the launch process
continues to experience learning at a respectable rate. Extrapolation of this
learning rate into the future indicates that the Space Shuttle launch
processing times should return to the pre-51L levels at approximately the
eightieth Shuttle launch. Space Shuttle processing times of 50 days could
be achieved by the 140th Shuttle launch. This analysis reveals that the
Shuttle system flight rate is currently process time limited, not resource
(facility or equipment) limited. A similar analysis of the NLS-2 booster
system has not been performed.
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Computer-Aided System
Engineering (CASE) analysis
was used to develop concept
processing flow diagrams
- Same rule set as KSC
Mission Planning Office
Space Shuttle Launch Processim
=,l
STARSIM is programmed using
object-oriented design for
modular model reconfiguration
• STARSIM software objects are
easily tailored to new concepts
",,._j
Figure 2.1-64 STARSIM Launch Simulation Software
• Throughput Capacity:
• Launch System Design Max
• Target (Derated to 80%)
• Post STS-51L Avg. Planned Days
• 6-Month Surge Capability
• Launch Operability Index (LOI)
• Total Man-hours/Flow
12.6 flights/year
10.1 flights/year
9.5 flights/year
7 flights
16
407,000
Additional launch rate capacity exists in today's Space Shuttle system ]
Figure 2.1-65 Space Shuttle Launch Simulations
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Facility/Resource Capability:
Name OPF VAB-1 &3 VAB-2&4
Location KSC KSC KSC
Status Existing Existing Existing
MLP Pad
KSC KSC
Existing Existing
[Design Max Utilization 82% 85% 49% 95%
Throughput Capacity:
• Planning @ 80% (flows/yr) 12.3 11.8 20.6 10.6
• Max @ 100% (flows/year) 15.4 14.8 25.7 13.2
Manpower (man-hours/flow) 213K 11K 15K 34K
48%1
20.8
26.1
78K
Figure 2.1-66 Space Shuttle Facility Utilization
CONTINGENCY LANDING SITE ._l_i LAUNCH PAD
I PLS INTERNAL FERRY HORIZONFTAA_IPI_CESSING _
DESERVICE &SAFING r_'___ _VAB
FACILITY _ _ I Ill- rl_
CORE ELEMENT 7--- _ j
DELIVERY -- _ _ /
DEL,VE Y
 L  O ,TE ELEMENT
DELIVERY
Figure 2.1-6"7 NL_-2 and PLS Launch Processing
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Figure 2.1-68 PLS/NLS-2 Simulation Model
Throuclhput Capacity:
Launch System Design Max
Target (Derated to 80%)
6-Month Surge Capability
13.4 flights/year
10.7 flights/year
7 flights
Facility/Resource CaDability:
Name HPF VAB-4 CA/PF MLT
Location KSC KSC CCAFS KSC
Status New Modified New New
I Desi_ln Max Utilization 23% 37% 22% 100%
Pad
KSC
Modified
31% I
Throughput Capacity:
• Planning @ 80% (flows/yr) 46.8 28.6 48.4 10.7 34.3
• Max @ 100% (flows/year) 58.5 35.8 60.6 13.4 42.8
. MLT is the constraining resource• Low utilization of KSC facilities
Figure 2.1-69 PIS/NIS-2 Launch Facilities Utilization
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_,,_j Figure 2.1-70 Ariane V Launch Processing Model
New PLS
NewAdaplor __
New 3rd Stage
New2ndSlago
New lit Stage
New Strap-on
Tanks
Figure 2.1-71 Proton Launch Processing Model
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Figure 2.1-72 Energia Launch Processing Model
NLS 1.5 Stage (612)
NLS 1.5 Stage (4/1)
NLS 2 Stage (STME)
NLS 2 Stage (F-l)
Ariane V
Energla
Proton
Flight Rate Constraining
(Rts/Yr) Resource
10 MLT
10 MLT
10 MLT
10 MLT
10 TBD
1 TBD
8 TBD
Figure 2.1-73 Comparison of Booster Launch Processing Simulations
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System Stand-down Effect
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Figure 2.1-74 NLS-2 Availability Impact to Flight Rate
90-I I-'1 Space Shuttle i
_ _ 0 PLS-NLS2 _
60- /Launch J--I
°,,,,za,,o.- i
30- / / // Launch II
Flight Rate (Launches/Year)
I There should be sufficient capacity for Space Shuttle and IPLS-NLS2 mixed fleet operations ]
Figure 2.1-75 NLS-2/PLS & Shuttle Mixed Fleet Operations
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2.1.5 Reliability Analysis
As a prerequisite to conducting Reliability analyses of candidate manned
launch vehicles, a thorough understanding of the reliability histories and
operational problems of previous launch vehicles is required. The manned
booster reliability analysis was performed by utilization of a computerized
database, called RAM, which contains operational and design details for the
following launch vehicles: Delta, Titan, Ariane, Space Shuttle, and Atlas.
Each launch of each vehicle is accurately detailed with respect to:
L A
When launched (date)
Launch Site (ETR, WTR, etc. )
Responsible agency (NASA, USAF, ESA, etc.)
If mission was successful or not
If unsuccessful, cause of failure and vehicle stage(s) responsible
for failure
Failure details (i.e., 2nd stage hydraulic system failure)
Moreover, the RAM database contains specific design and operational
parameters for each vehicle and its associated stage(s). These parameters
encompass: number of rocket motors, boosters and strap-ons, stages used,
thrust levels by stage, burn times by stage, rocket motor designations (part
numbers), fuels employed by stage, etc.
From the above information it was possible to generate statistics such as
overall mission reliability by vehicle, mission reliability by stage,
subsystem failure rates (MTBF's), subsystem percentage contributions to
overall failures, etc. These statistics reveal design-related criteria that
point the way to better designed and more reliable launch vehicles in the
future. These parameters were also used as the means of comparing the
several candidate manned booster concepts.
Pictorial displays from the RAM database show some of the more revealing
statistical facts developed. Note the significant variation in failure causes
by vehicle stage. To illustrate, the principal cause of 3rd stage failure
appears to be ignition-related (40% of all 3rd stage failures), whereas 2nd
stages suffer mostly from control problems. Frozen valves at high
altitudes have contributed to a large fraction of all 2nd stage mission
failures, and should be recognized as a design problem to be eliminated for
future launch vehicles.
_,...j]
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Pictorial Displays of Failure Causes
I st STAGE
• GUIDANCE
[] CONTROL
l MOTOR
[] ELECTRICAL
[]STRAP-
ON/SOLID
[] VALVES/PUMP
2nd STAGE
[]CONTROL
[] IGNITION
[] MOTOR
[] ELECTRICAL
[] HYDRAULICS
[] FUEL
m .gFPARATI(']N
II-S3
• GUIDANCE
[] IGNITION
[] MOTOR
[] VALVES/PUMP
S
[] HYDRAULICS
[] FUEL
3rd STAGE
When launch vehicle types are compared to one another it has been the
usual practice to simply compare their mission reliability. If, for example,
Vehicle "A" has an "observed" reliability of 0.915 and Vehicle "B" has an
"observed" reliability of 0.892, the former is regarded as the more reliable
of the two. Operationally, this is probably true, but this assessment fails to
consider all pertinent data. To illustrate, from a time-dependent* MTBCF
point-of-view the opposite might be true. If A's launch burn is 200
seconds and B's launch burn is 300 seconds it can be demonstrated that A's
time-dependent MTBCF L_P..S.L.tlli_ B's time-dependent MTBCF. Therefore,
on an equal exposure basis, B is more reliable than A. The table below
shows time-dependent MTBCF and burn time related to reliability.
Comparison of paper launch vehicle concepts, as was generally required in
this study, must take these factors into account when estimating the
booster's reliability.
MTBCF has both a time-dependent component and a cycle dependent
component. The RAM database contains a cycle-based or time-based
"flag" for each reported failure.
VEHICLE
A
B
0.915
0.892
200 seconds
300 seconds
MTB 
(time-dependent)
2251 seconds
2625 seconds
Reliability vs. Burn time vs. MTBCF
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It follows that consideration must also be given to differences in the
missions themselves. One vehicle may use two stages to reach LEO while
another vehicle uses 3 stages and achieves a significantly higher orbit. A
simple comparison of their numerical "observed" reliabiliW may not fairly
represent such vehicles when comparisons are attempted.
The degree of designed-in redundancy manifests itself in the levels of
reliability actually achieved. It appears that numerous failure modes exist
that could not be remedied by the use of redundancy. Valves freezing due
to entrapped moisture would still freeze regardless of the number of
redundant valves provided, whereas loss of guidance (i.e., IMU failure)
might be virtually eliminated by adding an adequate number of redundant
IMUs. However, the additional Life-Cycle Costs required to provide this
redundancy must be weighed against the Life-Cycle Costs associated with
vehicle loss and/or failure to meet mission objectives.
Application of the Above Methods to ATSS Studies.
J
When two or more candidate launch vehicles are compared the question
sooner-or-later asked is: "Which booster is the most (or least) reliable, and
why?" In fact, the question arose when the numerous NLS-2 booster
configurations were under study. Details of each booster's design were
basically limited to three-view drawings, but engine types and quantities
were known, as was the booster performance and trajectory data.
For example, one of the proposed NLS-2 two stage vehicles was configured
with 4 STMEs and 1 J-2S engines. Unfortunately, the reliability of the
STME is not known since it has yet to be built and tested. A reasonable
assumption, however, is that STME reliability will be as good as the current
SSME (Space Shuttle Main Engine), an engine for which reliability is known
with some precision and confidence. On 9/12/92, the SSME MTBCF was
estimated to be 77,000 seconds. This 77,000 second MTBCF was utilized
for all STME applications in candidate NIS booster configurations.
Similarly, MTBCFs for other engine types (i.e., the F-l, J-2S, etc.) were
derived directly from operational experience data of these engines.
Reliabilityof all the candidate NLS manned booster configurations, as well
as the currently operational vehicles such as the Proton (D-l-e), Energia,
and Titan W, were computed against the same "baseline" mission. That
mission was the delivery of a manned payload (PLS or CLV) to a 15 X 220
Nmi transfer orbit to Space Station Freedom. For each vehicle, propellant
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masses and engine burn times (by stage) were provided from trajectory
analyses of each booster as described in the Performance Analysis section
of this report.
To illustrate how booster reliability estimates can be made in the absence
of detailed design data, consider the following. Given that all we know is:
1. Vehicle "A" Has 3 SSME Engines (all must work).
2. Vehicle "B" Has 4 SSME Engines (all must work).
3. SSME burn times are identical for both vehicles.
The reliability of each vehicle can be calculated and comparisons made
based strictly on the engine MTBCF. First, we find that Vehicle "A" is
inherently more reliable than Vehicle "B" because the probability that 3 of
3 engines will work is higher than the probability that 4 of 4 engines will
work. To illustrate, for an SSME MTBCF of 77,000 seconds and a burn time
of 480 seconds, the following engine system reliability (R) will be achieved:
RA (3 of 3) = 0.9815
RB (4 of 4) = 0.9754
Conclusion = Vehicle "A" has higher reliability than Vehicle "B".
If, however, the 4-engine vehicle has single engine-out capability and the
3-engine vehicle does not, a substantially different answer results:
RA (3 of 3) = 0.9815
R B (3 of 4) = 0.9998
Conclusion = Vehicle "B" reliability is much better than Vehicle "A"I
This type of reliability analysis was performed for each of the manned
booster concepts examined in this study. Reliability of each booster was
estimated based on number of stages, number and type of engines in each
stage, engine burn times for each engine, and engine-out capabilities.
These reliability estimates were reported as the booster's Probability of
Mission Success. Incorporating the PLS escape system (number and type
of motors, motor burn times) as an additional stage to be employed if the
earlier stage did fail, a crew safety estimate was also made for each
booster (reported as Probability of Safe Return). It should be noted,
however, that reliability _ were made for the paper booster
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concepts. Reliability estimates for existing boosters (Space Shuttle, Proton,
and Titan IV) are actual, demonstrated reliability values.
The reliability analyses showed that the NLS-2 boosters are predicted to
achieve higher reliability than current expendable launch vehicles, and
also higher than the soon to be introduced Ariane V. The NLS-2 boosters
will also have higher reliability and higher crew safety than the current
Space Shuttle. Results of the reliability analyses for each booster are
presented below.
Table 3 Manned Booster Reliability Estimates
Engine
Vehicle Out ?
(Probability. of
Mission Success)
Crew Safety
(Probability. of
Safe Return)
Non-NIS
Space Shuttle No .9500 .9840
Ariane V No .9805 .9999028
Energia No .9771 .9998857
Proton No .9261 .9996305
Titan IV No .9169 .9995847
E-HLLV No .9677 .9998388
LRB (F-1A) No .9785
NLS
NIS-2 (6/2) Yes .9897 .9999488
" no engine out No .9811 .9999058
NLS 2 stage(STME) No .9765 .9998824
NIS 2 stage (F-1A) No .9845 .9999225
NLS-2 (4/1) No .9841 .9999205
Fully reusable
AMLS Yes .9880 .9999947
" no engine out NO .9500 .9999947
NASP derived Yes .9500 .9999950
SSTO (HTOHL) Yes .9500 .9999950
SSTO (VTOHL) Yes .9894 .9999946
The above results reveal that the variability in manned booster reliability
(which has been estimated from the number of stages, engine type, and
engine burn times) is much greater than the effects of engine out
capability. Where a class of booster concepts uses the same engine (such
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as with the NLS-2 class of boosters), the engine out effect is strong and
provides for a high probability of mission success, The single greatest
reliability driver among these booster concepts is the engine reliability
itself,
Also seen in the above results is the high crew safety estimates afforded
by the PLS (or CLV) escape system. The capability for the crew (payload)
to escape from the booster and return safely to Earth provides the greatest
measure of crew safety. The effects of booster reliability or booster engine
out capability on crew safety are minor compared to this escape capability.
Reliability Analyses are based on "real world" historical data
Historical data for Atlas, Delta, Titan and Shuttle
Include all flights, through May 1992, for the above vehicles
Each flight is independently tracked
- success, failure, what failed, when, why?
Data includes:
- vehicle model number
number of stages
burn time by stage
- engines and fuels employed
- avionics operating time
• Database Sort and Query capability
Figure 2.1-76 Reliability Estimates Based on Flight History
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For manned launch vehicles, Failure ;_ Loss
Most references to Shuttle reliability are in the context of vehicle and
crew loss
This is understandable, because for ELVs
reliability is measured that way...
mission and payload usually are lost
Unlike ELVS, manned systems can recover from critical failures and
return without damage
The measure of this capability is "Probability of Safe Return"
- Currently estimated to be 0.983
Most Shuttle missions have been successful, but not 100%
- In the event of a mission terminating failure, the Orbiter returns safely
to Earth
- The measure of this capability is "Probability of Mission Success"
- Currently estimated to be 0.948 for a 7-day mission
- Varies as a function of mission "specifics"
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Figure 2.1-77 Mission Success vs. Safe Return
PLS reference mission
STS reference mission
1.00
0.99 PLS on-orbit
0.98 reliability
0.97 (predicted)
0.96
0.95
0.94
0.93
0.9Z
0.91
0.90
STS on-orbit
0.89 reliability
0.88 (demonstrated)
0.87
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
ON-ORBIT TIME (DAYS)
Figure 2.1-78 Mission Reliability vs. On-orbit Time
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SSMEs have proven to be extremely reliable
46 flights flown to date
- No in-flight engine failures
- One commanded SSME shutdown
- Total burn time is 66,240 seconds.
The MTBCF (Mean-Time-Before-Critical-Failure) is 66,240 seconds
Reliability of a single SSME is 0.99278
Probability of losing 2 or more SSMEs in the first 260 seconds
of flight is 0.00004592.
SSME Safe Return reliability is 0.99995408
SRBs are the limiting element in Shuttle reliability
One failure in 47 flights flown to date
Total burn time is 11,190 seconds
Reliability of a single SRB is 0.9925
SRB Safe Return reliability is 0.9925
Figure 2.1-79 Shuttle Propulsion System ReliabiliW
In-flight failures of a critical avionics system component usually
results in loss of an ELV, its payload and its mission
- Atlas has lost 4 of 204 missions due to avionics
- Delta has lost 5 of 180 missions due to avionics
Titan has lost 2 0f 170 missions due to avionics
Shuttle has lost 0 of 47 missions due to avionics
Shuttle cumulative in-flight avionics operating times are 17 times the
combined Atlas, Delta and Titan operating times
avionics redundancy is credited with this reliability achievement since
a number of avionics failures have occurred in critical systems
• Avionics redundancy enables manned systems to remain on-orbit for
extended periods
Figure 2.1-80 Shuttle Avionics System ReliabiliW
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• The Orbiter has in excess of 6,500 hours of flight avionics operating time
Mission-terminating avionics failures occur for:
- Atlas every 10.6 hours
- Delta every 20.5 hours
- Titan every 63.5 hours
- Shuttle every 6,500 hours
I Redundancy in avionics components ]yield startling improvements in reliability
".._.t Figure 2.1-81 Avionics Reliability Through Redundancy
PROBABILITY OF MISSION SUCCESS (Demonstrated)
ELEMENT RELIABILITY MISSION PHASE RELIABILITY
SRB .9850 Prelaunch .8220
ET .9990 Ascent .9640
Orbiter .9630 Orbit ,9841
Entry .9990
Total Mission Reliability
PROBABILITY OF SAFE RETURN (Demonstrated)
ELEMENT RELIABIflTY MISSION PHASE RELIABILITY
SRB .9850 Prelaunch .9999
ET .9990 Ascent .9850
Orbiter .9989 Orbit .9990
Entry .9990
Total Vehicle Reliability
PROBABILITY OF SAFE RETURN (Predicted)
ELEMENT RELIABILITY MISSION PHASE RELIABILITY
'_ SRB .9900 Prelaunch .9999
ET .9990 Ascent .9899
Orbiter .9989 Orbit .9990
Entry .9990
Total Vehicle Rellability
"...._J
Figure 2.1-82 Summary of Space Shuttle Reliability
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Figure 2.1-83 NLS-2 Propulsion System Reliability
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Engine out benefits are not strongly
affected by engine actual MTBCF
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Figure 2.1-84 NLS-2 Engine Out Effects vs. MTBCF
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Figure 2.1-85 NLS-2 Avionics System Reliabili W
PROBABILITY OF MISSION SUCCESS (Predicted)
ELEMENT RELIABILITY MISSION PHASE RELIABILITY
NLS .981 Prelaunch .846
PLS .994 Ascent .980
Orbit .996
Entry .999
Total Mission Reliability
I I
PROBABILITY OF SAFE RETURN (Predicted)
MISSION PHASE RELIABILITYELEMENT RELIABILITY
NLS .999
PLS .988
Prelaunch .9999
Ascent .990
Orbit .999
Entry .999
Total Vehicle Reliability
Figure 2.1-86 NLS-2/PLS Reliability Summary
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Prob. nothing goes wrong
NLS-2 AMLS
1.5 Sta_te
.981125 .950054
Prob. something goes wrong
- complete mission anyway
Prob. something goes wrong
- cannot complete mission
- safely return to ground
Prob. something goes wrong
- cannot complete mission
- cannot return to ground
- SAFELY ESCAPE
.989755 .988025
N/A
.998947
.9999488 .9999947
Crew Loss Events (per 10,000 flights) .512 .053 1
Figure 2.1-87 Expendable vs. Fully Re-usable Boosters
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Figure 2.1-88 NLS-2 1.5 Stage Boosters Mission Success
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Figure 2.1-89 NIS-2 2 Stage Boosters Mission Success
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II-65
co
co
IJJ
U
U
u3
Z
_o
co
co
=E
LL
0
J
IZ)
<
0
0¢:
D.
1.000
0.995
0.990
0.985
0.980
ARIANE V
BEC
ME(
O @ 123.07 Sl COND_
O @ 6'_ 9.77 S :COND:
O 1OO 200 300 400 500 600
TIME OF FLIGHT (SECONDS)
0.9806
1.000
_q
0.995
U
U
0.990
Z
0
0.985
.R
o.98o
>-
I=j 0.975
<m0.970
0
ns
0.
TITAN IV
•.:!fiTtr!!T!'rl?[i]T
0 100 200 300 400
TIMEOF FLIGHT(SECONDS)
I
0.9771
500
k....2 Figure 2.1-91 Ariane V and Titan V Boosters Mission Success
l/1
uJ
U
U
Lq
Z
(2_
m
0
J
I]o
<
11o
0
1.00
0.99
0.98
0.97
0.96
0.95
0.94
0.93
0.92
0.91
PROTON(D-l-e) ENERGIA
1ST ,3"AGE(/0@ 1 9SECCNDS
N 2ND ,'fAOE-i_ I-3-S[-C-(NOS --
\ 3RDIffAGE(:/0@ 5 p9SECCNDS
\
\
,,\
I
100 200 300 400
TIMEOFFLIGHT(SECONDS)
k___
"-'-'_-- -- 0.9188
500 600
1.000 \
0.995 \ ,_::_u_ __m_._ __
o 0.990 ". i _ - m I_IREI_
z \
o ,%0.985 _ a e
_ o.98o
m 0.975
o .....
=" 0.970
0 100
t
)RF.,,-ENGINI %EJ_E_EL._
....., 'i
0.9771
200 300 400 500
TIME OF FUGHT (SECONDS)
_%,...jJ Figure 2.1-92 Russian Boosters Mission Success
II-66
2.2 Cargo Transfer & Return Vehicle Studies
The Cargo Transfer and Return Vehicle Concept, referred to as the CTRV, is
a system for performing the mission of cargo delivery and return to low
Earth orbit (LEO). As originally envisioned, this system would operate in
con]unction with a crew delivery/return system (such as the PLS). The
CTRV concept, together with a PLS concept and an appropriate launch
vehicle, form the architectural framework of the Access to Space, Option 2
study. Identifying the specific configurations of the CTRV, PIS, and launch
vehicles which best satisfied the Access to Space mission requirements was
the principle objective of the study.
The key CTRV mission requirement is delivery and return of Space Station
Freedom logistics elements. These logistics elements include both
pressurized and unpressurized payloads which are normally carried in the
Space Shuttle payload bay. The logistics elements are therefor
standardized around a 15 foot diameter cylindrical volume. The payloads
within these logistics elements are considerably smaller, but the key
payload is a Space Station logistics rack. These racks are the largest
pressurized payloads and constitute by far the greatest number of annual
payload deliveries (and returns) for the Space Station. Annual delivery
and return requirements of combinations of Pressurized Logistics Modules
(PLMs), Unpressurized Logistics Carriers (ULCs), and Propulsion Modules
(PMs) drove the CTRV payload volume and mass capabilities.
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Figure 2.2-1 The CTRV Concept
CTRV concepts have been examined over the past several years by NASA
MSFC and these concepts formed the starting point of current CTRV
studies. The initial CTRV designs were based on ballistic or lifting body
configurations with a parachute landing system. The reference
configuration (or starting point) for the CTRV studies was the Medium
CTRV concept. The Medium CTRV definition and initial configuration was
provided by NASA MSFC and General Dynamics Corp., who had jointly
developed the CTRV concept in earlier studies. Several versions of this
basic approach were developed for varying payload sizes. The smallest of
these was the PLS Caboose, which carried eight logistics racks and was
launched concurrently with the PIS. A preliminary Integral CTRV concept
from General Dynamics was also developed further. This concept
attempted to reduce the payload packaging factor by replacing the Space
Station logistics carriers and carrying only the logistics payloads
themselves (racks, lockers, etc.). Later versions of this Integral CTRV
concept included large fins which improved aerodynamic stability and
which also provided subsystem installation volume. Precision (runway)
landing of the CTRV concepts was recognized as a key requirement for
minimizing operations costs. This requirement led to the Winged CTRV
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concepts, which started with small payload capabilities (22,000 lbs) and
evolved to larger payloads and combined crew/cargo delivery capabilities.
Design and analysis activities for the various CTRV configurations
identified several key design issues for these systems. Payload volume
and mass requirements associated with the Space Station logistics elements
(which were designed for the Space Shuttle payload bay) placed the
greatest constraint on the overall CTRV configurations. Large payload bay
doors are required to transfer these payloads once at the Space Station.
Such large payload bays and doors limit aerodynamic and structural
designs of the CTRV concepts. Aerodynamic stability and heating
constraints during re-entry imposed design constraints which led to large
aerodynamic control surfaces and limited internal layouts (payload and
subsystems CG). The need to develop individual vehicles for the crew and
the cargo missions (even if launched by the same booster) was a major cost
factor which led to the combined crew/cargo CTRV configurations.
The selection process which determined the path taken from initial CTRV
concepts to the final design configurations was derived from the CTRV
design requirements and design issues. The mission requirements did not
change during the course of the study, but the issues were uncovered only
by the design process itself. The selection process thus followed a trail
illuminated by the design issues. Initial CTRV concept selections were
made on the basis of payload capabilities and launch weight. Later concept
selections were based on aerodynamic characteristics and
development/operations costs. The resulting final CTRV configuration
selected was one which provided optimal payload and launch weights and
best satisfied all design and cost issues. The final concept selected in the
NASA Access to Space study was the HL-42, a scaled up version of the PIN
concept with both crew and cargo delivery capability. The HL-42 performs
the same cargo delivery and return functions as the CTRV concepts
examined in this study, although with a reduced cargo volume and mass.
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2.2.1 PLS Caboose Concept
A concept which has not been featured in recent man/cargo launch system
architectures is a cargo transfer and return vehicle which is an integral
part of the PLS. This concept is similar to the Resource Module for the
Hermes space plane, but has a cargo delivery mission of its own,
independent of the manned capsule. The genesis of this concept, called the
PLS Caboose, was the excess lift capability of the NLS boosters for the PLS
delivery mission. Rather than re-size the booster downward from the
NLS-2 reference, it was decided to determine how much of the excess lift
capability could be converted into useful payload through a small cargo
delivery and return vehicle. The goal for a cargo vehicle design was to
utilize as much of the structure and functional capabilities which already
existed in the adjacent PLS and the PLS adapter/escape system. The PLS
adapter and escape system are normally carried all the way to the booster
Mt_CO conditions and then expended. At that point they are of no further
use for the PLS but they can provide useful propulsion and structural
elements for the cargo vehicle.
PLS Caboose
a Cargo Return Vehicle for PLS
Figure 2.2-3 The PLS Caboose Concept
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2.2.1.1 PIS Caboose Design
The PLS caboose was designed to deliver additional pressurized cargo on
the PLS launch, which essentially extended the pressurized cargo
capability of the PLS system it flies with. A pressurized volume and
payload mass capability equivalent to eight Space Station standard racks
was selected as the design point. The PLS caboose structural design was
built around the PLS launch vehicle adapter. The adapter was utilized as
an aeroshell for the caboose and an integrated load path for both PLS
launch loads and the cargo payload was developed. Due to the adapter
geometry limitations for the launch phase, a simple ballistic shape was
selected for the PLS caboose. A Quality Functional Deployment (QFD)
approach was used to guide the design process. The resulting design was
highly modular and utilized simple designs, shapes and materials,
especially in the high cost thermal protection system (TPS).
A hot structure approach to TPS was used for this relatively small sized re-
entry system. Hot structure concepts are generally heavier than Shuttle-
like tile systems, but are much cheaper. The caboose TPS concept
represented an attempt to see just how much weight impact a non-tile
system would cause for a small re-entry vehicle.
Propulsion systems (attitude control) were highly modular for the caboose
to permit off-line ground processing of these systems (or even expendable
units). The PLS escape motors were used for all orbit transfer propulsion
maneuvers. The use of modular propulsion system (attitude control
system) elements, coupled with the ability to utilize the caboose and PLS
thruster firings for translation maneuvers, resulted in a reduction in the
number of thrusters required to provide Fail Op/Fail Safe attitude control.
A total of 24 thrusters was required on the caboose to perform all
translation/rotation maneuvers with two failures anywhere in the system.
An additional 14 thrusters would have been required to perform the
required orbital maneuvers with the same level of redundancy without
this PIS aided approach.
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2.2.1.2 PLS Caboose Analysis
Trajectory analysis of the caboose concept showed that the re-entry loads
(3.5g deceleration) and the peak heating rates (40 BTU/ft2-sec) are well
within the desired range for the selected TPS and structures concepts.
Cross range capabilities for this ballistic shape are very limited (less than
150 nmi.). The hot structure approach resulted in a TPS/structure
combined weight of 6.0 lbs/square foot, 1.36 times the weight of an
equivalent tile/aluminum structure approach. The projected cost savings
of this approach, however, is dramatic. The hot structure TPS fabrication
and installation cost is estimated to be $40/ft 2. This is significantly lower
than the $16,000/ft 2 for tile installation costs currently being experienced
on the Space Shuttle. Some amount of weight reduction could be achieved
for an expendable structure by the use of ablator materials which would
directly reduce the required structural thickness. The combination of
limited cross range and an ablative type thermal protection system make
this design approach a particularly good solution for water landing type
systems.
A finite element structural analysis model of the caboose was prepared to
analyze the structural loads in the outer aeroshell and in the pressure
vessel. Both launch loads were calculated for the launch phase (integrated
with a NIS-2 booster beneath and the PIS (HL-20) above the caboose) and
re-entry phase. The analysis showed good isolation of the pressure vessel
from the launch loads (aerodynamic bending loads at max O0 and good load
distributions during the high deceleration re-entry. This model was used
to calculate the caboose structural weight estimates.
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Figure 2.2-9 PLS Caboose Re-entry Heating Rates
i /
Figure 2.2-10 Caboose & NLS-2 Booster Finite-Element Model
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vFigure 2.2-11 AerosheU Stresses at Max Q
Figure 2.2-12 Pressure Vessel Stresses at Max Q
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Figure 2.2-13 Pressure Vessel Stresses During Re-entry
Figure 2.2-14 AerosheU Stresses During Re-entry
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2,2,_ Medium CTRV Concept
A detailed design study of the Medium CTRV concept was performed to
obtain a better understanding of the CTRV design requirements and to
improve the design definition for this concept, The design effort included
trajectory analysis, thermal analysis, detailed structural design, and
parametric analysis of the CTRV landing system options (parachutes).
2.2.2.1 Requirements Analysis
A detailed set of design requirements was prepared for each CTRV
subsystem and for the system level design. The requirements were
compiled into a Requirements Definition Document (RDD) for each
subsystem and one RDD for the complete CTRV system. These documents
are structured such that the design requirements and the design solution
(design definition and performance capabilities) can be documented in a
single volume for future reference. Later definition of the system (and
subsystem) verification plans can aIso be included in these same volumes.
A total of 13 RDDs were prepared which included all subsystems except
the Avionics subsystems. Included in each of these documents is the
subsystem's definition, functional and design requirements, and subsystem
interfaces with the Space Station, the launch vehicle, and with the CTRV
payloads. The system level requirements documents are similar to the
subsystem RDDs but include mission, payload, and ground operations
requirements. These CTRV requirements documents were used to compile
the list of impacts to Space Station Freedom for a CTRV-based logistics
delivery system rather than the current Shuttle-based system.
k J
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Requirements ! Definition Document
Figure 2.2-16 CTRV Requirements Document (TPS)
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2.2.2.2 Structures Design
Detailed structural design of the Medium CTRV was performed to obtain
better weight estimates of this concept and to also determine dynamic
responses of this structure approach to flight loading conditions. Analysis
of load paths to carry flight loads through the structure has resulted in
some changes to the baseline structural concepts and in more detailed
structural definition. Relocation of several structural beams was required
in the forward and aft fuselage sections to redirect loads away from the
upper portion of the payload bay bulkheads (which cannot transfer axial
loads through the payload bay doors). Two keel beams were added to the
lower structural areas to accommodate flight bending loads. Definition of
structural beams and reinforcements in the aft fuselage section was
required to accommodate launch loads, propulsion, and docking loads. CAD
drawings of the design and layout were utilized for the current structural
definition and stress analysis models were developed from the CAD system
drawings for use in structural analysis.
Structural design layout drawings were prepared for the Medium CTRV
(C23LNF configuration, which is the CTRV configuration baseline for our
structural analysis). The layout drawings included dimensioned three
view layouts of the exterior surfaces and of primary internal structural
members (frames, longerons, etc.) Full color perspective drawings of the
CTRV were also provided in several orientations, showing the concept with
payload bay doors open and closed and with payloads installed.
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Figure 2.2-22 Medium CTRV Detail Design Layouts (2 of 3)
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2.2.2.3 Structural Analysis
A finite element model of the Medium CTRV structure design was
completed which includes all structural elements and major subsystems.
The major subsystems were included as point masses in the model with
the mass supported by the appropriate structural elements (beams,
longerons, or frames). These subsystem masses were included in order to
estimate the required loads for the primary structural members of the
CTRV design. The f'mite element model was translated into a NASTRAN file
for the structural sizing analyses under flight loads conditions. The
NASTRAN file provided initial bending mode information for the structure
as well as the vehicle moments of inertial about primary body axes. This
file also provided a computer calculated weight estimate for the Medium
CTRV structure,
The NASTRAN finite element model of the Medium CTRV structural design
was used to determine stress levels for several flight load conditions:
maximum acceleration (3.2 g's at MECO); maximum structural bending
loads (aerodynamic loads at max Q); and landing loads (29 ft/sec vertical
landing velociW). This last condition (landing) was run for a "perfect
landing" (4-wheel initial contact) and for a nominal landing (2-wheel initial
contact with 10 knot forward velocity). The analyses generally showed
that the structure is oversized and skin, frame, and longeron thicknesses
can be reduced. Most of the flight loads were being reacted by the skin
sections rather than the keel beams and frames. The keel beams help
transmit loads only during the landing conditions and thus can be greatly
reduced or eliminated in most of the mid-fuselage (payload bay) region.
The bulkhead structures at the forward and aft ends of the payload bay
were found to require some stiffening for the high axial acceleration
conditions (MECO and max Q). The payload bay frame structures were also
too flexible and will require some bracing for axial loads. These frames did
not carry high loads, however, so they could be replaced by a lighter truss
structure instead of the solid frame design initially modeled. Color stress
contour plots were prepared to illustrate the analysis results for each of
the load conditions.
The stress analysis results described above generally indicate that the
structural weight estimate for the CTRV can be reduced based on the
expected loads. These findings are preliminary, however, as additional
loads conditions such as skin panel loads and buckling due to aerodynamic
pressure distributions were not examined (especially for the forward and
mid fuselage sections). Total vehicle bending modes (buckling analysis)
also must be determined before completing any redesign.
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Figure 2.2-25 Medium CTRV Finite-Element Model
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k_# Figure 2.2-26 CTRV Stresses at Max O_
Figure 2.2-27 CTRV Stresses at Landing (Aft Gear Touchdown)
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Figtue 2.2-28 CTRV Stresses at Landing (Front Gear Slapdown)
Figure 2.2-29 CTRV Stresses at Landing (4-point Touchdown)
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2.2.2.4 Trajectory Analysis
Trajectory analyses of both the C23LNF and the more recent CV75
configurations of the Medium CTRV was performed with the POST
trajectory analysis model to compare their cross range and TPS heating
differences. The CV75 configuration was selected by NASA as the
preferred Medium CTRV configuration in order to achieve sufficient cross
range to reach an Edwards AFB landing site. The trajectory analyses
demonstrated that the CV75 configuration does in fact provide sufficient
cross range to reach Edwards AFB, but the total heat load on the vehicle
increased by 70% (re-entry heat rates and accelerations were about the
same for the two configurations). This significant increase in heat load will
directly affect (increase) the TPS weight for this configuration. Re-entry
environmental and performance parameters such as acceleration, heating
rates, cross range, and dynamic pressure were obtained for both Medium
CTRV shapes. The calculated re-entry trajectory environments for the
reference CTRV shape (C23LNF configuration) were used for the
subsequent detailed thermal analyses and landing systems design.
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2.2.2.5 Thermal Analysis & TPS Sizing
Thermal analysis was performed to determine the initial structure
temperatures which would be encountered at the start of re-entry. The
TPS/structure was subjected to thermal environments consistent with a
long duration Space Station docked attitude (local vertical) and then
allowed a 12-hour thermal conditioning period prior to the start of the re-
entry mission phase. The analysis identified initial structure temperatures
between 120°F and 70°F at the end of the thermal conditioning period.
TPS sizing analysis was then performed using these initial structure and
tile temperatures. Heating rates for several flow streamlines around the
reference shape were computed and used to determine heat loads and TPS
thicknesses at selected CTRV body points.
The TPS sizing analysis indicated a TPS weight of 6,415 lbs (excluding the
RCC nose cap) for the CTRV. This translates to a net TPS tile weight per
square foot of 1.60 lb/ft2, which is more than the net TPS tile weight of
1.23 lb/ft 2 for the Space Shuttle. The greater average TPS tile thickness
than Shuttle is due to the larger percentage of high temperature tiles for
the CTRV (60%) vs. the Shuttle (50%). The required TPS thicknesses are
actually slightly thinner than would be seen on a Shuttle for equivalent re-
entry heat loads. The reason for the thinner tiles is the lower initial
temperatures found on the CTRV structure and tiles. The Shuttle tiles
were sized for a mission which required re-entry immediately after
launch. The CTRV has no similar mission (or any equivalent abort
missions) and temperatures are allowed to stabilize to orbital conditions
prior to entry. The effect of a 12-hour pre-entry thermal conditioning
period is seen in the tile thicknesses also. Su-ucture and tile temperatures
for the CTRV HRSI (black tiles) areas needed this thermal conditioning
period to lower the temperatures they reached when exposed to direct
solar radiation while in space.
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Figure 2.2-35 CTRV On-orbit Temperature Distribution
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Figure 2.2-39 CTRV Aeroheating & TPS Thickness Distribution
• A passive subsystem consisting of materials applied externally to the primary structural shell of
the CTRV In order to maintain exterior temperatures within acceptable limits.
• TPS materials and temperature limits are:
1) Reuseable carbon-carbon _RCC). Used in areas where surface temperatures exceed 2300OF.
RCC density is 98.5 Ibm/cu.ft.
2) High-temperature reusable surface Insulation (HRSI). Acceptable for 1200°FdT<230OOF.
HRSI density Is 9.0 Ibm/cu.ft.
3) Low-temperature reusable surface Insulation (LRSI). Acceptable for 700°F_r<1200OF.
LRSI density is 9.0 Ibm/cu.ft.
4) Coated Nomex felt reusable surface Insulation (FRSI). Acceptable for Surface temperatures
less than 700°F. FRSI density is 5.4 ibmlcu.ft.
Shuttle Orbiter
TPS Area Weight WtJArea % Total
Material sq. ft. Ib Ib/sq.ft. Weight
RCC 409 3,742 9.15 19.8
HRSI 5,164 9,728 1.89 51.5
LRSI 2,741 2,236 0.82 11.8
FRSI 3,581 1,173 0.33 6.2
Misc _ 2,025 m 10.7
TOTALS 11,895 18,904 1.59 100.0
TPS Comparison
CTRV
Vertical tall Included
TPS Area Weight WtJArea % Total
Material sq. ft. Ib Ib/sq.ft. Weight
RCC 143 1,307 9.14 14.2
HRSI 2,124 5,276 2.48 57.3
LRSI 1,611 1,760 1.09 19.1
FRSI 1,817 596 0.33 6.4
Misc m. 278 m 3.0
TOTALS 5,695 9,215 1.62 100.0 j
Figure 2.2-40 CTRV vs. Shuttle TPS Differences
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2.2.2.6 Landing System Design
Landing system designs and performance were established for the CTRV
concept based on a design approach which called for a supersonic
deployment (Mach 1.4) of a drogue chute and parachute deployment loads
under 4 g's. The current re-entry trajectory for the CTRV reaches the
Mach 1.4 conditions at 80,000 ft altitude. Trade studies of parachute sizing
and deployment options, system cost and weight impacts, and parachute
deployment loads were performed to determine an appropriate landing
system design for the CTRV. The parachute system selected for the CTRV
is an eight chute cluster of 137 foot parachutes. This main chute system
results in a terminal descent rate of 28 ft/sec velocity and weighs 4,100
lbs. In addition to the main parachutes, a drogue chute is required, as well
as pilot chutes for both the main and drogue chutes. The CTRV parachute
system weight is estimated at 5,865 lbs, requiring a volume of 140 cubic
feet.
__.St'I'_r"_Ol__2|_e"J
I Primary Decelerator ] 0 Using cost as the dominant
selection driver, a scenario
s,,,,.._.=_. is selected to provide the[ Transonic ] j..............::.:..........L.]
,IT basis for CTRV landing
system preliminary design
Terminal Decelerator J O Primary Decelerator -
Transonic Drogue
O Terminal Decelerator-
_ILowGlid_______e] [ High Glidej Conventional Parachute
Cluster
O Impact Attenuation- Energy
ImpactAttenuation Absorbing Land landing
'=°ero'f,o,o,,,.o.,,o]
Figure 2.2-41 Landing System Design Selection Path
II-99
Conventional Cluster: It is required that conventional
parachutes be clustered for application to the
CTRV weight range, A single chute would be
impractically large.
The size/weight of the cluster is driven by the required
terminal rate of descent', ....
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Figure 2.2-42 Parachute Sizing Trades
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Selecti0n of Parachute Cluster Size depends heavily on required
terminal rate of descent.
Systems with retro rockets operate at a higher Vv than pure drag
systems
Weight curves for _ _,_
parachute/retro systems _-_,ooo •
show a minimum system ssoo " . ._\'_ Minima
weight 0N'a) for Steady s_ fi_¢_._. /
State Rate of Descent _c__ _
(Vv)-50-60 fps. '_
Pure drag systems are w_n,3'_ ._z_"_2_7_7_:_
designed for the minimum ' \
V v compatible with weight =.o0o ....
and volume constraints. _ " - "
For the CTRV, a vertical =,_ _/,,_--L-
velocity range (A) of ,50o ______A)_j / _
' 20 eO.O00It>
20-60 fps provides a _' ,__ Wd.,b
comprehensive basis for vo._,. - ,oo ,,°
analysis.
PioneerAerospaceCorporation
J
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F_gure 2.2-43 Parachute Weight Sensitivity Analysis
Vertical Velocities much lower than 30 fps result in excessively
large canopies.
Se_cting an upper limit for D <150 ft. fits well with Vv<30 fps
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Figure 2.2-44 Landing Sink Rate Sensitivity Analysis
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• Drogue Parachute Type- Conical Ribbon
• Materials
O Canopy- Nylon
O Suspension - Kevlar/Nylon
• Reefing:
O Single Stage
O S,JSo = 0.45 - 0.65
• Physical Properties:
L L/
Integral CTRV Medium CTRV
Wd = 50 KIb W_ = 75 KIb
Nominal Diameter, D,, (if) 46.5 57.4
Projected Diameter, Dp (ft) 32.6 40.2
Number of Gores, No 56 68
Line Length, Lt. (ft) 93 114.8
Drogue Pack Weight (Ib} Incl. bag 617 1114
Pioneer Aerospace Corporation "
k..J
Figure 2.2-45 Medium CTRV Drogue Parachute Design
Dp
• Main ParachuteType-Triconical
• Materials
O Canopy - Nylon
O Suspension - Kevlar
• Reefing:
O Single Siege
O Sr/So=0.85
• Physical Properties:
Integral CTRV Medium CTRV
W= [] 50 KIb W d = 75 Klb
Cluster Size, N 5 8
Terminal Vertical Velocity, V, (fps) 28 28
Nominal Diameter, D° (ft) 13g.1 137.1
Projected Diameter, Dp (It) g6 95
Number of Gores, N= 122 120
Line Length, L L (ft) 201.7 198.8
Pack Weight (Ib/chute) Incl. bag 556 517
Pioneer Aerospace Corporation
Figure 2.2-46 Medium CTRV Main Parachute Design
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• Drogue Pilot Chute Mortar Fire
• Pilot Chute extracts Drogue Pack and deploys reefed Drogue Chute
Drogue deployed
• Drogue disreefs to full open
• CTRV descends on Drogue to preselected transition altitude
Pioneer Aerospace Corporation
Figure 2.2-47 CTRV Drogue Parachute Deployment
• At preselected altitude (16kfl for first Iteration) Drogue Is released
• , Main Pilot Chute Mortars fire deploying twin pilot chutes
To Main Chutes
Main Pilot Chutes extract and deploy Main Cluster In s reefed condition
Main Chutes dlsraef to establish steady state descent
Initial suspended
attitude under
main chutes
• Pioneer Aerospace Corporation
Figure 2.2-48 CTRV Main Parachute Deployment
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To Main Chutes A • Reposltlon command A _I_I_T_t_ _
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Figure 2.2-49 CTRV Parachute Reposition for Landing
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SVlllll Time kit Yet MIch q Chute Accel
(sic] (fl.MSL) (Ipll No. (psi) Load (Ib) (G)
Drogue Pilot Mortar Fire 0_0 |?r/_ |3719 1.4 Ss.1 O i.0
DrOgue lit Peak Load 2.3 14714 1398 1.38 ll,g 80291 2.18
Dr_us Dllree! S.S a0¢10 t261 1.29 6S.6 5736? 1.94
Drogue 2r_d Puk Laid 6.3 /9S34 1223 1.25 94.8 131190 2.91
D_gue Rekmss and 144.0 IS000 208 0.iS SI,S 73010 1.0
Msln Pilot Mortlr Flee
MMn is! Pelk Laid 147.9 1403f iS4 g.14 40,4 234580 3,19
In ,_-ULI,_ - Bib Olllill 1Sl 0 141U 122 0.11 If S 885115 I 2
Chute Load (KIb) .| _ " " "' Ml_n 2rid t_lk Laid 1|2.E 1_ N 0.09 7.49 207SOS 2.77
II i elaady Dai.n! 180.0 13800 33 0.03 0.83 74963 1.0
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_, ..... INI I for subsequent Iterations:
I IIII t • Cd profile of CTRV
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Figure 2.2-50 CTRV Landing System Performance
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_-,v/ r'n'°c--1 MEDIU i CTRV
.& . .'- _
• RECOVERY SYSTEMCOMPONENTWEIGHTS
O Con,nmt_rml Cluster flcova_f aVofom designed tar V.a_l
O Syalem waklht b,_,,_dow'rmvary wfln d_;c_t weight
• MAIN CHUTE PACKS: Includes main chutes with reefing
provisions, deployment bags end flsem
• MAIN & DROGUE HOUSINGS: Stowage for main and
drogue parachute pecks
• PILOT CHUTE ASSYS: Includes 2 pilot chutes with
deployment bags, risers and mortars
• DROGUE ASSY: Drogue pack wllh reefing provisions,
deployment beg and riser
• DROGUE PILOTASSY: Drogue pilot chute pack wtlh
deployment beg, riser end mortar
COMPONENT Integral CTRV Medium CTRV
WEIGHTS Wd = 50 KIb W d =75 KIb
Main Chute PIcks 2770 4137
Main & Drogue Housings 174 263
Pilot Chute Aseys 206 299
Drogue Chute Pack 817 1114
Drogue Pilot Aesy 30 5.1
TOTAL 3805 5864
",,..j
Figure 2.2-51
• Since available volume Is
unknown, required volume is
calculated based on maximum
pack density
• Pack densities in excess of 40
Ib/ft _ are expensive and difficult to
achieve
• Component Volumes Include:
O Main Chute Ally: includes Main chute
pack end ¢onlelttor
O Pilot Chute Aa|y:,inc|udea Pilot chute
pack and mortsr
O Drogue Chute Ally: Includes Drogue
chute pack end container
O Drogue Pilot Asay: Includes Drogue
Pilot chute pack and mortar
COMPONENT Integral CTRV MediumCTRV
VOLUMES W,_• S0 KIb W, = 75 KIb
Main Chute AeBye:
Each 14.1 13.1
Cluster 70.S 104.8
Pilot Chute Aseye:
Eech 2.1 3.1
Pair 4.2 62
Drogue Chute Aeay 1S.6 20.1
Drogue Pilot Asey 0.5 1.0
TOTAL 00.8 140.1
Figure 2.2-52
CTRV Landing System Weight
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2.2.2.7 Reliability Analysis
A reliability analysis was completed for the reference (initial study
definition) Medium CTRV configuration, Our MAtrix reliability model was
used to determine reliability levels and maintenance requirements down
to the subsystem and major components level, For the medium CTRV
(mission duration of 60 hours), a reliability (Probability of Mission Success)
of ,995 was predicted, Maintenance requirements for this configuration
are predicted to be an average of 4 unscheduled maintenance actions per
mission,
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Figure 2.2-53 CTRV Reliability Prediction
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Figure 2.2-54 CTRV Unscheduled Maintenance Prediction
2.2.2.8 Launch Processing Analysis
Analysis of the CTRV ground (launch) operations was completed with a
simulation of the combined Medium CTRV, PLS, and their launch vehicle
(NLS-2 type) systems launched over a ten year period. The CTRV systems
were modeled at the subsystem level to identify the payload integration
differences between the Medium and the Integral CTRV concepts. The
analysis demonstrated that the planned flight rates for PLS/CTRV to
support Space Station Freedom logistics missions can be achieved when
using the subsystems processing times as projected by the PLS program.
The simulation included periodic maintenance down-periods for both PLS
and CTRV, as well as unscheduled maintenance activities resulting from
mission (flight) failures.
Analysis of the CTRV ground (launch) processing operations was also
performed with an upgraded STARSIM model which included the effects of
the predicted maintenance delays for the vehicle configuration. A
maintainability/logistics simulation of the CTRV system was first
performed to establish the launch processing delay factor as a function of
II-107
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the spares Probability Of Sufficiency POS. The simulation indicated that a
logistics delay factor of eight times the system total mean time to repair
(MTTR) would exist for this configuration. The STARSIM analysis then
demonstrated that at the anticipated mission reliability levels for this
CTRV, a 90% (POS) spares level will be satisfactory for this system. This
translated into an average delay (per launch cycle) of just over five days.
While this is not an insignificant factor, other launch systems analyzed
have shown significantly higher delay times and/or required significantly
higher spares inventory.
Inteqral CTRV
• Requires removable propulsion module
• Propulsion module deserviced in SAEF-2
• Vehicle transported from SAEF-2 to
SSPF for payload integration, and then
back to SAEF-2
• Payload/PLM's integrated into vehicle in
SSPF
• Two vehicle types
Medium CTRV
• Propulsion system deserviced in OPF
• Payload/PLM's transported from SSPF to
OPF
• Payload/PLM's integrated into vehicle in
OPF
• One vehicle type
Modelinq Assumotion_
• Post 2007 "steady-state" scenario without a Space Shuttle program
• 350 work-days/year (245 work-days/year more realistic?)
• SSPF and VAB are non-hazardous processing facilities
• Hazardous fueling operations performed at launch pad
• 21-day minimum launch interval does not apply
• No simultaneous missions allowed (one vehicle going up or down at a time)
• Multiple vehicles may be docked to space station
• Maximum CTRV subsystem commonality with PLS (HL-20)
Figure 2.2-55 CTRV Launch Processing Assumptions
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Launch Pad
Primary Landing Site
/ V
Transport Aircraft _ MLT
/ t_k " _ '_ Space Stallon
/ _ __ Processing Fac.
Horizontal Processing -",._
J. so-s P
• I Core Assy/'Proc.
Faci,lty
Core Stage
Delivery Adapter Processing
Adapter Element Delivery
M.CTRV Flow (Pi<:lOdal)
System Arch;leer
FdFeb 19. t993 1S:t0
.' I STARSIM "_ CTRV MOdel
Figure 2.2-56 Medium CTRV Launch Processing Flow Diagram
ThrouahDut CaDacitv:
PLS Launch Rate
CTRV Launch Rate
Avg. Time In System
Avg. Time Between Launches
Touch Labor Estimate
4 flights/year
4 - 6 flights/year
46 days
39 days
862 - 1,178 k-hours/year
F_;ilitY/Resource Capability:
Name HPF VAB Pad
Servers 3 2 2
Location KSC KSC KSC
Status Modified Modified Modified
(OPF)
Utilization 17% 17% 25%
I" MLT is the constraining resource I
MLT
3
KSC
Modified
(MLP)
81%
Figure 2.2-57 Medium CTRV Launch Facilities Utilization
II-i09
2.2.3 Integral CTRV Concept
The Integral CTRV concept was developed to reduce the packaging
overhead of Space Station logistics cargo payloads. Rather than load the
logistics payloads into a pressurized module which is then loaded into the
unpressurized payload volume of the CTRV, the Integral CTRV payload bay
itself is pressurized and the payloads can be installed directly into the
CTRV. The Integral CTRV thus directly replaces the Space Station
Pressurized Logistics Module and remains at the Space Station for several
months duration before returning to Earth. Space Station unpressurized
logistics payloads are similarly delivered in an unpressurized version of
the Integral CTRV. The Integral CTRV is a ballistic type re-entry vehicle
(parachute landing) but the aft payload bay location requires large fins for
aerodynamic stability during re-entry. Analysis of the Integral CTRV
concept was performed to determine the differences in design
requirements for this alternative CTRV approach and to bring the design
definition up to a level more consistent with the reference Medium CTRV.
The study effort included trajectory analysis, aerodynamics and thermal
analysis, preliminary structural design in the area of payload retention and
deployment, and parametric analysis of the CTRV landing system options
(parachutes).
"T'. ,
Figure 2.2.3-1 Integral CTRV Concept
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2.2.3.1 Requirements Analysis
A new set of design requirements was prepared for those Integral CTRV
subsystems which were unique to this configuration (pressurized volumes,
hatches, and atmosphere circulation/conditioning). These requirements
were added to the other subsystems requirements documents which had
been prepared for the Medium CTRV concept. Modified system level
requirements documents were also prepared for the Integral CTRV in both
the pressurized and the unpressurized configurations.
2.2.3.2 Trajectory Analysis
Trajectory analyses with the selected Integral CTRV configuration were
performed to determine the effects of flying various angle of attack
trajectories and cross range. The analysis showed that this configuration
could be flown to a maximum cross range of 70 NMi without violating
structural and thermal loads constraints. The trajectories were flown at a
7.5* to 15" angle of attack to achieve these results. This low angle of attack
also minimizes heat load to the TPS system, especially to the majority of
the vehicle surfaces (along the fuselage sides). Since the vehicle is not
flown at a high angle of attack (40* or higher like the Medium CTRV), there
is not a large surface area which requires TPS tiles, a design goal for this
CTRV configuration.
k....j-"
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Figure 2.2.3-2 Integral CTRV Design Trajectory
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Figure 2.2.3-3 Integral CTRV Trajectory Options
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2.2.3.3 Aerodynamics Analysis
The aerodynamic shape for an Integral CTRV is highly constrained by the
required payload volume (diameter and length). The pressurized and
unpressurized versions of an Integral CTRV are still required to carry
Space Station logistics elements which result in a payload bay diameter of
15 feet. Given this diameter constraint, the aerodynamic shape which
worked satisfactorily for the Medium CTRV will not scale down to the
lower payload weight range of the Integral CTRV. The vehicle body length
required to achieve both sufficient lift and required CG for this diameter
payload bay remains at approximately seventy feet long, the same length
as required for the Medium CTRV. Several lift and drag producing
modifications were analyzed for the reference aerodynamic shape,
including flared base regions and small to large wing sections. All of these
configurations could be made to satisfy the re-entry heating, cross range,
and acceleration limits for a CTRV, but they all ended up at a seventy foot
fuselage length.
This analysis indicated that an entirely new aerodynamic approach will be
required for the Integral CTRV in order to arrive at acceptable structural
weight fractions. A significant reduction in the payload bay diameter
would alleviate this requirement, but would force major redesigns of the
Space Station logistics elements. Alternative aerodynamic concepts which
were studied included the use of high drag devices (such as ballutes) and
lift producing deployable (or even inflatable) structures. Deployable
structures such as these can produce over twice as much lift and/or drag
as the baseline configurations without long fuselage lengths and forward
CG constraints.
The final aerodynamic configuration for a low cross range version Integral
CTRV was developed by performing a sensitivity study of lift (C1) and drag
(Cd) coefficients from a general ballistic re-entry CTRV configuration. The
variable C1 and Cd parameters were used to generate a map of optimized
re-entry trajectory performance as calculated from several POST computer
simulations. This process enabled a desirable combination of C1 and Cd to
be determined which satisfied cross range, acceleration, heat rate, and heat
load constraints for the Integral CTRV. The resulting configuration was a
basic cylindrical mid fuselage with a forward fuselage consisting of a 20 °
cone with 5 foot radius sphere nose. A 20" flared skirt was added at the
aft end of the cylindrical section to further increase drag. A pair of large
fins (not wings) were added to the cylinder/skirt to move the aerodynamic
center of pressure aft for hypersonic flight stability and CG considerations.
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Figure 2.2.3-4 Aerodynamics Trade Study Options
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Figure 2.2.3-6 Aerodynamic Data - Hypersonic Regime
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2.2.3.4 Structures Design and Analysis
Payload installation and deployment for the Integral CTRV concepts has
generally been envisioned to be through end mounted doors. A large 15
foot diameter door for the unpressurized cargo version, and a smaller
Space Station sized hatch for the pressurized cargo configuration. A
payload bay configuration which is common to both pressurized and
unpressurized cargo can be designed, but the unpressurized configuration
presents some unique issues for on-orbit operations. In a Shuttle-like
payload bay, the cargo is fully exposed for a 180 ° clear access and the
payloads are removed radially. In an end opening payload bay as
envisioned for the Integral CTRV, payloads must be removed axially. This
presents limited access and deployment capabilities for the unpressurized
configuration. (The pressurized configuration functions in the same
manner as the Pressurized Logistics Module which it is replacing). The
payloads must be installed and removed sequentially, moving only that
cargo element which is closest to the door at any time. Payload retention
and deployment concepts have been designed for the unpressurized
configuration by use of a clocking arrangement, but still the installation
and deployment sequence is restricted. Additionally, the clearance
requirements and timing of opening or closing the end-mounted payload
bay door (a 15 foot diameter structure) must be examined for Space
Station impacts.
Structural design of the Integral CTRV configuration was completed to the
point of generating a layout of major structural elements (such as beams,
longerons, and frames) for the fuselage (payload bay) and fin surfaces.
Three view dimensioned drawings, as well as perspective wire-flame and
color surface views of the external surfaces, were also prepared. Estimates
of the structure weight were prepared from the layout drawings. The
fuselage design for this concept must be quite stiff since there are no
wings to react flight bending loads (as in the Shuttle mid-fuselage design).
Unlike the Medium CTRV concept with Shuttle-like payload bay/doors, this
Integral CTRV design concept provides a circular fuselage which offers a
more efficient structural shape.
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Figure 2.2.3-7 Integral CTRV - Plan View
Figure 2.2.3-8 Integral CTRV - Structural Layout
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Figure 2.2.3-9 Integral CTRV Design Configuration
Figure 2.2.3-10 Integral CTRV Payload Installation
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Structure 15,700
TPS 2,250
Active Thermal Control 800
OMS/RCS 1,500
Elec. Power Generation 1,780
Elec. Power Distribution 1,660
Avionics 1,065
Purge/Vent 380
Landing 5,600
26. 735 Dry Wei_oht
Consumables
OMS/RCS 4,000
Fuel cell reactant 1,700
Payload 22,000
Total Launch Weight I 58,435 I
Re-entry Weight 53,300
I Ballistic = 77 psfCoefficient
I
I PayloadFraction
= 38 % i
k._j
Figure 2.2.3-11 Integral CTRV Weight Estimate
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2.2.3.5 Thermal Analysis & TPS Sizing
Preliminary sizing of Integral CTRV thermal protection system (TPS) was
estimated from an assumed heating rate distribution over the vehicle. The
TPS sizing was based on flying a low angle of attack (7.5 °) trajectory, as
demonstrated in POST trajectory analyses of the selected configuration.
These trajectories resulted in low heating rates to most of the surfaces and
much lower total heat loads than as seen in the Medium CTRV trajectories.
The total heat load for the Integral CTRV trajectory is less than 20,000
BTU/ft 2, compared to 50,384 BTU/ft 2 for the Medium CTRV (C23LNF). The
maximum heat rate for the Integral CTRV is held within advanced carbon-
carbon nose cap material limits by the large radius nose cone (5 ft).
The thermal protection system (TPS) concept for the Integral CTRV was
modified to avoid the problem of bonding TPS tiles to a pressure vessel
(severe technical design issues related to tile gaps and on-orbit/re-entry
structural temperature limits would be encountered). A debris shield will
be used as an intermediate structural shell for attaching the tiles. Current
Space Station debris shield concepts (which have a several inch standoff
from the primary pressure vessel structure) will permit underlying
insulation blankets to protect the pressure vessel from the tile bondline
temperatures (both on-orbit and during entry). The debris shield will
protect the tiles from excessive gap changes caused by expansion of the
pressure vessel in space. Use of either aluminum or higher temperature
materials (titanium, Inconel, ...) for the debris shield will permit a wide
range of TPS concepts to be explored for this configuration. Significant
operational efficiencies may also be realized by this concept since the tiles
can be installed or maintained off the vehicle by removing the debris
shieldpanels.
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Figure 2.2.3-12 Integral CTRV Tile Sizing Chart
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Figure 2.2.3-13 Integral CTRV TPS Distribution
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2.2.3.6 Landing System Design
A parachute system design was also selected for the Integral CTRV
configuration. The Integral CTRV system is similar to the Medium CTRV
design and consists of a five chute cluster of 139 foot parachutes. This
main chute system results in a terminal descent rate of 28 ft/sec velocity
and weighs 2,800 lbs. In addition to the main parachutes, a drogue chute
is required, as well as pilot chutes for both the main and drogue chutes.
The total weight for the Integral CTRV parachute system is estimated at
3,800 lbs, requiring a stowage volume of 91 cubic feet.
MJ
• High Glide devices such as the parafoil
promise significant benefits for space
payloads
O Precise Landing at Selected Site
O Wind Penelratlon
O Soft IJndlng
• The State of the art is defined by the NASA
(MSFC) Advanced Recovery Systems
demonstration in which a 15,000 Ib payload
was recovered and guided to a soft landing
in Nov '91.
• The US Army (Natick Labs) proposes to
advance the ARS technology to
demonstrate guided recovery of airdrop
payloads of 42,000 Ib by the end of FY°96.
O The high glide option will become viable for the
Integral CTRV sl that payload level
O Application to the Medium CTRV will require
addtUonel expansion of the payload envelope
• High glide recovery should be held as an
evolution path for the CTRV (ICTRV first)
Pioneer Aerospace Corporation - 1_/_
Figure 2.2.3-14 Potential Integral CTRV Landing System Option
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Drogue Parachute
• Drogue Parachute Type- Conical Ribbon
• Materials
O Canopy- Nylon
O Suspension - Kevlar/Nylon
• Reefing:
O Single Stage
O Sr/S o = 0.45 - 0.65
• Physical Properties:
Integral CTRV Medium CTRV
W N= 50 Klb W= = 75 KIb
Nominal Diameter, D= (ft) 46.5 57.4
Projected Diameter, Dp {ft) 32.6 40.2
Number of Gores, N= 56 68
Line Length, L L (ft) 93 114.8
Drogue Pack Weight (Ib} Incl. bag 617 1114
,,,,j
Figure 2.2.3-15 Drogue Parachute Design
Main Parachute Cluster
Dp
• Main Parachute Type- Triconical
• Materials
O Canopy- Nylon
O Suspension - Kevlar
• Reefing:
O Single Stage
O S,JS o=0.65
• Physical Properties:
Integral CTRV Medium CTRV
W d = 50 KIb W_ = 75 KIb
Cluster Size, N 5 8
Terminal Vertical Velocity, V, (fps) 28 28
Nominal Diameter, D. (ft) 139.1 137.1
Projected Diameter, Dp (ft) g6 95
Number of Gores, N¢ 122 120
Line Length, L L (fl) 201.7 198.8
Pack Weight (Ib/chuto) Incl. bag 556 517
Figure 2.2.3-16 Main Parachute Design
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Drogue PIIol Morllr Fire O.O
Drogue lit Pelk Load 2.3
Drogue Dhlreef 9.5
Drogue 2rid Pelk Load 10,3
Drogue Relelsl and 124,0
Main Pllol Morlar Fits
Main 1ll Peak Load 127.g
Main Dt|reet 132.0
Main 2nd Peak Load 132,6
Steady Delcen! 140,0
Touchdown 013.0
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14150 08 0.og 7.43 197494 578
13M0 33 0,03 0.83 4g917 1.0
49937 1 .O0 27 0.02 0.93
• The transonic drag area profile
of the CTRV Is essential to the
parachute drag simulation
• Key assumptions Include:
• CTRV Supersonic C a - 1.12
• CTRV Sub sonic C a - 0.42
• Angle of attack transition smooth
from pre-recovery (high r=) to steady
! State pre-reposition (_ : 0)
IO
Figure 2.2.3-17 Landing System Performance
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• RECOVERY SYSTEM COMPONENT WEIGHTS
O Cenwmt_r, sl Clustw _ eyalsm ¢eslgr._ far v.,,,ta tin
O Syulem _'4lhl bmekdmme v_y wick d_mce_
• M/UN CHUTE PACKS: Includes main chutes with rlmflng
provisions, deployment bags and risers
• MAIN A DROGUE HOUSINGS: Stowage for main end
drogue perschule pocks
• PILOT CHUTE ASSYS: Includes 2 pllol chutes with
deploymanl begs, rlssrll and mortar==
• DROGUE ASSY: Drogue pack wilh reefing provisions,
deploymanl big Ind riser
• DROGUE PILOT ASSY: Drogue pgot chute peck with
deployment big, riser end mortm"
COMPONENT Inlegrel CTRV I
WEIGHTS w 9 = S0 KIb j
Main Chute Packs 2778
Main & Drogue Hou|lnga 174
Pilot Chute AseyI 206
Drogue Chute Pack let7
Drogue Pilot Ally 30
TOTAL 3805
Pioneer Aerospace Corporation
Figure 2.2.3-18 Landing System Weight
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unknown, required volume is 1ooo - -
calcuTated based on maximum -
pack density i 800
Pack densities in excess of 40
Ib/ft _ are expensive and difficult to 600 __
achieve
Component Volumes Include: 4°.° I t[] o,o0ue^=_ I
O packMelnChule Aeey: Includes Mainc t andcontainer 20oi t BI Rj°' Pay I
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O Drogue Chule Any: Includes Drogue
chule pack and container
O Drogue Plier Asey: Includes Drogue
Pilot chute pack and mortar
COMPONENT Integral CTRV MedlumCTRV
VOLUMES W d = 50 KIb W= = 78 KIb
Maln Chute Assys:
Each 14.1 13.1
Cluster 70,5 104.8
PIlot Chute Aseys:
Each 2.1 3.1
Pair 4.2 6.2
Drogue Chule Aeey 15.6 2B.I
Drogue Pilot Any _
TOTAL O0._ 140.1
48000 50000 52000
De=cant Wt, Wd (lb]
Pioneer Aerospace Corporation
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®
Figure 2.2.3-19 Parachute Volume Requirements
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2.2.3.7 Reliability Analysis
A reliability analysis was performed using the MAtrix model for the
Integral CTRV configuration to determine reliability levels and
maintenance requirements down to the subsystem and major components
level. With the Integral CTRV's long mission duration of 4320 hours (6
months), the analysis revealed a reliability of .969 and 25 unscheduled
maintenance actions per mission. Use of "S" rated ("S" for satellite, and
very expensive) avionics parts for the Integral CTRV was assessed to try to
improve the mission reliability over its long mission duration. This
increased the reliability only to .970, and thus is not recommended. The
minimal improvement in reliability is due to the long dormant period for
most of the avionics systems during the 6-month mission. Because the
level of redundancy was not specified in many of the reference CTRV
avionics components (and no redundancy was modeled unless specified), it
is expected that better definition of actual component redundancies will
improve the avionics (and total Integral CTRV) reliability.
m 0.995O
o
m 0.990
z
O
m 0.985
u. 0.980O
>,,.
I-- 0.975
.-I
m
<
m 0.970
O
el-
D.
I
60 HOURS I
-_" ,I NOMINAL MISSION IS 60 HOURS. FOR
LENGTHIER MISSIONS THE CTRVIS OPERATED QUIESCENTLY,
SOLID LINE = "B" FIATED AVIONICS HOURS (6 MONTHS)_. 4320
• Q i i
DASHED LINE = "S" RATED AVIONICS
0._5' • "'' I .... i .... I ....
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
MISSION TIME (HOURS)
Figure 2.2.3-20 Integral CTRV Reliability
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2.2.3.8 Launch Processing Analysis
Launch processing analysis of the Integral CTRV was performed similar to
the Medium CTRV analysis. The CTRV was modeled at the subsystem level
to permit expendable versus reusable evaluations to be made at the total
CTRV system level or at the individual subsystems ievel (such as
propulsion, avionics, TPS/heat shield). Subsystem processing times were
identical to those used for the Medium CTRV. Only the payload integration
activities and propulsion systems were different from the Medium CTRV
analysis. Integral CTRV propulsion system processing was performed off
the vehicle and payload integration was performed on the vehicle, just the
opposite from the Medium CTRV concept. These differences did not
significantly affect the results of the analysis, but the required system
flight rate did affect the results. The Integral CTRV concept must fly up to
11 flights per year (versus 4 to 6 flights per year for the Med. CTRV). The
launch processing simulation demonstrated that this higher flight rate can
be achieved with the planned facilities and resources. A much higher
manpower consumption is caused by the high flight rates, however. The
Integral CTRV concept used almost twice as many hours of touch labor
(direct "technician-hours") to accomplish the same SSF logistics supply
mission as the Medium CTRV concept. This higher technician usage may
or may not translate directly into higher launch processing costs,
depending on the selected technician staffing levels and thus the resulting
technician utilization factors (how much of the army is standing).
Of particular importance for the Integral CTRV processing analysis is the
constraints imposed by the Space Station elements and payloads. The
pressurized version of the Integral CTRV would be required to utilize the
Space Station payloads processing facilities for integration of the payloads
(Space Station racks) into the Integral CTRV payload compartment. This
will require the propulsion systems for this CTRV to be either new
(unflown) or removed and processed separately from the rest of the
vehicle.
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Figure 2.2.3-21 Launch Processing Flow Diagram
Throuqhput Capacity:
PLS Launch
CTRV Launch Rate
Avg. Time in System
Avg. Time Between Launches
Touch Labor Estimate
4 flights/year
6 - 11 flights/year
49 days
26 days
1,178 - 1,967 k-hours/year
Facility/Resource Capability:
Name SSPF
Servers 2
Location KSC
Status New
(lntgrtn.
Cells)
Utilization 2%
HPF VA.._._.BB Pad
2 2 2
KSC KSC KSC
Existing Modified Modified
(SAEF-2
or PHSF)
8% 19% 36%
I ° MLTis the constraining resource I
MLT
3
KSC
Modified
(MLP)
86%
Figure 2.2.3-22 Facilities and Resources Utilization
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2.2.4 Winged CTRV Concept
2.2.4.1 introduction
As the analysis of Integral CTRV and Medium CTRV concepts progressed, i{
became apparent that the operating costs of these systems would not meet
the goals of the NASA Access to Space study. A precision (runway) landing
version of the CTRV concept was recognized as a key requirement for
minimizing operations costs. This requirement led to the Winged CTRV
concepts, which started with small payload capabilities (22,000 lbs),
evolved to larger payload versions, and eventually to combined
crew/cargo concepts such as the Crew Logistics Vehicle (CLV) and the
scaled-up, cargo carrying version of the PLS (the HL-42). The Winged
CTRV, the CLV, and the HL-42 concepts all became competitors for the
crew/cargo element of a launch system architecture based on expendable
launch vehicles. The development of each of these concepts evolved as the
NASA Access to Space study (Option 2) continued to refine the design
requirements. The CLV concept definition was continued by NASA's
Johnson Space Center, the HL-42 definition by the Langley Research
Center, and the Winged CTRV by the Marshall Space Flight Center with
design support from this ATSS contract. The Winged CTRV concept
evolved from the (original) small Winged CTRV, to a larger payload version
(the Medium Winged CTRV), and finally to a combined crew/cargo version
similar in function to the HL-42 but with a larger payload volume and
weight capability (the Singte Development Winged CTRV).
Figure 2.2.4-1 Winged CTRV Concept
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2.2.4.2 Requirements Analysis
An analysis of the Access to Space study requirements was performed to
identify traceability of CTRV and PLS requirements to NASA mission or
other requirements. This task was performed with a Computer Aided
System Engineering (CASE) software tool to track the flowdown of
requirements and their _location to system elements. The requirements
provided were specifically for Option 2 of the Access to Space study, and
only those requirements provided from the Access to Space study
groundrules were used to populate the requirements database at this
point. The launch systems database (of available or potential launch/space
systems to which the requirements may be allocated) was limited to
Option 2 systems. The analysis effort provided only top level
requirements allocations, but the software model used is capable of being
populated with requirements down to any level desired (e.g. to the
subsystem level of selected launch or space systems). Several report
formats were created to illustrate the requirements flowdown tree, the
system elements tree, and the allocation of requirements and missions to
each system element.
Requirements Functions Systems
Mission
Requirements
Attributes
source
description
I FunctionalRequirement
I destinations
payload type
payload services
, /
Performance
Level
Requirements
/
# ofcrew |
Ibsofcargo,volume
missiondurations
orbit characteristics
AV & attitudeconstraints
l systemRequirements
pLsI
 lcT"vl
_] CTVLV
J
Figure 2.2.4-2 Access to Space - Requirements Flowdown
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I Satisfy ]NationalLaunch Needs
I
I Sat's_1NASA CargoLaunch Needs
I 1
SSF Logistics ] SSF Logistics/
Payloads J Payloads
I i
PressurizedSSF Un-press.SSF II
Logistics PLM Logistics ULC ]1
I I PMJ
t i,, l
Inslallationof
Live Payloads
I
l ProvideLaunch Pad
Accessto Pressurized
PayloadVolume
• Traceability to basic mission needs
• Captures and defines the operational
element of the system design
• Leads directly to performance and design
requirements
Pe °rmanc' 'au'r'me lJ* Provide for pressurized • Provide Ingress/egresscargo payload installation hatch for access toto within T-12 hrs of pressurized cargo volumeslaunch, in either horizontal or
vertical orientation
1 III I
Figure 2.2.4-3 Functional Requirements Flowdown
• Derived from mission model &
functional requirements breakdown
• Sorted and allocated via CASE tool
CTRV Functional Requirements List
• Provide acceptable life cycle cost
• Meet SSF safety requirements
• Provide de-orbit Impulse thrust
• Provide pedgee Impulse thrust
• Provide re-startable engine (orbital maneuvering)
• Initial operating capability in mld-CY2005
• Land on runway
• No solid propellants
• Autonomous operation (rendezvous and lan_ng)
• Operational availability which minimizes scheduled and un-scheduled maintenance
• Acceptable program risk (technical, cost, & schedule)
• Affordable RDT&E costs
• Reusable propulsion & avionics
• Separate crew and cargo vehicles
• Single propellant system to minimize ground handling, storage ....
k,..) Figure 2.2.4-4 Element Requirements List
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ELVs
• ELV-1 (20k ref.)
• _ (50k ref.)
• _'-V"_ (100k ref.)
• Titan IV
Upper Stages
• Centaur
= Bus 1
• Stage IV
• PAM-D
Payload Carriers
"["_"_ • Soy'uz
• HL-42 • ACRV
• CLV-P • CTV
.r-c-_
f
I
ELV-2 I
Option 2A PLS + Winged CTRV
I "
I
Figure 2.2.4-5 System Elements Tree
• Assigned by CASE tool from mission
model database per system element
functional requirements
CTRV Mission Assignment List
• Deliver and return SSF PLM
• Deliver and return SSF PM
• Deliver and return SSF ULC
• Deliver SSF EMUs
• Deliver middeck cargo
• Deliver and return Sortie Science
--_i PLS Mission Assignment List i
Deliver and return SSF crew (Rotation)
• Perform satellite servicing
Return SSF crew (Emergency)
Figure 2.2.4-6 Element Mission Assignments
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The evolution of the three Winged CTRV concepts was a direct result of
evolving design requirements, There were three distinct design
requirements which generated these three concepts:
Requirement
Reduce operations costs
Design Solution
Small Winged CTRV
Reduce annual launch rate Medium Winged CTRV
Reduce development costs Single Development Winged CTRV
J
The small Winged CTRV concept was a direct evolution of the Integral
CTRV into a winged runway landing vehicle in order to reduce the high
ground operations costs associated with parachute landing systems. The
immediate design problem was to obtain a sufficient lift/drag ratio to
perform a landing flare maneuver and actually fly the vehicle to a runway
landing. The small Winged CTRV fuselage was sized to provide the same
payload capability as the Integral CTRV concept (a 15' diameter by 25'
long payload bay is provided, 22,000 Ib payload mass). The Integral CTRV
fins were converted to wings and moved to the bottom of the fuselage for
landing. This design change made a Shuttle type payload bay more
efficient and allowed the orbital propulsion systems to be located in an aft
fuselage section. The Winged CTRV resembles a shortened Shuttle Orbiter
but the wings have been modified (no camber and a higher aspect ratio) to
reduce ascent aerodynamic loads on the booster and provide a much
reduced entry cross range capability. A combined crew/cargo payload
capability is possible with this winged CTRV concept by installing a small
pressurized crew cabin in the forward fuselage section.
The Medium Winged CTRV concept is a larger version of the small Winged
CTRV concept with increased payload capability (42,500 lb) in order to
reduce the required number of launches. The payload bay was lengthened
from 2S' to 37.5' in length and wing span increased to handle the higher
landing weight. A vertical tail (stabilizer) was added to this configuration
to improve directional stability. This concept can be used in conjunction
with a Spacehab module to provide a late access capability for refrigerated
or biological payloads. This CTRV configuration represented the optimum
cargo vehicle concept for pairing with the PLS HL-20 on the proposed
booster concepts. The estimated CTRV launch weight of 99,000 lbs was
just within the 100,000 lb limit study groundrule and thus represented the
largest CTRV configuration possible for launch on the study's candidate
expendable boosters.
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The Single Development Winged CTRV concept was generated to evaluate
how the Winged CTRV concept would perform in a combined crew/cargo
payload mission, thereby eliminating the need for a separate vehicle for
crew delivery and return. (This concept provided a trade study
configuration for comparison with the HL-42 crew/cargo vehicle concept,
but with a larger payload capability.) The forward fuselage of the Winged
CTRV was replaced with the biconic PLS concept to allow crew to be
carried on top (for launch abort) and the full 42,500 lb cargo payload to be
carried in the payload bay. The biconic PLS concept included the full
launch escape system as defined for individual PLS launches and a
modified adapter for mating with the CTRV mid fuselage. This concept's
125,000 launch weight violated the 100,000 lb launch weight limit. The
CTRV wing span was not increased in this configuration, choosing instead
to let the entry heating rates and the landing angle of attack to increase.
Leading edge TPS temperature limits were not exceeded and the angle of
attack at landing increased from 21 ° to 26".
A means for providing late access to pressurized payload volumes was also
imposed as a requirement for the CTRV concept. This requirement is
based on the current Space Shuttle mid-deck locker payload service which
allows last minute loading of refrigerated (or even live) payloads to be
installed on the launch pad. This type of payload has been identified as a
specific payload design requirement for the CTRV. Since the winged CTRV
does not contain an integral pressurized volume for such payloads, some
other method of delivering these payloads is necessary. A downsized
version of the Spacehab module was selected as the design solution for this
requirement. The Spacehab module is designed especially for this type of
payload, providing the Shuttle with the capability to deliver as much as 61
additional locker payloads. For the CTRV, a smaller version of the
Spacehab would satisfy the mission needs (although the CTRV can deliver a
Spacehab in its current configuration as well). Downsizing the Spacehab to
a 12-foot diameter by 7-foot long module wiU permit installation of 42
lockers. Access to the new module can be provided through the CTRV
forward fuselage while on the launch pad (or on the runway) without
opening the payload bay doors. Access doors in the CTRV forward payload
bay bulkhead and the sidewall will permit launch personnel to open the
module door and install locker payloads. After launch and docking with
the Space Station, the module would be attached to a pressurized port and
utilized as a mini-"closet" module.
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• CTRV performs departure maneuver
Launch Ooerations
• ELV delivers CTRV to 15x220 Nmi orbit
- Max acceleration < 3.2g
- Max Q <850 ps, / De_tandRezntry ^._,;,.
• CTRV can rovide abort ca abili CTRV performs de-orbit maneuver
J - Max acceleration = 1.7 g ,
J . q _nMa_x,_h.,e_a,t, ra_ :,:t BJU/ft2"s(ref 1 )
(____ • 390 Nmi crossrange capability
• KSC or EAFB landing sites
• Autoland capability
• CTRV refurbished for next mission
Figure 2.2.4-7 CTRV Mission Profile - SSF Logistics Resupply Mission
Launch Operations
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De-orbit bum Entry interface (400K ft.) • 1920 s 1
Max heating • 2620s [
Max acceleration • 2900 s l
Touchdown • 3280 s)
CTRV Mission Timeline-96 Hr SSF Logistics Resupply MissionFigure 2.2.4-8
Orbit Insertion & phasing
SSF rendezvous & docking
SSF mated operations
SSF departure & re-entry phasing
Re-entry
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• Lockers provided via pressurized
"Suitcase" module
- Downslzed Spacehab module
- Sized for 24 "mid-deck" lockers
- Self-contained electrical power
(battery)
• CTRV provides access doors to Suitcase
module
- Vertical (launch pad)
- Horizontal (runway)
• Module transferred to SSF after docking
_ ] t _"°"_ _*--t *°'°"
Figure 2.2.4-9 CTRV Late Access Capability - Locker Payloads Delivery
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2.2.4.3 Structures Analysis & Weight Estimates
Weight estimates for the CTRV were based on the latest subsystem design
definitions as provided by NASA MSFC engineers. Structural weight
estimates were based on the stress analysis results from the Medium CTRV
(the parachute landing version) and then scaled to the Winged CTRV
dimensions. A weight reduction of 25% was applied to all fuselage and
wing primary structure weight estimates based on the results of the
NASTRAN analysis of Medium CTRV flight loads. This structural weight
reduction was offset by some increased subsystem weights and the result
was a launch weight for the Winged CTRV (including launch vehicle
adapter) of just under 100,000 pounds. The CTRV thermal protection
system (TPS) weight was determined from TPS tile thicknesses as sized
from the calculated heating rates, in turn generated from re-entry
trajectory analyses. Calculation of the CTRV center of gravity (CG) for both
launch and landing conditions was also calculated.
M_J
Figure 2.2.4-10 Winged CTRV Perspective View
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CTRV Structural Corn
T T
Structure Weight (Ib)
Forward fuselage 6,000
Mid fuselage 7,190
Aft fuselage 4,250
Wings 5,518
Payload bay doors 2,770
Door hinges/latches 1,140
Vertical tail 875
TOTAL 27,743
Environmental Control Weight (Ib)]
1Purge ducts 106Vent doors 598TOTAL 704
3onents
-r=L
SubsequentanalyseswillIdentify
locationsfor purgeductsandvent
doorstosatisfyenvironmental
controlrequirements.
Figure 2.2.4-11 CTRV Structural Components
The CTRV is generally of conventional aluminum construction protected by _
reusable surface insulation.
• Forward fuselage: Composed of 2024 aluminum alloy skin/stringer panels,
frames, and bulkheads.
• Mid fuselage: Includes the wing carry-through structure and the payload
bay. Composed of 2124 aluminum alloy integral machined panels and
honeycomb sandwich panels.
• Aft fuselage: Composed of 2124 aluminum alloy skin/stringer shell.
° Wings: Composed of 2024 aluminum alloy. Uses corrugated spar web,
truss-type ribs, and riveted skin/stringer and honeycomb covers.
• Vertical tail: Composed of 2124 aluminum alloy construction consisting of a
two-spar, multi-rib, integrally machined skin assembly.
• Payload bay doors: Graphite epoxy frames and honeycomb panel construction.
Hinged along the side of the midfuselage and split at the top centerline.
k.._. / Figure 2.2.4-12 CTRV Structure
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2.2.4.4 Aeroheating Analyses & TPS Sizing
Preliminary sizing of the Winged CTRV thermal protection system (TPS)
was calculated from estimated heating rate distributions over the vehicle.
The TPS sizing and weight estimates were based on flying a moderate
angle of attack (25 °) trajectory, as demonstrated in POST trajectory
analyses of the CTRV configuration. These trajectories resulted in
moderate heating rates to most of the lower surfaces. Heating rate
distributions over the fuselage surfaces were estimated from analyses
performed on the Medium CTRV configuration. A carbon-carbon TPS
material was assumed required for the entire wing leading edge span.
A shock layout (position vs. mach number) was prepared for the Winged
CTRV configuration to determine whether the bow shock would impinge on
the wing tips during maximum heating and maximum dynamic pressure
conditions of the trajectory. The layout showed that the shock wave would
not reach the wing's vertical stabilizers (tip fins) until after maximum
dynamic pressure (mach 5.0). The shock position during maximum heating
was well inboard of these surfaces.
R
Peak Temperatures of the AI 2024 Structure for various
HRSI Thicknesses and Heat Load Percentages
'r200 r
,oo600
O.O 0.5 1,0
I I l
Total Heal Load = 587901BTU/sq[t I I I I
¢1l 2.5% of Heat Load 1
• 5%olHeaf Load
• 10% of Heat Load
-- • 20%otHeal Load
• 40%olHeat Load
B 6(_, oi'Heal Load
• 80%or Heal Load
, /
. •
• 't.5 " ":L0 " "2.S 3.0 3,5 4.0 4.5 $,0 S.5 6.0 (I,5 7.0
HRSI Thickness (Inches)
Figure 2.2.4-13 Peak Temperatures for the A1 2024 Structure
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TPS Area Weight
Material sq. ft. Ib
RCC 143 1,307
HRSI 2,124 5,276
LRSi 1,611 1,760
FRSI 1,817 596
Misc .m 276
TOTALS 5,695 9,215
_.V'LT
i
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f / J
/ / I
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/
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Figure 2.2.4-14 TPS Material Location
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2.2.4.5 Trajectory Analyses
Trajectory analyses of the selected Winged CTRV configurations were
performed with the POST trajectory simulation tool. The analyses were
performed for all versions of the CTRV and included the complete re-entry
trajectory, from entry interface (400,000 ft altitude) down to the runway
threshold (50 ft altitude directly above the runway). The landing flare
was performed with a 1.5 g pull-up from the -18 ° flight path angle (outer
glide slope) to the final glide slope angle of -1 °. This maneuver was
successfully performed with a low speed L/D ratio as low as 3.5, but the
landing angle of attack was too high (30 °) for good controllability. The
CTRV wing aspect ratio was increased until the L/D reached 4.0 to improve
the landing characteristics.
Improved re-entry trajectory simulation techniques from those used in the
Medium CTRV analyses were required to more accurately predict the
heating environment for CTRV's wings. Lacking detailed aerodynamic
coefficients for the CTRV (aerodynamic control surface trim data), previous
trajectory designs were based on guidance schemes which optimized the
angle of attack and kept FLxed bank angles. By estimating control surface
gains (from Shuttle 6-DOF trajectory simulations), a bank angle steering
guidance mode was added to the CTRV's 3-DOF trajectory simulation. This
permitted both angle of attack and bank angle profiles to be optimized by
POST for a minimum heat rate trajectory. This improved trajectory
capability permitted the Winged CTRV concept to fly constant heat rate
and constant drag profiles during the re-entry (this is the basic Shuttle
trajectory approach). Maximum heating rates for the wing leading edges
were reduced by a factor of almost two in these trajectories. The
improved trajectory analysis eliminated the need for a re-design of the
CTRV wing based on heating rates.
An analysis of the impact footprint for an uncontrolled CTRV re-entry was
also performed. The analysis objective was to determine just how large an
area of populated land mass might a re-entry vehicle such as the CTRV
pose a danger to if system failures occurred during the entry phase of
flight. There are many failure modes which might cause a re-entry safety
hazard (including both uncontrolled and controlled re-entry) which may or
may not lead to structural breakup of the CTRV. System failures such as
loss or degradation of GN&C systems, control surface(s) malfunction, TPS
failures, and loss of electrical power can occur at any time in the re-entry
trajectory. The effects of these failures range from a missed landing
approach, to uncontrolled flight and structural breakup of the vehicle. Any
prediction of the vehicle (or debris) footprint is highly subjective due to
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the high degree of variability in potential failure effects and times. Key
trajectory parameters for the vehicle/debris are also highly variable and
must be estimated for such criteria as debris mass & drag, velocity vectors,
and time of vehicle breakup.
In order to obtain an estimate of the potential impact area, the CTRV
vehicle (intact) trajectory was run to its geographic limits (cross range and
downrange limits) without normally imposed heating and acceleration
constraints. This technique assumes that the greatest lift and drag (or L/D)
coefficients of any debris are less than that of the intact vehicle. The
resulting trajectory footprints thus include maximum range dispersions of
the intact vehicle under off-design heating and acceleration conditions.
The results of this analysis showed that the potential debris impact
footprint included most of the United States (from Hawaii to San Francisco,
Chicago, Washington DC., and Florida) and the entire upper half of Mexico.
This result indicates that a CTRV concept should have sufficient
redundancy in flight critical systems to ensure that the vehicle can be
guided to a controlled impact area in the event the primary or secondary
landing sites cannot be reached due to system failures.
Also considered in the failure scenario was the effect of system failures
during the communications blackout period of the re-entry trajectory.
This blackout period normally prevents vehicle communications with
ground controllers because of highly ionized gasses surrounding the
vehicle during portions of the re-entry. For a vehicle such as the CTRV,
this period would be expected to last for approximately 400 seconds at an
altitude of 250,000 to 200,000 feet (Mach 24 to 15), a region which is
approximately 4,000 Nmi upgrange from the landing site. The CTRV is
always aerodynamically stable during this blackout period, and would
trim at an angle of attack of 55" without any control surface inputs
required. This angle of attack produces a much less than maximum
Lift/Drag ratio. Consequently, if a failure occurred at this point in the
trajectory and no further control surfaces commands were issued to the
vehicle (from on-board or ground sources), the vehicle would land well
short of the targeted landing site. Specifically, it would land about 2,000
Nmi short of the landing site, which is a water impact off the coast of the
US. or Mexico even for a KSC primary landing site. This condition thus
results in a somewhat fail safe trajectory (that is, for several system
failure scenarios) for the CTRV during this blackout period.
II-142
,*.._j
4'*
q.
V
O
m
<
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000,
50000,
0
0
_Max heating= 33_BoTUIft2-se_ce_gL:_:ial_gmra:tee_vers&speeds with,n
\s.u.,esea.
Max dyn. press. = 260 psi _;>
Max Accelleratlon = 1.7 g I \J\
I
250
2000
IBO0
leo0
Flare = 1.5 g ,,oo=
] I ,oo =-
750 11 _ C ....500 ,oorossrangs = 390 Nml
Time(se°lI , _:_n-- 1_ o"°'°°'°°500 450 400 ISO 300
Refailvt ¥11oolfy (fVsea)
Figure 2.2.4-15 CTRV Re-entry Performance
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Figure 2.2.4-16 Trajectory Data - Hypersonic Regime
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Figure 2.2.4-17 Trajectory Data- Landing Maneuver
Issue
What failure modes must be considered for re-entry of an
um-manned spacecraft over populated land areas ?
r
Failure Modes 1
• Loss or degradation of GN&C
° Control surface(s) malfunction
• TPS failure
• Structural failure
• Loss of electrical power
f Failure Effects
• Structural breakup
• Missed landing
• Uncontrolled flight/trajectory
• Environmental contamination
• Civilian damage/casualties
Figure 2.2.4-18 CTRV Flight Safety - Re-entry Failure Modes
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2.2.4.6 Aerodynamic Analyses
Modifying the Integral CTRV into a runway landing system required
sufficient low speed lift to counter the high drag caused by the wide and
short fuselage. The Winged CTRV aerodynamic design was achieved by
adding just enough wing area and stretching the fuselage just enough to
reach the desired subsonic L/D ratio of 4.0. This point was reached when
the forward fuselage (nose section) was increased to 25 feet long and the
wing span increased to 52 feet. The aerodynamic characteristics of this
configuration were calculated with the APAS analysis tool at both
hypersonic and sub-sonic speeds. Trade studies of the configuration
options showed this design to be very sensitive to wing span, which
became the key control parameter for adjusting the low speed L/D ratio. A
subsonic L/D ratio of as much as 6.0 was generated with wing spans
reaching 60 feet. Pitch stability of these higher (L/D > 4.0) lift
configurations was found to be very good and the wing loading was found
to be low compared to the current Space Shuttle design.
An analysis of the aerodynamic loads caused by several of the competing
CTRV concepts on their launch vehicles was also performed. The analysis
evaluated bending moments and static stability margins for typical
boosters for this class of payload at maximum aerodynamic pressure (max
(2) conditions (an NLS-2 booster was used for the launch trajectory
conditions). The analysis showed that the HL-42 concepts produced
moderate launch vehicle bending moments at max Q, but the CLV concepts
imposed high launch vehicle bending moments and associated large
booster engine gimbal offsets. Winged CTRV concepts produced only low
aerodynamic moments because of their relatively low-lift wings and a low
normal force coefficient at the 5" angle of attack condition at max Q, The
Winged CTRV wings were designed expressly to minimize the booster's
max O_loads, but had to make up for this design with higher aspect ratio
wings for landing. The CLV wing designs were directly scaled from the
Shuttle Orbiter (cambered) and thus were subject to the higher lift loading
at the max O_condition.
Much of the analysis of the CTRV wings focused on the design's hypersonic
heating issues. The initial CTRV configuration was selected on the basis of
aerodynamic characteristics in the low speed (landing) regime. The re-
entry and hypersonic aerodynamic characteristics of this configuration
were analyzed to identify those configuration changes necessary to obtain
satisfactory heating rates. The aerodynamic heating was initially found to
be extremely high on the outboard sections of the wing leading edges (due
to the low sweep angle and smaller leading edge radius). Heating rates on
both the wing leading edges and the CTRV nose are limited by the surface
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temperature limit of the advanced carbon-carbon leading edge material.
Alternative re-entry trajectories were attempted at various angle of attack
profiles, but all were found to produce high heating rates. Analysis of the
bow shock location on the wing during re-entry also indicated too high
heating rates (bow and wing shock interaction effects).
Several wing re-design options were evaluated, including changes to the
wing sweep angle, deployable wing sections, increased wing planform area
(extended wing chine areas), and supercritical wing sections. Increasing
the wing planform area produced higher drag during the high angle of
attack re-entry (_=50°), which reduced the maximum heating rates but
also added considerable structural weight. Use of supercritical wing
sections would result in an increase in the wing thickness, and would
increase the wing leading edge radius by a factor of about two greater than
the current wing section. This would reduce heating (by a factor of _f2)
but reduce the low speed lift/drag ratio. The most promising options
appeared to be a change to the outboard wing section sweep angle (from
20 ° to 30 °) or deployable outer wing sections. The increased sweep angle
produced some reduced heating effects for little area (weight) increase. A
deployable wing section provided the best solution for both high speed and
low speed performance but would only prove weight effective if the
weight of the hinge and deployment mechanism could be offset by a
reduced carbon-carbon leading edge area. That is, the deployed wing
section would have to not require carbon-carbon leading edges while in
the swept-back position. Aerodynamic coefficients were calculated for
several increased wing area options and for the deployable wing
configuration option. Re-entry trajectory analyses were then performed
for each configuration to determine the resulting heating rate reductions.
Eventually, the re-entry trajectory simulations were improved enough (see
Section 2.2.4.5, Trajectory Analysis) to lower the predicted heating rates to
acceptable conditions and no wing redesign was actually required.
Aerodynamic stability analysis of the winged CTRV was performed to
determine directional stability characteristics. A combination of various
winglet sizes, nose cone shapes and vertical stabilizer sizes were evaluated
to determine which approach would provide positive stability margins at
the lowest weight. The analysis results showed that retaining the current
winglet size and adding a vertical stabilizer of approximately 100 square
foot area would provide a positive stability margin (C_B _ O.O08/deg at
M=0.3). A single vertical stabilizer mounted at the top of the aft fuselage
section of the vehicle was chosen as the design reference. Design
configuration drawings and weight estimates for the CTRV were updated to
reflect the stabilizer.
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Figure 2.2.4-20 Aerodynamic Data - Hypersonic Regime
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Reference
728
Max CLV W-CTFW
Q 777 777 est.
(psf)
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Moment
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/
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Figure 2.2.4-22 CTRV Induced Airloads - Comparison of Loads on NLS
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2.2.4.7 Subsystems Definition
Subsystem definitions and weight estimates were updated from the
Medium CTRV concept to reflect the final Winged CTRV design
configuration and also to obtain maximum commonality with the PLS (HL-
20) subsystems design. During coordination meetings with NASA JSC and
LaRC personnel, it was decided that all of the CTRV concepts (winged CTRV,
HL-42, and CLV) should be based on a common avionics system definition.
Differences in the CTRV concepts for vehicle lengths and cockpit displays
would have minor effects on most subsystems weights (wire harnesses,
etc.). A review of all systems was conducted with NASA I_aRC to identify
where the CTRV subsystems could be common with the PLS (HL-20)
subsystems def'mitions.
Achieving commonality of the Winged CTRV's Orbital Maneuvering System
(OMS) and Attitude Control System (ACS) with the PLS represented a
significant design trade study between the CTRV'S hypergolic propellants
and alternative propellants such as the hydrogen peroxide/RP-1
propellants of the PLS. Studies performed by MSFC engineers showed only
a minor weight and volumetric penalty for the CTRV between a hypergolic
propellant system (MMH and N204) and the hydrogen peroxide (H202)
system. An assessment of the launch processing impacts resulting from
hypergolic propellant systems servicing was performed to identify how
much of a savings might be realized if the H202 system was used. The
assessment, based on actual Shuttle processing of OMS and RCS systems,
revealed that hypergolic systems processing typically resulted in six shifts
of serial, hazardous operations. This included removal and re-installation
of a hypergolic propulsion module in the OPF, and fueling of the hypergolic
systems at the launch pad. (Actual servicing of the Shuttle hypergolic
system components is performed off-line in a controlled facility removed
from the main system processing. This approach would be recommended
for any propulsion system to allow high pressure testing of propulsion
components.) Determination of the safety support requirements (e.g.
SCAPE operations support equipment and personnel, titre trucks, etc.) were
also identified for these hazardous operations.
Additional impacts to KSC operations of a hydrogen peroxide system were
identified based on the special characteristics of H202. Although this
propellant is not toxic, it is unstable and requires strictly controlled storage
conditions. During trade studies of this propellant option under the PLS
program, it was found that there are currently no production facilities in
the United States or Europe for propellant grade H202 and there are no
storage facilities at KSC or CCAFS for any quantities of this propellant.
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SERIAL OPERATIONS IMPACTS
Hypergolic Propellant Systems
OPF Operations (_)
• System removal (e.g. 1 each OMS pod)
• System Installation (e.g. 1 each OMS pod)
LC-39 Operations @
• Hypergolic propellant loading
Total Serial im
Serial Impact
(Shifts)
6 shifts
Notes
1. Typical OPF flow includes 6 facility clear operations (11 total shifts) and 39 local clear
operations (85 total shifts). OMS pods and Fwd RCS module are not removed every flight,
only as required for unscheduled maintenance actions.
2, Typical LC-39 hypergolic propellant loading Is s scheduled 36 hour process with 31 hours
of "pad clear" operations, During this 31 hour period, a total of 17 propellant tanks are
filled In parallel operations (includes OMS, RCS, APU, and HPU systems propellant loading
and pressurization)
k._y
Figure 2.2.4-23 Operations Impacts - Hypergolic Propellant Systems
OMS/RCS PROPELLANT TRADE
POTENTIAL DISCRIMINATORS
MMH/N204 HYPERGOLICS JP-4/H202
• MONOMETHYLHYDRAZINE(MMH)
- CAUSTIC, LOCALLY DAMAGING TOXIC AGENT &
HIGHLY FLAMMABLE
- PROVEN WELL UNDERSTOOD SAFETY
PROCEDURES tN PLACE
• OPF*: MINOR SPILL (DROP, <1/2 CUP)
DRIVES "CLEAR" AREA
- EVACUATE OPF BAY { 100 - 200 PEOPLE)
- UP TO 1/2 SHIFT CLEAN-UP, "SCAPE" CREW
• OPF': MAJOR SPILL (> 1/2 CUP)
- EVACUATE OPF BAY 1 & 2 ( 200 - 400 PEOPLE)
- EVACUATE ANNEX OFFICES ( - 100 PEOPLE)
- UP TO 2 SHIFT CLEAN-UP "SCAPE" CREW
• N204 REQUIRES SAME PROCURES,
DIFFERENT SPILL KIT
• HYDROGEN PEROXIDE (H202)
• UNSTABLE,
SUSCEPTIBLE TO HEAT & CONTAMINATION
- STRONG IRRITANT
- NON FLAMMABLE, BUT ACTIVE OXIDIZER
REACTING WITH FLAMMABLE MATERIALS
" OPF*: MINOR SPILL (DROP, <1/2 CUP)
DRIVES "CLEAR • AREA
- EVACUATE AFFECTED AREA
SMALLER AREA? FEWER PEOPLE?
- WATER DELUGE CLEAN-UP
- SIMILAR CLEAN-UP,
BREATHING APPARATUS
• OPF': SPILL PROCEDURES SPECIFIED BUT
NOT IN PLACE
• NO EXISTING MANUFACTURING FACILITY
(REFINERY) FOR go + % H202
• NO EXISTING STORAGE FACILITY FOR
H202 AT KSC/CCAFS
•OM._v'RCSTANKSPURGEDPRIORTOENTRYINTOORBITERPROCESSINGFACR./TY(OP_
SCAPE:SELFCONTAINEDATMOSPHERICPROTECT_ ENSEMBLE
REFERENCESA_,116_.30. VOL LIOUIOPROPELLANTS:GP 1098-F..KSCGROUNDOPERATIONS$AFETYPLAN
Figure 2.2.4-24 OMS/RCS Propellant Trade - Potential Discriminators
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2.2.4.8 Reliability Analyses
Reliability and maintainability analyses of the Winged CTRV concept were
performed to reflect the subsystem design changes (including the addition
of the CTRV's wings and aerodynamic control surfaces). The effect of these
relatively more complex subsystems of the Winged CTRV than the Medium
CTRV concept had a dramatic effect on the CTRV's launch operations
simulations. The reliability of all major components in each subsystem was
calculated by our MAtrix program per the current subsystems weight and
mission duration. These CTRV component reliability estimates were used
to calculate maintenance requirements (MTBF, MTBR, ...) at the LRU level.
The increase in subsystems complexity, and thus increase in maintenance
actions (failures per flight increased from 2.1 to 6.5) was simulated in the
SIMtrix maintainability model. This produced a logistics delay factor of 21
times the MTTR, a significant increase from the 8X factor associated with
earlier (and simpler design) Medium CTRV reliability estimates. This data
was in turn used to update the STARSIM simulation of integrated CTRV,
PLS, and NELV launch processing. It was found that a spares level of 95%
would be required to meet the CTRV and PLS launch rates (rather than the
90% level previously required).
The SIMtrix maintenance simulation tool was then used to establish a
recommended spares quantity for each LRU based on the predicted
reliability and maintenance data generated from MAtrix. The
recommended spares level for most LRUs was only one each except for
high quantity components such as thrusters (36 total per vehicle, 6 each
spares recommended). The estimate of the required spares levels for the
CTRV was used to support CTRV cost exercises.
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Figure 2.2.4-25 CTRV Downtime Variation
WINGED CTRV SPACECRAFT =QTY UNIT WT TOTAL WT ! LRU? MllBR _._IEDSOURCE: WCTRV WEIGHT STATEMENT OF 614/93 (Ibs) (Ibs) (RI Hrs) SPARES OTY
(POS = 0.90}
i.TrlTUDE REACTION cOWrROL & OMS 1898 NO 56 NIA
TANK (MMH ÷ NTO) 21 502.50 100_; NO 3,027 N/A
THRUSTER (FORWARD) 1 8 8.10 110 Y1ES 17 II 3
TItRUSTER (AFT) 18 6.10 110 YES 176 3
--1 --00.00 80--ND- __US| N/A
--PLUMBING -- --
THRUSTER (OILS) 11 38.00 35 YES _ 552 3PLUkiIBING, VALVES I ETC. 258.00 258 NO 30_ N/A
• I 695 NO 381 NIA
AVIONICS .1' J "_
GUIOAH.CE, NAVIGATION ANDCONTROL • I 438 NO 497 N/A
IMU I HEXAD 1 55.0C 55 YES 6,231 I
GN&C COMPUTER 2 10.OC 20 YES 17 z134 I
GPS RECEIVEP_ROCESSOR 2 9.0_ 18 YES 19,037 I
FLOODUGHT, PTZ 2 6.00 13 YES 999 I
CA',JE_,.._,PI-Z 1 78.00 78 'YES 4=393 1
CONTROLLER, GIMBAL ORIV1E 25.00 2 S; YES 81,985 1
COHTR_rUl I:R, RCS 33.00 331 YES 48=042 I
CONTR OLLERj ACTU.A.TOR 40.00 40 YES 38,723 I
ALTIMETER 2 i 5.00 1 0 YES 34,207 1
RF AC:C:I:MRI'_zMSBLS 22[ 7.00 1 4 _E5 24,479 1" - 21 42 8,159RECBVER/OECOOER, MSBLS
THANSDUCER_ AIR DATA 21 19.00 38 YES i 8,018 1
SENSOR AIR OATA 21 25..00 50 _ES _: 6,053 1
COMMUNICATIONS ANDTRA.CK.ING . _ - : 200 NO i _1,31_ N/A
PnWPR AMPLIRER. RF ] 21 6.00i 12 YES i 28,557t 1
Figure 2.2.4-26 MAtrix Model Spares Recommendations
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2.2.4.9 Cost Analyses
",._./
The design complexity and percent new design cost factors for the CTRV
concept were provided to MSFC for cost estimation activities by NASA.
Definition of a scale for these cost factors was provided to JSC and to LaRC
to permit a common costing approach among the competing CTRV concepts
(Winged CTRV, PLS, HL-42, and the CLV). Using these definitions, cost
factors for design complexity and for percent new design of the CTRV (as
well as for the CLV, PLS, and HL-42) were established and coordinated
with the NASA centers. This approach allowed a common cost basis for
comparing the relative benefits of these concepts with respect to each
other, without suffering from different programmatic or design
groundrules which may be preferred for the individual concept programs
(or governing NASA center).
The CTRV subsystems were evaluated to establish DDT&I_ cost factors in
support of CTRV cost estimating efforts. The subsystems were compared
to similar current (Shuttle or other space system) subsystem designs to
establish relative new design and design complexity factors. As the
Shuttle design experience provides the only re-usable space system with
an available cost database, most of the factors are based on Shuttle
comparisons.
D&D D_n FH
PERCENT DESIGN DESIGN
SUBSYSTEM NE'WDESIGNCOMPI._ COMPLEXITY
STRUCTUREF_O BOOY(NASCOM MANk_: 6O% 1.00 1.oo
STRUCTUREM©BOOY (NASCOMMANNED) 20% 1.00 1.oo
STRUCllJRE AFT BCOY(NASCOM MANNED 60% 1.00 1.00
STRUCTUREW1NGGROLIP(NASCOMMANN 60% 1.00 1.00
PAYLOADBAYDOOR (NASCOM MA.NIkED) 20% 1.00 I.O0
STRUCTURCREWMOOULE(NASCOMMAN_ 0% 0.00 1,00
RECOVERY(PARAC_ (SI_JCM) 0% 0.00 1.00
LAkC)INGGEAR(NASCOMMANNED) 40% - 1.oo 1,oo
TPS LEADINGEOGE(NASCOM MANNED) 20_ I.OO 1.oo
TPS_LES(NASCOMMANmO) 30% 1.00 too
"f_ (BLANKETS)(SPECIAl.C_E_) 20% 1.00 1.00
_CH_aSM (LVCM) 40_ too I.OO
ORBITAL MANUVERINGSYS (OM_ (LVCM) 40% 1.00 1.00
REACTIONCONTROLSYSTE_(RCS) (LVCM} 40% 1.00 1.00
TANKS (S_M) 40% i.O0 1.00
GN & C (ffikSCOMUNMANI'_) 50",6 !.00 1.00
DATA MANAGEMENTSYS (NASC.,OMMANI_ 30% 1.20 1.00
COM_L&]RJJ_K_G(NASCOMUNMAN_ 40_ i.oo I.oo
INSTRUI,ENTAl'ION 50% 1.20 1.00
POWEROEN(i_4k_ (NASCOMU_ 40% i.O0 i.O0
EtECPOWm _ (reELCEU.)_SCU) _ i._ tOO
ELEC CONY& DISTRIBUTION(S._M) 60% 120 1.00
CONTRO.(NASCOMUNMANNED 4O% I .oo I .oo
_o SUqFACECONTROL_ (_ so,y, i.oo ioo
==_=_---=_==:=====_================================
NOTE:
D&D= DESIGN AND D_OPMENT
FH= FLIGHT H/_DWARE pRODUCTION)
Figure 2.2.4-27 Winged CTRV (WCTRV) (Unmanned Cargo Carrier)
Cost Estimating Factors
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2.2.4.10 Launch Processing Analyses
Analysis of uncertainty in the predicted Winged CTRV and PLS subsystems
turnaround processing times was also examined with the STARSIM model.
The CTRV and the PIS subsystems were analyzed using both the predicted
fast processing timelines and using current Shuttle subsystems processing
timelines. As expected, the PLS and CTRV vehicles occupied their
processing facilities for a greater amount of time, but the desired flight
rates could be still be achieved even with the Shuttle processing times.
The effect of the longer subsystems processing timelines was not as
significant as the effect of longer maintenance delays for spares! This
demonstrated that the CTRV (and the PLS) reliability and maintainability
parameters are at least as important as the launch processing times.
The effect of the subsystem processing timelines on manpower utilization
was also demonstrated in these STARSIM simulations. Comparison of
manpower expenditure for both the fast (predicted) and Shuttle processing
times showed only minor differences. A manpower consumption of 1.60
million man-hours per year was required to process the required 9.5
flights with the fast timelines. The manpower increased only to 1.69
miUion man-hours for the Shuttle timelines. The small difference is due to
the low average facility utilization rates of several key facilities when the
faster processing times are simulated. This effect is consistent with
staffing practices at KSC in which most direct labor staff are assigned to
specific facilities and are not employed on a per flight basis. This
demonstrates another important observation about launch processing
costs: reducing launch processing timelines does not directly reduce launch
processing costs. A better means of reducing direct (and even indirect)
labor costs is to reduce the number of processing facilities required (e.g.
high utilization of fewer facilities). Launch processing timelines thus need
to be balanced among all facilities to produce the most efficient use of
resources (just as a production line must balance the quantity and work
content of all work stations in the manufacturing flow).
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Figure 2.2.4-28 Launch Processing Operations
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L J Figure 2.2.4-29 Medium CTRV - Launch Processing Flow
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Turnaround Times
Aircraft-like
Operations
Shuttle-like
Operations
CTRV Time in System (Work-Days)
PLS Time in System (Work-Days)
Launch Interval (Work-Days)
44.4
58.8
26.4
86.7
101.0
26.4
Manpower Requirements
Annual Touch Labor (Million Hours) 1.512 1.690
Facility Utilization
Landing Facility Utilization 0.042 0.042
HPF Utilization 0.326 0.857
VAB Utilization 0.648 0.935
Launch Pad Utilization 0.389 0.394
MLT Utilization 0.694 1.000
Crawler-Transporter Utilization 0.028 0.375
Figure 2.2.4-30 CTRV Launch Processing Analysis - Simulation Results
Facility Facility Total
Assumed Staffing Levels Staff (EP) _ Staff (EPI
OPF 85 3 255
VAB (_) 84 2 168
Launch Pad 63 2 126
CAJPF 265 1 265
Total 814
As Aircraft As Shuttle
Facility Utilization Levels Processlna Processlna
Landing Site .04 .04
OPF ,33 .82
VAB .65 .85
Launch Pad .39 .48
CA/PF ? ?
Derived Manpower Utilization
- Launch processing functions(_)
(_) - VAB staff must perform launch pad functions also
(_ - A target utilization of 80% recommended, remainder for facility & GSE
maintenance, training ....
Figure 2.2.4-31 Direct Labor Utilization Estimate
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2.2.4.11 Alternative Winged CTRV Concept
One alternative CTRV concept was briefly examined to evaluate potential
changes to the CTRV requirements. This concept was the Single
Development Winged CTRV. The concept was an attempt to reduce the
development and operations costs of two separate airframes for crew and
cargo delivery missions. The HL-42 already satisfied this objective, but at
a very low payload capability. The Single Development Winged CTRV was
used to determine the potential benefits of increasing this payload range.
2.2.4.11.1 Single Development Winged CTRV Concept
In order to reduce the Access to Space "Option 2" operating costs, a means
of reducing the combined CTRV/PLS annual flight rate from 9 per year to 6
per year was investigated. The CTRV configuration which enables this cost
savings is one which combines the Bi-conic PLS concept with the CTRV
(PLS replaces the CTRV nose cone). This configuration was not previously
considered because it results in a total launch weight greater than the
100,000 pound limit (study groundrule). The biconic PLS concept as
reported by NASA JSC was used essentiaUy intact as the CTRV forward
fuselage. The "PLS" configuration includes the escape motors and the
Space Station docking port as per a "stand-alone" PIS spacecraft. This
approach permits the PLS to be a fully functional system when (if)
separated from the CTRV at any time in the mission (launch, orbit, entry).
The CTRV configuration was also left essentially intact, retaining the full
42,500 pound payload capability. CTRV subsystem weights were increased
to allow for extra redundancy (e.g. FAIL OP/FAIL SAFE for critical
functions) associated with the PIS. Life support and other crew related
subsystem requirements were included in the PLS weight statement. The
combined PLS/CTRV launch weight was 125,000 pounds. While greater
than the study groundrules, this weight is within the performance levels of
some candidate launch vehicles for the Option 2 architecture and thus
could be viable.
Re-entry trajectory analyses were performed for this CTRV configuration
to determine the impact of the increased weight (CTRV wing size was not
changed). The analyses showed only small differences between the
reference CTRV re-entry and the combined CTRV/PLS re-entry. The
trajectory prof'fle was essentially identical with only a small increase in the
heating rates experienced by the vehicle. The maximum aerodynamic
heating rate experienced on the CTRV's wing leading edge was raised from
58 BTU/sq ft-sec to 65 BTU/sq ft-sec. This increase merely used up the
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design margin which existed in the CTRV, raising the leading edge surface
temperature up to its 3100 ° F temperature limit (same heating rate limit
as Shuttle wing leading edges).
Analysis of the heavier CTRV landing maneuver showed the effects of not
increasing the wing area. The landing flare maneuver was increased to a
2.0 g acceleration turn (was 1.5 g) and the final flare required a 29 ° angle
of attack (was 21 °) to maintain sufficient lift until touchdown. While the
landing maneuver could be performed with the existing wing, a slightly
larger wing would have brought the landing characteristics closer to
conventional performance. Changes in the currently undefined body
flap/elevon sizes and deployment schedules would also improve the
landing performance of this concept.
Deliver & return all SSF logistics
payloads, including crew
Runway landing capability
- EAFB crossrange capability
Auto-rendezvous and autoland
capability
Payload volume = 15' dia X 37.5' L
Payload mass = 42,500 Ibs. + 6 crew
Launch weight -- 125,510 Ibs.
Landing weight = 113,660 Ibs.
Wing design (64000 sedes wing)
- 0 ° incidence angle
- symmetric (no camber, no twist)
- 82", 60 °, 20 °, 48°(tips) sweep angles
- 60' span
Vertical stab. (64000 series wing)
- symmetric, supercdtical
- 30 ° sweep
/
Figure 2.2.4-32 Winged CTRV with PLS Concept
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Structure 34,550
TPS 10,600
Active Thermal Control 1,850
OMS/RCS 1,840
Elec. Power Generation 2,150
Elec. Power Distribution 1,900
Avionics 1,220
Purge/Vent 700
Landing Gear 3,590
PLS Abort motors 7,770
Other 1,210
67.380 Do; Weioht
Consumables
OMS/RCS 9,410
Fuel cell reactant 2,350
Payload 42,500
Crew (2+4) 1,800
Launch veh. adapter 1 800
Total Launch Weight 1125,51 0
Re-entry Weight 113,360
Launch C.G. =
Re-entry C.G. =
A
/oa\
/ 0
F -entryLUnch
X Y Z II466 0 103445 0 105
Figure 2.2.4-33 Weight Estimate - Winged Medium CTRV with PLS
400000
350000
, 300000
250000
®
200000
15000o
w
< 100000
50000
• Re-entry profile similar to Space Shuttle
• Trajectory constrained by wing leading
edge heating rates
ax heating= 38 STU/ft2-sec • Landing maneuvers & speeds within
Shuttle state-of-the-art
• PLS capsule can escape at any
point in trajectory
I,;o ,.. ........'.?:o,_,o_,......
Figure 2.2.4-34 CTRV Re-entry Performance
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2.3 Launch Abort Studies
An important element of manned launch systems is the ability to safely
perform a launch abort in the event of a failure in a critical system
component. This launch abort capability is vital to crew safety
considerations and is also a major cost factor for un-manned but fully re-
usable launch systems in which the reusable element represents a
significant ffmancial investment. The objective of the launch abort function
is to return the crew (and/or reusable system element) safely to the
ground so that they may be used again. The initial mission objectives of
the launch are not retained. The capability to perform the launch abort
function is typically provided by both the launch vehicle and the manned
element, but neither element providing the full abort capability during the
entire mission. Launch abort analysis of manned launch systems must
therefor examine the capabilities of both elements over the entire launch
mission phase. The abort analyses performed in this study were
conducted during the NASA Access to Space study period and utilized
launch vehicle and manned dement concepts as defined in the NASA work.
These launch abort studies directly contributed to the NASA study effort.
2.3.1 Abort Studies Approach
2.3.1.1 Launch System Elements
Launch abort analyses were performed to determine the ability of four
launch vehicles to perform a mission abort during the launch portion of the
nominal mission (ascent trajectory phase). The launch vehicles selected for
analysis were those identified as the most promising from the NASA
Access to Space, Option 2 study. These launch vehicles used either the HL-
42 or the CLV-P crew/cargo concepts as the system's manned/reusable
elements. The analysis was performed for each Option 2 booster as
def'med by NASA (Boosters 2A', 2C, and 2D for the HL-42, and Booster 2B
for the CLV-P). The abort trajectories were analyzed with the POST
trajectory software for nominal 15X220 Nmi insertion transfer orbits at
both 28.5 and 51.6 degree inclinations. All analyses were based on launch
from KSC using 3-DOF trajectories with mean annual KSC winds (peak wind
velocity of 102 fps at 36,000 ft). The HL-42 vehicle includes a number of
abort solid rocket motors which may be used to perform the abort
maneuvers (for both rapid escape from the booster and post-escape
velocity addition). These abort motors by themselves permit an abort
from the launch pad and for the first 64 seconds of flight. The HL-42 and
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CLV-P orbital maneuvering system propulsion systems may also be used
for certain abort conditions (when the vehicle is at high altitudes). The
HL-42 design also provides an option for emergency water landing by
parachute. The CLV-P does not provide this option, but does provide for
crew escape (bail out) at lower altitudes and velocities. The abort
trajectory analyses were performed for both ascent and entry conditions
with POST. During the re-entry/landing portions of the abort trajectories,
design heating rate limits were maintained but acceleration limits were
relaxed (to 8 g's) for the HL-42 per allowable abort requirements. Specific
design characteristics of the booster were provided by NASA MSFC; HL-42
and CLV-P destgn data were provided by NASA LaRC and JSC, respectively.
No predictions of booster stage impact points were attempted during these
analyses.
Architecture 2A'
• 1.5 StageLV Family
UtilizingRecoverable
P/A Modules_ _
Delta Atlas STS/'Titan
Replacement
Delta for 10K Class
Atlas for 20K Class
STS/Titan Replacement Class
- HL-42 for Craw Trees,
- ATV for Cargo Trans.
- Single Eng, Centaur
- 1.5 Stage Parallel Burn
- All LOX ILR2
- pert Reusable (P/A)
- SSME
Architecture 2B
Parallel Burn LV Family
Utilizing LOX / LH2 Core
and LRB's
Delta 20K Titan / STS
Replacement
Et,atuf_
• Delta for 10K Class
• New 2OK to Replace Atlas
• BTS/Titan Replacement CkRSS
-- Full SlMIon Logistics Return
- CLV-P for Crew & Cargo
- Single Eng. Csnlsur
- 2 Stage Parallel Burn
- All LOX/LH2
- Expendable LV Elements
- Low Cost, STME
- Cornrnonlllty: Boostsra,'Cora./20K
Architecture 2C
• Parallel Burn LV Family
Utilizing Hybrid Strapon
Boosters
Delta 2OK STS I Titan
Replacement
Etatumm
• Delta for 1OK Class
• New 20K to Replace Atlas
* BTS/Titan Replacement Class
- HL-42 for Crew Trans.
- AW for Cargo Trane,
- Single Eng. Centaur
- 2 Stage Parallel Bum
- Hybrid Booster - LOX/L.H2 Corn
- Expendable LV Elements
- Low Cost, STME
- Commonnllty: Core W/2OK
Architecture 2D
Series Burn LVFamily
Based on LowCostI
Low Risk RD180 Russian
Engine
Delta 20K STS / Trlan
Replacement
Ecatumm
• Delta for 10K Class
• New 20K to Replace Atlas
• STS/Titan Replacement Class
- HL-42 for CrawTrans,
- ATV for Cargo Trans.
- Single Eng. Centaur
- 2 Stage Serlas Burn
- LOXIRP Boolt,- LOXlLH2 2nd Stg.
- Expendable LV Elements
- RD t 8GrJ2S
Figure 2.3-1 Option 2 - Architecture Overview
2.3.1.2 Launch Abort Modes
The launch abort modes considered in the analysis included; Return To
Launch Site (RTLS), Trans-Atlantic Landing (TAL), Engine Out (EO), Abort
To Orbit (ATO), and Abort Once Around (AOA). These five intact abort
modes represent means of the spacecraft (HL-42 or CLV-P) to achieve a
runway landing in the event of a malfunction during the launch phase.
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The RTLS abort mode is used to return the spacecraft directly to the launch
site. This means abandoning the launch trajectory, and reversing the
ground track to gain sufficient velocity toward the launch site for a landing
on the KSC runway. The TAL abort mode is similar to the RTLS in that the
ascent trajectory is abandoned, but in this case the decision to abort is
reached much later in the trajectory and the landing site is in Europe or
Africa (depending on the launch inclination). The EO and ATO aborts
permit the launch trajectory to continue to a MECO target (altitude and
velocity) which places the spacecraft into orbit. The EO abort allows the
nominal MECO target to be reached, and thus the mission continues as
planned. In the case of the ATO abort, this orbit is a lower energy orbit
than nominal (a 50X80 Nmi. ATO orbit was used for these analyses). The
AOA abort is used when insufficient energy exists to reach orbit, but the
lVlt!CO target can send the spacecraft once around the Earth for a landing
back at the launch site. A North America Landing (NAL) was used for
Booster 2D at high inclination orbits to compensate for this two-stage
(series burn) booster design.
For those periods of the trajectory where above described intact abort
modes are not available, the HL-42 would perform a water landing which
would permit a safe recovery of the crew or cargo. The CLV-P would
descend to a stable, low altitude/velocity condition for the crew bail out.
All abort modes were initiated at an assumed single engine failure in
either the booster or core/second stages (as appropriate) at various times
of the launch trajectory. Multiple engine failures or system level failures
were not analyzed. Failures of this type would generally incapacitate the
entire booster and result in a water landing/bailout for the spacecraft.
The landing sites selected for the intact abort options included the
Kennedy Space Center (for RTLS, EO, ATO and AOA), and either Banjul,
Gambia or Brize-Norton, England (for TALLat 28.5" and S 1.6 ° inclinations,
respectively). Several additional landing sites were identified for the NAL
abort mode for Booster 2D. This abort mode was identified for the HL-42
concept when the Booster 2D second stage engine fails to start during high
inclination orbit launches (51.6°). Under these special circumstances, the
HL-42 can land in Boston or other nearby cities which have a 10,000 foot
runway. A similar abort mode was attempted for this launch configuration
at low inclination orbits (28.5°), but no land masses (islands such as Puerto
Rico, the Bahamas, Bermuda) were close enough to the trajectory path to
enable a runway landing. The landing sites for the orbital abort modes
(EO, ATO, AOA) was KSC.
.,._#
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Figure 2.3-2 Abort Landing Sites
Discussions which follow of abort capabilities of the several launch
vehicle/spacecraft configurations is based on the 51.6" inclination orbit
trajectories to the Space Station. Analyses were performed to both 28.5 °
and 51.6" inclination orbits but the higher inclination orbit is of most
interest because of the current Space Station redesign. Results at the 28.5 °
orbits are generally very similar to the 51.6" orbits and were not a major
factor when comparing the booster configurations. Data from analysis of
both inclination orbits is presented in enclosed tables and figures.
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2,3,2 Abort Coverage of Selected Boosters
2.3.2.1 HL-42 Aborts on Booster 2A'
The abort analyses performed using the HL-42 on Booster 2A', a 1.5-stage
booster for the Option 2 architecture, showed this configuration to be
particularly effective for manned flights. This launch vehicle configuration
consists of a core stage and several booster engines which are staged early
in the flight. The booster engines are four SSME engines (staged in pairs),
and the core stage uses two SSME sustainer engines (all LOX/LH2
propellant). Because the HL-42 configuration weight is well below the
maximum payload capability of this launch vehicle, there is considerable
excess propellant in the booster propellant tanks (assuming the tanks are
filled to capacity for the launch). This excess propellant is valuable for
abort capabilities when recovering from propulsion failures in either first
or second stage flight.
The abort analysis revealed that 100% of the launch trajectory has an
intact abort mode coverage for the HL-42 (no water ditching required).
During first stage flight, the RTLS abort mode is provided from the launch
pad until 192 seconds into the launch, at which time the vehicle is too far
downrange for the HL-42 to return to KSC. During the first 64 seconds of
flight, the HL-42 can return to KSC using just its own abort motors. The
extended RTLS period (64 sec. to 192 sec.) is available by using the booster
core stage thrust to perform a powered turnaround maneuver and to
generate sufficient velocity back toward the launch site for the HL-42
range to reach the KSC landing site. Also during first stage flight, if a
booster engine fails late in its burn duration (last 60 seconds), an engine
out (EO) capability exists (nominal MECO target is achievable). Both of
these abort modes utilize propellant margins in the core stage to make up
the thrust loss of the booster stage engine failure. The EO and RTLS abort
mode periods overlap, thereby providing full abort capability during the
entire first stage flight.
During second stage flight, the abort modes available are the TAL, ATO,
and EO aborts. These abort modes are available through the use of excess
core stage propellant (since there are two engines in the core stage) and
the HL-42's abort motors and on-board OMS systems (if necessary). The
TAL abort mode is available for 158 seconds of flight time and returns the
HL-42 to a landing site in northern Europe. The HL-42 abort and OMS
propulsion systems, coupled with the long gliding range of the HL-42
aerodynamic shape, assist the remaining core stage engine in performing
this abort mode. The ATO abort mode is available for 127 seconds during
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the second stage trajectory. The launch vehicle can adjust its trajectory to
a lower energy MECO target if a core stage engine fails during this period.
The HL-42 would remain in this orbit until a landing opportunity becomes
available or it may perform some of the on-orbit mission objectives from
this orbit. (Note: it is assumed that when an engine out capability becomes
available, the ATO abort mode would no longer be needed and the EO abort
mode would be the preferred option.) The second stage trajectory EO abort
mode (a duration of 63 seconds) is enabled by use of the remaining core
stage engine. Failure of a core stage engine during this period would not
prevent the HL-42 from achieving the nominal MECO target. The booster
second stage flight is thus found to provide full abort coverage. During this
182 second time period, an engine failure would not result in a HL-42
water landing.
The Booster 2A' configuration has thus been found to provide full abort
coverage, providing at least one abort mode during the entire launch
trajectory. At no time during the launch is the HL-42 exposed to a water
landing contingency. An EO abort capability (that is, successful completion
of the mission after suffering the loss of a single engine) exists for 31% of
the trajectory and the alternate landing site exposure (TAL) is only 30%
(48% and 26% for 28.5* trajectories).
HL-42 ABORT OPTIONS
RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Any engine failure in core stage. Use remaining engines and HL-42
escape motors to execute powered tumaround maneuver and establish
sufficient velocity toward launch site for HL-42 range to reach landing site.
ENGINE OUT
Single booster or sustainer engine failure. Utilize remaining engines
to reach nominal MECO target.
TRANS-ATLANTIC LANDING (TAL)
Single booster or sustalner engine failure. Utilize HL-42 escape motors
and OMS to establish sufficient velocity for HL-42 range to reach landing
site in Europe or Africa.
ABORT TO ORBIT (ATE))
Single booster or sustainer engine failure. Utilize 2nd stage to reach
lower energy MECO target for 15X80 Nmi. parking,_transfer orbit. HL-42
circularizes to low altitude orbit, waits for first available landing opportunity
WATER LANDING (WL)
Multiple engine or propulsion system failures, no runway landing available.
HL-42 performs escape maneuver and glides to water landing.
Abort Window
O sec < MET:_ 192 sec
150 sec <:MET _; 210 sec
329 sec <:MET < 392 sec
210 sec <:MET _; 368 sec
265 sec s MET _ 392 sec
Not Required
z Figure 2.3-3 Booster 2A' Abort Capability
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Figure 2.3-4 Booster 2A' Abort Coverage
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HL-42 ABORT OPTIONS
RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Any engine failure in core stage. Use remaining engines and HL-42
escape motors to execute powered turnaround maneuver and establish
sufficient velocity toward launch site for HL-42 range to reach landing site.
ENGINE OUT
Single booster or sustainer engine failure. Utilize remaining engines
to reach nominal MECO target.
TRANS-ATLANTIC LANDING (TAL)
Single booster or sustainer engine failure. Utilize HL-42 escape motors
and OMS to establish sufficient velocity for HL-42 range to reach landing
site in Europe or Africa.
ABORT TO ORBIT (ATO)
Single booster or sustainer engine failure. Utilize 2nd stage to reach
lower energy MECO target for 15X80 Nmi. parking/transfer orbit. HL-42
circularizes to low altitude orbit, waits for first available landing opportunity.
WATER LANDING (WL)
Multiple engine or propulsion system failures, no runway landing available.
HL-42 performs escape maneuver and glides to water landing.
Abort Window
0 sec _; MET < 187 sec
103 sec _; MET < 210 sec
311 sec < MET < 389 sec
210 sec _; MET _; 368 sec
214 sec < MET < 389 sec
Not Required
Figure 2.3-5 Booster 2A' Abort Capability (28 °)
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Figure 2.3-6 Booster 2A' Abort Coverage (28 °)
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2.3.2.2 CLV-P Aborts on Booster 2B
Abort analyses were performed for the CLV-P on Booster 2B, a 2-stage,
parallel burn booster for the Option 2 architecture. The two booster stages
each use two ATLCE engines (LOX/LH2 booster stage propellant), and the
second (core) stage uses a single ATLCE engine (LOX/LH2 core stage
propellant). Because the CLV-P configuration weight is the maximum
payload capability of this launch vehicle, there is no excess propellant in
the booster core stage available for extended abort capabilities when
recovering from first stage propulsion failures.
The abort analysis revealed that a large percentage (43%) of the launch
trajectory has no abort mode coverage for the CLV-P (requiring a crew
bailout over water and loss of the vehicle and payload). During first stage
flight, the RTLS abort mode is provided only after a minimum of 20
seconds after liftoff from the launch pad and until 200 seconds into the
launch, at which time the vehicle is too far downrange for the CLV-P to
return to KSC. The RTLS period (180 seconds duration) is available only
for an engine failure in one booster stage by using the remaining booster
engines and the core stage thrust to perform a powered turnaround
maneuver and to generate sufficient velocity back toward the launch site
for the CLV-P range to reach the KSC landing site. Also during first stage
flight, if a booster engine falls late in the burn duration (last 95 seconds),
either an ATO or an EO abort option can be flown. Both of these abort
modes utilize remaining engines and propellant in the booster and core
stages to make up the thrust loss of the booster engine failure. The ATO,
EO, and RTLS abort mode periods overlap, thereby providing some abort
capability during all but the initial 20 seconds of first stage flight.
During second stage flight, the only abort mode available is the TAL abort.
This abort mode is available only through the use of the CLV-P abort
motors and on-board OMS systems since there is only a single engine in
the booster core stage. The TAL abort mode is available only for the last
17 seconds of flight time and returns the CLV-P to a landing site in
northern Europe. The CLV-P abort and OMS propulsion systems, coupled
with the long gliding range of the CLV-P aerodynamic shape, enable this
abort mode. The second stage EO abort mode (a short duration of only 8
seconds) is enabled only by use of the CLV-P abort motors. The booster
second stage flight is thus found to have no abort coverage until the last 17
seconds. During this 198 second time period, an engine failure would force
the CLV-P to perform a water ditching (and crew bailout if manned).
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The Booster 2B configuration has thus been found to provide only limited
abort coverage for the CLV-P. During the launch, the CLV-P (and crew) is
exposed to a water ditching/bailout contingency for 43% of the trajectory.
An EO abort capability exists for 23% of the trajectory and the alternate
landing site capability (TAL) is only 4% (24% and 10% for 28.5* inclination
trajectories). This level of abort coverage is not considered acceptable for
a new manned launch system.
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CLV-P ABORT OPTIONS /
RETUR N-TO-LAU NCH-BITE (RTLS)
Singte engine failure in booster stage. Utilize booster & core stages plus
CLV escape motors to execute powered turnaround maneuver and
establish sufficient velocity toward launch site for CLV to reach KSC.
ENGINE OUT
Single engine failure in booster stage. Utilize remaining booster engines
and core stage to reach nominal MECO target.
TRANS-ATLANTIC LANDING ('TAL)
Single engine failure in core stage. Utilize CLV escape motors/OMS to
establish sufficient velocity for CLV range to reach landing site in Europe.
ABORT TO ORBIT (ATO)
Single engine failure in booster sta_]e. Utilize core stage to reach lower
energy MECO target. CLV circularizes to low altitude orbit, waits for first
available landing opportunity.
WATER DITCHING (WD)
Single engine failure in core stage. CLV descends to low altitude for
crew to safely bail out over water.
Abort Window
20 sec < MET < 200 sec
129 sec < MET < 224 sec
405 sec < MET _;422 sec
130 sec < MET :; 224 sec
224 sec _; MET < 405 sec
Figure 2.3-7 Booster 2B Abort Capability
%%_..,,/-
II"-170
+ Sta¢
f
f
/
/
-/if--
RTLS
TAL
1-Engine
out
ATO *
WD /" ----if --HI
J
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Mission Elapsed Time, MET (seconds)
* Abort to 50x80 Nmi transfer orbit
Altitude
J 3501<'
300_C
25OK'
20OK'
150W
100K"
SOK"
O'
450
L J
Figure 2.3-8 Booster 2B Abort Coverage
*= /
II-171
I CLV-P ABORT OPTIONS
• RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Single engine failure inboosterstage.Utilizebooster &core stagesplus
CLV escape motors to execute poweredturnaroundmaneuverand
establishsufficientvelocitytowardlaunchsitefor CLV to reach KSC.
• ENGINE OUT
Single enginefailure inboosterstage. Utilizeremainingbooster engines
and core stageto reach nominalMECO target.
• TRANS-ATLANT1CLANDING ("rAL)
Singleenginefailure incore stage. UtilizeCLV escapemotors/OMS to
establishsufficientvelocityfor CLV rangeto reachlandingsite in Africa.
• ABORTTO ORBIT (ATO)
Singleenginefailure inboosterstage. Utilizecorestageto reach lower
energyMECO target. CLV circularizesto lowaltitude orbit,waitsfor first
availablelandingopportunity.
• WATER DITCHING ONE))
Singleenginefailure in corestage. CLV descendsto low altitudefor
crewto safelybailout over water.
Abort Window
20 sec _;MET _;200 sec
120 sec < MET _ 224 sec
380 sec <MET _ 422 sec
107 sec _<MET <224 sec
224 sere:; MET < 380 sec
Figure 2.3-9 Booster 2B Abort Capability (28 °)
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2.3.2.3 HL-42 Aborts on Booster 2C
_._.Y
Abort analyses were also performed for the HL-42 on Booster 2C, a 2-stage
parallel burn, hybrid booster for the Option 2 architecture. The two
booster stages each consist of a single engine hybrid motor (hybrid
propellant booster stages), and the second (core) stage uses a single ATLCE
engine (LOX/LH2 core stage propellant). Because the HL-42 configuration
weight is near the maximum payload capability of this launch vehicle,
there is no excess propellant in the booster core stage available for
extended abort capabilities when recovering from first stage propulsion
failures. Also, because the booster stages are large thrust, single engine
stages (nearly 1.5 million lbs thrust each), loss of one booster stage will
require shutdown of the other booster stage to maintain control of the
launch vehicle.
The abort analyses revealed that a large percentage (66%) of the launch
trajectory has no abort mode coverage for the HL-42 (requiring a water
landing/ditching). During first stage flight, the RTLS abort mode is
provided from the launch pad until 130 seconds into the launch, at which
time the vehicle is too far downrange for the HL-42 to return to KSC.
During the first 64 seconds of flight, the HL-42 can return to KSC using just
its own abort motors. The extended RTLS period (64 sec. to 130 sec.) is
available by using the booster core stage thrust to perform a powered
turnaround maneuver and to generate sufficient velocity back toward the
launch site for the HL-42 range to reach the KSC landing site. The RTLS
abort mode is not available after 64 seconds for a core stage engine failure.
Also during f'n'st stage flight, a limited ATO abort option can be flown if a
booster engine fails late in the burn duration (last 2 seconds only). This
abort mode utilizes the remaining core stage engine/propellant and selects
a lower energy MFCO target to make up the thrust loss of the booster
stages. No EO abort capability exists for first stage flight, and since the
ATO capability is so limited, the RTLS abort is the only practical option
available during first stage flight.
During second stage flight, the only abort mode available is the TAL abort.
This abort mode is available only through the use of the HL-42 abort
motors and on-board OMS systems since there is only a single engine in
the booster core stage. The TAL abort mode is available only for the last
37 seconds of flight time and returns the HL-42 to a landing site in
northern Europe. The HL-42 abort and OMS propulsion systems, coupled
with the long gliding range of the HL-42 aerodynamic shape, enable this
abort mode. The second stage EO abort mode (a short duration of only 8
seconds) is enabled by use Of the HL-42 abort motors. The booster second
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stage flight is thus found to have no abort coverage until the last 37
seconds. During this 365 second time period, an engine failure would force
the HL-42 to perform a water ditching.
The Booster 2C configuration has thus been found to provide only limited
abort coverage for the HL-42. During the launch, the HL-42 (and crew) is
exposed to a water landing contingency for 66% of the trajectory. No EO
abort capability exists for the trajectory and the alternate landing site
capability (TAD is only 6% (7% and 11% for 28.5 ° inclination trajectories).
This level of abort coverage is not considered acceptable for a new manned
launch system.
<.../
HL-42 ABORT OPTIONS
RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Single engine failure in booster stage. Utilize core stage and HL-42
escape motors to execute powered tumaround maneuver and establish
sufficient velocity toward launch site for HL-42 range to reach landing site.
ENGINE OUT
Single engine failure in core stage. Utilize HL-42 escape motors
and OMS to reach nominal MECO target.
TRANSATLANTIC LANDING ('FAL)
Single engine failure in core stage. Utilize HL-42 escape motors and
OMS to establish sufficient velocity for HL-42 range to reach landing
site in Europe.
ABORTTO ORBIT (ATO)
Single engine failure in booster stage. Utilize core stage to reach lower
energy MECO ta/get for 15X80 Nmi. paJ'king/transfer orbit. HL-42
circularizes to low altitude orbit, waits for first landing opportunity.
WATER LANDING ('WL)
Single engine failure in booster stage, single engine failure In core stage.
HL-42 performs escape maneuver and glides to water landing.
Abort Window
0 sec _; MET _; 130 se¢
487 see < MET < 495 sec
458 sec < MET < 495 sec
128 sec _; MET _; 130 sec
130 sec < MET < 458 sec
Figure 2.3-11 Booster 2C Abort Capability
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HL-42 ABORT OPTIONS
RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Single engine failure in booster stage. Utilize core stage and HL-42
escape motors to execute powered turnaround maneuver and establish
sufficient velocity toward launch site for HL-42 range to reach landing site.
ENGINE OUT
Single engine failure in core stage. Utilize HL-42 escape motors
and OMS to reach nominal MECO target.
TRANS-ATLANTIC LANDING ("FAL)
Single engine failure in core stage. Utilize HL-42 escape motors and
OMS to establish sufficient velocity for HL-42 range to reach landing
site in Africa.
ABORT TO ORBIT (ATO)
Single engine failure in booster stage. Utilize core stage to reach lower
energy MECO target for 15X80 Nmi. parking/transfer orbit. HL-42
circularizes to low altitude orbit, waits for first landing opportunity.
WATER LANDING (WL)
Single engine failure in booster stage, single engine failure in core stage.
HL-42 performs escape maneuver and glides to water landing.
Abort Window
0 sec < MET _; 130 sec
487 sec _; MET _;495 sec
434 sec _ MET < 495 sec
128 sec < MET _ 130 sec
130 sec < MET < 434 sec
Figure 2.3-13 Booster 2C Abort Capability (28 °)
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2.3.2.4 HL-42 Aborts on Booster 2D
The abort analysis performed using the Booster 2D, a 2-stage booster for
the Option 2 architecture, was particularly interesting. This booster first
stage uses three Russian RD-180 engines (LOX/RP 1st stage propellant),
and the second stage uses a single J-2S engine (LOX/LH2 2nd stage
propellant). Because the HL-42 configuration weight is well below the
maximum payload capability of this launch vehicle, there is considerable
excess propellant in the booster second stage (assuming the tanks are filled
to capacity for the launch). This excess propellant is valuable for abort
capabilities when recovering from first stage propulsion failures.
The abort analysis revealed that a large percentage (53%) of the launch
trajectory has no abort mode coverage (other than the water ditching) for
the HL-42. During first stage flight, the RTIS abort mode is provided from
the launch pad until 185 seconds into the launch, at which time the vehicle
is too far downrange for the HL-42 to return to KSC. During the first 64
seconds of flight, the HL-42 can return to KSC using just its own abort
motors. The extended RTLS period (64 sec. to 185 sec.) is available by
using the booster second stage thrust to perform a powered turnaround
maneuver and to generate sufficient velocity back toward the launch site
for the HL-42 range to reach the KSC landing site. Also during first stage
flight, if an engine fails late in the burn duration (last 58 seconds), either
an ATO or an EO abort option can be flown. Both of these abort modes
utilize propellant margins in the second stage to make up the velocity
shortfall of the f'u'st stage failure. The ATO and RTLS abort mode periods
overlap, thereby providing some abort capability during the entire first
stage flight.
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During second stage flight, the only abort modes available are the TAL and
engine out (EO) aborts. These abort modes are available only through the
use of the HL-42 abort motors and on-board OMS systems since there is
only a single engine in the booster second stage. The TAL abort mode is
available for the last 65 seconds of flight time and returns the HL-42 to a
landing site in northern Europe. The HL-42 abort and OMS propulsion
systems, coupled with the long gliding range of the HL-42 aerodynamic
shape, enable this abort mode. The second stage EO abort mode (a short
duration of only 8 seconds) is enabled by use of the HL-42 abort motors.
The booster second stage flight is thus found to have no abort coverage
from its single engine start until the last 65 seconds. During this 297
second time period, an engine failure would force the HL-42 to perform a
water landing. Of particular concern for this launch vehicle was the impact
of a failure to start the second stage engine (generally regarded as a high
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risk event), Because of the HL-42 vulnerability to this risk (a water
landing), a determined effort was made to find a means of performing a
runway recovery for the HL-42 for this condition, Specifically, a North
America Landing (NAL) abort mode was devised to protect the system
from failure of the Booster 2D second stage engine (a J-2S) to ignite, No
other intact abort modes were available to the HL-42 for this failure event
(too far downrange for RTLS, not enough downrange for TAL),
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To achieve the NAL abort, the Booster 2B must be flown with off-loaded
second stage propellant in order to increase the staging velocity. A
propellant off-load of 116,050 lbs in the second stage is possible for the
booster to still insert the HL-42 into the nominal trajectory with no
failures. This significant reduction in the total launch vehicle weight
results in a faster and longer first stage trajectory and also reduces the
nominal MECO time by 153 seconds. Operation of the booster in this
fashion increased the staging velocity by 3,000 feet per second and thus
created enough energy at staging that the HL-42 can reach landing sites in
New England and Canada should the J-2S engine fail to start. Under these
conditions, the HL-42 has sufficient energy to land at any 10,000 foot long
runway along the North American East Coast (such as at Boston). Without
the excess propellant in the second stage, however, the launch vehicle
gives up significant capability to perform the first stage aborts (RTLS, ATO,
and EO). The RTLS capability was reduced by 29 seconds and the EO and
ATO capabilities were completely eliminated. The total exposure to water
landing, however, was reduced significantly; from 297 seconds during
second stage flight to only 55 seconds during first stage flight. An
important design tradeoff exists between these two options (excess vs. off-
loaded second stage propellant) to determine which of the potential engine
failure modes (first stage or second stage) should be protected against. No
attempt was made during the analysis to perform this design trade study,
but the significantly reduced HL-42 exposure to water landing (from 53%
to only 13% of the trajectory) was noted as a key factor favoring the off-
loaded propellant approach. This trade study is an important design
consideration for any manned two stage launch vehicle. Launch vehicles
which employ parallel burn stages (all engines running before liffoff) do
not experience this condition.
The booster second stage was clearly found to play a crucial role in the HL-
42 abort capabilities on this launch vehicle. Ignition of the second stage
engine is a requirement for most of the RTLS abort coverage and both of
the ATO and EO abort modes. Excess propellant in the second stage was
also a key parameter for extending performance of the RTLS, ATO, and EO
aborts. Removal of this excess propellant, on the other hand, was required
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to protect against failure of second stage engine ignition. The other launch
vehicle concepts (such as 1,5 stage boosters or parallel burn 2-stage
boosters) provided significantly different abort coverage than was found
with this two stage booster,
[HL-42 ABORT OPTIONS
• RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Single engine failure in tst stage. Utilize 2nd stage and HL-42 escape
motors to execute powered turnaround maneuver and establish sufficient
velocity toward launch site for HL-42 range to reach landing site.
• ENGINE OUT
Single engine failure in 1st or 2rid stage. Utilize 2nd stage propellant
margirdreserve or HL-42 escape motors to reach nominal MECO target.
• TRANS-ATLANTIC LANDING ("rAL)
Single engine failure in 2rid stage. Utilize HL-42 escape motors and
OMS to establish sufficient velocity for HL-42 range to reach landing
site in Europe or Africa.
• ABORT TO ORBIT (ATO)
Single engine failure in 1st stage. Utilize 2rid stage to reach lower energy
MECO target for 15X80 Nml. parking/transfer orbit. HL-42 circularizes to
low altitude orbit, waits for first available landing opportunity.
• WATER LANDING (WL)
Multiple engine failures in 1st stage, single engine failure in 2nd stage.
HL-42 performs escape maneuver and glides to water landing.
Abort Window
0 sec _ MET < 185 sec
168 sec < MET :; 201 sec
555 sec < MET < 563 sec
498 sec :; MET < 563 sec
143 sec _; MET _; 201 sec
201 sec < MET < 498 sec
Figure 2.3-15 Booster 2D Abort Capability
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RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Single engine failure in 1st stage. Utilize 2nd stage and HL-42 escape
motors to execute powered turnaround maneuver and establish sufficient
velocity toward launch site for HL-42 range to reach landing site.
NORTH AMERICA LANDING (NAL)
Second stage engine failure to start. HL-42 performs left bank
and glides to landing site on east coast of U.S. or Canada.
HL-42 uses abort motors and/or OMS as required,
TRANS-ATLANTIC LANDING (TAL)
Single engine failure in 2nd stage. Utilize HL-42 escape motors and
OMS to establish sufficient velocity for HL-42 range to reach landing
site in Europe or Africa.
WATER LANDING (WL)
Multiple engine failures in 1st stage, single engine failure in 2nd stage.
HL-42 performs escape maneuver and glides to water landing.
ENGINE OUT (EO)
ABORT TO ORBIT (ATO)
Abort Window
0 sec _<MET _<156 sec
21 lsec _<MET _<350 sec
316 sec _; MET _<410 sec
156 sec < MET _; 211 sec
Not Available
Not Available
Figure 2.3-18 Booster 2D Abort Capability- Offloaded Propellant
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I HL-42 ABORT OPTIONS
RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Single engine failure in 1st stage. Utilize 2nd stage and HL-42 escape
motors to execute powered turnaround maneuver and establish sufficient
velocity toward launch site for HL-42 range to reach landing site.
ENGINE OUT
Single engine failure in 1st or 2nd stage. Utilize 2nd stage propellant
margin/reserve or HL42 escape motors to reach nominal MECO target.
TRANS-ATLANTIC LANDING ('rAL)
Single engine failure in 2nd stage. Utilize HL-42 escape motors and
OMS to establish sufficient velocity for HL-42 range to reach landing
site in Europe or Africa.
ABORTTO ORBIT (ATO)
Single engine fa_ure in 1st stage. Utilize 2nd stage to reach lower energy
MECO target for 15X80 Nmi. parking/transfer orbit. HL-42 circularizes to
low altitude orbit, waits for first available landing opportunity.
WATER LANDING (WL)
Multiple engine failures in 1st stage, single engine failure in 2nd stage,
HL-42 performs escape maneuver and glides to water landing,
Abort Window
0 sec _; MET _; 185 seo
170 sec _; MET < 201 sec
555 sec < MET < 563 sec
498 sec < MET < 563 sec
146 sec _; MET < 201 sec
201 sec _; MET _;498 sec
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Figure 2.3-20 Booster 2D Abort Capability (28 °)
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Figure 2.3-21 Booster 2D Abort Coverage (28 °)
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2.3.3 Abort Studies Findings
The abort analyses showed that a large percentage (generally 40 to 60%) of
the launch trajectories have no intact abort mode coverage for booster
configurations 2B, 2C, and 2D. This is caused by the single engine
operation of these designs during second stage flight. During first stage
flight, the RTLS abort mode is generally provided from the launch pad
until approximately 200 seconds into the launch, at which time the vehicle
is too far downrange for the spacecraft to return to KSC. The ATO and EO
abort mode periods usually overlap with the RTLS abort mode, thereby
providing some abort capability during the entire first stage flight. During
second stage flight (post booster or engine staging), the only intact abort
modes available are the TAL, ATO, and EO aborts. Where there is only a
single engine in the booster's second (or core) stage, these abort modes are
available only at the very end of the trajectory through the use of the
spacecraft's abort motors and on-board OMS systems. The abort and OMS
propulsion systems, coupled with the long gliding range of the HL-42 and
CLV-P configurations, enable these abort modes.
The booster second (or core) stage was clearly found to play a crucial role
in the HL-42 and CLV-P abort capabilities on these launch vehicles.
Utilization of this stage's engine and propellant plays a significant role in
late RTLS capabilities. A second engine on these stages (available only on
the Booster 2A' configuration) provides extended intact abort coverage.
Only the 2A' booster configuration has sufficient intact abort coverage to
completely eliminate the spacecraft water landing exposure. For manned
spacecraft flights, the Booster 2A' configuration is clearly superior to the
other booster configurations analyzed.
k..J
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Figure 2.3-22 Summary of Abort Capabilities
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2.4 SSTO MPS Operability Studies
The principal objective of all proposed SSTO launch vehicle concepts is a
dramatic improvement in vehicle operability. Regardless of which SSTO
design concept is eventually selected for development (VTOHL or VTOVL,
LOX/LH2 or tri-propellant, etc.), all concepts must achieve significant
reductions in ground processing timelines and the supporting workforce in
order to meet the proposed cost benefits of an SSTO program. An often
stated goal is that "the SSTO concept will be operated like an airplane." In
practice, this is difficult to execute, but there are many facets of airpiane
operations which can be applied to the SSTO concept. In particular, the
methods by which an airplane designer (or the airplane operator)
identifies and incorporates operational requirements into the design
process can be applied to a SSTO launch vehicle. Under the ATSS study, a
method which was first used in the design of the Lockheed L-1011 aircraft
(and subsequently other aircraft) was adapted for analyzing the
operability characteristics of the reference SSTO concept as defined by
NASA in their recently completed Access to Space study, Option 3. This
method is one in which the vehicle flight and ground operations are
analyzed by computer simulations. The simulations include the flight
operation and both scheduled and unscheduled maintenance operations for
all vehicle components. The components' performance is determined from
current (or projected) component reliability and maintainability histories.
Use of such a technique is viewed as a proven example of "operations
driving the design." Use of this technique early in the design of the SSTO
concept permits the vehicle operability to be designed in, not just
allocated.
2.4.1 Operations Simulation Analysis
2.4.1.1 MPS Operability Study Approach
The SSTO Main Propulsion System (MPS) was selected for this operability
analysis. There was insufficient time to model the entire SSTO concept,
therefor this single subsystem was chosen. The MPS is not only a critical
subsystem of any SSTO concept, but it is, historically, also one of the most
difficult to process. Differences among the several SSTO concepts are
clearly reflected in their MPS designs, so tiffs subsystem also serves as a
useful benchmark for comparing the operability of competing concepts.
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The starting point of the MPS operability study is to determine the current
Shuttle NIPS component reliability (Mean Time Between Failure, MTBF) and
maintainability (Mean Time To Repair, MTTR) characteristics and use these
components as representative of the current state-of-the-art MPS
capability (at least for a reusable MPS). This data is then used in a
simulation of the planned ground processing of the SSTO to determine the
probability that a component will fail (and therefore, its related ground
process/test) and then will require unplanned/unscheduled maintenance
actions beyond what might have otherwise been allocated. All of the MPS
components are individually identified for each process or test performed
during the SSTO turnaround and launch sequence. Changes in the
component reliability, or changes in the MPS design which change
component quantities, can thus be directly reflected in the resultant
ground processing timelines. This permits new technology and hardware
design improvements beyond the current state of the art (SOA) to be
measured in terms of their impact on the SSTO operability. It also permits
analysis of competing SSTO concepts (with their varying number and type
of main propulsion engines, propellants, and components) to also be
directly compared in terms of operability.
The goals of this initial operability analysis are to support trade studies of
various SSTO concepts. The level of accuracy reflected in the operations
simulations is thus not too exact. Only representative mean maintenance
downtimes (MDT) and unscheduled maintenance manpower (UMMHR)
estimates are needed to permit trade study comparisons among concepts.
The simulation results provided in the study are considered to be good
representations of projected SSTO operations, but should not be assigned
high accuracy. Much more detail would be required in the simulation
models before the analyses can be claimed accurate.
The operability analyses are performed with Rockwell's proprietary
SIMtrix and STARSIM simulation models. These simulation models
provide detailed assessment of the propulsion system components and
checkout activities and also provide a complete system-level simulation of
the SSTO launch capability, facility requirements, and resource utilization
needs.
2.4.1.2 SSTO Main Propulsion System Definition
A detailed schematic of a typical Single Stage To Orbit (SSTO) vehicle main
propulsion system (MPS) was created which includes a fluid flow diagram,
and for each component in the system, a reference designator and a
II-186
k..J
representative part number. The MPS schematic was based on a seven
engine (SSME) propulsion system, but the number and type of engines may
be changed to reflect alternate design concepts. Part numbers were
selected from Space Shuttle MPS components in order that representative
reliability and maintenance data for the SSTO components could be
generated. The MPS system definition includes the complete fuel system,
oxidizer system, and helium/nitrogen purge and pressurization systems.
For the tri-propellant SSTO concepts, the schematic includes the complete
RP-1 fuel system and any necessary changes to the helium pressurization
system. The level of detail in these schematics includes items such as all
isolation valves (such as engine pre-valves and tank fill/drain valves),
check valves, He regulators and filters, propellant feedlines and
manifolds(with vacuum jacketing), ground fluids disconnects, etc. The MPS
helium system design assumed that pneumatic actuation would be
required for the large feedline valves and for engine valves and purges (as
per current Shuttle and SSME designs). Instrumentation for the tanks,
feedlines, and engines were also included (Shuttle MPS instrumentation
was used as the guideline for instrumentation requirements). No
hydraulics were included in the SSTO MPS schematic as it was assumed the
vehicle would utilize electro-mechanical actuators (EMAs). Individual wire
harnesses (and connectors), engine insulation, test lines and test ports, and
other ancillary equipment were not included.
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Figure 2.4-1
SSTO Main Propulsion System (Generic)
System Diagram
SSTO Main Propulsion System Schematic
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Figure 2.4-2 LH2 and LOX System Schematics
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Figure 2.4-3 RP-1 & He/GN2 System Schematics
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2.4.1.3 MPS Component Reliability/Maintenance Data
The source of component reliability and maintenance data to support the
simulation models was obtained from the Space Shuttle program. The
Shuttle is the only reusable propulsion system from which to obtain such
data and an extensive failure database for all Shuttle components exists,
The Space Shuttle program's Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
(PRACA) database was used to collect all problem reports (PRs) on the MPS
components which had been generated either during flight or during
ground processing. This comprehensive NASA KSC database includes all
functional failures of the components, as well as inspection defects. The
database covers all launch processing activity since the Challenger
accident, including all tanking tests, launch scrubs and aborts. Electronic
sorting of the database was used to generate the failure list for the desired
MPS components for the SSTO study. The PRs used in the simulation were
segregated by functional and defect type failures to account for the
different repair times associated with each of these type of PRs, A Shuttle
logistics database (PEARL) was also used to determine the vendor repair
activities of Shuttle MPS components in order to estimate logistics
requirements for an SSTO NIPS. This database provided a summary of all
vendor repair actions for MPS components and the average repair
turnaround time (time to return repaired parts to KSC from the vendor) for
each component.
To calculate a component's MTBF, not only the number of failures, but also
the operating time of the component is required. To determine the
operating time on Shuttle components, KSC's scheduled OPF, VAB, and
launch pad operations timelines were reviewed and equipment operating
times estimated. The ground test sequences were then correlated to the
specific Mt_ components being checked in the test in order to calculate the
individual component ground processing times. These component ground
operating times were added to the component's in-flight operating time
(including on-orbit and re-entry timelines) to obtain an estimate of the
total hardware operating time for all Shuttle flights since the Challenger
accident (thus correlating the operating time period with the PR database
time period). The Shuttle MPS components' operating times for all ground
tests, launch countdowns, and flights were then combined with its PR
history to calculate the MTBF. A separate MTBF estimate was calculated
for functional and defect type failures. The calculated MTBF for each MPS
component was used to represent the current level of reliability for SSTO
MPS hardware. A detailed breakdown of the SSME component reliability
as experienced in the Shuttle program (Mean Time Between Removal,
k...j
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MTBR) was provided by Rocketdyne to determine the mean engine
removal rate for the SSTO.
The maintainability data for MPS components was similarly obtained from
the Shuttle flight history. MPS engineers from Rockwell's Florida
Operations who are directly involved in the Shuttle MPS processing
provided repair time and removal time estimates for each component in
the SSTO MPS schematic. Manpower requirements, including any special
skills requirements (such as welding, brazing, x-ray, foaming skills) were
also identified for each component maintenance action. This data provided
the basis for estimating the unscheduled maintenance time and manpower
which would be required to return the MPS system to a flight ready
condition once a component failure has been experienced. The combined
Space Shuttle MPS component MTBF and MTTR data comprised the
required reliability and maintainability database for performing the SSTO
MPS operations simulation. Additional data used in the simulation was the
NASA KSC safety limitations on the maximum number of personnel which
can be working in closed or open compartments at any one time.
MPS Ground Processing Maintenance Includes both
Functional and Inspection (Defect) Failures
Functional Failures:
Inspection Defects:
Component fails to perform to specified levels during
ground processing (e.g. leaks, valve fails to open, ...)
Component has been Improperly installed or damaged
(e.g. scratched, dented, contaminated, misaligned .... )
Shuttle MPS Component PRs
Funct. Defect Total
Valves 81 91 172
Lines & manifolds 39 313 352
Helium tanks 41 54 95
Regulators 47 21 68
Disconnects 44 201 245
Filters (He system) 0 0 0
Sensors (temp, press) 46 24 70
Total 298 704 1002
Figure 2.4-4 Shuttle NIPS Component Failures
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2.4.1.4 SSTO NIPS Ground Processing
Definition of detailed SSTO MPS ground operations test and checkout
processes were not found in any SSTO concept descriptions (NASA or
contractor documentation). A default set of checkout processes was
therefor generated from the combined Space Shuttle Orbiter and ET
checkout processes. While these processes and tests may be greatly
reduced or eliminated when advanced technologies are developed for the
SSTO (such a integrated vehicle health management concepts), the basic
functions these processes perform will still be required. The basic tasks of
checking the MPS helium system, the LH2 system, and the LOX system will
be performed. Engine checkout and verification of engines/flight control
systems interfaces will also be performed. It is not known today how long
these tasks will take and how many people may be required to execute
them. Exactly how these task are to be automated is also not known.
For the simulation purposes, all basic Shuttle MPS checkout operations
were Included in a detailed ground processing timeline, but were allocated
to a 40 hour period (2.5 days at two eight-hour shifts per day), consistent
with ground ruled SSTO ground processing timelines. The basic sequencing
and constraints which are currently used on the Shuttle MPS and SSME for
these tasks were also retained. This allocation process can be changed for
each process as more information of the envisioned SSTO ground
processing is generated. For the purpose of conducting trade studies, the
ground processes as described above served as the SSTO baseline
turnaround processing.
These baseline SSTO checkout sequences provided the framework for
evaluating the net effect of the reliability and maintainability
characteristics of the SSTO MPS components. When a component failed
(whether in flight or.during ground checkout), the failure was correlated to
a specific ground test and a specific time in the turnaround process. This
permitted the simulation to "schedule" the SSTO MPS maintenance
activities during each flow and more realistically model the ground
processing. Included in the maintenance scheduling were constraints on
the number of technicians which could be working on the MPS system at
any one time. For example, only one engine was allowed to be removed or
installed at a time. This allowed for known serial processing activities to
be properly represented. The SSTO was assumed to have an "open
boattail", which permitted a maximum of 16 people to be working on the
MPS system at any one time.
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The SSTO MPS component operating times per turnaround and flight were
calculated from the ground ruled SSTO checkout timelines, just as was done
for Shuttle MPS components and timelines. The Shuttle derived reliability
and maintainability data for SSTO components, coupled with the detailed
SSTO ground processes derived from ground ruled turnaround timelines,
provided the simulation with the necessary information to calculate the
SSTO component failure data.
• LAND AT KSC LANDING FACILITY (SLF) | TIME IN HOURS |
L J
SAFE/DESERVICE AT SLP (12 SHIFTS)
• TOW TO SSTO PROCESSING FACILITY
PAYLOAD REMOVAL
PERFORM POST-FLIGHT INSPECTION, CONNECT CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT
40 PERFORM SUBSYSTEM VALIDATION/REPLACEMENT
INSTALL GSE BASE PLATE
PERFORM CLOSEOUT
[] MATE SSTO TO ERECTOR
INSTALL PAYLOAD AND VALIDATE INTERFACE
• MOVE SSTO/PAYLOAD TO PAD
[] ERECT SSTO AND VALIDATE INTERFACE
SERVICE VEHICLE/PAYLOAD AND
PERFORM COUNTDOWN
• LAUNCH
MISSION
PAD REFURBISHMENT
ERECTOR MAINTENANCE
l- . -J t.-12-,J
Figure 2.4-5 SSTO Baseline Ground Processing Timeline
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Figure 2.4-6 MPS 40-Hour Ground Processing Detail
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2.4.1.5 SSTO MPS System Modeling
<..J
Simulation models for analysis of the SSTO MPS ground processing were
developed from Rockwell's SIMtrix and STARSIM computer codes. The
SIMtrix model analyzes reliability, maintainability, and logistic parameters
(as discussed above) to determine the effects of unscheduled maintenance
on the planned SSTO MPS ground processing estimates. The calculated
Shuttle MPS component level functional and defect failure rates, and all
ground processing timelines, sequences, and constraints were used in this
model. The model was used to simulate both the Shuttle NIPS and the SSTO
MPS ground processing. The Shuttle simulation results were checked
against the actual Shuttle MPS experience as a benchmark test.
The STARSIM model was used to analyze the SSTO launch rate capability
and launch facility needs/utilization based upon data provided by the
SIMtrix model. This model operates at the system level, but accepts data
at the subsystem level (such as from SIMtrix) for calculating the total
vehicle ground turnaround timelines. The STARSIM reference turnaround
scenario was based on the Access to Space Option 3 study's SSTO
groundrules. The simulation included a five vehicle fleet of SSTO vehicles,
mission times randomly distributed from one to seven days, total ground
turnaround timelines of 100 hours, and scheduled maintenance down
periods (OMDPs) every 20 flights.
A few additional processing groundrules had to be added to the STARSIM
model for simulation completeness. The study manpower specifications
were broken into a two-shift workforce and allocated a 246 workday year
(consistent with current NASA KSC operating practices). To permit the
effects of weather, pad aborts, and other launch pad delays to be
measured, the current Space Shuttle history of launch delays and pad
aborts was included in the model. (The SSTO design may or may not have
similar sensitivities to these effects, but current design detail is far too
vague to ignore them at this time. The Shuttle experience is typical of all
launch vehicles and should serve as a good reference point for SSTO
designers.) The model assigned a launch delay probability of 58%, with the
cause of delay distributed among weather, MPS systems, avionics systems,
ground systems, and other fluid systems as observed from the Shuttle
launch history (post-Challenger). For MPS and fluid system delays, a
percentage of these were assumed to require a rollback to the SSTO HPF
for corrective action before launch. (The SSTO operational scenario is
assumed to be geared to very minimal on-pad maintenance.)
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SSTO Ground Operations Simulations are
Performed with SIMtrix and STARSIM
SIMtrix
STARSIM
Monte Carlo simulation of scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance & repair activities for
specified ground processing sequences and
timelines
Includes: . - component MTBF, MTBM
- component M'I-i'R
- spares POS and RTAT
- undetected failures
Probabilistic simulation of launch systems and
facility/resource utilizationfor specified launch rates
and launch processes
Includes: - launch vehicle subsystems
- payload integration
- facility constraints '
- manpower allocations
Figure 2.4-7 Operability Analysis Software Tools
• Timeline follows Access to Space Option 3 (operational)
100 hrs allocated for vehicle turnaround
40 hrs allocated for subsystems processing
• Mission time uniformly distributed from 1 to 7 days
• Fleet of 5 SSTO vehicles
• 5 SSTO processing bays, 2 launch pads
• Single mission control center
• All missions return to KSC
• OMDP every 20 flights/vehicle, 90 workdays duration
,50 maintenance crew per shift for OMDPs
• 25 maintenance crew per vehicle per shift
2 shift workdays, 246 days/yr
• Probability for on-pad launch delay (based on Shuttle)
20% for MPS system scrub (60% require rollback)
13% for weather scrub
11% for fluid systems scrub (50% require rollback)
7% for avionics system scrub
7% for GSE scrub
• Reliability & logistics support
Component repair times (M'ITR) per SIMtrix
Spares availability (POS) per SIMtrix
Figure 2.4-8 STARSIM Ground Processing Baseline
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2.4.1.6 SSTO MPS Operability Trade Studies
2.4.1.6.1 SIMtrix Simulation Results
The SIMtrix model was first checked against the actual Shuttle experience
as a benchmark test. The simulation returned a predicted Space Shuttle
(MPS) mean down time of 370 hours and a mean unscheduled
maintenance manhour requirement of 3,110 manhours. Combining this
prediction with actual planned work schedules and planned manpower
requirements resulted in a reasonably close correlation with the actual
Shuttle experience (within 10% of actual Shuttle OPF processing times and
MPS processing manpower). This means that the SIMtrix model of Shuttle
MPS ground processing provides a good representation of the current
state-of-the-art (SOA) for reusable MPS hardware. This SOA reference
establishes the point of departure for all of the SSTO concept trade studies
which followed.
The extrapolation from this SOA (Shuttle) reference to the envisioned SSTO
MPS ground processing was performed in incremental steps in order to
understand the individual effects of several parameters. The intermediate
steps taken to get to the SSTO reference are:
1. Increase the number of SSME engines from 3 to 7.
2. Reduce the scheduled ground test time for MPS checkout to
40 hr's.
3. Reduce the MPS component repair times to 6 hours.
4. Increase the MPS component reliability for selected parts.
The effects of these incremental steps illustrated the very strong impact of
extended (and intensive) ground testing on flight hardware. The addition
of four extra engines (and the necessarily related additional MPS
components) produced an additional 17 maintenance actions (PRs) per
flow, resulting in a 135% increase in mean downtime and 4,493
unscheduled maintenance manhours. This result was not unexpected
given the increase in system complexity that 7 SSMEs would create. When
the scheduled ground test time for the MPS was reduced from 700 to 40
hours, the PRs dropped to 19 per flow. This resulted in a mean downtime
of only 160 hr's, and only 1,323 unscheduled maintenance manhours, less
than half of what was estimated for the Space Shuttle today. This
significant improvement in required maintenance is an indicator of how
much of the Shuttle MPS hardware life is being consumed by ground
testing. (Because the Shuttle ground processing activities to date have
been highly variable, the estimated component ground operating times can
II-197
only be roughly estimated. The estimates made are believed to be
reasonable, however, and thus the effects of ground testing believed to be
representative of the actual Shuttle program.)
The next step to the SSTO reference simulation was to reduce component
repair times. Many of the Shuttle MPS components are welded in place
and covered with thermal protective foam insulation. This design creates
for significant removal/repair times for these Shuttle components because
of the need for the serial processes of foam removal, cutting, welding, weld
x-ray, and finally foaming. Nevertheless, simulation of the SSTO required
6 hour component replacement groundrule was performed to show the
benefits such a requirement might provide for an SSTO, given that it can
be accomplished in the system design. The simulation revealed that the
mean downtime was greatly reduced to only 55 hours and the resulting
maintenance manhours further reduced to 600 hours (PRs were unchanged
as the repair time does not influence the rate at which components fail).
The final step to the reference SSTO simulation was to increase the
reliability (MTBF) of selected NIPS components. Since the SSTO will not be
placed into operational status for many years to come, there is every
reason to expect that many of the components used will exhibit improved
reliability from that seen today. This is even true for those components
which currently demonstrate poor reliability, as they will encounter many
opportunities for design improvements. The MTBF for several components
was increased by a factor of 50% to allow for this component reliability
growth. This Final step also offers an insight into the sensitivity of the SSTO
ground processing mean downtime to component reliabilities. The key
components selected for this reliability improvement included: all
electrically actuated isolation valves, all check valves, pneumatic operated
fill and drain valves, helium supply regulators, relief valves, and vacuum
jacketed lines. The simulation results revealed that the number of PRs
per launch processing cycle fell to a mean of 16.5. The predicted mean
down time was 50 hours, with an unscheduled maintenance manhours
prediction of 534 hours. This final step of the simulated SSTO ground
processing scenario indicates that the planned 40 hour maintenance period
with S0 personnel would be expected to require 50 additional hours (6.25
shifts) and 534 additional manhours just for the MPS system alone.
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Figure 2.4-10 SlMtrix Data for Tri-Propellant SSTO
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PRs MDT UMMHR Total HPF
# (hrs) (hrs) Time (hrs)
Shuttle Reference with 7 SSMEs ]
60 499 4,493 539
IVHM to checkout subsystems in 40 hrs. J
19.4 160 1,323 200
Improved designs to reduce remove/repair times (M3_R) to 6 hrs ]
19.6 55 600 95
[ Improved component reliability (MTBF or MTBM) by 50% ]
16.5 51 535 90
Flight
Rate
43 _+
51
Figure 2.4-11 Technology Steps to Reach SSTO Operability
Mean Downtime Sensitivity Study to R&M Parameter8
PRs MDT UMMHR Total HPF Flight
# (hrs) (hrs) Time (hrs) Rate
SSTO Reference with IVHM J
19.9 164 1,380 204 43
Improved Reliability only(MTBF)]
17.7 150 1,248 190 43
Improved Maintainability only (MTTR) i
19.8 55 605 9& 51
Improved Reliability & Maintainability J
17.7 54 590 94 51
Figure 2.4-12 SSTO Operability Sensitivity Study
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2.4.1.6.2 STARSIM Simulation Results
These SIMtrix simulations of MPS ground checkout operations were used
to drive the STARSIM model of the SSTO, a complete system-level
simulation of SSTO launch capability, facility requirements, and resource
utilization. Prior to the SIMtrix results being available, the STARSIM
model was used to perform a basic sensitivity analysis of the annual SSTO
flight rate capability. The model varied several operational parameters
such as the interval and duration of SSTO maintenance down periods
(OMDP), fleet size (number of SSTO vehicles), and the mean HPF
turnaround time.
The results of the STARSIM sensitivity analysis showed that the planned
SSTO flight rate (43 flights/year) is easily achievable under the current
groundrules. A mean (average) flight rate of 53 per year was achieved
even with the launch pad delays included (a yearly average of 11 rollbacks
were predicted at this flight rate). This level of flight activity resulted in
2.50MDPs per year and a net direct labor consumption of 10,000
manhours per launch. The two launch pads were utilized at a mean level
of 75%, the HPFs (one per vehicle) at 54%, and the mission control center
at 87%.
The effects of certain of the Access to Space Option 3 groundrules were
modeled from this Reference SSTO simulation. The OMDP period was
changed from once every 20 flights to one in ten, fifteen, and twenty. The
duration of the OMDP period was also changed from 90 days to 60, 120,
and 180 days. This rather wide range of OMDP variables was found to
have a weak effect on the SSTO annual flight rate. Over the range of these
two variables (each one taken independently), the minimum mean flight
rate was 50 flts/yr and the maximum mean flight rate was 58 fits/yr.
This results indicates that considerable margin exists in this scenario for
scheduled depot maintenance and/or modification for the SSTO vehicles.
The resulting cost per flight (as measured in direct labor manhours per
launch) of these OMDPs was more significant, however. The annual direct
manhours to both process the vehicles for launch and to perform the OMDP
maintenance varied by +45% to -20% over the range of these OMDP
variables. Thus, while the SSTO flight rate is not overly sensitive to the
depot maintenance requirements, the SSTO cost per flight is.
The effect of a longer than ground ruled HPF processing time had a direct
and strong effect on the SSTO flight rate capability and on the manhours
per flight. The subsystem processing (checkout) time was varied from the
ground ruled 40 hours to much longer times (up to a mean time of 480
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hours, or 120096). This resulted in the SSTO mean flight rate dropping to as
low as 28 flights per year, with a resultant 250% increase in cost
(manpower) per launch. The flight rate correlation with HPF processing
time was not linear, and the rate did not drop below 50 flts/yr until the
HPF time increased to 120 hours. The planned 43 flts/yr was not met
when HPF times increased to approximately 220 hours. At the highest
processing time simulated (480 hrs), the HPF mean utilization rate was
85%. This level indicates that the HPF processing itself, not the facility,
was the constraint on flight rate. While the processing times had the
strongest effect seen in the model on per launch manpower (cost), the
effect was not direct. The processing times increased by a factor of 12,
whereas the manpower per launch only increased by a factor of 2.5. This
effect is caused in part by the reduced number of OMDPs performed each
year (from 2.5 to 1) because of the reduced flight rate.
The HPF mean downtime predictions from the SIMtrix model all fell within
the range of the STARSIM HPF processing sensitivity analysis (40 to 480
hours). The extrapolation of the SIMtrix maintenance analysis to the net
SSTO flight rate capability was straightforward. The reference SSTO MPS
maintenance estimate (Step 4 of the Simtrix sequence) translates into an
annual SSTO mean flight rate of 51 flights per year. This is well above the
SSTO baseline of 43 flights per year. In fact, this baseline flight rate can be
met even at the Step 2 simulation. That is, even with the current Shuttle
MPS component reliability levels, the current maintenance repair times,
and the current launch delay/scrub rates, a five SSTO vehicle fleet could
provide an average of 43 flights per year. This finding is based, however,
on the SSTO ground processing and facilities being capable of checking out
the systems within the 40 hour allocation and of performing a 12 hour
launch pad countdown.
One interesting finding from the analysis was the observation that the
SSTO launch rate was at some times being constrained by the number of
vehicles which could be in space at any one time (one). This is a current
Shuttle program constraint which may or may not apply to the SSTO
program, but this result at least indicates increased facility and personnel
requirements which would be required of NASA operations centers.
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Figure 2.4-13 STARSIM Simulation Sensitivity Study
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2.4.1.7 SSTO MPS Operability Analysis Findings
The data generated by the SIMtrix and STARSIM simulations of SSTO MPS
operations has provided a comparison of competing SSTO concepts from an
operability standpoint and has also identified the relative importance of
several technology pursuits relative to the SSTO program. The analysis has
identified the time to perform the subsystem test and checkout as the most
important factor for reducing turnaround times and costs. By drastically
reducing the test time of flight hardware, equipment operating times are
reduced and the number of failures (PRs) decrease accordingly. The next
most significant factor was the reduction of time to remove and replace (or
just to repair) a defective component. This factor directly reduces the
maintenance time (MDT) and labor (UMMHR) to return the vehicle to an
operational condition. These two factors both result in shortening the total
time the SSTO is in the processing facility. A direct link between processing
time and the number of maintenance actions has been demonstrated on the
current Shuttle program, and is also found in other programs (e.g. the X-15
program). The effect of improving flight hardware reliability was not found
to be a strong factor in improving SSTO operability.
The total time the SSTO is in its processing facility was the most important
factor in achieving high flight rates. The effect of maintenance down periods
(OMDP) was found to not be a strong factor in achieving high flight rates, but
did affect the SSTO operations costs. Significant variations in both the
frequency and time to perform OMDP maintenance can be tolerated without
reducing the annual flight rates. The additional labor required to perform the
maintenance, however, is directly related to the time and frequency of these
events.
Comparison of a tri-propellant propulsion system concept with the reference
(LH2/LOX propulsion) SSTO found that either concept can achieve the SSTO
flight rate objectives, but higher maintenance costs should be expected with
the tri-propellant design. Even with the 3-engine RD-701 concept, higher
maintenance costs were found than the 7-engine SSME concept. The
components added for the additional fuel system generally required higher
maintenance times than those added for a higher number of engines.
In summary, these simulations have demonstrated that low SSTO operations
costs can best be achieved by reducing the time to test and checkout vehicle
subsystems and by reducing component repair times. High SSTO flight rates
can also best be achieved by reducing the per flight maintenance times.
Improved component reliability and periodic maintenance effects are weaker.
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Operability of Alternative SSTO ConceDtss
PRs MDT UMMHR Total HPF
# (hrs) (hrs) Time (hrs)
Reference SSTO with 7 SSME engin-_
20 55
Tri-propellant SSTO with 3 RD-701 engines
16 55
Tri-propellant SSTO with 7 RD-704 engines
25 78
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f
Figure 2.4-14 SIMtrix Simulations Summary
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Figure 2.4-15 STARSIM Simulations Summary
1]-205
M..."
2.4.2 SSTO Engine Throttling Studies
A key factor in any SSTO launch vehicle's maintenance characteristics is
the amount of time the main propulsion system engines have to operate on
each mission. Rocket engines generally have a short operating life
between maintenance. Any SSTO design parameter which can minimize
the engine operating time, or even the amount of time the engine is
operated at full power levels, can be translated into reduced MPS
maintenance costs. An analysis was performed to determine what engine
throttling and shutdown schemes might be devised to minimize total
engine operating time and engine operating times at full throttle for a
reference SSTO concept. The Access to Space Option 3 reference SSTO
rocket concept utilized a 7 SSME configuration main propulsion system.
Concepts with a large number of engines such as this typically have to
shutdown and/or throttle engines during the launch trajectory. Changes to
the engines operating schemes may, however, detract from the vehicle's
payload lift capability and its abort capabilities. Several engine operating
schemes were investigated for the 7 SSME SSTO concept, each evaluated
for total engine operating time, time at full and reduced power levels,
payload impacts, and also for single or two engine out abort capability.
The tri-propellant RD-701 propulsion system SSTO concept was also
evaluated for comparison with the reference SSTO configuration.
2.4.2.1 SSTO Engine Throttling Analyses
Trajectory analyses of the reference SSTO launch vehicle (7-SSME
propulsion system) were performed to determine optimum operating
techniques for maximizing both engine reliability/life and maintaining
adequate abort coverage. Variations in engine throttle profiles and
shutdown sequences were performed to find the minimum engine
operating times, the minimum engine operating time at 100% throttle
level, and the maximum engine out abort capability. The analyses were
performed with the POST trajectory analysis tool using 3-DOF trajectory
simulation with a moment balance maintained in the vehicle pitch plane
(consistent with other SSTO performance analyses performed in the Option
3 studies). Six different engine operating techniques were evaluated:
A)
B)
c)
D)
B.1)
Constant acceleration (maintain 3 g),
Ramp throttle to 65%,
No throttle,
Step throttle to 65%,
Ramp throttle 5 engines, leave two at 90%
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B.2) Ramp throttle 5 engines, leave two at 100%
These throttle profile variations produced little change in the vehicle
payload performance and all resulted in the eventual shutdown of five
engines to meet the 3g acceleration limit. The time to final engine
shutdown (MECO) varied from 372 seconds to 412 seconds among these
launch profiles. The lowest performance was found with the no throttle
(-1,000 lbs) and the step throttle (-1,950 lbs) profiles. The analysis of
these throttle profile variations showed that total engine operating times
(seven engines combined total burn time) could be reduced (or increased)
by approximately 10%. A range of about 400 seconds from maximum to
minimum total operating times was found over the nominal 2200 seconds
total engines operating time. This is not a great variation for a single
mission, but when applied to a planned 20-mission life between engine
removals, this translates to an equivalent of two additional missions before
planned removal of the seven engines, which is a significant maintenance
improvement.
A much greater variation was found in total operating time at 100% for the
engines. A range from nearly 2,000 seconds down to 1,230 seconds was
found. Engine life and reliability may be significantly affected by these
different operating techniques for the SSTO concept. The specific engine
selection and its design characteristics will determine if this effect can be
translated into maintenance savings.
The engine gimbal profile was examined for the Case B.1 engine throttle
scenario to determine if the SSTO shutdown sequences would cause
excessive gimbal ranges. The analysis was performed with the POST
trajectory code and was based on the specific engine installation layout
which is described in Section 2.4.3. (7 SSMTs in a circular arrangement
near the fuselage outer diameter, no engine(s) installed in the center of the
fuselage). The engines were required to gimbal to maintain the vehicle
pitch balance and steer it to the MECO target while performing the engine
throttle and shutdown sequences. The analysis showed that the maximum
engine gimbal was 6 ° with a mean gimbal angle of 5" (±1") for the high
dynamic pressure periods of the trajectory (approximately 30 to 130
seconds after liftoff). During the later trajectory periods, the gimbal angle
was a relatively constant 2.9". This analysis indicates that the engine
throttling and shutdown sequences will not create excessive gimbal ranges
to be required, even for the asymmetric throttling scenario.
Another significant finding from this analysis was the observation that
most of the throttle/shutdown techniques resulted in an engine shutdown
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within 10 to 20 seconds of MECO. At this time in the trajectory, very little
propellant is left in the tanks (approximately 6%) and the engine shutdown
results in an acceleration change from 3 g's to as low as 1.3 g's. This
condition will cause significant propellant movement in the tank,
potentially uncovering the tank outlet and shifting the CG of the vehicle.
(Remember, at this point in the trajectory the vehicle is flying nearly
horizontal, not vertical.) To prevent an engine shutdown late in the
trajectory, two variations of the ramp throttle approach (Case B) were
created. Two asymmetric throttle variations (Case B.1 and B.2) were
devised in which five of the seven engines were allowed to be throttled
but two engines were kept at 100% (or 90%) thrust until the end of the
trajectory. This method allowed throttling of the last two engines to
maintain smoother acceleration levels during the final minute of the
trajectory and prevent large propellant shifts due to engine shutdowns.
The Case B.1 was most successful, resulting in no engine shutdown for the
last 60 seconds and producing constant 3 g's acceleration during the last 10
seconds.
V_
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2.4.2.2 SSTO Engine Out and Abort Analyses
Engine out and abort analyses were also conducted for these engine
throttling techniques to determine if they would improve (or reduce) the
SSTO abort capabilities. Both single engine out and two engine out aborts
were analyzed. Engine throttling capability again improved the SSTO
vehicle performance, but only under certain scenarios. A 30 second
improvement was found with Case B. 1 (asymmetric throttle, 100%) for the
single engine out condition (22 seconds for 2 engines out). If the reserve
propellant budgets are allowed to be consumed for the engine out
conditions (a 1,000 lb propellant reserve just for aborts is a reasonable
groundrule), all throttle profiles produced similar results for a single
engine out condition. For 2 engine out conditions, the no throttle scenario
proved best. Again, however, only the asymmetric throttle profiles
produced smooth acceleration prof'fles near MECO.
The SSTO abort analysis produced similar results as was found in the
Access to Space Option 23 study. The RTLS trajectory analyses included
aerodynamic loads limits (maximum dynamic pressure and maximum
normal force) as well as aeroheating limits on the SSTO vehicle (data as
provided from the NASA Option 3 study). The capability exists to perform
an RTLS from liftoff to as late as 207 seconds into the launch trajectory.
Single engine out capability was available as early as 141 seconds into the
trajectory, with two engine out capability at 205 seconds. An ATO abort
capability is not required since the EO coverage overlaps with the RTLS
coverage.
The combined RTLS and engine out capabilities of this SSTO vehicle
provide full abort coverage, a runway landing option is available over the
entire launch trajectory. The vehicle can achieve the nominal MECO target
after a single engine failure during 6496 of the trajectory.
11-214
SSTO Abort Capability
LOX/LH2 Propulsion (7 SSME )
I SSTO ABORT OPTIONSi
RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Any engine failure in booster. Use remaining engines to execute
powered turnaround maneuver and establish sufficient velocity
toward launch site for SSTO to land.
SINGLE ENGINE OUT
Single booster engine failure. Utilize remaining engines
to reach nominal MECO target.
TWO ENGINE OUT
Two booster engine failures. Utilize remaining engines
to reach non_al MECO target.
TRANS-ATLANTIC LANDING (TAL)
Multiple (>2) booster engine failure. Utilize remaining engines
to establish sufficient velocity for SSTO range to reach landing
site in Europe or Africa.
ABORT TO ORBIT (ATO)
Multiple booster engine failure. Utilize remaining engines to reach
lower energy MECO target for 13X74 Nmi. parking/transfer orbit.
51.6 ° Inclination Orbit
Abort Window
0 sec _. MET _<207 sec
141 sec < MET _<388 sec
205 sec < MET < 388 sec
GROUND-RULED OUT
100 sec _; MET < 205 sec
Figure 2.4-25 SSTO Abort Capability (7 SSME Engines)
SSTO Abort Capability
LOX/LH2 Propulsion (7 SSME )
I Abort Options and Coverage
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Figure 2.4-26 SSTO Abort Coverage (7 SSME Engines)
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2.4.2.3 Tri-propellant SSTO Configuration Analysis
Trajectory and launch abort analyses of a tri-propellant SSTO propulsion
system utilizing three Russian RD-701 engines were also completed. The
analyses were similar to those performed for the seven SSME engine
propulsion concept for SSTO. The fewer number of engines, coupled with
their dual thrust level, was found to eliminate the need for engine
throttling studies as was performed for the SSME concept. What was
discovered, however, was that this concept has very limited engine out and
RTLS abort capabilities. Because these engines have two thrust chambers
per engine, they experience large thrust losses for an engine failure (the
engine failures modeled assumed the two thrust chambers could not
operate independently). A single engine out capability was not achievable
until 336 seconds into the trajectory (nominal MECO occurs at 373 sec.).
Two engines out could not be tolerated at any time. An allowance of 1,000
lbs reserve propellant just for the engine out condition extended the
engine out capability back to 310 seconds. The RTLS capability was
greatly reduced by the significant thrust loss of an engine early in the
trajectory. The RTLS could not be performed for an engine failure any
earlier 37 seconds nor any later than 189 seconds after liftoff. An ATO
abort is required to cover the gap (121 seconds) between RTIS and EO
aborts. A single engine failure can not be tolerated early in the trajectory
and a two engine failure cannot be tolerated at any time. The combined
RTLS, EO, and ATO abort capabilities for this concept result in less than full
abort coverage (90%). This level of abort coverage is marginally acceptable
for a fully reusable launch vehicle.
The same tri-propellant SSTO concept with seven, single-nozzle engines
was also performed (the RD-704 engine concept). The Case B.1 engine
throttling profile which seemed the best solution for the SSME concept was
analyzed. This version of the tri-propellant engine SSTO design produced a
much improved abort performance. The RTLS capability was extended
back to liftoff and out to 198 seconds. A single engine out capability was
achievable at 262 seconds into the trajectory, and two engine out abort
capability was achievable at 265 seconds (nominal MECO occurs at 390
seconds). An ATO abort mode was still required to span the gap (64
seconds) between RTIS and EO abort coverages. The EO abort performance
of this concept is not as good as the 7 SSME propulsion system (33% vs.
64% of the trajectory), but at least this configuration achieves the full abort
coverage which the RD-701 configuration could not.
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SSTO Abort Capability
Tri-propellant Propulsion (3 RD-701 )
ISSTOABORTOPTIONS!
• RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Any engine failure in booster. Use remaining engines to execute
powered turnaround maneuver and establish sufficient velocity
toward launch site for SSTO to land.
• SINGLE ENGINE OUT
Single booster engine failure. Utilize remaining engines
to reach nominal MECO target.
• TWO ENGINE OUT
Two booster engine failures. Utilize remaining engines
to reach nominal MECO target.
• TRANS-ATLANTIC LANDING (TAL)
Multiple (>2) booster engine failure. Utilize remaining engines
to establish sufficient velocity for SSTO range to reach landing
site in Europe or Africa.
• ABORT TO ORBIT (ATO)
Single booster engine failure. Utilize remaining engines to reach
lower energy MECO target for 12X74 Nml. parking/transfer orbit.
_51.6 ° Inclination Orbit i
Abort Window
37 sec < MET _<189 sec
310 sec < MET _<373 sec
NOT POSSIBLE
GROUND-RULED OUT
180 sec < MET < 310 sec
Figure 2.4-27 SSTO Abort Capability (3 RD-701 Engines)
SSTO Abort Capability
Trl-propellant Propulsion (3 RD-701 )
IAbort Options and Coverage
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Figure 2.4-28 SSTO Abort Coverage (3 RD-701 Engines)
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SSTO Abort Capability
Trl-propellant Propulsion (7 RD-704 )
ISSTOABORT OPTIONS i
RETURN-TO.LAUNCH-SITE (RTLS)
Any engine failure in booster. Use remaining engines to execute
powered turnaround maneuver and establish sufficient velocity
toward launch site for SSTO to land.
SINGLE ENGINE OUT
Single booster engine failure. Utilize remaining engines
to reach nominal MECO target.
TWO ENGINE OUT
Two booster engine failures, Utilize remaining engines
to reach nominal MECO target.
TRANS-ATLANTIC LANDING ('FAL)
Multiple (>2) booster engine failure. Utilize remaining engines
to establish sufficient velocity for SSTO range to reach landing
site in Europe or Africa.
ABORTTO ORBIT (ATO)
Multiple booster engine failure. Utilize remaining engines to reach
lower energy MECO target for 15X80 Nmi. parking/transfer orbit.
51.6 + Inclination Orbit i
I
Abort Window
0 sec _; METe; 198 sec
262 sec < MET _ 390 sec
265 sec < MET _ 390 sec
GROUND-RULED OUT
135 sec < MET < 265 sec
Figure 2.4-29 SSTO Abort Capability (7 RD-704 Engines)
SSTO Abort Capability
Trl-propellant Propulsion (7 RD..704 )
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Figure 2.4-30 SSTO Abort Coverage (7 RD-704 Engines)
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2.4.3 SSTO MPS Design Layout
A key aspect of ground processing is access to NIPS components to perform
necessary maintenance and inspections. A design concept for an open
boattail was initiated to support the SSTO MPS ground processing study.
Many MPS design groundrules were identified in the Operationally
Efficient Propulsion System Study (OF PSS) by NASA KSC and Rocketdyne
which would provide significant improvements in propulsion system
processing costs. An open boattail was one of the key parameters
identified in the study.
A design layout study was performed using 3-D CAD tools to vigorously
apply the OEPSS groundrules. The design provided for a seven SSME
propulsion system and included features such as no closed compartments,
hardware integration, accessibility, no heat shields, lift-off umbilicais, and
hardware commonality were incorporated. The design layouts currently
include engine envelopes, LOX and LH2 feedlines, and an integrated
tank/thrust structure arrangement. The design concept is similar to that
employed on the Saturn S-II and S-WB stages in which the engine thrust
structure is integrated with the tank lower bulkhead. The design also
includes modular engine assemblies which integrate the engine with the
TVC system and portions of the thrust structure. No closed compartments
exist in the propulsion system region and considerable access is provided
for engine and feedline maintenance. A three-point structural attachment
was developed for the engine module to accommodate rapid engine
replacement.
E
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A rocket propulsion based SSTO(R) as
defined in NASA's
Access to Space Option 3
• VTHL
• LOX/LH2 propellants
• 7 evolved SSME engines
• Forward LOX tank with two
19" feedlines, toroidal manifold
• LH2 tank with spider manifold
• Electromechanicai actuators
• Hot gas tank pressurization
Figure 2.4-31 SSTO MPS Design Layout (7 SSMEs)
Figure 2.4-32 SSTO MPS Internal Components
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Figure 2.4-33 Modular Engine & Structure integration
Figure 2.4-34 NIPSEngines, Feedlines, & Thrust Structure
_-22!
Figure 2.4-35 MPS Engines & Feedlines
.)_-.
Figure 2,4-36 MPS Engines & Thrust Structure
x...d Figure 2.4-37 MPS Feedlines & Manifolds (Top View)
Figure 2.4-38 3-Point Engine Mounting (Pinned Joints)
T
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2.5 Appendices
This section of the Interim Final Report contains several individual reports
which were written over the course of the study period on selected key
topics. These reports represent concentrated study efforts on key issues
related to manned booster concepts. The first two reports summarize
detailed analyses which were undertaken to fully understand the
structural impacts to a booster when a winged payload (such as the CLV
and the PLS concepts) is Installed as the launch payload. The third report
is the current release of a report which documents the NASA man-rating
requirements and converts these requirements into functional design
requirements for a manned booster. This detailed examination of man-
rating requirements and consequent booster design impacts is a continuing
study activity. This report will therefore be updated as the study
progresses. The fourth report summarizes a detailed analysis of the NASA
KSC launch process itself to determine if this process exhibits learning
curve effects. The analysis was performed on the Space Shuttle system,
but is applicable to other NASA booster and manned spacecraft launch
processes.
Enclosed Repor_:s
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Structural Analysis of CLV on NLS-2
Structural Analysis of PLS with CRV on NIS-2
Man-Rating Requirements Report (Rev. A)
Learning Curve Analysis of Space Shuttle Processing
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ADVANCED TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM STUDY
Manned Launch Vehicle Concepts for Two Way
Transportation System Payloads to LEO
Structural Analysis of a
Manned Payload on the NLS
Crew Logistics Vehicle (CLV)
September, 1992
Contract NAS8-39207
Prepared by: H.R. Grooms
Rockwell International
Rockwell International
Space Systems Division
Huntsville Operations
FORWARD
This report documents analyses conducted under Contract NAS8-
39207, Advanced Transportation System Studies for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C. Marshall Space
Flight Center. The report describes a preliminary analysis of
aerodynamic loads, structural dynamics and stress, and weight
estimation of the NLS-2 launch vehicle with a large manned payload
(the Crew Logistics Vehicle concept as defined by the Johnson
Spaceflight Center). This work was performed during the period of
August and September, 1992 under the direction of Mr. Henry
Grooms at Rockwell International, Space Systems Division, in
Downey, CA. The primary technical analyses were performed by
Vyto Baipsys (Aerodynamics), Keith Maeda (Weights), Al Yeung
(Structural Dynamics), and Van Richardson (Stress), all of Rockwell
International.
_.._Y
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
OF A CREW LOGISTICS VEHICLE
INTRODUCTION
This report documents a preliminary analysis of a Crew Logistics Vehicle (CLV). This
analysis took an initial design concept and peffom_ a strength and weight assessment.
I. Ground Rules and Assumptions
The CLV isa scaled(58%) versionofa ShuttleOrbiterthatismounted atopa National
Launch System (NLS) booster (Figure 1). Existing information on the Orbiter and NLS
was used directly/modified to expedite this study.
The main purpose of the study was to determine what impact calTying the CLV would have
on the NLS booster. It was decided, because of this, to represent the mass of the CLV but
not its stiffness. The aerodynamic forces on the CLV were included.
The analysis and assessment wocedure is shown in Figure 2. Most of the work done for
this report was done using the computer program "IDEAS" and other auxiliary programs
that are compatible with it.
II.Aerodynamic Load Distributions
reign considerations were outlined as part of this effort in _ to identify key issues to
ce the NLS/CLV technical development risk. Aerodymumc loads distributions have
been defined for on-pad and high dynamic pressure (q) condition to support structural
analysm for the NLS/CLV launch configuration depicted in Figure 3. The CLV _ a 0.58-
scale Orbiter geometry vehicle launched by a 10-foot tank stretch version of the 1.5 stage
NLS booster. The CLV is attached to the NLS booster by an adapter and replaces the
conventional NLS payload shroud. In order to'show the relative difference between the
NLS shroud and the CLV, Figure 3 shows the stack with the NLS shroud superimposed
over the stack in dashed lines.
The key issues to be addressed for the NLS/CLV development ale outlined below:
1. Evaluate ground wind loads to insure CLV wind load bearing capacity and uructural
design of NLS2 fro'ward adapter.
NLS Wind (Mter_
(A) Nmmal W'md Operations (includes launch)
5% _ factm', windiest l-hr exposure period
Wind speed of 34.4 knots at 60 ft altitude
(B) High W'md Operations
(Unfueled)
1% risk factor, windiest 180-day exposure period
Wind speed of 74.5 knots at 60 ft altitude
(Partly or fully fueled)
1% risk factor, windiest one-day exposure period
W_nd speed of 47 knots, at 60 ft altitude
• °
FIGURE. 1. CLV MOUNTED ON NLS BOOSTER
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2. Evaluatelaunchwind environment toinsure NLS2 booster gimbal control authority.
For wind criteria see (A) above.
. Evaluate in-flight aerodynamic loads due to winds Mo_plus-gust to insure structural
design of NLS2 forward adapter, booster gimbal control authority, and CLV wing load
bearing capability.
Use conservative winds alot with superimposed synthetic 10 m/s cosine-shaped
gust at maximum qa condition.
Insure that NLS2 gimbal authority is sufficient to handle de-stabilizing moment
produced by CLV wing rift. If not, provide concepts for enhanced static stability
and control.
Evaluate CLV wing shear and bending moments to insure structmal integrity.
(Positive alp.ha can be experienced on the wings with in-line CLV exposed to
winds. Orbxter ascent is typically fown with negative alphas, which limits wing
loads.)
Evaluate pressure and buffeting fi'om CLV wing vortices on NLS 2 structure.
• pressure spikes
• panel flutta"
4. Evaluate the effect of scaled wing and tail leading edges, and the smaller nose radius on
thermal heating rates during entry.
What is the impact on loading edte _ selection?
5. Explore and apply advanced TI_ mamrials to reduce costs of production and operations
relative to STS Orliter.
Advances made in studies for the STS Orbiter
Advances made by the Emutama Space Agency (ESA) for Hermes
6. Evaluate launch vchiclc dynamic chatacterim'cs (mode shape and frequencies)
assocmted with the CLV mass at the top or"the NLS2 boostcr.
7. _aa_Ct,V _ ot gravity (03) range selections based on correct aerodynamic
mflili_ .ysis. Iatmt page 60and Figure 4.2-1 (April 1992 CLV Relxm) uses
.The distributed am/__ wind 1.oacL?for the on-I:md wind condition are shown
m the spreadsheet resulm m Table 1. The wind speed uaed wu fzqm the NLS wind criteria
(References 1 and 2) which specifies the maximum wind speed at 74.5 knots at 60 foot
height above ground level (the NLS base is 95 feet above ground). This is a 1% risk factor
wind (99% probability of not
.. exceeding it) for a 180-day exposure duration. The wind
speon .m_.. s exponentially with height, as tabulated in the spreadsheet. The spreadsheet
snows me mstributed wind drag loading ov_ the entire launch stack and the computation of
the lr_g drag load and bending moment smnn_tions along the NLS booster. These
drag oad and moment summations begin at the top of the NLS/O.V adapter (Smdon
1(
TABLE 1. NLS GROUND WIND LOADING
10' STRETCH NLV2 WITH INLINE CLV
NLS STRUCTURE BASE AT 95 R _T-FtVATION
X ST_ No Component DIAMEIER HeiSt Dr_ Cod Vwind
In ft It tbued on A/_ee
ON-PAD AERO LOADS =
SUMMED LOADS INCLUDE CLV
1% RISK FACTOR. 180 WINDIEST DAY
F-.XPOSURE DURATION
V_nd=74.5 ETS @ 60 fl: Ref. Altltud,
w
SUMMED SUMMED LOC_
DRAG "1.5 IOAD MOMENT PRESSURI
(vortex shed) VERSUS X ABOUT X DISTRIB.
2167_0 0_0
2167.80 27.127cbg 10.17
2301.00 Frustum 19.19
2424.80 • 2738
2424_0 1_ Stage 2738
2472.80 • 27_8
2_9_0 " 2738
2583.55 • 2738
2644.O6 " 2738
2711.77 " 273858
2778_ • 2738
2838.41 • 27._8
285Z80 • 2738
2897.10 • 273858
2941.40 • 2738
29_ • 2738
3034_0 " 2738
30833) " W38
3123.15 • 2738
3137.54 • 2738
3201.70 • W.J
32_50 • 2738
33313) • 2738
337735 • 27Z4
3435.@ • 27.M
3500.70 • 27._
3565.70 • 2738
3623.8O • 27.,q8
3706.10 " 27.56
3784_0 • 27_8
3871_0 • 2738
3932.OO • 2738
399W0 • 2738
40_00 • 2738
4108.91 • 2738
4122.6S Thn_ n'ud, 2738
4137.30 • 2738
4151.90 • 2738
4166.60 • 2738
279.81 1.000 147.56
279.81 1.000 147.56
288.71 1.000 146.95
258.39 1.000 146.35
256.39 1.000 146.35
254_1g 1J)O0 14_11
246.31 1_00 145.62
245.16 1AOO 145.56
240.12 1JX)O 146._
0.000
S2.617
61.081
87.0g7
r/.og7
u.82S
M.1M
5.223E+04 1.112E+06
9.223E+04 1.112E+06
S.847E+04 1.723E_)6
6.764E+04 2371E+06
9.764E+04 2371E_)6
7.182E+04 2._0E+06
9.021E+04 3_d4E+06
9.140E_04 USTE+O_
9.560E+04 &?IIOE+06
2g4.48 1.000
22U8 1.000
223.g2 1.000
222.73 1.000
219.03 .1.000
215.34 1.000
211.85 1.000
m7.61 1.000
14438J 86.418
i
1-.19] 54_1
144.11] e4.s40
14usI
146._
14_06 l_._2
Z)_.,_ 1,000 142.77
_00.20 1,000 142._
lgUO 1,000 14_.@
1_ 1.000 142.08
112S 1,000 141.81
182.8S 1.000 141.19
179.01 1.000 140_
174.13 1.000 140.47
168.73 1.000 140.01
163..12 1.000 139.54
158.48 1.000 139.10
151.82 1.000 138.47
145.06 1.000 137.83
137.88 1.000 137.11
132.N 1000 136.57
127.39 1.000 135.56
122.29 1.000 135.41
118.05 1.000 134.91
116.90 1.000 134.738!
11&68 1.000 134.63
114.47 1.000 134.48
113_4 1.__no0 134.33
83.018
1_..746
82..188
81.721
81.241
80.8m
8O.442
NA0_
78.919
78215
77.$12
76.716
76.131
73,4_
74.8_
74.12S
74.177
74.018
73_
73_
0.0000
0.2674
0_52
0.2631
0.2631
0.2623
0.26O6
0.26O4
0.2593
9.,_40E+04 4_$E,06 0.2581
9.812E+04 4.818E+06 0.2568
I_2E+0_ LI17E,06 02S57
1.044E+05 5.442£+O6 0.2554
1.081E+95 f_34E+06 0.2545
1,118E+95 (L_0E+06 0.2537
1,156E+05 6_0E+06 0.2528
1.195E+95 7.135E+06 0.2518
1.237E+05 7.833E+06 0.25O8
1270E+95 9.04_+06 0.25OO
1_2E+05 _02E+06 02497
1_E+95 L90_06 02483
I_E+O_ _TE+_ 02469
1A41E_ I_40E+07 02454
1A73E+05 1.0_E+07 02444
1.S2SE+(_ 1.1_E+07 02430
1.577E+95 1253E+07 02415
1,829E,tO_ 1.340E+07 0.2399
1.87SE,1.05 1.420E+07 0.2384
1.740E+95 1.537E+07 0.2363
1.801E+95 I_E_7 0.2342
1.56"/E+05 1,735E+07 0.2318
1.914E+0_ 1.881E+07 0.2300
1.993E_ 1.956E+07 0.2281
2.009E+0S 2307E+07 0.2262
2.047E+95 2.173E+07 0.2245
2.0_/E+05 2.197E+07 0.2241
2.068E+05 2.222E+07 0.2236
2.07gE+05 2.247E+07 0.2231
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TABLE 1.
(con't)
NLS STRUCTURE BASE AT 95 ftELEVATION
NLS GROUND WIND LOADING
10' STRETCH NLV2 WITH INLINE CLV vJe
ON-PAD AERO LOADS
$UMMED LOADS INCLUDE CLV
1% RISK FACTOR. 180 WINDIEST DAY
EXPOSURE DURATION
Vwind=74.5 KTS @ 60 R Ref. Altitude
LOCAL Cd
X STA.No Component DIAMETER Height Dra_ Coe_ Vwlnd
in R fl ibaKd on Rl_ec
side are_
SUMMED SUMMED lOCAL
DRAG *1.5 LOAD MOMENT PRESSURE
vortex shed) VERSUS X ABOUT X DISTRIB.
l_/tn 1_ R-rm pela
w/dr w/dr
4181.20 " 27.58 112.03 1.000 134.18
4195.70 " 27.58 110.82 1.000 134.08
4210.30 " 27.58 109.60 1.000 133.88
4227.40 " 27.58 108.18 1.000 133.m
4241.60 " 27.58 106.99 1.000 133.54
4254.10 " 27.58 105.95 1.000 133.41
4265.00 " 27.58 105.04 1_00 133._
4275.90 * 27.58 104.13 1.000 133.17
42_.90 " _.58 10322 1.000 133.05
4297.80 " 27.58 102.31 1.000 132.g2
430e.80 " 27.58 101.39 1.000 132.80
4319.70 " 27.58 100.48 1.000 132.67
433).60 " 27.58 WM 1.000 1:S2.G5
4341.60 " 27._ _ 1.000 132.42
4352.20 • 27.58 97.78 1.000 132.30
4362.80 " 2T.q8 9U9 1.000 132.17
4374.20 " 27.58 95.94 1.000 132.04
4385.50 End04_ 27.58 95.00 1.000 131.g0
73.534 2.101E+05 2.298E+07 0.2222
73.371 2.1tlE+05 2.323E+07 0.2217
73.206 2.122E+_ 2.349E+07 0.2212
73.010 2.134E+05 2.379E+07 0.2206
72.846 2.145E+05 2.40_+07 02201
72.700 2.154E+05 2.427E+07 02196
72.572 2.162E+05 2.447E+07 0.2193
72.443 2.170E+_S 2.4eeE+O'/ 02189
72.312 2.178E+05 2.486E+07 0.2185
72.182 2.18BE+05 2.,q)E_)'/ 02181
72.049 2.1_E_ 2.52BEd)7 02177
71.916 2201E+(_ 2.S4_+07 0.2173
71.783 2.20_._ 2.5_7 0.2169
71M7 2217E+05 2_7E+07 021
71.515 222SE+05 2._6E+07 0.2161
71_2 2.232E+05 2.62SE+07 0.2157
71.2_ 2240E405 2.847E+07 02152
71.094 2.248E+05 2J_SE+07 02148
_J
2167.8) and continue m the NLS booster base at Station 4385.5. The effect of the CLV on
the loads is represented as a concen_ dragforce and moment acting at the top of the
NLS/CLV adapter. The CLV drag value was obtained by multiplying its planform area of
1337 ft2 by a drag coefficient of 1.5 and a dynamic pressure of 26 psf (the result of wind
speed and air density at the hight corresponding to the centroid of the CLV area at Station
1912.27). The moment cuased by the CLV was the product of the drag load multiplied by
the distance between the above area centroid and any X Station in question.
CLV drag = 1.5x1337x26.043 = 52,230 lbs
CLV moment = 52,230x(X Sta-1912.27)/12 ft-lbs
(moment varies with X Sta) Moment- 1.112E+06 ft-lbs at
X Sta = 2167.8, the top of the NLS/CLV adapter
Net pressure distributions along the booster were computed from the distributed drag
loading and are shown in the table. In addition to the steady-state drag loads the total loads
in the table include an amplification factor of 1.5 to account for transient loads in the
dragwise and the transverse directions due to oscillatory vortex shedding from the booster
sides.
Figures 4 and 5 depict the wind drag distribution (with the 1.5 amplifr, afion factor)and the
resulting distribution of net pressures across the booster, respectively. The CLV
concentrated drag load is depicted as a single force vector in Figure 2.
Plots of summed drag load and mcxnent along the NLS booster due to ground wind are
shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. The total drag load on the stack is 2.248E44)5 lbs.
The resulting moment about the NLS booster base is 2.67E+07 ft-lbs. These are the
aex_ynamic loadswhich the NLS smactt_ has to withstand and which will have to be
reactedagainst by the booster fie-down system.
Similar type of results were obtained for the in-flight condition of maximum product of
dynamic pressure times alpha (q-alpim)max to define the highest bending moment in flight.
This condition cccmred at an altitude of 31,116 feet and a Mach number of 1.32 at a
conesponding dynamicpressure 777.34 Inf. A conse_ative angle of attack(a) of 5.3
degrees was computed b7 supetimpo_g an NLS wind of 96.44 R/see (Reference 3) and a
33 f't/sec gust on the vehicle speed of 1391 ft/sec.
ct-Tan'l(Vwind___wind_+.Vg_ ) --5.3deg
Vv_cle
_i.__ mmlts definingthedisu'ibutedaidoaddistributionateshown inTable2.CLV nam_ for_ _ and centerofpressurewere derivedfrom theSTS
Orbiter amalymmlc dram0tefe:eace 4). For this condition, the CLV nmml force
coe_ wu roaredIB I_ 0.39066 (based on the SIS re.fm'e.ncearea of 584 ft2 and a
center-of-pressure at X Sta=1917.67). Normal force coefficient distribution on the
NLS/CLV adapter and the NLS booster was derived from the NLS distributions (Reference
5) with some naxiification to the distribution over the adapter section to reflect a longer
NLS/CLV adapter.
Normal force distribution and the resulting distribution of net pressures across the booster
are shown in Figures 8 and 9, respectively. For this condition, the distributed loads
depend only on the steady-state aerodynamic normal force distributions and do not include
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TABLE 2. NLS/CLV MAX q AIRLOAD DISTRIB. ABOUT Xcg
10' STRETCH NLV2 WITH INLINE CLV
Sref = 593.96 ft.,',2 MACH = 1.3
[ Xc_(s_a)= 3030 ] q (psfl = 777.34
a= 5.3deg
CN clv = 0.39066
Xcp clv= 1917.67
LOCAL CNa
D_R
R per Ra_
Perx/D
MAX q AIRLOADS
SUMMED LOADS INCLUDE CLV
X STA. No Component
in
NOMINALTRAJECTORY
MACH=I.3, a -53 deg
NORMAL SLrb1_ED S_D LOCAL
AiR LOAD NORMAL F. MOMENT PRESSURE
DISTRIBr.TrE.D FWD OF X ),BOUT Xcg DISTR/B.
Ibs/tn Ibs R-Ibs psla
wlClv wlClv
1917.67 <<< CLVXcp 0.00 0.00000
2167.80 22.127d+g 10.17 0.91254
2308.80 Frustum 19.72 228900
2424.80 • 27.58 2.53390
2424.80 1stSlage 27.58 1.42650
247Z80 " 27..58 0.00000
2520.80 • 2758 0.08000
2583.55 " 2758 0.41000
2644.06 " 2758 0.51000
2711.77 " 2758 0.46000
2778.89 " 2758 0.40000
2838.41 " 2758 0.34000
2852.80 " 2758 0.32000
2897.10 " 2758 0.27000
2941.40 " 2758 0.22000
2985.67 ' 2758 0.16000
3O34.2O • 2758 0.09O00
3083.30 " 2758 0.03000
3123.15 " 2758 -0.03000
3137.54 • 2758 -0.05000
3201.70 " 2758 -0.12000
3266.50 ". 2758 -0.140OO
33313) • 27-_ -0.07000
337L15 " 2"/38 -0.02000
343£.@ • 2758 003O00
3500.70 • 2758 0.08O00
35_.70 • 2758 0.10169
• 2758 0.10169
3706.10 " 27.58 0.10169
3784.90 " 2758 0.10169
3871.00 " 2758 0.10169
3932.00 " 27._ 0.10169
3996.80 • 27.58 0.10169
4058.00 " 27.5A 0.10169
4108.91 • 2758 0.10169
4122.65 Th_¢ s_ucUe. 2758 0.10169
4137.30 " 2758 0.10169
4151.90 • 27.58 0.10169
4165.5o • 2758 O.lO,lm;
0.00
117.75
3O8.25
• 326.95
184.06
0.00
10.32
5Z90
6SJH
59.35
51.61
43.67
41.29
34.84
28.39
20.64
11.61
3.87
-3.87
_45
-15.48
-11L06
-9.O3
-2-58
3,87
10.32
13.12
13.12
13.12
13.12
13.12
13.12
13.12
13.12
13.12
13.12
13.12
13.12
13.12
1.604E+05 1.672E+07
1.B04E+05 1.672E+07
2.104E+05 1.867E+07
2-472E+05 2.071E,07
2.472E+05 2.071E,07
2.517E,05 2-093E+07
2.519E+05 2.094E+07
2.539E+05 2-101E_7
2.575E+05 2.114E+07
2.617E+05 2-126E+07
2.654E+06 2.136E+07
2.653E,05 "2-140E+07
2-689E+05 2.141E+07
2.706E+05 2-144E+07
2-720E_5 2-145E+07
2-731E+05 2.145E+07
2.739E_5 2.146E+07
2.742E+05 2.146E+07
2.742E+05 2.146E+07
2-742E_5 2.148E+07
2.735E+05 2.146E,,.07
2.724E+05 2.148E+07
2.715E,,.05 2.150E+07
2.712E+05 2.151E,,.07
2-713E+05 2-151E,07
2.717E_5 2.149E+07
2.725E+05 2.146E,07
2.732E+05 2-142E+07
2.743E*05 2-137E,,07
2-754E+05 2-130E,07
2.765E+05 2.123E+07
2.773E+05 2.117E+07
2.781E_5 2.111E+07
2-789E,05 2.104E+07
2.796E,,05 2._E+07
2.798E,05 2.096E+07
2-BOOE+05 2.095E+07
ZB02E_5 2.093E,07
2.804E+05 __1E,07
0.000
0_65
1.302
0.988
0.5.56
0.000
0031
0.160
0.199
0.179
0.156
0.133
0.125
0.105
0.086
0.O62
0.035
0.012
-0.012
-0.019
-0.647
-0.055
-0.027
-0.008
0.012
0031
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.04O
0.O4O
0.040
0.04O
0.O40
0.640
0.040
0.040
0.040
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TABLE 2. NLS/CLV MAX q AIRIX)AD DISTRIB. ABOUT Xcg
(con't) 10' STRETCH NLV2 wrH-I INLINE CLV
X STA.No
in
Sref = 593.96 R^2 MACH = 1.3
X_(m)-- 3030 { q (psf) = 777.34
a= 5.3deg
CN clv = 0.39066
Xcp clv= 1917.67
LOCAL CNa
Component DIAMETER
R perRadlan
perX/D
MAX q A/RLOADS
StTM_D LOADS INCLUDE CLV
NOMINALTRAJECTORY
MACH=1.3,a .5,1 deg
NORMAL SUMMED SUMMED
AIR LOAD NORMAL F. MOMENT
DISTRIBUTED FWD OF X ABolYr Xcg
Ibs/In Ibs R-rm
wl clv wl_9'" '
VJB
8/I4_2
LOCAL
PRESSURE
DISTRIB.
psla
4181.20 " 27.58 0.10169
4195.70 " 27.58 0.10169
4210.30 " 27.58 0.10169
4227.40 " 27.58 0.10169
4241.60 " 27.,58 0.10169
4254.10 " 27.58 0.10168
4265.00 ' 27.58 0.10169
4275.90 " 27.58 0.10169
4286.90 " 27_8 0.10169
4297.80 " 27.58 0.10169
4308.80 " 27.58 0.10169
4319.70 " 27..58 0.10169
4330.60 " 27.58 0.10169
4341.60 " 27.,58 0.10169
4352.20 " 27_8 0.10169
4362.80 " 27.58 0.10169
4374.20 " 27.58 0.10169
4385.50 " 27.58 0.10168
4-_'__550 Endof m____ 0-00 0.00000
13.12 2.806E+05 2.089E+07
13.12 2.808E+05 2.087E+07
13.12 2.809E+05 2.085E+07
13.12 2.812E+05 2.O93E+07
13.12 2.814E+05 2.081E+07
13.12 2.815E+05 2.080E+07
13.12 2.817E+05 2.078E+07
13.12 2.818E+05 2.077E+07
13.12 2.819E+05 2-075E+07
13.12 2.821E+05 2.074E+07
13.12 2.822E_5 2.072E_07
13.12 2.824E+05 2-071Ed)7
13.12 2.B25E_5 2.069E_7
13.12 2.B27E+05 2.068E+07
13.12 2.828E+05 2-066E+07
13.12 2.829E+05 2-065Ed)7
13.12 2.831E+05 2-063Ed)7
13.12 2,832E.1.05 2.061E+07
0.00 2.832E+05 2.061E+07
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.O4O
0.040
0.O4O
0.O4O
0.04O
0.O4O
0.04O
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.O40
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.O4O
0.000
I I
THRUST,Ibs. 2,941,220 I 8/a=, 0.012
Xgimbal= 438S.SO I 8= 3._5
x¢- 21s._ Ic_). 0.11_ _,¢. 2_s._1
ITa-gmlaiT. 182,709
<<rad/_
<<deg imbalreq'd
los
los
Veh.Weight= 1,600,000 los
Acted= 1.8347 g's (AxiaJT)
Tan_._ = 0.1770 g's (aero+'r)
_%..,.,j;
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any amplification factors which had been applied for on-pad loads due to vortex shedding.
Figure 8 shows the CLV normal force of 1.8E+6 lbs concentrated at X Sta=1917.67.
The summed moments were computed about the vehicle Xcg at Station 3030 (adjusted for
thepresenceofCLV from available_ mass properties).The totaloadsand moments
areshown inFigures10 and IlfortheNLS/CLV configuration.These airloadshow a
summed dragof2.248E+05 Ibsand a moment abouttheXcg of 2.06E+07 ft-lbs.
Staticbalancecalculationswere includedinthespreadsheetofTable2 todeterminethe
amount ofenginegimbalanglerequiredinordertoovercome theacxodynamicmon_nt
induced by the airload. This was computed from the moment balance require between the
aerodynamic moment and the engines, as shown below.
TSin(8)fXgimbal - Xcg) = CNczqaS_f(Xcg - Xcp)
Assuming small angles, Sin(8) can be represented by 8, in radians
then: 5 = CNctqSref (Xcg - Xcp)
radians/degree
a XcO
where: 8 = engine glmbal angle, radians
0_ = angleofattack,degrees
CNcx = nmmal fotr.¢ coefficiem slope, per degree
q = dymunic pressure Ibs/sq ft
TSrcf = refer.nee area, sq ft
= Chine thrust,lbs
Xcg = center of gravi_ su_m, in
xXcpbaI = cen_ of pressuresm'.u_ in- e_glmglm_ stolon,m
This relation is then solved fo¢ the _ a from d_ ¢a_ m solve for the glmbal
angle, 8.
With the glmbel angle defined, the axial and mng_al thrustvalues can be
These are shown in the bov_ mv,a at tbe end of u_ spreadsheet.
du'ust compome,nm ca then be used to compu_ the axial w,celeTation and the
tangential s_elerafion
Axial Acceleration = Vehicle Weight
Tan_,ential Thrust + Y./Airload)
Tangential Accel_atim = Vehicle Weight
17
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The results of this calculation are shown at the bottom of Table 2 where 8 and the
accelerations are shown in the boxed area at the bottom of Table 2. In addition, Figures 12
and 13 show the 8 sensitivity with Xcg and the product of qa.
This added gimbal angle can be used to evaluate potential launch configurations for gimbal
conu'ol feasibility. It is also used to improve the finite element model (FEM) structural
analyses by specifying the magnitudes of the inertial acceleration and correct thrust
component inputs to the FEM.
HI. Finite Element Model
A finite element representation was created to aid in assessin_ the tmpact on the tankage of
carrying a CLV. The finite element model uses the structu_ sizing that was generated for
the NI.,S baseline design. The model has the following characteristics:
1. Nodes - 1800
2. Degrees of Freedom - 11,000
3. Elements - 4600
The model was run with unit load cases for checkout purposes and then with two balanced
conditions (on-pad wind, high-Q). The stresses and deflections for the balanced conditions
are presented in a later section of d_is _-port.
The model is shown in Figures 14 through 16.
IV. Mass l'ropenies
A weight Ixeakdown (Table 3) has been generated to support the stress, dynamo, and
perf_ aaalyse_ The mass pmpmies are used as the starting point for creating
inertial loads and a mass mau'ix (used in computing mode shapes and frequencies).
The vehicle was broken down into its bask: systems, the mau _ found for each
system, then the systems reugnnh_d. Some sys_ were not included on each vehicle,
but wee included in the amlym it _ey wee aopLicab_ The _ breakdown included:
su'ucmre, payload, _ TI_, avionics, and fuel The toud vehicle weight
tx'ealatown and diazibu_a _ dam.fouad by suma_g up each system. Spreadsheets
wee created to help in the _ cd'the weight laeakdown for each vehicle.
Much of the micmal used Io find these weights were taken from both the Shuttle and Saturn
programs. The Shuttle external mak and engines, and Saturn designed bulkheads,
propulsion _ and subay1_.ms wee used as guidelines for mass properties
detemiaation.
V. Vehicle Lo_
The vehicle .was analyzed for two balanced conditions- (1) on-pad winds, and (2) a high-Q
flight condiuon. The first condition includes inertial (one-G) and aerodynamic erects. The
second condition includes inertial, thrust, and aerodynamic forces.
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¥FIGURE 14. FINITE ELEMENT MODEL
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FIGURE 15. FINITE ELEMENT MODEL
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FIGURE 16. FINITE ELEMENT MODEL
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TABLE 3. NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOAD(CLV_ - STRETCH "B" VERSION
CLV
ITEM
CG(Xc )
Z
C_E TANX
FWD SKIRT
Z
LO2 TK-F DOME
(FIXED WT)
y.
CYUNDER
LO2 TK-A DOME
(FIXED WT)
£
INTERTANK
Z
U'I2 TK-F DOME
(FIX Wr}
tQQ
STA RI REF
• rr ILBS 
456s-'- o
FROM TAILOF CLV
TOTAL W_
2480.4 1696
2520.8 1084
2410.1 26
2417.6 209
2440.6 388
2480.4 545
2520.8 281
2520.8 816
2580.5 998
2644 1724
2711.7 1814
2778.8 1724
2838.4 1089
2852.8 i 907
2852.8 86
2892.5 690
2932.3 1285
2955.3 1803
2962.7 931
2852.8 1306
2697.1 1979
2941.4 1966
2985.8 2067
3034.2 2143
3083.3 1979
3123.1 1243
3013.1 430
3020.8 833
3043.8 594
3083.4 3191
3123.1 40
3137.5 943
3201.7 1362
3266.5 2200
3331.3 2235
3377.3 1886
"B" VERSION
w'r (LBS_
81444
1781
1138
27
219
407
572
295
857
1048
1810
1905
1810
1143
952
L
90
725
1349
18_
978
1371
2O78
2064
2170
2250
2O78
1305
452
875
624
335
42
990
1430
2310
2347
1980
81444
2919
1521
9526
5O35
Z 2327
CYUNDER
(81444
13317j
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TABLE 3 (con' t) • NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOAD(CLV_ - STRETCH "B" VERSION
ITEM
r.
LH2 TK-A DOME
(FIXED WT)
£
AFT SKIRT
<'NO=T*Tm U:_
Z
EXT HARDWARE
STA
3435.9
3_0.7
3565.5
3623.8
RI REF
WT CLBSt
1781
2O96
22OO
2O96
2410
"B" VERSION
w'r (LBS_
1870
2201;
2310
2201
3706.1 2531
3784.9 2759 2897
3871.0 2829 2970
3_2.0
3996.8
4058
4122.6
4187.6
4252.2
2515
2165
2641
2273
2165 2273
1921 2017
1118
244
55
444
826
4252.2
4292.6
4332.4
4355.4
4362.8
1159
5_
4355.4 2211
4362.8 2210
3O2520.8+
2580.5 35
62
65
2644
2711.7
2778.8
2838.4
2852.8
61
38
29
2897.1 43
2941.4 43
2985.6
3O342
44
46
433O833
3123.1 27
3137.5 38
3201.7 621
1174
256
58
466
86"1
1217
628
3266.5
3331.3
3377.3
3435.9
3500.7
3565.5
3623.8
3706.1
3784.9
2211
2210
32
37
65
68
64
40
3O
45
45
• 46
48
45
28
4O
65
65
TOTAL WT
36671
3236
4421
62_
53 56
50 53
59
62
62
65
62
71
81
83
59
68
77
79
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TABLE 3 (con' t). NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOAD(CLV) - STRETCH "B" VERSION
__.i "7
ITEM STA
3871.0
3932.0
3996.8
RI REF "B" VERSION
WT (LBS) WT (LBSI
71 75
61 64
61
55
64
58
2644
2711.7 38 40
36 38
4058
4122.6 30 32
4187.6 6 6
Z
TPS-LO2 TANK 2520.8 15 16
2580.5 21 22
36 38
2778.8
2838.4
2852.8
23
23
Z
TPS-LH2 TANK 3137.5 27
24
24
28
3201.7 38 40
3266.5 62 65
63 66
53
5O
Z
59
3331.3
3377.3
3435.9
3500.7
3565.5 62
56
53
62
65
3623.8 58 62
3706.1 68 71
3784.9 78 82
3871.0 8O
71
61!
61
84
3932.0
3996.8
4O58
4122.6
75
64
64
54 57
4187.6 32 34
4252.2 8 8
2852.8 94INSULATION
2887.1 142
2941A 141
2985.6 148
Z
LO2-FEED
3034.2;
3083.3
154
142
89
136
3123.1
2985.6
3034.2 139
3083.3 129
3123.1 81
3137.5 115
99
149
148
155
162
1491
g3
143
148
135
85
121
TOTAL WT
1595
202
1035
956
BWPCLVI.XLS 9/24/92
28
TABLE3 (con' t:). NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOADtCLV_ - STRETCH "B" VERSION
ITEM STA
3201.7
3266.5
3331.3
RI REF
WT (LBS)
186
190
163
"B"VERSION
WT fLBS)
195
20O
171
3377.3 152 160
3435.9 180
3500.7
189
2OO190
3565.5 180 189
3623.8 207 217
3706.1
4058
234 246
3784.9 240 252
3871.0 213 224
3932.0 1831 lg2
3996.8 183 192
171163
954122.6 100
4187.6 29 30
Z
LO2 - PRESSURE 2330.3 1211
9 ¸
6
4
4
8
2424.8
2472.8
2580.5
2644
2711.7
2778.8
2838.4
S_
8
8
2852.8
2997.1 4 4
2941.4
....... 51
S;2985.6 5
3034.2 6; 6
830e3.3
3123.1
3137.5
3201.7
3286.5
3331.3
3377.3
:
9 _
101
10I
9
8
8
3435.9
3600.7
3,,q5.5
3623.8
3706.1
3784.9
3871
3932
3996.8
4058
5
3
5
8
8
8
9
11
11
9
TOTALW'[
3557
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TABLE 3. (con' t) NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOAD(CLV_ - STRETCH "B" VERSION
ITEM STA
4122.6
4187.6
4252.2
RI REF
w'r (LBS_
7
4
"B'VERSION
4!
1
TOTAL WT
230y.
LO2 - VENT 2330.3 27 28
2424.8 21 22
2472.8 14 15
9
11
19
2580.5
2644
2711.7
2778.8
2838.4
2O
18
2852.8 12
2897.1 9
294114
9
12
2O
21
19
13
9
14
29e5.6
13
13 14
3034.2 14 15
3083.3 14 15
3123.1 13 14
3137.5
3201.7
¢
U'I2- _
LH2 - PRES_e,URE
8
12
193266.5
3331.3 19
3377.3 16
3435.9 15
18
19
18
2O
23
24
21
18
18
16
9!
2
3500.7
3565.5
3623.8
3706.1
3784.9
3871
3W2
3U6JB
4O58
4122.6
13
4187.6
2O
2O
17
16i
19
2O_
19
21
24
25
22
19
19
17
9
42_o2
3O34.2
4187.6 84 88
_r,_ 84 88
11 12
_3t_3__3 12
3123.1 11
7
10
13
12
7
11
17
3137.5
?,___1.7
3_'_'_'_'_'_'_'_'___.5 16
548 _
176
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TABLE 3 (con' t). NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOADICLV! - STRETCH "13"VERSION
"-.,,_i"
\ J
ITEM STA
3331.3
3377.3
Ri REF
16
13
"B"VERSION
17
14
TOTAL wT
3435.9 13 14
3500.7 15 16
3565.5 16 17!
3623.8 15 16
3706.1 17 18
3784.9 20 21
3871 20 21
3932 18 19
3996.8 15 16
4058 15 16
4122.6 14 15
4187.6 8 8
4252.2 2 2
¢ 298
LH2- VENT 3034.2 14 ..........i5
3083.3 15 16
3123.1 14 15
3137.5 8 8
3201.7 12! 13
3266.5 19 20
3331.3 20 21
3377.3 17 18
3435.9 16 17
3500.7 19 20
3565.5 20 21
3623.8 19 20
3706.1 21 22
3784.9 24 25
3871 25 26
22 23
3996.8 19 20
4058 19 20
4122.6 17 18
4187.6 10 11
4252.2 2 2
]_ 370
RANGE _ 2330.3 11 12
2424.8 7 7
2472.8 5 5
2580.5 6 6
2644 10 11
2711.7 10 11
2778.8 10 11
2838.4 6 6
42852.8
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TABLE 3 (con' c) • NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOAD(CLV3 - STRETCH "B" VERSION
rrl=M STA RI REF
WT (LBS)
72897.1
2941.4 7
2985.6 7
3034.2
3083.3
3123.1
3137.5 6
3201.7 10
3266.5 10
3331.3 8
3377.3 8!
3435.9 9
3500.7 10
93565.5
3623.8 11
4187.6
i'.
TOTAL WEIGHT
3706.1 12
3784.9 13
3871 11
3932 10
3996.8 10
4058 9
4122.6 5
1
"B" VERSION
WT tLBS_
7
TOTAL W"[
7 _]
7
7
7
4
6
11
11
8
8
9
11
9
12
13
14
12
11
11
9
5
1
273
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TABLE 3 (con' c). DISTRIBUTED PROPULSION WEIGHTS- STRETCH "B" VERSION (CLV)
ITEM
STRUCT - BEAMS
STA
4252.2
4272.8
RI REF
WT (LBS_
140
701
4295.5 1402
4325.5 1402
4355.5 701
4385.5 327
I;
LONGERONS
y.
COVER
4252.2 24
4272.8 119
4295.5 238
4325.5 238
4355.5
4385.5
4252.2
4272.8
4295.5
4325.5
4355.5
4385.5
42 .s
119
56
y.
48
S/S INSTAL
Z
I"PS-COVER
241
482
482
241
113
"B" VERSION
WT (LBS_
73
168
842
1684
1684
842
393
29
143
286
286
143
67
58
29O
579
5"/9
290
135
4_ 59
4325.5 244 293
43ds..;; 244i
4385.5
334252.2
4272.8 33
4295.5 33
33
3343r_.S
4385.5 33
Z
_i_ 4Q96.S' 198
4325.5
4355.5
395
395
1984385.5
88
39
39
39
39
39
39
TOTAL WT
(36528
2;
SEPARATION
£
FiEED
5613
952
1931
731
236
237
475
475
237
4355.5 102 123
123102
82 99
412 495
4385.5
4252.2
4272.8
1424
245
BPROPI.XLS
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TkBLE 3 (ton't). DISTRIBUTED PROPULSION WEIGHTS- STRETCH "B" VERSION (CLV)
...._1-
--...._
ITEM
PNEUMATICS
STA RI REF
8244295.5
4325.5 824
4355.5 412
4385.5
4252.2
4272.8
192
5O6
5O6
TVC 4295.5 95
4325.5 477
4355.5 477
4385.5 143
DE-ORBIT 4355.5 770
4385.5 77O
Z
ENGINES 4435 17600
T
Jk"T/IS_W
STRUC'r 4252.2 317
4272.8 1587
4295.5 3175
4325.5 3175
4355.5 1587
4385,5 7411
S/S INSTAL 4252.2 35
4272.8 173
4295.5 346
4325.5 346
4355.5 173
4385.5 81
¢
TPS - CYL 4252.2 5
427"2.8 26
4295.5 52
4325.5 52
4355.5 26
4385.5 12
T
TPS - BHS 4355.5 295
4385.5 295
TPS - CANNISTERS " 4435 1976
Z
"B '° VERSION
990
99O
495
231
607
607
115
573
573
172
925
925
17600
248
1241
2483
2483
1241
135
271
271
135
4
20
41
41
9
231
TOTAL
3299'
1214
1432
1850
176OO
8276
902
135
461
1545
(539O7)
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TABLE 3 (con' t). DISTRIBUTED PROPULSION WEIGHTS- STRETCH "B" VERSION (CLV)
v
ITEM
SEPARA_ON
FEED
PNEUMAT_
I"VC
£
STA
4252.2
4272.8
4187.6
RI REF
WT (LBS_
102
102
2041
8854252.2
4272.8 1021
4295.5
4325.5
4355.5
1702
1702
1021
"B"VERSION
WT (LBS)
80
80
160
692
799
1331
1331
799
4385.5 272 213
4187.6 2 1
4252.2
4272.8
13
4355.5
4295.5
4325.5 13
8
4385.5
44O6
ENGINES 4463
Z
4252.2
21
2384
35200 ¸
AW
JETTISON - BATT
Z
|
BA'n" CNTRL
I;
EEl
Z
RETAINED - BAIT
Z
RETAINED - BATT
231
455¸
446
465
10
10
6
427"2.8
4295.5
4325.5
1864
3520O
231
455
446
465
481 481
282
524325.5 52
4355.5 108 108
4385.5 53 53
4355.5 28
4272.8
28
294385.5 29
42r 2 139 139!
243 243:
4355.5
4295.5 227 227
4325.5 227 227
229 229
TOTAL WT
160
5324
39
1864
35200
236O
213
57
4385.5 115 115
1180
4325.5 27 27
(7334)
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TABLE 3 (con't). DISTRIBUTED PROPULSION WEIGHTS- STRETCH "B" VERSION (CLV)
ITEM STA
4355.5
RI REF
R&R
52
"B"VERSION
52
TOTALWT
4385.5 27 27
]; 106
EIU 4295.5 29 29
29
OTHER 4295.5 519 519
T. _ 519
CONICAL ADAPTER 2330.3 242 242
2424.8 604 604
2472.8 362 362
T 1208
OTHER 2424.8 33 33
2472.8 45 45
2580.5 30 30
2644 35 35
2711.7 68 68
2778.8 68 68
2838.4 68 68
2852.8 40 40
2897.1 26 26
2941.4 40 40
2985.6 40 40
3034.2 43 43
3083.3 45 45
3123.1 41 41
3137.5 25 25
3201.7 36: 36
3266.5 68 68
3331.3 68 68
3377.3 54 54
3435.9 51 51
3500.7 56 56
3565.5
3623J_ 56 56
3706.1 73 73
3784.9 89 89
3871 76 76
73
-100
3932 73
tO0
5658
4122.8 56 56
4187.6 35 35
4252.2 7 7
_. 1662
(17859}
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TABLE 3 (con't). DISTRIBUTED PROPULSION WEIGHTS- STRETCH"B" VERSION (CLV)
_. J
V
ITEM
JETTISON
LO2-FEED
STA
4252.2
4272.8
4295.5
RI REF "B" VERSION
WT (LBS_ WT (LBSi
i32
231
115
201
215 187
4325.5 216 188
4355.5 110
T.
4272.8 675
1354
LO2-TORUS
4295.5
4325.5 675:
T,
4272.8LO2-UNES 25O
376
751
4295.5
4325.5
4355.5 751
4385.5 376
LH2 4252.2 6
4272.8 30
4295.5 60
4325.5 60
4355.5 30
4385.5 14
y.
3435.9
3500.7
3565.5
477
499
477
543
621
3623.8
RETAINED
LO2-UNES
y.
LO2 - TANK
3706.1
96:
587
1176
587
218
327
653
653
327
5
26
52
52
26
12
466
488
466
531
6O7
3784.9 637 623
3871 571 558
3932 488 477
2696.8 488 477
4058 432 422
4122.6 249 243
4187.6 61
4252.2 143
4272.8 267
4295.5 375
193
66O
1270
910
49O
4325.5
2424.8
2472.8
2580.5
2644
6O
140
261
189
45,
1241
89O
479 ¸
TOTAL WT
786
2352
2178
174
6374
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T_LE 3 (con't). DISTRIBUTED PROPULSION WEIGHTS- STRETCH "B" VERSION (CLV)
_TEM STA
2711.7
RI REF
W'T (LBS_
60
]:
LH2- LINE 4252.2 293
4272.8 579
4295.5 493
4325.5 143
];
LH2 - TANK
Z
T_TAL WEIGHT
:pROp_'[ LAN'FJ m II/Jr
LO2 TK-F DOMt
(FIXP_n WT)
Z
CYUNDER
2985.6
3034.2
3083.3
3123.1
42
3266.5
43
4O
25i
"B" VERSION
WT (LBS_
59
286
566
482
140
41
42
39
24
3137.5 36 35
3201.7 58 57
58 57
3331.3
3377.3
3435.9
49
3500.7
47
56
58
3565.5 58
3623.8 63
733706.1
3784.9
48
3871
46
55
57
LO2 TK-A DOME
(FIXED WT)
55
62
71
74 72
67 65
3932 57
3996.8 57
51
3O
4O58
4122.6
4187.6 38
4252.2 38
4272.8 20
4295.5 69
2472R
32
10147
899O9_nn.5
56
56
50
29
37
35
20
67
31
11353
10O598
2844 147435 164964
__-_¢_;0_.5 123355 138021;
2644
2711.7
2778.8
__r,2.8
212243
224941
211336
135145
5272
42176
_'_t97.1
237477
251684
236462
151212
5899
47190
TOTAL WT
3314
1474
1207
115628
276915
1014856
(1894498)
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TABLE 3 (con' t). DISTRIBUTED PROPULSION WEIGHTS- STRETCH "B" VERSION (CLV) }
,,,...I
ITEM
E
STA
2941.4
2985.6
3034.2
"B" VERSION
WT (LBS_
87826
123219
63576
LINE 2985.6 258
3034.2 415
T.
LH2 TK-F DOME
(FIXED W'I')
Z
CYUNDER
3083.3
3123.1
3137.5
3201.7
3266.5
3331.3
3377.3
3435.9
3500.7
3083.3
3123.1
3137.5
3201.7
3266.5
3331.3
3377.3
3500.7
3565.5
RI REF
WT (LBS)
78494
110126
56821
231
371
501
463
291
414
__: =
667
678
576
544
646
652
5281
8701
14138
14138
12181
11528
T,
561
518
4122.6
4187.8
4252.2
4272.8
LH2 TK-& DOME
(RXF.DWT)
TOTAL WEIGHT
326
463
746
759
644
09'
723
730
59O9
9735
15819
15819
13629
12899
3435.9 13486 15069
14138
3623.8 15443 17279
3706.1 17619 19714
3784.9 18054 20200
3871 16096 18010
3932 13703 15332
3996.8 13703 15332
4058 12396 13872
4.122.6 7178 8031
4187.6 1523 1704
373
3037
565O
79O6
15819
15O89
417
33_ ¸
6322 _
8846;
TOTAL WT
32771 1-
5022
6638
243373
18963
2125755
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JVI. Resultant Stresses and Deflections
Stresses and deflections for the on-pad and high-Q conditions are shown in Figures 17
through 23. Figures 17 and 19 show vehicle deflections while the remainder show
stresses. The tank stresses shown in the contour plots reflect a zero internal tank pressure.
The tank pressures have been accounted for in the assessment summary shown in Table 4.
The detailed computations are shown on the pages that follow Table 4.
VII. Dynamic Characteristics
The first five mode shapes and frequencies were computed for the vehicle with 100% fuel.
The original mass and stiffness matrices were not reduced from over 11,000 degrees of
freedom (DON. Simultaneous vector iteration was used to compute the first five mode
shapes and frequencies. The results are summarized in Table 5.
VIII. Comparisons with NLS/Other Vehicles
The on-pad and in-flight aerodynamic load distributions are compared with such
distributions for the NLS with the standard payload shroud. The replacement of the
payload shroud with the CLV produced negligible change in on-pad aero loads. However,
it contributed to a significant change for the high-Q in-flight condition.
Comparison plots of on-pad summed drag load and moment along the NLS booster are
shown in Figures 29 and 30 between the NLS/CLV and the basic NLS with the standard
payload shroud, respectively. Due to the similar size between the CLV and the NLS
payload shroud, these loads and moments are nearly identical for the two configurations.
Comparisons are shown in Figures 31 and 32 for the high-Q summed loads and moments
between the NLS/CLV configuration (for the trajectory q and alpha), and the NLS with
payload shroud (for its trajectory q and alpha). The normal force and moment for the
NLS/CLV are seen to be greater than for the NLS with payload shroud. As a result of such
differences, these comparisons show that the CLV geometry has a profound effect on the
magnitude of the aero loads.
Table 6 gives a comparison of dynamic characteristics between the CLV stack and the basic
STS external tank.
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FIGURE 17. ON-PAD DEFLECTIONS
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FIGURE 18. ON-PAD CONDITION, OUTER SHELL
SURFACE STRESSES
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FIGURE 20. MAX Q STRESSES (SHELL OUTER SURFACE}
FIGURE 21. ON-PAD STRESSES (SHELL MIDDLE SURFACE,
LONGITUDINAL)
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jFIGURE 22. ON-PAD STRESSES, INTERTANK SECTION (SHELL MIDDLE
SURFACE. LONGITUDIN &L)
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FIGURE 23. ON.PAD STRESSES IN LOX TANK
(SHELL MIDDLE SURFACE. LONGITUDINAL)
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Mode
2
3
4
5
Freq (Hz)
1.68
1.68
2.34
2.34
2.39
Description
X-Y Bending
X-Z Bending
Shell Mode - LO2 , LH
Local Mode - LO2
Local Mode - LO2
Table 5. Summary of CLV Modes
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%_,,,,,,L_,f5 iiiiiRiiiiil
tglnoimllll
FIGURE 26. THIRD MODE (SHELL 3IODE. LO-_, I_H._}
m
IIIIb_;GdlllI
IliiP_P__qllili
JlUmllfl,
_IEIIIIBII/]I,
l_lglllill
ilWmlllllll
llllllUlltl
x._./ FIGURE 27. FOURTH MODE (LO 2 MODE_
',_1lillll|li !
!_llllllD]lq
IlllllllllB
IIIIIIlUlII
LtIilllllIIt.
!!!!!!!!!!i!
,,.lllllllllil
_!!!1111111t_
ilIlIllllUI!
k._,,' FIGURE 28. FIFTH .MODE (LOCAL LO , .MODE)
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_.r,,.._ #
Mode
2
3
4
5
CLV Freq (Hz)
1.68
1.68
2.34
2.34
ET Freq (Hz)
4.43
4.56
4.93
ET Mode Description
Body Bending
Body Bending
Shell Mode
Shell Mode
2.39 5.73 Shell Mode
Table 6. Dynamic Characteristics (ET vs CLV)
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FORWARD
This report documents analyses conducted under Contract NAS8-
39207, Advanced Transportation System Studies for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C. Marshall Space
Flight Center. The report describes a preliminary analysis of
aerodynamic loads, structural dynamics and stress, and weight
estimation of the NLS-2 launch vehicle with a large manned payload
(the Personnel Launch System concept as defined by the NASA
Langley Research Center) combined with a Cargo Return Vehicle.
This work was performed during the period of September and
October, 1992 under the direction of Mr. Henry Grooms at Rockwell
International, Space Systems Division, in Downey, CA. The primary
technical analyses were performed by Vyto Baipsys (Aerodynamics),
Keith Maeda (Weights), Susan Chen and Jack Barrett (Structural
Dynamics), Van Richardson (Stress), and Ben Thompson and Bill
Blanchard (Structural Design), all of Rockwell International.
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A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
OF A CARGO RETURN VEHICLE (CRV)
INTRODUCTION
This report documents a preliminary design and analysis effort on a Cargo Return Vehicle
(CRV). This work includes the computation of stresses, deflections, weights,
aerodynamic distributions and dynamic characteristics for a preliminary CRV design.
I. Ground Rules and Assumptions
The CRV fits on top of a National Launch System (NLS) booster and below a Personnel
Launch System (PLS) vehicle. This is shown in Figure 1. Figures 2 and 3 show some of
the details of the CRV. Figure 4 shows the analytical flow for this work.
The main objective of this study was to produce a credible weight estimate for CRV. The
su'uctural evaluation was done to corroborate/revise the estimated su'uctund sizing.
II. Aerodynamics
Results are presented in Hgures 6 - 19 and Tables 1 - 5 to document the work performed in
support of the CRV .su'uctural design. These results provided inputs to structural analysis
for the launch stac eJements .depicted in Figure 5 and for the entering CRV capsule. The
stack consists of a 10-foot tar_ m-etch, vernon of the 1.5 stage _NLS vehicle (Conflg. "B")
analyzed inRefe:e:w,e I amp of which ride the CRV _ the PLS. The CRV is attached to
the NLS booster and the PI_ by adapter sections which transmit on-pad and ascent aero
loads to the CRV. During entry the CRV is subjected to high dynamk: pressure and
deceleration (g's) loads.
v_e 1 andf_gures 6 - 9 sl_w the ..sp_adsheet results and graphs of the distributed groundloads or the on-pad wind condition. The wind speed used was from the NLS wind
criteria (References 2 and 3) which specifies the maximum wind speed of 74.5 knots at a
60 foot height above ground leveL The NLS base is 95 feet above ground. This is a 1
,risk fac_. ,wind (.99.perce_tpmbabili_ of not exceeding it) for a 180 day exposure
n. I ne wma _em increases exponenually with height, as shown inthe spreadsheet
(Table 1). The alrloed dislribution is depicted in Figure 6 by a normal force distribution
be ".g'..u_." g with PLS adapter just aft of the PLS and continuing over the NLS booster. The
resultm., g .net press .ure distribution, which is used as input to the finite element mructural
analysls, Is shown m Figure 7 over the same sections of the stack. The PLS-produced
airload is. treated u a point _ in. its affect on the adapters, CRV, and the NLS struc_n'e.
Cg.n_anson plots are shown m Figure 8 between the NLS/CRV/PLS and the basic NLS
with the standard payload shroud for the summed running air load and in Figure 9 for the
moment along the NLS boo_. ter. Due to the lower projected area of the CRV/PLS relative
to the payload shroud, the mr load and moment axe lower than for the basic NLS vehicle.
Table 2 and Figures 10 - 14 depict similar type of results for the condition of maximum
product of dynamic pressure times alpha (q-alphamax) to define the highest bending
omcnt in flight. The dynamic pressure (q) variation with flight altitude, along with other
ectory parameters, was obtained from the RI Huntsville CRVINI_ trajectory. A
conservative angle ot attack (a) was computed by superimposing an in-flight wind
(Reference 4) and a 33 ft/sec gust at each altitude to find the maximum product of q-alpha.
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TABLE I. NLS/PLS/CRV GROUND WIND LOADING
IO' STRETCH NLV2 WITH INLINE PLS/CRV
NLS STRUCTURE 13ASE AT g5 fl ELEVATION
[ LOCAL Cd
X STA. No Component DIAMEII_ He/_t Dr_ Coeff V_dnd
tn /t It (bued on tt/sec
_8
ON-PAD AERO LOADS
LOADS INCLUDE PZ_ICRV
I% RISK FACIDR. 180 WINDIEST DAY
EXPOSURE DURATION
Vwmd=74.5 EI_ @ 60 i_ Re/'. AIUtude
2_70 0.00 264m 1.000 _47_l
2109.70 3?.S clsg 3_7 2S4JS 1.000 147.831'
21_7o _ _ m.N 1.ooo 147._1
2175.70 " _i0,67 27_1S 1,000 147oS3[
21S1.,17<_,_ 13,07 277.21 1.000 147.42[
2241.70 " 17.87 273.85 1.000 147.22
2263.70 " 2000 271.82 1.000 147.12
_70 • _._ _.u 1_ _47.02
zr_o_ <_,,M z,.oo _.m _.ooo 1_go
,:;"-t_.2340210 f_ng 25_8 1.000 .14&76
_._:2370.B0 " 282.B_ 1,000 1_61
2424.80 • _.._l _ 1.000 14_35
,;.:. It,,,:-2424.80 lslS_ 27_11 1.000 146_1$
2472_ " 27,Sl 2S4JB 1_00 146.11
2569.80 • 27_ _1,11 1.000 145.52
2583.55 " 27_ 24S.16 1.000 145.55
2544.06 • 27,RI 240.12 1.000 145.24
2711.77 ' 27.,_ 234.48 1.000 i44.88
2778.89 • 27_1 1.000 144.S2.;.::|.::
2838.41 ' 27,r_ 22_JI2 1.000 144.1g
2852_ • 27_6 222.73 13)00 144.11
2897.10 ' 2736 21|_ 1.000 14,t.86
2941.40 ° 27,_6 21L14 1.000 143.61
2985.67 • 27.,_ 211.$5 1_00 143,35
3034.20 • 27_6 207_1 1.000 143.06
3083.30 ' 27_6 203._2 1J)O0 142.77
:;123.15 • 27,_11 200.20 1.000 142.521
3137.54 • 27.58 I_.00 1,000 142.43;
3231.70 " 27,_i 193.68 1,000 142.03!
3266.50 " 27.58 181_.2_ 1.000 141.61!
3331.30 • 27..58 18Z_ 1.000 141.19i
3377.35 " 27_! 179.01 1.000 140.S8i
3435.90 " 27.58 174.1,_ 1.000 140.47
3500.70 " 27,_8 168.73 1.000 140.01
35_5.70 • 27.58 163.12 1.000 139.54
3623.80 • 27.58 lr_._ 1,000 139.10
3706.10 " 27.58 151.52 1.000 130.47
SUM_m SUM_O.D _C_"r
DRAG "I.S LOAD MOMENT PRESSURE
vor_d_d_ VY_,RSUSX ABOUT X DISTRn_
roslU_ Ib_ ¢t-_b. ps_
,u,Ipls/_c_, w oblcrv norm-i to re.u-r-,,,
0_00 1,13_JI l_0_E+0_ OJX)O0
11,804 1339_ 1_03E+05 03181
26,750 14245.7 ?.111E+05 03173
54.20g 14917.3 2.404E+05 0,1168
41,_4 1S779.8 2.710E+0S 03164
49,047 18/492 3.018E+0S 0.,11(0
_43_ 17gO_.S 3._S£_ 0.11_
63.804 lg2_2.1 3.8_6E_05 0,1152
71.152 _n718.§ 4.06_+0S 0.1147
79.S10 22607.6 4,_15E+_; 0.1143
79511 22S07.6 45t5E+0_ O_'TS
81.521 25022.9 S._I_.I.O_ 0.26?0
83.521 274g_.S 6.586E+68 0.2655
87.097 32105.2 8.699E+05 02S,_
87.097 32105.2 8._1_+68 02S,11
8¢_ 36279.3 I_)TIE+06 02523
85.2_ 44674.2 1,54SE+06 0_S0$
86,185 4_.8 1.616E+06 0.2604
85.828 51064.0 1.948E+04 0.25g_
85.416 56861.5 2350E+06 02581
85.0O5 6258O.9 2.7"FJE+06 O.2568
84.631 b"/l_. 3.18"/E_06 0.255'7
64.540 68846.4 3.28gE+06 0_554
84.258 72585.3 3_13E+06 02545
83.968 76311.4 3.gSOE+06 0.2537
83J_76. 80022.2 4,101E+06 02528
83.352 6407S.2 4.700E+06 0.2518
83.016 M15g.6 5.121E+0_ 02508
82.743 -614_2.3 S.475E+06 02SO0
82.643 92S,_;2.3 S.605Ed)4 0.2497
82.189 97940.1 6.203Ed)6 02483
81.721 1032S0_ 6.835E+06 0.24_
81.241 108530.8 7.4C_E,,.06 0.2454
80_893 112_o3.9 7.582E+06 024¢4
80.442 116987.0 8.621E+06 02430
79.930 122183.1 9.1S3E_.06 0#,415
79.403 127361.4 1.012E_07 0_399
78.919 131960.7 1.082E_07 0.2384
78213 138426.7 1.18GE+07 0.2363
7
_.J
TABLE 1. NLS/PLS/CRV GROUND WIND LOADING
(CONT.) 10' STRETCH NLV2 _ INLIN_. PLS/CRV
STRUCTURE BASE AT 95 ftELEVATION
X No Componmt DU_II_t i_t
t t
Cd
DrU Co_ V_nd
VJB
ON-PAD AERO LOADS
LOADs mCLUDB _LS/CXV
z% ruSK FACTOR. ZSO'wn_w.sr DAY
KXI_SUI_ DURAT[ON
Ywlnd,,74.5 KTS @ 60 _t P_. A]tnude
3794..93 " 27.r_I 14,_05
3871.00 " 27.S8 137.88
39_.03 " 27._i 132.R
39_a0 " 27..qi 127.3g
40SIL00 " 27_I 122.29
4108.91 " 27.M 118.05
4122.68 Thnmstnn. 27.$8 116.90
4137.30 " 27.58 11S.68
4151.90 " 27.58 114.47
4168.60 " 27.58 113.24
418120 " 27.,_ 112.03
4195.70 " 27.._8 110.92
4210.30 " 27.58 I09.B)
4227.40 " 27,S8 108.18
4241,60 • 27.S8 106..90
4254.10 • 27.58 105.95
426S.03 • 27.S8 10_04
4275.90 " 27.S8 104.13
4286.90 • 27._ 10_L22
4297.80 " 27.$8 102.31
4308.80 • 27.B 101._
4319.70 " 27.$I I00.48
t330.93 • 27_ 90_1
4_._1.50 ' 27_1 05M
4Y._0 " 27.._ 97.71]
436?.80 • 27._! 96J)
4374.20 • 27._8 95_4
4385.S0 EndofslnJ_ 27.58 95.00
1_00 137_
1_00 137.11
1.000 138.$7
1_00 13SJ8
1_00 135,41
1.000 1343)1
1.000 134.78
1.000 134.63
1.000 134.48
I_00 134.33
1_00 134.16
1.000 134.03
1_0 133.88
1_00 133.69
1.000 133.54
1.000 133.41
1.000 13329
1.000 133.17
1_00 133.05
1_00 132.92
1.000 132.80
1.000 132.67
1000 132.55
1.000 132.42
I_00 132.30
1.000 132.17
1.000 132.04
1.000 131.90
S_ S_ LOCAL
DRAG "1.5 LOAD ]_)4_Z_
vor_zdzed) VERSUSX ABOUT X D_TRIE
w pbla,," v pb/a._ _ tosur_a
77.S12 144562.3 1.289E,01 02342
78.710 151201.8 1.405E_7 02_18
7e,131 155853.7 1_+07 0.2300
71.490 1_77U " 1.5M£_07 0.2281
74.M3 16,_71L9 1.977E+07 0.2262
74,325 158174.9 1.TS4E_07 0224S
74.177 170194.7 1.77SE_07 02241
74.018 171280.3 1.7_E+07 02236
172_5_.8 I_20E+07 0.2231
73_ 1734443 1_43E+07 0222S
174519.1 1_E_07 0.2222
73_71 175_4.1 1_89E+07 02217
7'3.206 176_4.2 1.913E_01 0.2212
73_10 177i]04.3 1.940E+07 0.2206
72.8441 178939.9 1.993E,,07 0.2201
72.700 179949.5 1.933E+07 02196
72.572 180641.3 2.001E+07 02193
72.443 181431.6 2.018E+07 0.2189
72.312 182227.8 2.036E+07 021_
72.182 183015.3 Z0S4E+07 02181
72.O49 18380U _/2E+07 0.2177
71.916 184593.1 2.091E+07 02173
71.7_ 185371LI 2.109E_07 0.2169
71.947 18816.%2 2.127E_7 02168
71.$15 18_)23.9 2.14SE+07 02161
71.182 187681.3 2.163E_07 02157
71.238 188494.2 2.182E_07 02152
71.094 189298.4 2201E+07 0.2148
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The maximum product, q-alphamax, of 3907 psf-dcg, was calculated for a vehicle speed of
1353.46 ft/sec, q of 705. l psf, and a corresponding wind speed of 98.3 ft/scc. At this
condition a was computed as follows:
a = Tan-1( Vwind + Vgust )
V
vehicle
= Tan "1( 98.3 + 33
1353.46-" - 5.5deg
The airload distribution methods of Reference 5 were used to modify the normal force
distribution over the PLS/CRV adapter sections from earlier-defined (Reference 6) NLS
normal force distribution. The summed moments in this analysis were computed about the
VlqChi[cl,cX g _ S llition..30.$.l (.adjusted from curlier NLS mass properties). Tabulated and
_ot_clno_a__rorcc _smou_on, summ.c_l.loads and moments, and net pressures are
t,wu us me sprcaasnee_ or tame z aria t'tgures 10 - 13 with stations beginning at the
ada.pter (just .aftof the.PI_) and continuing over the NLS booster. Static balance
catcmauons were included m the spreadsheet of Table 2 to determine the amount of engine
_2ou_. _ms was com.putm .t_om _ moment oatance reqmre between the aerodynamic
utou_n_ anQ me engll_S, as sllown OelOW.
TSin(8)(Xgimbal-Xcg) = CNaqaSrcf(Xcg- Xcp)
Assuming small angles, Sin(8) can be represented by 8, in radlans
then: _8 = CNaqS ref (Xcg - Xcp)
T(XgimMl - Xcg)
radial.s/degree
where: s
a s
CNa =
_ref =II
"I
Xgimbal =
engine gimbal angle, radians
angle of atur& degrees
normal force coefficient slope, per degree
dynamic pressure lbs/sq ft
refaence area, sqft
engine thrust, lbs
center of gravity station, in
center of pressure station, in
engine gimbal station, in
This equation was then solved for the appropriate a from the trajectory to solve for the
gimbal angle, & A gimbal angle of 1.85 degrees was required to provide static balance
against the aefodynan_ bending moment. Figures 15 and 16 show the 8 sensitivity with
Xcg and the product of q-alpha variation. The sensitivity is seen to me greater with the
product of q-alpha.
With the glmbal angle defined, the axial and _ngenfial thrust values were calculated. These
are shown in the boxed area at the end of the spreadsheet of Table 2. These thrust
compo_nts were then used to compute the axial acceleration and the tangential
acceleration.
13
Axial Acceleration -
Vehicle Weight
Tangential Acceleration = Tangential Thrust + Z_Airload)
Vehicle Weight
The results of this calculation are shown at the bottom of Table 2 where 8 and the
accelerations are shown in the boxed area at the bottom of the table. This added gimhal
angle is used to evaluate the configurations for gimbal control feasibility. It is also used to
end_ .ee tl).e fini_ ele.ment model _ structural analyses by specifying the malimimdes
vi tac merua acce_eranon aria correct w.n_t component inputs to the FEM.
force distribution and resulting net pressure distribution along the vehicle are
__,g_:.I0and!I,resp.ec.ti ,,ely..Forsummeda_oadsandmoments,thePLS-
aarioaa _sueaum as a point load m _ts artect on the adapters, CRV, and the NLS
structure. Comparisons are shown f_orth.e___tt__normal forces and moments (about Xcg) in
Figures 12 and 13 between (1): the r_L_/CRV/PLS configuration with current trajectory
data (q and alpha) from RI Huntsville, (2): the NLS with:
and al"ha as in t,, __., .... ....... n payload _ for the same q
l_n ¢ _.;._ ._._ff,__a_u _j: me r_t._ _m payload s_ud. for the q and alpha from the
:,.a._ _,_l_li wdjut_uJry_. 1 -qCS_ compsI'ISOnS snow _ Uotll th¢ CRV LS Rq_OlTletrv anti th,
a'ajecu_ nave a profound effect on the magnitude of the aero loadsl/p "--_-_ ......
Plme°_Ic_o_a_I,,,,_t_Sated.sumn_, momen.ts arc also shown (F_i_gu_ 14 and Table 3) in the
• ,.,._,._, v_i__t_,auapter eglonasrunmng moment versusX staffX- " " . - m and taken about eachdo. ao. m
Figures 17 - 18 and Table 4 present the entry net pressure dislribution over the CRV
• " ' Wajecto_. (assumes a = 0 degrees). These pressures
entry con_tions s oumm r_ewtoman pressure method and are shown for the
obtained from u'ajectory runs at RI Huntsville. Base region (all the aft-
facing portions shielded from the alrstream) pressure values are also specified. In addition,
the entry drag .coefiScient variation with Mach was also estimated to assist in trajectory
analysis and is mcluded in Figures 19 and Table 5.
HI. Finite Element Model
A finite element model _ the CRV (capsule) has been created (Figure 20) and mounted on
of the NLS booster (Figures 21 and 22). The complete model has the following
cnatacteristics:
1. Nodes = 2100
2. Degrees of Freedom - 12, 600
3. Elements - 5,100
The model does not include a stiffness representation of the PLS but its mass is
incorporated.
14
TABLE 2.
NLS/PLS/CRV MAX q alpha AIRLOAD & MOMENT @ Xcg
I0' STRETCH NLV2 WITH INI/NE PLS/CRV
Sref = 593.96 f£^2 MACH - 1.3
I Xcg(sta)"30Sl I q(P s'_ " 705"1
of 5.5
C_ pls - 0.1378
xcp p_, - 1966
X STA.No Com.poneszt DIAMETE_
In It pa. _dian
MAX q alpha AIRLOAD$
SUMMED LOADS INCLUDI_ Iw._/CRV
_ TRAJECTORY
MACH-I,%a.SS dq
vJ8
p=.xjo b,/m
2109.70 32.5dog 3.87 0.4857S
2153.70 _g 833 1.4N_
2175.70 • 10,67 2.00025
219L37 _ _ 13.07 2.53443
2212.70 " 15.34 3_2903
2241.70 , " 17.87 3.531M
22e3.70 " 20.00 3.qm04
2285.7O ' 2234 4.48_
2310.80 _ bulkhead ;500 4.,_672
2310,80 7.74dlg 25.00 |,32707
234040 bJdng 1.288=
23704O • 1.,141':-__!
2424.80 " 27.58 1.17137
2424.80 lslb'_ago 27.58 .0.05000
2472.80 " 27.58 0.00000
25204O " 27.M 0.00000
;583._ • 27.58 0.41OOO
2S44.06 • 27.m 0,_1000
2711.77 • 27.58 0.46000
27"_.m • _.,_ O_O00
2838.41 • 2LM 034000
" 2/,Sl 032000
2897.10 " 27.M 027000
2941.40 • 2/._ 0.22000
29es.r/ • 27.S8 0.1lOOO
3O34.2O " 27.58 O_SO00
[,],:_:,X,3083,30 " 27.M
3123.15 " 27.M. ,0.03000
3137.,% " 2738 .O.OgO00
3201.70 " 27.._ -0.12000
32M._ ' 27.58 .0.14(_0
3331.30 ' 27_ _.07000
3377.35 ' 27M .O.02000
3435.9O ' 27.58 0_000
3500.70 ' 27,_8 0.08000
35r_.7o ' 27M 0.101W
3623.80 " _.$8 0.10169
370_.I0 ' 27.58 0.101Sg
59.00
179.70
242.S4
3O7.82
367.89
542.24
6O6.88
161.18
154.05
1S3.im
14227
_.07
0.00
9.72
49.80
81.94
SU7
48.S8
41.30
38.87
32.79
28.72
19.43
10.93
3£=4
.3.64
-6.O7
-14.S7
-17.00
-8.50
-2.43
3.64
9.72
12.35
12.35
12.35
NORMA_ SUMM]m) SUMMED LOCAL NET
A_ LOAD NORMAL P. MOMZNT PRF,SSUI_
DI_]UBUTEO FWDO1_X ABOUTX_
lbe A-a)m [o_
w I_s/crv _ psnv normaltomur_ace
&771E+04 S.218E+06
&296E+04 S.618E_)6
6.761E+04 _ E_)4
7385E,04 6.411E+(_
&106E_04 (L916E+04
_+04 7._1SE_06
g,_gE_Q4 8.184E+06
1.112E+0_ UlSE+O6
12S6E+05 U20E+06
12S6E+05 U20E+(_
1,10_E+05 1.011E+07
1,_0E+0S 1_7E+07
1.429E+0S 1_1E+07
1.429E+OS 1_!1E+07
1.4_E+0_ 1_0E+07
1.4,10E_0_ 1_1E+07
1.kLgE,_ 1.MgE+07
1.483E,0_ 1.101E+07
1,_23E+0_ 1.113E+07
I..._SE+OS 1.122_+07
1.,,_L_,OS 1.128E+07
1.SgOE+OS1.129E+07
1.606E._S 1.131E+07
1.019E+0S 1.133E+07
I_30E+0S 1.133E+07
1._7E+0_ 1.134E+07
1_41E+0_ 1.1_E+07
1_41E+0S 1.134E+07
1_40E+0_ 1.134E+07
1_3E_0_ 1.134E+07
l_23E+0S 1.138E+07
1.01SE+OS 1.138E,,07
1.612E+OS 1.138E_7
tG13E+05 1.138E,07
1.617E+0S 1137E,07
1._4E+0S 1.134E+07
1.631E+05 1.130E+07
1841E_S 1._25E+07
11305
2.2S02
232m
_704
2_
0.S422
04O4S
0.4_
0.4338
,0.0183
0.0OOO
0.O294
0.1504
0.1871
0.1688
0.1488
0.12,18
0.1174
0.0991
O.O8O7
0.0M7
0.O33O
0.0110
.0.0110
.0.018]
.O.O44O
.0.0514
.0.02S7
.0.0073
00';10
O.OZo4
OO373
0.o373
oo3n
IS
\ /
v
_.._j
TABLE 2. (CON'T)
NLS/PLS/CRV MAX q sdpha AIRLOAD & MOMENT @ Xcg
io'STRETCH NLV2 V TrHINIXNEPLS/CRV
[ xc_(m). 3osI
Sref = 593.96 R^2 MACH = 1.3
[ q (psi) = 705.1
a= 5.5
CNpls - 0.1378
x_p,. 1966
X STA. No Component DE
h-I A
3784.9O " 2738 0.10169
3871.$0 " 2738 0.101m
3932.00 " 2738 0.10169
3_JG_$0 " 27.M 0.10169
4058.00 "" 27.58 0.10169
4108.91 " 27.58 O.101m
4122.65 Thnmllnx:a_. 27.58 0.I01m
4137.30 • 27.58 0.10169
4151.,90 " 27M 0.10169
4166.60 • 27.M 0.I0169
4181.20 • 27.58 0.10169
4195.70 • 2738 0.10169
4210.30 • 2738 0.10169
4227.40 • 2738 0.10169
4,?.41.50 • 2738 0.10169
4254.10 • 27.M 0.10169
4265.00 " 2738 0.10169
4275.$0 • 2738 0.10169
4286.90 • 2738 0.10169
4297.80 " 2738 0.10169
4308.$0 • 2738 0.10169
4319.70 • 2]'38 0.10169
4330.$0 • 2738 0.10169
4341.69 • 2738 0.10169
4352.20 • 27.M 0.10150
4382.$0 • 2738 0.10169
4374.20 " 2738 0.10169
4355.50 • 2738 0.10169
4385.50 End_ sU_t 0.00 O.___nO0__.
THnUST,bS= 2,941,220 [ _o= 0.006
XgimbaJ., 4385.50 ! 8 = 1.849
Xcp. 2316.71
dlg). 0.07490 AxialThn_, 2,939,(m8
T__ n_aJT= 94,965
MAX q alpha AIRLOADS
SUMMED LOADS INCLUDE P__91CRV
l,tkC_t,,1,,,,.W deg
v,_
NORM._. S_ SU'_ LOCALNor
/u_t LO/¢) ;_0104_ F. MObl_ PR_
DISFRIBUTED FWD OF X ABOUTXq[ DLSWI:W3.
l_Zm tbs It.l_
wlpr,crv w [_crv nonr,,_to _,__e,__
123S 1._1E,05 1.12)E,07 0.0373
1235 1.692E_05 1.113E+07 0.0_73
123S 1.699E+0S 1.107E+07 0.0873
12.15 1_"/7E+0$ 1.101E+07 0._
123S 1.MSE+05 1.0g_07 0.0_73
1235 1._IE+OS 1.050E+07 0.0373
12.35 1J_E+OS 1.0_E+07 0._73
1235 1.695E+0$ l_ff/E+07 0.0373
12,35 1_E+0$ 1_5E+07 0_73
12.15 I.(_E_)5 1_E+07 0.0373
12_$ 1.700E+0S 1.082E+07 0.0373
12.35 1.702E+0S 1.050E+07 0.0373
12.35 1.704E+05 I_)78E+07 0.0373
12..15 1.706E+05 1_76E+07 0.0373
12.35 1.708E+0$ 1.074E_07 0,0373
12.35 1.709E+0$ 1A73E+07 0._73
12.35 1.710E+0S 1.072E+07 0.03.73
12.35 1.712E+0S 1.070E+01 0.0373
1235 1.713E+05 1.069E_07 0_373
12.35 1.714E+OS 1.067E_7 0.0373
12.35 1.TIGE+0S 1.066E+07 0.0373
1235 1.717E+05 1.065E+07 0.0373
12.35 1.719E+05 1.0_3E+07 0._73
1235 1.750E+0$ 1_)_2E+07 0.0373
i2.35 . 1.721E+0S 1.060E+07 0._73
12.35 1.722E+0$ i_E+07 0.0373
12.35 1.724E+05 1.0S7E,,07 0.0_,"3
17.35 1.72$E+05 1.050E+07 0.0373
0.00 1.725E+OS 1.0,_E+07 0.0000
<<r'_'deg 1
<<dzggimbalreq'd
V_ Weight;, LS45323 IM
Ibs AxiaJ_. i.9023 g's(AdalT)
bs ra_. Accel.• 0.1116 7t (aem.,,.T) _
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TABLE 3.
MAX q olpha SUMMED RUNNING MOMENT
FROM LOADS FWD OF X-STA
NLS2/CRV/PLS
MACH =1.3, q=705.1 psf
alpha = 5.5 deg
SUMMED
X STA. No Component MOMENT
in de_ril_ioa ABOUT X-STA
ft-lt_
2109.70 32.5 dog 6.906E+05
2153.70 faidng 9.102E+05
2175.70 ° 1.030E+06
2198.37 <fwd bulkhead 1.163E+06
2219.70 " 1.301 E+06
2241.70 " 1.457 E+08
2263.70 • 1.631E+05
2285.70 ° 1.824E+06
2310.80 <aft bulkhead 2.071E+06
2310.80 10.4 dog 2.071E+06
2340.80 faidng 2.391 E+06
2370.80 " 2.723E+06
2424.80 ° 3.349E+08
2424.80 1St Stage 3.349E+06
2472.80 " 3.920E+06
2520.80 " 4.491E+06
2583.55 " 5.243E+06
VJB
9/2/92
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-r
|
ll_p '_IgNV _lV_I_I9 _d/fl_)3rd
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TABLE 4. CRV ENTRY PRESSURE AND DRAG LOADING
h=135,135
Max g = 5.5
Max q = 312 psf
A_ha. 0.0 Smf, ft'2 -
490.87
MACH - 9.3
x rad_ COMPONENT m Cpb¢_
in dq coo_
0.00 0.00 90.63"_ohen_ 90.OO 1_20
0_0 737 " 65.34 1Jl 8
0.70 1124 • 82.87 1_02
1.20 14.70 " 80.67 1.782
ZOO 18-9,1 " 77,94 1.751
3.00 23.13 " 75.22 1.711
4.OO 26.63 " 72-91 1.872
6.OO 32.43 • W.04 1.596
8.OO 37.23 " 65.75 1.522
10.OO 41_8 ° (_83 1.449
12.OO 45.07 " _.18 1_378
14.OO 48.39 " 57.73 1.309
16.00 51.42 • 65.43 1_?A1
19.OO 5421 " 5328 1.178
20.00 56.79 " 5120 1.112
2?.OO 59.19 " 4922 1.050
24.OO 61.44 " 4722 0.989
26.OO 63.54 " 46.49 ' 0.q_l
28.OO 65.51 " 43.71 0.874
30.00 67_37 " 41.q9 0.819
3?.OO 69.11 " 40_1 0.766
34.OO 70.78 " 38.67 0.715
36.OO 72.32 " 37.07 0.665
38.OO 73.78 " 35.50 0.617
40.00 7_17 " 33.96 0.571
41.94 7_44 ° 3?.50 0.528
41.94 76.44 32.6 deg cone 3?.50 0.528
48.OO 80.30 " 3?.50 0.528
52.OO 82Jm " 3?-5O 0.528
56.OO 65.40 " 32.50 0.528
60.OO 67-95 " 32.50 0.528
64.OO 90_0 " 32.50 0.526
56.OO 93.04 " 32.50 0.628
7?.00 95.59 " 3?-50 0.528
76.00 9_L14 " 3?-50 0.528
80.OO 100.59 " 32.50 0.528
64.OO 10324 " " 3?.50 0.528
83.00 103.79 " 3?.50 0.528
9?-00 108.33 " 32.50 0.528
_6.00 110.88 " 32.50 0.528
100.00 113.43 " 3?-50 0.528
104.C0 1";5.98 " 32.50 0.528
108.00 118.53 . " 32.50 0,528
112.00 121.08 " 32.50 0.528
l_e.00 123.32 " 32.50 0.520
I base net pressure (psi)= -0.0357
mudace net
prmmu,re
pJ
3J_O
3.888
3.787
3.7O2
3.818
3.453
3.154
2.631
2.888
2443
2.465
2.271
2.140
2.014
1.891
1.77'4
1.857
1.548
1.439
1.3_
1.238
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
1.143
_ _ta drag
ft'2 I:)l
0.000 0.0
1.184 670.9
1.573 8832
1-957 1086.3
3.108 16_1.7
3.845 205O.0
3.802 1980.7
7.473 3715.8
7.298 3459.3
7.124 3215.1
6.9¢9 2982.7
6.775 2761.7
6.600 2552.0
6.426 2353.1
6251 2164.9
6.077 1987.0
5.902 1819.1
5.728 1660.9
5.553 1512.2
5.379 1372.6
5.204 1241.9
5.030 1119.8
4.855 1OO5.9
4.680 900.0
4.506 801.9
4.197 690.8
0.000 0.0
13.209 2174.4
9.071 1493.1
9.354 1539.7
9.637 1586.4
9.921 1633.0
10.204 1679.7
10.487 1726.3
10.771 1772.9
11.054 1819.6
11.337 13662
11.621 1917-9
11.904 1959.5
12.187 2006.1
12.471 2052.3
12.754 2099.4
13.037 2146.1
13.321 2197.7
13.604 2239.3
27
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TABLE 4 (CONT.)
CRV ENTRY PRESSURE AND DRAG LOADING
11-135.135 ft
Max g. 5.5
Max q - 312 psf
i pha- o.o Sref, fP2 -
490.87
X radius COMPONENT slope
in deg
120.00 126.17 " 32.50
124.00 128.72 " 32.50
128.00 131.27 " 32.50
132.00 133.82 " 32.50
136.00 136.37 " 32.50
140.00 138.91 " 32.50
144.00 141.46 ° 32.50
150.00 145.28 " 32.50
157.40 150.00 max diameter 32.50
157.40 0.00 0
MACH = 9.3
Cp bcai
coefficient
0.528
0.528
0_528
0.528
0.528
0_28
0.528
0.528
0.528
0,000
base net pressure(psi). -0.0357
surface net
prMwJm
pld
1.143
1.143
1.143
1,143
1.143
1.143
1.14,1
1.143
1.143
0.000
pmt_ tor_x_y
deltaAnm delll drag
ft"2 Ibs
13.887 2286.0
14.171 2332.6
14.454 2379.3
14.737 2425.9
15.021 2472.6
15.304 28192.
15.587 2565.9
23.912 39362.
30.379 5000.7
0.000 0.0
157.40 150.00
167.00 148.00
157.00 0.00
167.00 148.00
drag - lOS50111_
0.6900 Iw/o C_base
0.7065 ] w/Cd base
28
C_
(.
C
2g
TABLE 5.
CRV DRAG COEFFICIENT
Sref,, 491 ft^2
_...j
MACH Cd forebody Cd base Cd total
0.00 0.3000 0.0500 0.3500
0.40 0.3000 0.0700 0.3700
0.60 0.3200 0.0900 0.4100
0.80 0.4000 0.1300 0.5300
0.94 0.5100 0.1900 0.7000
1.05 0.6200 0.2100 0.8300
1.20 0.7100 0.2100 0.9200
1.40 0.7870 0.1950 0.9820
1.50 0.8200 0.1860 1.0060
1.60 0.8200 0.1790 0.9990
1.80 0.7900 0.1620 0.9520
1.90 0.7700 0.1550 0.9250
1.97 0.7600 0.1480 0.9080
2.00 0.7580 0.1450 0.9030
2.50 0.7200 0.1200 0.8400
2.75 0.7100 0.1100 0.8200
4.00 0.6900 0.0625 0.7525
5.00 0.6818 0.0571 0.7389
10.00 0.6904 0.0143 0.7047
20.00 0.6926 0.0036 0.6962
"-.,..j
3O
--.j FIGURE 20. CRV C.XPSUI.E
FI(;II_.IC21. t_R\ ()NTOP()FBO()STER
FI(;tRE 22. CRV ON BOOSTER
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IV. Mass Properties
A weight breakdown (Table 6) has been generated to support the stress, dynamic, and
performance analyses. The mass properties are used as the starting point for creating
inertial loads and a mass matrix (used in computing mode shapes and frequencies).
The vehicle was broken down into its basic systems, the mass propertiesfound for each
system, then the systems reassembled. Some systems were not included on each vehicle,
but were included in the analysis if they were applicable. The general breakdown included:
structure, payload, propulsion, TPS, avionics, and fuel. The total vehicle weight
breakdown and distribution was then found by summing up each system. Spreadsheets
were created to help in the determination of the weight breakdown for each vehicle.
Much of the rational used to find these weights were taken from both the Shuttle and Saturn
programs. The Shuttle external tank and engines, and Saturn designed bulkheads,
propulsion cones, and subsystems were used as guidelines for mass properties
determination.
V. Vehicle Load Conditions
The vehicle was analyzed for two balanced conditions: (1) on-pad winds and (2) a high.Q
flight condition. The first condition includes inertial (one-G) and aerodynamic effects. The
second condition includes inertial, thrust, and aerodynamic forces.
VI. Resultant Su'esses and Deflections
Stressesand deflections for the on-pad and high-Q conditions are shown in Figures 23 -
27. The tank stresses shown in the contour plots reflect a zero internal tank pressure. The
tank pressures have been accounted for in the assessment summary shown in Table 7. The
detailed computations are shown on the pages that follow Table 7. Re-entry stresses are
shown in Figures 28 and 29.
VII. Dynamic Characteristics
The first five mode shapes ( Figures 30 - 34) and frequencies were computed for the
vehicle with 100% fueL The original mass and stiffness matrices were not reduced fi'om
over 11,000 degrees of freedom (DOF). Simultaneous vector iteration was used to
compute the first five mode shapes and frequencies. The results are summarized in Table
8. A comparison with El" modes is given in Table 9.
VIII. Conclusions
The preliminary assessment of a CRV capsule has been performed. The concept appears to
be structurally feasible.
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I/_:_LE 6.
NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOAD(CRV! - STRETCH "B" VERSIOH
"...j
ITEM STA
CGiX.I,)
CG (Xnls)
£
FWD SKIH-i-
Z
LO2 TK-F DOME
(FIXED WT)
Z
CYUNDER
Z
LO2 TK-A DOME
(FIXED WT)
Z
INI_RTANK
¢
LH2 TK-F DOME
, (FIXED W"F)
RI REF
WT fLBSI
245 === 0
"" FROM TOP OF CRV
2273.1 0
2186 0
2480:4 1696
_.,_¢0.8 1084
2410.1 26
2417.8 '209
"B" VERSION
WT tLBS)
3200O
140OO
4O0O
1781
1138
27
219
2440.6 388 407
2.480.¢ 545 572
2520.8 281
816
9ge
1724
2520.8
2580.5
2644
27il.7 1814
;'//8.8 1724
10892838.4
2852.8 907
86
690
857
2932.3 l:)Rq
2955.3 1803
2962.7 931
2852.8 1306
1979
1966
2067
2897.1
2941.4
2985,6
3034.2 2143
3083.3 1979
3123.1 1243
3013.1 " ¢,',30
3020.6 833
3043.6 594
3083.4 319
3123._ 40
1048
1810
1905
1810
1143
952
93
725
1349
978
1371
2078
2064
2170
2078
1305
452
875
624
3.35
42
TOTAL W_
32000
14000
4OOO
2919
1521
5O35
13317
(3200C
.(14000
(4OOO
BWP1.XLS 9/_2
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]ABLE 6 (CONT,)
NLS DISTRIBUTI_D WEIGHTS W/PAYLOAD(CRV_ - STRETCH "Bo VERSIObl
BWP1 .XLS
ITEM STA RI REF "B" VERSION
WT (LBS) WT fLBS)
Z
CYUNDER 3137.5 943
¢
LH2 TK-A OOM=
(FIXED WT)
990
3201.7 1362 1430
3266.5 2200 2310
3331.3 _:_L_K 2347
3377.3 1_R_16_ 1(__
3435.9 1781 1870
3500.7 2096 _n,
3565.5 2200 2310
36_.8 2096 _Wl
3706.1 2410 :)_1
3784.9 2759 __-_L9_7
3871.0 _ 2970
3932.0 2515 _264_.1
3996.8 2165 2273
40,58 2165 2273
4122.6 1921 2017
4187.6 1118 1174
4252.2 24_ ___
--vW
4252.2 55 58
4292.6 444 466
4332.4 R_ 867
_55.4 1159 1217
4362.8 598
4355.4 2211 2211
('NO STATION LOC) 4362.8 2210 2210
Z
2520.8 30 32
258O.5 35 37
2644 62 65
65 68
61 64
2711.7
zu_.8
_8.4 38 40
2a5,?.8 29 30
2897.1 43 45
2941.4 43 45
2985.6 44 46
3034.21 46 46
30_3.3 43 45
3123.1 27 28
3137.5 38 40
3201.7 62 65
3266.5 62 65
3331.3 53 55
3377.3 5O 53
EXT HARDWARE
k
TOTAL WT
'_7
__'_,b"71
3236
9/22/92
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NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOAD(CRV3 - STRETCH "B" VERSIOH
BWP1 .XLS
ITEM
Z
TPS-LO2 TANK
STA
3435.9
RI REF
3_0.7 62
3555.5 59
3623.8
3706.1
3784.9
68
77
79
"B" VERSION
WT (LBS)
62
65
62
71
81_
83
3871.0 71 75
3932.0 61 64
3996.8 64
4058
61
55
3O
58
32
6 6
TOTAL WT
4122.6
4187.6
2520.8
2580.5
2644
2711.7
2778.8
1595
15] 16
21 22
36 38
4038
36 38
2838.4 23 24
2852.8 23 24
¢ 202
TPS-LH2 TANK 3137.5 '27
3201.7 38 40
3268.5 62 65
3331.3 63 66
3377_ 53 58
53so3435.9
3500.7 59 62
3565.5 62 65
3623.8 59 62
3706.1 681 71
7e
8O
71
61
3784.9
3871.0
3932.0
Z
3996.8
4058
4122.6
4187.6
4252.2
61
54
INSULATION
32
62
84
75
64
57
34
88
2852.8 94 "99
2897.1 142 149
2941.4 141 148
2985.8 148 155
3034.2 154 162
3083.3 142 149
3123.1 89 93
1035
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TABLE 6 (CONT.)
NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOAD(CRV_ -STRETCH "B"VERSION
ITeM
Z
LO2-FEED
STA RI REF
WT (LBS_
1362985.6
3034.2
3083.3
3123.1
3137.5
3201.7
3266.5
3331.3
3377.3
3435.9
3500.7
3565.5
3623.8
3706.1
3784.9
3871.0
3932.0
3996.6
4O58
4122.6
4187.6
2330.3
2424.8
2472.8
2580.5
2644
2711.7
2778.8
2838.4
2852.8
2897.1
p.,,
2941.4
2985.8
3034.2
3083.3
m,
3123.1
3137.5
3201.7
3266.5
3331.3
3377.3
3435.9
3500.7
3565.5
3623.8
139
129
81
115
186
190
163
152
180
190
180
"B"VERSION
w'r t'LBS}
143
146
TOTAL WT
135
85
121
195
2OO
171
160
189
2O0
lW
207 217
234 246
240 252
213
183
183
163
224
Ig2
192
171
10095
956
29 3O
1; 3557
L02 - PRESSURE 11 12
9 9
6 6
441
4 4
8 8
8 8
si
1
5 5
5 5
6
8
6
6 6
7 7
8 8
7 7
BWP1.XLS 9/22/92
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TABLE 6 ({.;ONI.)
NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOADtCRV) -STRETCH "B"VERSION
iTEM
BWP1 .XLS
STA
3706.1
RI REF
WT (LBS_
9
"B" VERSION
3932
WT (LBS)
9
3784.9 10 11
3871 I 0 11
9
3996.8
4058
4122.6
4187.6
4252.2
2330.3
2424.8
2472.8
2580.5
2644
2711.7
2778.8
2838.4
2852.8
2897.1
2941.4
2985.6
3034.2
3083.3
3123.1
3137.5
3201.7
3266.5
33313
33773
3435.9
3500.7
3565.5
3623.8
8
8
4
27
¢
LO2 - VENT
21
14
9
11
19
a)
18
12
9
13
13
14
14
13
8
12
19
19
16
15
18
19
18
2O
23
3706.1
3784.9
I
28
22
15
12
2O
21
19
13
14
14
15
15
14
13
2O
2O
17
16
19
2O
19
21
24
3871 24 25
3932 21 22
3996.8 18 19
4O58 18
16
9
4122.6
4187.6
19
17
9
TOTAL WT
230
4252.2 2 2
¢ 548
LH2 - FEED 4187.6 84 88
4252.2 84 88
176
9/22/92
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TABLE 6 (CONT.)-
NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS Wl PAYLOAD(CRVI -STRETCH "B"VERSION
ITEM
LH2 - PRESSURE
];
LH2 - VENT
STA
£
RANGE SAFETY
3034.2
3083.3
3123.1
3137.5
3201.7
3266.5
3331.3
3377.3
3435.9
3500.7
RI REF "B" VERSION
WT (LBSI
11
12
11 _
71
10
16
16
13
13
WT (LBS)
m
12
13
12
7
11
17
17
14
14
15 16
3565.5 16 17
3623.8 15 16
3706.1 17 18
3784.9 2O 21
3871 20 21
3932
3996.8
18 19
15 16
4058 15 16
4122.6 14 15
4187.6
4252.2
3034.2
8
2
14
3083.3
3123.1 14
3137.5 8
3201.7 12
3266.5 19
3331.3 20
w
3377.3 17
3435.9 16
i
3500.7 19
3565.5 20
3623.8 19
3706.1 21
3784.9 24
3871 25
3932 22
3996.8 19
4058 19
8
2
16
16
15
8
13
20
21
18
17
20_
,, r
1'
20
22
25
26
23
2O
2O
4122.6 17 18
4187.6 10 11
4252.2 2 2
2330.3 11 12
2424.8 7 7
2472.8
TOTAL WT
298
370
BWPI.XLS 9/22/92
4O
TABLE 6 (CONT.)
NLS DISTRIBUTED WEIGHTS W/PAYLOAD(CRW - STRETCH "B" VERSION
',,,.j
ITEM STA RI REF
WT (LBSI
62580.5
2644 10
2711.7 10
2778.8
2838.4
2852.8
2897.1
2941.4
2985.6
3034.2
3083.3
3123.1
10
4
7
7
7
7
7
4
TOTAL W'[
3137.5 6
3201.7 10
3266.5 10
3331.3 8
3377.3
3435.9
3500.7
3565.5
8
9
10
113623.8
3706.1 12
3784.9 13
3871 11
3932 10
3996.8 10
4058
"B" VERSION
WT tLBSI
6
11
11
11
6
4
7
7
7
7
7
4
6
11
11
8
8
9
11
9
12
13
1¢
12
11
11
9
5
1
4122.6
4187.6
Z 273
TOTAL WEIGHT 1__'_u__13
BWPI.XLS. 9/22/92
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Z 1662
R&R (17859)
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371
501
463
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87____
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NLS CLV/CRV STRESS ANALYSIS
Assumptions: LH2 tank pressure = 34 psi
Lox tank pressure = 29 psi
The objective of the stress analysis is to develop the lowest weight
skin/stringer configurations for the different segments using the FEM results.
Since the FEM is a rough model with approximate sizing, the stresses may be
unreasonable. Therefore, the following procedure was _d. Bpth the 'On Pad' and
'Hi Q' conditions were reviewed. The max andmi_loagi_l skTn stresses were
combined with the effective skin thickness (t bar) of the FEM to determine the
internal loading of each segment, Nx. Stresses due to tankage internal pressure
were added when appropriate (no internal pressure for 'On Pad' condition). The
loading and geometry was then used in a skin/stringer optimization program called
BSOP. BSOP develops the lowest weight configuration that will sustain the loading
based on the following analysis; strength, Euler stability, short column
buckling, blade crippling, skin buckling and overall panel stability. Once
skin/stringer configuring is complete the frames can be sized.
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Table 8. Summary of CRV Modes
iii
Mode
2
3
4
5
Freq (Hz)
2.03
2.04
2.27
2.39
2.40
Description
H 2 Tank Shell Mode
X-Y Bending
Shell Mode - LQ2, LH 2
Shell Mode- LO2
Shell Mode- L02, LH 2
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vTable 9. Dynamic Characterlstlcs (ET vs CRV)
Mode
2
3
4
5
CRV Freq (Hz)
2.03
2.04
2.27
2.39
2.40
ET Freq (Hz)
4.43
4.56
4.93
5.02
5.73
ET Mode Description
Body Bending
Body Bending
Shell Mode
Shell Mode
Shell Mode
i
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This document was prepared under Contract NAS8-39207, Advanced Transportation System
Studies for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C. Marshall Space
Flight Center by Rockwell International. The document identifies the requirements for
man-rating of launch vehicles as defined in several referenced documents. The document
will be updated periodically during the contract to incorporate additional references and
further analysis of man-rating requirements. The document will be included in the Final
Report (DR-4) at the completion of the contract.
Revision A
Revision A of this document adds Appendix A, which contains the functional flow block
diagrams for the man-rating functional requirements.
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INTRODUCTION
American Astronauts have piloted a number of vehicles into space. The first of these
vehicles were essentially rocket-propelled airplanes and converted ICBM missiles. The
development of the Apollo/Saturn launch represented the first launch vehicle designed
from inception to a set of man-rating requirements. The definition of man-rating evolved
with the succession of manned launch vehicles, but was generally constrained by the
specific requirements and vehicle configurations of each program. The Space Shuttle
program now provides an extensive source of man-rating requirements. Application of
these Space Shuttle requirements to other programs, however, would not be straight-
forward because of the likely different missions and subsystems which would be found. The
Space Shuttle requirements also would not provide a sufficient grasp of the basic objectives
of man-rating, which have evolved over several programs and are now expressed in great
detail only in the context of the Shuttle program. Designers of new manned launch
vehicles have new missions and a freedom of design that stretches beyond the
requirements found in the Shuttle program.
The objective of this document is to identify a set of man-rating requirements which
represent both the spirit and the letter of man-rating requirements from past and present
programs. It is further desired to isolate those requirements which result in launch system
hardware or software functional requirements. By isolating this type of requirement from
programmatic or design guidelines, it is possible to identify subsystem changes or additions
which may be required for new manned launch systems.
The approach used in this document is to treat the most recent man-rating requirements
document from the NASA Johnson Space Center (Reference 1, JSC 23211, November 1991) as
the baseline and foundation of the effort. Requirements from other man-rating documents
will be interleaved with the requirements of this reference, maintaining the outline of the
reference document. The result is a grouping of man-rating requirements from a variety
of sources/programs in the topical outline of the most current man-rating requirements
document. This format permits direct comparison of man-rating requirements from
current and past programs. Where current man-rating requirements may be stated in
general terms, the comparison with past programs should serve as an interpretation or
specific application of the requirement.
The functional flow block diagrams for each of the man-rating functional requirements
are provided in Appendix A. Each diagram identifies the specific requirement from which
it was derived. External interfaces, including data requirements and external functions, are
shown for the man-rating functional flow diagrams.
Future additions to this document will organize all of the identified functional requirements
by generic subsystems requirements. These addition will permit direct comparison of
subsystem functions from an existing or planned launch system with the requirements for
man-rating.
Use of this Document
The man-rating requirements are organized by the categories used in Reference (1) and
appear in the same order. Requirements are segregated as either Guidelines or Functional
Requirements within each topic. Within any specific category, requirements from all
sources are provided and identified by the reference document from which they were
obtained. Each requirement within a topic appears in ascending order per the reference
document number (see References section of this document). Note that some of the
requirements are stated as suggestions or recommendations in many of the reference
documents. These are considered as requirements for the purposes of this document.
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The functional flow block diagramsare keyed to the source requirementsby a box in the
top of each page. The diagram number is shown first, e.g., (MR_I.4_I). The source
requirements are then listed, with the requirement paragraph number and the
requirement statement printed.
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Man-Rating Requirements
BASELINE DOCUMENT
1. DESIGN CRITERIA
Guidelines:
The responsible design element shall establish and maintain an effective strength
analysis, structural test and structural assessment program to assess and verify the
structural integrity of space vehicle structural and propulsion systems.(6)
Design criteria shall be furnished by the procuring activity. Criteria originated by
the responsible design element shall be approved by MSFC prior to use.(6)
Functional Requirements:
None
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1.1 Environmental Conditions
Guidelines:
Operational environmental conditions (e.g. temperature, atmosphere, radiation,
g-forces), under normal and emergency modes, should be well within known
human limits.(1)
...consider alternate missions ...instead of destroying the entire launch vehicle
and aborting the crew.(2)
An alternate-mission plan must be planned in case problems occur during
launch .... The alternate mission that will satisfy the greatest number of flight
objectives within the' capability of the flight constraints must be chosen.(2)
Flight path constraints are placed on the mission because of the data-collection
and voice communications requirements... This requires that telemetry contact
with the vehicle be maintained.(2)
Since some malfunction detection systems (MDS) require continuous ground
telemetry data or commands, use of such systems could also result in flight path
constraints...(2)
Abort data link transmissions may modify the direction of the launch. Some
systems may have only a narrow corridor where safe abort is possible ... as a
result of forces on the crew during return.(2)
Surface temperatures within habitable volumes shall be designed to be less than
45°C (l13°F) and greater than 4°C(41.2°F).(3)
The sound pressurelevels, shall be measured at, or translated to, the external
auditory meatus of the operating personnel. Exposures shall not exceed the
allowable levels, periods, or repetition rates.(3)
Internally Generated Radiation: Sources emitting electromagnetic wavelengths
between x-ray and visible light, sufficiently strong to pose a hazard, shall be
positioned to preclude crew exposure or touch. Hazard distance shall be
marked.(3)
Acoustic Noise Criteria: Acoustic noise sound pressure levels establish the
maximum acceptable flight crew environmental limits which would result from
operation of the total spacecraft system and from the expected environment
during all phases of a mission.(3)
Functional Requirements:
None
1.2 Escape System
Guidelines:
Provisions should be made for a viable means of escape from the system in the
event of an impending catastrophe. In situations where immediate and complete
escape may not be feasible, an alternative approach can be considered if it can be
proven reliable.(1)
The flight crew must be provided with a viable means of escape from the space
vehicle in the event of an impending catastrophe. In situations where immediate
escape from the space system may not be feasible, alternate approaches such as a
safe haven may be considered if such can be provided to be viable.(4)
Functional Requirements:
"_..j
Crew to be provided abort sensing and implementation data upon which to base
an abort decision.(1)
Emergency considerations have become a distinguishing characteristic of
man-rated systems; the resulting vehicle system changes and additions
provide for emergency detection, control, and/or escape of the crew.(2)
The provision for a safe landing area for the spacecraft and the surrounding
facilities is required.(2)
An escape system has the attendant requirement for providing the crew with
abort sensing and implementation data upon which to base an abort
decision.(4_
1.3 Failure Tolerance
Guidelines:
Primary structure, pressure vessels and thermal protection systems should be
designed for minimum tolerance for any failure or malfunction that would
jeopardize the safety of the crew. When redundancy is unfeasible, designs should
be based on conservative criteria. Positive margins should be demonstrated by
means of appropriate test programs.(l)
Failure tolerance is the basic safety requirement that shall be used to control most
payload hazards. A hazard which is critical can result in damage to launch system
equipment, a nondisabling personnel injury or the use of unscheduled safing
procedures that affect operations of the launch system or another payload. A
hazard which is catastrophic can result in the potential for a disabling or fatal
personnel injury, loss of the launch vehicle, ground facilities or launch system
equipment.(5)
Fracture Control and Fracture Mechanics Analysis: All flight structures shall be
examined to determine their fracture criticality and associated fracture control
requirements.(6)
Fracture Mechanics Analysis and Proof Testing: Fracture mechanics analysis
shall be performed on all fracture critical parts to demonstrate that the maximum
size flaw or crack-like defect that could exist after proof testing and
nondestructive evaluation (NDE) inspection will not grow to critical size and cause
premature failure during the required service life. Proof testing, supplemented
by NDE, shall be the preferred method for establishing the maximum size flaw or
crack-like defect to be used in the service life analysis. All load sources and
environments shall be considered in determining the appropriate loading
spectrums for life analyses and proper application of flaw growth data. (6)
Fatigue Analysis: A detailed design life cycle history shall be developed in
sufficient detail that a cumulative damage assessment can be analytically verified
for all applicable components. The applicable loads and associated histories shall
be determined and the indicated factors applied for the creep life analysis.(6)
Pressure vessels androtating machinery shall be considered fracture critical and
therefore subject to fracture control. Other flight structures with failures modes
that could cause loss of vehicle or crew shall be considered fracture critical
candidates and undergo a fracture mechanics evaluation. All fracture critical
parts shall have a fracture control plan establishing responsibilities, criteria, and
procedures for the prevention of structural failures associated with the initiation
and propagation of flaws or crack-like defects during fabrication, testing,
handling and transportation; and operational life.(6)
Current state-of-the-art NDE inspection techniques shall be utilized. The best
current state-of-the-art fracture mechanics analytical techniques shall be
utilized. The fracture mechanics analyses shall demonstrate a calculated life of
4.0 times the required service life. Stress concentration factors shall be included
in the mean and cyclic stresses. The proof test factor shall be the larger of the
values determined by fracture mechanics analysis/proof test requirements.
Proof testing shall be performed in the actual expected environment
(temperature and media) when feasible. In no case shall the adjusted proof test
factor be less than 1.05 without MSFC approval.(6)
All structural elements shall be designed and analyzed to demonstrate the follows
factors: 1) The limit stress/strain shall be multiplied by a minimum factor of 1.15
prior to entering the S-N curve to determine the low cycle/high cycle life, 2) the
low cycle/high cycle fatigue analysis shall demonstrate a minimum calculated
life of 4.0 times the required service life, and 3) the alternating and mean
stress/strain shall include the effects of stress concentration factors when
applicable.(6)
Functional Requirements:
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All critical crew/system functions shall be designed to be two-failure tolerant
as a minimum. Functions essential for critical mission support shall be
designed to be single failure tolerant as a minimum. Noncritical functions
shall be designed to fail in safe mode. Total functional failure of a subsystem
should not be allowed to propagate to other systems.(1)
No single failure shall result in a critical hazard. No two failure shall result in
a catastrophic hazard.(4)
The payload must tolerate a minimum number of credible failures and/or
operator errors determined by the hazard level.
a) Critical hazards shall be controlled such that no single failure or operator
error can result in damage to launch system equipment, a nondisabling
personnel injury or the use of unscheduled sating procedures that affect
operations of the launch system or another payload.
b) Catastrophic hazards shall be controlled such that no combination of two
failures or operator errors can result in the potential for a disabling or
fatal personnel injury, loss of the launch vehicle, ground facilities or
launch system equipment.(5)
In case of failure of an essential function for the crew, the system must still be
in a safe condition, i.e., the system must be at least fail-safe. For safety
essential functions, redundancies or back-up features have to be incorporated
into the design without considering any failure probabilities.(7)
1.4 Hazard Detection and Safing
Guidelines:
The fast response of the automatic system is utilized by setting discrete sensors to
respond only to ultimate indicators of an imminent catastrophe.(2)
Manual systems are believed to prevent some false aborts; however, the system
must be designed to preclude failures which would not allow for pilot reaction
time.(2)
Abort parameter selection and display is based on the design failure philosophy
and type of abort initiation (i.e., manual or automatic).(2)
4
\v j
The trajectory information with plots of velocity, acceleration, altitude, and
dynamic pressure versus time are not all inclusive of various manned systems.(2)
All manned booster emergency detection systems have included electrical voltage
and attitude rate sensors, and, generally, the display of all abort parameters has
been by panel light.(2)
In review, the following parameters and signals are common to all systems:
a. Pitch, yaw, and roll rates.
b. electrical voltage.
c. Abort and destruct signals.
d. Staging command and separation signals (in staged vehicles).(2)
Protection of Electrical/Mechanical Systems from Debris: Malfunction of
inadvertent operation of spacecraft electrical, electronic, or mechanical
equipment caused by exposure to conducting or nonconducting debris or foreign
material floating in a gravity-free state shall be prevented.(3)
Shatterable Material: Material that can shatter shall not be used in the habitable
compartment unless positive protection is provided to prevent fragments from
entering the cabin environment.(3)
Lightning Protection: Lightning protection shall be designed into spacecraft
which will operate in earth's atmosphere such that, in the event of a lightning
strike, flight hardware will not be damaged or affected to the extent that mission
success or crew safety is compromised.(3)
The need for hazard detection and safing by the crew to control time-critical
hazards will be minimized and implemented only when an alternate means of
reduction or control of hazardous conditions is not available.(5)
A hazard status list shall be prepared and continuously updated.(7)
A malfunction detection system shall incorporate an airborne sensing system and
both ground and crew monitoring.(8)
A manual switchover from a primary to a redundant system shall not occur until a
malfunction has been .detected by one data source and verified by a second
independent data source.(8)
Functional Requirements:
A caution and warning system should be provided which will identify
equipment failures, fire, or other potential emergency situations. This does
not rule out an automatic hazard safing systems for instances of slow crew
response time.(l)
The space system should provide a fault detection, isolation and recovery
system addressing problems in critical and non-critical systems over which
the crew has controls. The status of critical systems shall be displayed in a
manner that prevents misinterpretation. Fire suppression capability should
be provided in local and general areas, and may be either automatic or manual
depending on the type of risk.(1)
It is the function of the emergency detection system to monitor
predetermined launch vehicle parametersand supply a signal to selected crew
warning displays and the abort initiation system when parametric limits are
exceeded.(2)
Malfunction detection to survey, alert, and provide the signal for emergency
action.(2)
The pilot or controller should have sufficient displays ... to separate actual
malfunctions from false malfunctions.(2)
In all cases..,the destruct commandsignal is displayed to the crew as a light.
(2)
Abort, staging command, and stage separation signals are common to all
EDS's.(2)
After selection of the sensor range and switching events, adequate provisions
for sensor failure must be made.(2)
Provision for safe control and/or shutdown of critical elements by automatic
or manual systems.(2)
Fire Control: The capability shall be provided to detect any fire. Means shall
be provided for fire-resistant storage of all items that are not self-
extinguishing when they are not in use.(3)
Critical mechanical items shall be provided with debris-proof covers or
containers. Critical electrical items shall be provided with suitable containers,
potting, or conformai coating. Filters, strainers, traps, or other devices shall
be provided in all moving-fluid systems to eliminate such systems as a threat to
critical mechanical or electrical components. All such filters, strainers, traps,
or other devices shall be capable of inflight cleaning and/or replacement.(3)
Interior walls and the secondary structure shall be self-extinguishing. All
combustible shall be self-extinguishing in the most severe oxidizing
environment to which they will be exposed. The material used to extinguish
fires must be nontoxic and capable of being easily cleaned up after use.(3)
The capability to withstand the strike shall be verified by test using, as a
minimum a lightning waveform of 200,000-A peak, having average currents[
of at least 200 A for a minimum of 200 ms. The 200,000-A peak should be
reached in 10 Its after strike start. The current shall be applied to the vehicle
skin at each major protuberance and the vehicle shall be grounded at the
furthermost extremity.(3)
The crew shall be provided with a caution and warning system which will
identify equipment failures, fire or other potential emergency situations.
Further, the vehicle shall be provided with a Fault Detection, Isolation and
Recovery System which will address problems in critical and non-critical
systems.(4)
capable of being tested forIAppropriate functions, when implemented, shall beproper operations during both ground and flight phases.(5)
1.5 Structural Criteria
Guidelines:
a) Primary structures, pressurized lines, and fittings should be designed in
accordance with proven aerospace standards. Structural margins should be
demonstrated by formal tests. Vibration and fatigue analyses should be
performed.
b) Primary structures should be designed in accordance with safe-life design
concepts. Safe-life should be determined by analysis/test considered to be the
total number of mission cycles expected during the entire service life of the
structure.
c) Primary structures should be assessed for stress corrosion susceptibility.
d) Pressure vessels should be designed by fracture mechanics to leak-before-
burst criteria.
e) Structures should be designed to accommodate critical design loads for the
entire flight envelope, derived from applicable design principles such as
crash load requirements and crash-worthy principles.(1)
Thermal Design and Analysis: Nominal and worst-case analyses shall be done for
all temperature-sensitive components and structures.(3)
Structural Analysis: Structural analysis shall be performed on all spacecraft
structures, including pressure vessels, to show that all elements of the design,
such as the strength, stiffness, structural stability, and life, meet all specified
criteria for the anticipated loads and environments.(3)
Worst hot and cold cases shall be analyzed single values of thermal parameters
which, in combination, produce the worst-case conditions.(3)
The analyses shall include stress analyses, fatigue or fracture analyses, loads and
environmental data, the appropriate reference, and, in general, shall meet the
same requirements as analyses generated for the purpose of certifying the
flightworthiness of structures.(3)
Primary structure must be assessed for stress corrosion susceptibility. Pressure
vessels shall be designed by fracture mechanics to leak before burst criteria.
Structures shall be designed to accommodate design loads derived from applicable
crash-worthy design principles.(4)
Primary structure shall be designed to an ultimate factor of safety of 1.4 or
greater. Structural margins are to be demonstrated by test. Pressurized lines and
fittings shall be designed to an ultimate factor of safety of 4.0 or greater.(4)
The payload structural design shall provide acceptable factors of safety for all
mission phases. Design compliance will be verified in accordance with proven
standards. When structural failure can result in a catastrophic event, the design
shall be based on fracture control procedures.(5)
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The structural design shall comply with the ultimate design load factors for
emergency landing loads that are specified.(5)
Materials used in the design of payload structures, support bracketry, and
mounting hardware shall be rated for resistanceto stress corrosion cracking.(5)
Pressurevessels shall be assessedfor adequatestress rupture life.(5)
Pressure containers shall meet leak-before-burst (LBB) criteria as determined by
fracture mechanicsanalysis. The fracture mechanicsanalysis must employ a
safe-life approach for containers of hazardousfluids and non-LBB designs.(5)
In circumstanceswhere pressure loads have a relieving or stabilizing effect on
structural load capability, the minimum expectedvalue of such loads shall be used
and shall not be multiplied by the factor of safety in calculating the design yield
or ultimate load. Stress calculations of structural members,critical for stability
and compressivestrength, may be performed using the mean drawing thickness
as the maximum thickness. The thickness used in the stress calculations for
pressure vessels and for tension-critical and shear-critical members shall be the
minimum thickness shown on the drawing.(6)
Hardware shall be designedto minimize weight and yet resist all loads and
combination of loads that may reasonablybe expectedto occur during all phases
of fabrication, testing, transportation, erection, checkout, launch flight, and
recovery.(6)
Factor of Safety: For components,or systemssubjectedto several missions, static
strength safety factor requirementsshall apply to all missions. Consideration
shall be given to transient loads and pressure,such as surge phenomena,when
required. Elongation criteria rather than the yield safety factors may be applied,
if the structural integrity of the componentaffected is demonstratedby adequate
analysis and test.(6)
Materials and mechanical parts used in load carrying structural elements, the
integrity of which is a safety issue, together with related manufacturing
processesare fully assessed,for fracture mechanics, fatigue and stress corrosion
resistance.(7)
To assure structural integrity, special attention should be given to aerodynamic
loads for the launch vehicle configuration, loading due to manual and automatic
switchover from primary to redundant systems, and structural break-up for safe
abort.(8)
Functional Requirements:
None
1.6 Redundancy
Guidelines"
All critical systems, except for primary structures, should be designed with the
appropriate degree of functional redundancy as determined by supporting
mission and design analyses. Redundant components should be chosen from
different manufacturing lots. To prevent generic failure, the last level of
redundancy should use dissimilar components or practices. Special attention to
redundancy requirements should be given to power supplies, breathing air
supplies, pyrotechnics and communications.(1)
...analysis has established:
• The effect of man-rating subsystems to increase crew safety.
• The gain in mission reliability (launch completion) by man-rating
several subsystems.(2)
...redundant systems are switched in automatically using malfunction
detection signals.
...manual controls are used to correct four types of failures when the
automatic systems malfunction.(2)
Slow failures of the drift type may be corrected by overriding controls...(2)
Failures which occur as step functions without redundant backup are only
correctable by automatic action. If the failure is of a critical nature then
abort should be automatic.(2)
Design compatibility should be emphasized in the area of GSE.(2)
Critical Subsystems: The redundancy requirements for critical flight vehicle
subsystems (except structure, thermal protective system, and pressure vessels)
shall be established on an individual subsystem basis but shall not be less than
fail-safe. Flight hardware and payloads will be designed, as a minimum, to sustain
a failure of a single item of hardware in any subsystem without loss of life or
vehicle. Where the above criteria are not met, a list shall be provided of critical
nonredundant items, the failure of which could cause loss of the crew or require
abort of missions.(3).
All critical systems, except for primary structures, pressure vessels and thermal
protection systems, shall be designed with an appropriate degree of redundancy
as determined by supporting mission and design analyses.(4)
Safety-critical redundant subsystems shall be separated by the maximum practical
distance, or otherwise protected, to ensure that an unexpected event that damages
one is not likely to prevent the others from performing their functions.(5)
All redundant functions that are required to prevent a catastrophic hazard must
not be routed through a single connector.(5)
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Redundant flight control and electrical systems are necessary. Switchover from
primary to redundant systems can be manual for malfunctions that result in
relatively slow divergence, and automatic for malfunctions that result in rapid
divergence. All sensor outputs should be redundant to preclude any possibility of
sensor malfunction causing switchover.(8)
Functional Requirements:
Systems should be designed so that the interruption of gas flow, fluid, or
electrical current should not, by itself, cause a critical condition. Single point
failures and credible single failure modes shall be guarded against through
separation of redundant paths, failure propagation control, and redundancy
management. Purely redundant systems or components should be prohibited
from performing their function unless 1) a primary system or component has
failed, or 2) the redundant systems or components are being intentionally
tested. This "standby redundancy" uses redundant hardware items which are
non-operative until they are switched into the subsystem upon failure of the
primary element.(1)
Automatic detection and switching must be used for the violent control
malfunction type of failure ... (2)
Man-rating of the AGE [GSE] and prelaunch operations is equally as important
to a program success as the present studies of the vehicle and its inflight
operations.(2)
Establish a list of all possible flight failure modes and analytically determine
the probability of failures.(8)
1.7 Materials
Guidelines:
Designers should only use well-understood and characterized materials. The use
of new or highly improved materials, for which there exists little detailed
information on their properties, capabilities, long-term effects, and other related
characteristics, should be avoided. The environment the materials will
experience should be _known as well as their reaction to that environment and
each other.(1)
Design considerations may include such important aspects as ... limitation of
propulsion-created effects such as toxicity... (2)
Selection and Review: Materials to be used in the fabrication of spacecraft
structure, mission-essential flight equipment, and ground support equipment,
where operational failure can adversely affect the integrity of flight hardware,
shall be selected by consideration of both functional and compatibility
requirements.(3)
Wiring Material Flammability: This standard applies to electrical wiring within
habitable compartments of spacecraft.(3)
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Mercury Contamination: Prior to initial manned operations, the breathing
systems of spacecraft, environmental chambers, and auxiliary life support
systems shall be tested for mercury contamination. Any level of mercury
contamination in breathing systems shall be avoided. Continuous exposure to
mercury at greater than 0.005 mg/m3 is consideredtoxic to humans.(3)
Mercury Use: The use of equipmentcontaining mercury in liquid or vapor form
shall be avoided where the mercury could come in contact with the spacecraftof
spaceflight equipment at any time during manufacturing, assembly, testing,
checkout, or flight.(3)
Titanium Use: Titanium or its alloys shall be used whereexposedto liquid
oxygen.(3)
Beryllium Use: Unalloyed beryllium shall not be used within the crew
compartment(s) of spacecraft unless suitably protected to prevent erosion, or
formation of salts or oxidizes.(3)
CadmiumUse: Use cadmiumand cadmium plating should be avoided under the
following conditions:
1) Where cadmium in contact with breathing gas could reach temperaturesthat
would generate toxic fumes.
2) In equipment containers where electrical and electronic equipment could be
degradedto an unacceptablelevel by vaporization and deposition of cadmium
on the equipment surfaces.
3) In applications where the combination of temperatureand proximity of the
cadmium or cadmium plating could adversely affect critical surfaces by
cadmium deposition.
4) In applications where temperatureof the cadmium or cadmium plating could
exceed 232.2°C(450°F).(3)
Explosive Device Packaging: Explosive devices, such as pyrotechnicsand
electroexplosive components,shall be packaged in a conductive materials which
provide protection from static electric charges.(3)
Tests shall be conducted using calibrated analytical instruments capable of
detecting concentrationsof mercury less than 0.005 mg/m3. The minimum
temperatureof a system while undergoing testing shall be 20°C(68°F).(3)
Where the use of equipment containing mercury cannot be avoided, the following
information shall be documented:
1) A list of equipment containing mercury to be used during manufacturing,
assembly, testing, and checkout, along with justification for each use.
2) The amount of mercury contained in the equipment.
3) The protection provided to prevent the releaseof mercury.
4) A plan for decontaminationin the event the mercury is release. The plan
must note that, a) an environment containing mercury vapor in
concentration of 0.005 mg/m3 (or greater) is not acceptable,and that b)
mercury must not be removed from metal surfaces with any abrasive cleaning
method. The removal of oxide films on the metal will cause immediatemercury
penetration.(3)
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Titanium or its alloys shall not be used where exposedto gaseousoxygen at any
pressureor with air at oxygen partial pressuresabove 34.5 kPa (5 lb psia).(3)
Beryllium is an extremely toxic material whose threshold limit is 0.002 mg/m3.
Alloys containing 4 percent or less of beryllium are an exception to this
standard.(3)
Packaging materialsshall have a maximum surface resistivity of 3 x 104 ohmsat
all levels of humidity when tested.(3)
Use only well understood and characterizedmaterials. (Designers should
definitely avoid the use of new or highly improved materials for which there is
little detailed knowledge and understanding of materials characteristics,
compatibilities, long term effects, etc.).(4)
Selectedmaterials should be well understood and characterized. Test data should
be available. Hazardous materials which are toxic or would threaten hardware if
released, should be avoided. Particular attention should be given to materials used
in systems containing hazardous fluids.(5)
The selection, application, qualification and procurement of parts and materials is
a major safety consideration in any space project, since the end product is no
better than the basic material used.(7)
All non-metallic materials shall be rated for their characteristics of flammability
under elevated oxygen levels, toxic offgassing and odor, in addition to their
"normal" evaluation for space application like outgassing and UV stability.(7)
Functional Requirements:
Functional requirements including, but not limited to, load distribution and
magnitude, temperature, life, and use of exposure environments shall be met
by consideration of such material properties as mechanical strength, fatigue,
thermal stability, fracture toughness, and flaw propagation rates. Material
compatibility requirements shall be met by consideration of possible
degradative mechanisms including, but not limited to, stress corrosion
galvanic or dissimilar metal corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement, creep, cycle
and thermal fatigue, oxidization, vacuum stability, and radiation exposure.(3)
Electrical wire insulation, wiring accessories, and materials in contact with
electrical circuitry shall not be capable of sustaining combustion in the most
severe oxidizing environment to be encountered during operations:
1) After removal of the source ignition.
2) Following melting of the electrical conductor by high currents, such as
those resulting from short circuits or equipment malfunction.(3)
Toxicity: No materials that, when exposed to a short circuit, will generate toxic
fumes in a concentration sufficient to impair crew safety shall be used for
wire insulation, ties, identification marks, and protective covering on wiring.
Nonmetallic materials used within crew compartments shall not provide a toxic
atmosphere.(3)
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a) For hazardouschemicals that must be contained, each level of containment
will be free of leaks under maximum use conditions. Documentationof all
chemicals used and their method of containment will be maintained.
b) Payloads shall not constitute an uncontrolled fire hazard, and a
flammability assessmentshall be documented.
c) Material used in the crew cabin and other habitable areas must be tested
under worst-case cabin environment conditions. Offgassing tests shall be
conducted.(5_
1.8 Displays and Controls
Guidelines:
...launch vehicles have used the crew of the vehicle to perform...
a. Detection of malfunctions...
b. Corrective action...to preclude aborting the mission.
c. Actuation of abort...
d. Checkout of the vehicle prior to launch and in an earth...parking orbit.
e. Flight control of the vehicle as a backup to an automatic system.(2)
... a wide variance was found in the degree to which the crew participated in the
operations of the vehicle.
[Primary control by crew]
[Primary control by crew but with automatic override]
[Automatic control with manual override]
[Monitor only] (2)
The pilot or controller should have sufficient display ...to separate actual
malfunctions from false malfunctions.(2)
The information presented to the pilot must include information required for him
to make decisions and information required in an emergency to evaluate the
situation and make a fast, accurate decision.(2)
The pilot or controller should have sufficient displays...to separate actual from
false malfunctions.(2)
Operating Limits on Temperature-Controlled Equipment: For spacecraft
equipment where the operating temperature is normally controlled by heating or
cooling equipment and the temperature is monitored in ground test and flight,
the test program and/or appropriate analyses shall define:
1) The maximum and minimum temperatures expected in normal operations.
2) The maximum and minimum temperatures at which equipment may be
expected to:
a. Fail to function until temperature is restored to normal range.
b. Be permanently rendered inoperative.(3)
Monitoring circuits should be designed such that the information obtained is as
directly related to the status of the monitored device as possible.(5)
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Functional Requirements:
M.J
Displays and controls should be provided to the crew for monitoring system
status and failure alerts.(l)
Must be available, accessible, and readable in emergency situations. Controls
for critical functions must not be able to be activated or deactivated
inadvertently.(1)
...a combination of automatic and pilot control is favored.
should be provided where signals may be erroneous.(2)
Crew override
Communications and data transmission are an integral part of the design
aspect of "man-rating". ...Man-rating of a launch vehicle cannot be considered
complete without a full analysis of the limitations imposed and the potentials
offered by communications systems. The reliability of the data transmission is
essential.(2)
Where abort is by astronaut command, a clear communications channel must
exist for advice and recovery.(2)
...the computer should have all possible alternate missions preprogrammed so
that the optimum alternate mission can be selected. Then, new commands can
be supplied to the flight control system, and illuminated display lights on the
crew's console tells them of the alternate mission and the new parameters that
require resetting, if applicable.(2)
Indication of Failure: Those measurements systems which display critical
flight information to the crew on panel indicators shall be designed so that
when such a system fails, it should provide an indication of its failure.(3)
Attitude Control Authority: Spacecraft automatic attitude control circuitry
shall be designed so that the crew can assume manual attitude control at all
times.(3)
Separation Sensing System: Separation sensing systems used to detect
separation of stages or modules of the space vehicle shall be designed so that
actuation of separation sensors will not result from structural deformation or
vibrations less severe than those associated with structural failure of the
vehicle.(3)
Gyroscope Performance Verification: Guidance and navigation subsystems,
stabilization subsystems, control subsystems, and any similar subsystems using
gyroscopes for guidance or stabilization of spacecraft during propulsion
subsystem operation shall provide continuous outputs for verification and
proper gyroscope rotational speed or drift rate.(3)
Fluid Temperature/Pressure Monitoring: All spacecraft systems and ground
support servicing equipment requiring storage of reactive fluids (i.e.,
oxidizers, monopropellants, etc.) shall be designed to include devices for
monitoring temperature and pressure to permit accurate determination of the
rates of active oxygen loss of the oxidizer contained in their respective
systems.(3)
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Atmospheric
monitor and
trace contaminants.
biological.(3)
Explosive Devices: In the design and operation
provisions shall be made for arming explosive devices
expected use as is feasible without compromising
Provisions shall be made to promptly disarm explosive
needed.(3)
For critical components, automatic sating with manual
used.(3)
Pressure and Composition Control: Provisions shall be made to
control oxygen, carbon monoxide, atmospheric pressure, and
Trace contaminants may be organic, inorganic, or
of spacecraft systems,
as near to the time of
reliability or safety.
devices when no longer
override only shall be
Where the separation sensing system is used to initiate automatically
subsequent steps in a sequence of events, the sensing system shall be
configured so that actuation or failure of a single sensor will not initiate the
sequence of events.(3)
Immediately prior to engine ignition for launch, including inflight launches,
the rotational speed or drift rate of all gyroscopes, normally required to
operate at launch, shall be verified to be within required safe operating
limits.(3)
These monitoring devices will provide time for corrective action in the event
that abnormal decomposition of the oxidizer is initiated.(3)
"Arm" and "fire" shall be separate functions and separately displayed.
and fire switches shall be guarded switches.(3)
Arm
a) Monitor circuits shall be current limited or otherwise designed to prevent
operation of the hazardous functions with credible failures. Loss of input
or failure of the monitor should cause a change in state of the indicator.
Notification of changes in the status of safety monitoring shall be given to
the flight crew in either near-real-time or real-time.
b) When timers are used on deployable payloads to control inhibits to
hazardous functions, complete separation of the payload from the launch
vehicle must be achieved prior to timer initiation. If credible failure
modes exist that could allow the timer to start prior to separation, a sating
capability must be provided.
c) A function whose inadvertent operation could result in a critical hazard
must be controlled by two independent inhibits, whenever the hazard
potential exist.
d) A function whose inadvertent operation could result in a catastrophic
hazard must be controlled by a minimum of three independent inhibits
whenever the hazard potential exist.(5)
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1.9 Aborts
Guidelines:
The system should be designed to accommodate sufficient abort scenarios to allow
the crew to return home safely or attain safe haven from any credible failure for
all phases of the mission.(l)
Payloads must be safe for aborts and contingency returns.(5)
To meet fail-safe requirements, rescue provisions have to be foreseen in cases of
launch or mission interruption.(7)
In instances where an immediate abort from a unstable launch vehicle is not
feasible and the crew must "ride it out" for some finite time, incorporate
hardware changes to the vehicle that assures that any vehicle break-up would
not cause a fire-ball type failure, but rather permit eventual safe abort.(8)
In the event that a malfunction is not cured by a switchover from primary to
redundant systems, an abort is required.(8)
Functional Requirements:
Credible failures for which abort procedures should be developed shall
include, at a minimum, one engine out and loss of cabin pressure. All abort
scenarios shall be tested and the crew fully trained in their execution.(1)
Hazard controls may include deployment, jettison or design provisions to
change the payload configurations.(5)
A parachute system for the habitable compartment of the launch vehicle or
emergency landing for a winged system.(7)
2. DESIGN PRACTICES
Guidelines:
Designers should use existing manned spacecraft design practices which have been
developed and proven by NASA, the military, and aerospace industry.(l)
a) Overpressurization should be avoided.
b) All critical service lines should be routed and protected to preclude damage
from any cause other than a catastrophic occurrence. Redundant systems
should be adequately separated from one another to avoid common-cause
damage.
c) Lines providing non-compatible materials or services should be run in
separate protective shields.
d) All sharp corners and other protrusions should be eliminated to preclude
damage to crew, space suits, or related equipment.
e) Toxic or explosive gases should be avoided.
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f) All equipment and material flammabilities should be designed to be compatible
with the expected pressure environments (normal and emergency) of the
habitable areas.
g) Special attention should be given to the integrity of quick-disconnects(gas
and fluid) that may be operatedby the crew.
h )Oxygen partial pressurebuild-up or decreaseshould be avoided.(1)
Designers shall use existing manned spacecraft design practices which have been
developed and documented.(4)
a) The maximum design pressure(MDP) for a pressurizedsystem shall be the
highest pressure defined by maximum relief pressure, maximum regulator
pressure or maximum temperature.
b) All pressurevessels shall be designedto satisfy proof testing requirements.
c) The structural integrity of the payload design must be demonstratedfor
external load environments.
d) Flexible hoses and bellows shall be designedto exclude flow induced
vibrations.
e) Payload sealed compartmentswithin a habitable volume of the launch vehicle,
including containers which present a safety hazard if rupture occurs, shall be
capable of withstanding the maximum pressure differential associated with
emergency depressurization of the habitable volume.
f) A proof test of each flight pressurevessel to a minimum of 1.5xMDP and a
fatigue analysis showing a minimum of 10 design lifetimes may be used in lieu
of testing a certification vessel to qualify a vessel design.
g) The proof test factor for each flight pressurecontainer shall be a minimum of
1.1xMDP.(5)
Priorities in design shall be given in order to avoid safety critical situations.
Designs are to be based on "leak-before-burst" principles.(7)
Special attention in the design is neededto maintain cleanliness,to avoid excessive
generation of potentially damaging particulates.(7)
The order of precedenceto avoid safety critical situationsshall be 1. design for
minimum hazard, 2. provide safety devicesto limit hazardsto an acceptablelevel, 3.
incorporate warning devices for timely detection of hazardousconditions, and 4.
develop procedures to encounter hazardous conditions.(7)
Functional Requirements:
li. :! j
a) Pressure relief valves or other safeguards should be provided to prevent
overpressurization.
b) Cryogenic systems, with sections where cryogenic liquid may be trapped,
should be designed to prevent line rupture if relief valves freeze. System
should be provided with relief valves paralleled by burst discs.
c) Systems or materials, which are potentially hazardous if allowed to
physically meet, shall be redundantly separated or shielded from one
another, or adequately spaced apart.
d) TBD
e) A detection system and an appropriate exhaust or neutralizing system
should be provided where toxic or explosive gases may be expected.
f) "roD
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g) TBD
h ) Oxygen flow limiters and/or monitoring devices should be required to
insure against oxygen partial pressure build-up or decrease.(1)
Outer shells (i.e., vacuum jackets) shall have pressure relief capability to
preclude rupture.(5)
Where pressure regulators, relief devices, and/or a thermal control system are
used to control pressure, collectively they must be two-fault tolerant from
causing pressureto exceedMDP.(5)
Relief devicesmust be redundantand sized to.permit full flow at MDP.(5)
2.1 General Issues
Guidelines:
Design considerations may include such important aspects as engine-out
capability and holddown.(2)
Limitation of propulsion-created effects, such as toxicity, noise, and vibration also
should be considered.(2)
Separation of Redundant Equipment: Redundant systems, redundant subsystems,
and redundant major elements of subsystems shall be separated to the maximum
extent practicable or otherwise protected to ensure that an unexpected event
which damages one is not likely to prevent the orbiter from performing the
functions.(3)
Interior Design for Cleanliness: The greatest practicable precautions shall be
taken to ensure freedom from debris within the spacecraft compartment and
within individual systems or components.(3)
Equipment Protection from System Liquids: Location of sensitive equipment
below plumbing, cold plates, or other equipment capable of leaking or generating
condensate during ground operations shall be avoided.(3)
Equipment Protection 'from Moisture: Equipment within a pressurized
compartment shall be designed so that performance of the equipment will not be
degraded by humidity or moisture droplets in the spacecraft atmosphere or by
condensation.(3)
Ingress of Undesirable Elements: In the design of pressurization, repressuri-
zation, and ventilation systems for habitable areas, provisions shall be made to
minimize ingress of undesirable elements.(3)
Functional Requirement:
Electrical wiring of redundant systems, redundant subsystems, or redundant I
major elements of subsystems shall not be routed in the same wire bundle orl
through the same connector without wiring of the other redundant systems,[
subsystem, or subsystem element. Redundant systems and redundantl
components should be designed so as not to preclude concurrent operation.(3)|
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Protective covers shall be provided. The use of particulate-generating
materials and surfaces is prohibited. If such material must be used they must
either be coated, encased, or taped. The ventilation system shall include
debris-collection screens on air inlets. Removal and/or control of biologically
active components shall be considered when specifying the use of debris
screens or filters.(3)
Design plumbing to be insensitive to the liquid leakage. Design plumbing or
equipment containing the liquid to locate couplings, vents, service points, and
other items where leakage from them could not reach the sensitive equipment
from leakage during ground operation. Provide insulation to prevent
condensate from falling on the equipment.(3)
Applies to manned spacecraft which have habitable areas pressurized at less
than atmospheric pressure during normal mission.(3)
2.2 Electrical Issues
Guidelines:
Mating Provisions for Electrical Connectors: Electrical connectors, plugs, and
receptacles which otherwise could be incorrectly mated shall be designed to
prevent incorrect connection with other accessible connectors.(3)
Protection of Severed Electrical Circuits: Electrical circuits which are to be
severed in the normal course of mission events shall be protected against short
circuiting or compromising of other circuits during the mission.(3)
Moisture Protection for Electrical Connectors: Electronic and electrical
equipment, both external to and within the crew compartment, which is not
hermetically sealed or otherwise positively protected against moisture shall not
be cooled below the dew point of the surrounding atmosphere.(3)
Corona Suppression: Electrical and electronic systems and components shall be
designed such that corona discharge will not occur under any operating
conditions.(3)
Protective Covering for Electrical Receptacles and Plugs: Electrical plugs and
receptacles of flight equipment and ground equipment that connects with flight
equipment shall be protected at all times.(3)
Control of Electrostatic Discharge (ESD): All ESD-susceptible parts and assemblies
which make up the Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) shall be ESD-classified by test,
while the LRU and higher level items my be ESD-classified by analysis.(3)
Bioinstrumentation Systems: Such systems shall be designed with sufficient
resistance in series with each body electrode, and must limit to safe levels any
electric shock current that could flow through an instrumented member as a
result of contact with available voltage sources.(3)
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Pressure Garment Wiring: Current entering a crew member's pressure garment
through wiring shall not ignite or damagematerials used within the garment
under the worst condition.(3)
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Electronic Connectors: Considerationwill be given
to improve the capability of the gloved astronautto effect the mating and
demating of electrical connectorson boxes designed for changeoutin orbit.(3)
Ionizing Radiation Effects: Spacecraftelectronics shall be designedto
accommodate the orbital ambient ionizing radiation environment.(3)
Use of constraintsbuilt into a cable or harness. Selectionof different sizes for
connectors. Permanent identification of mating connectors.(3)
All parts and assembliesat the LRU level must have a certified ESD sensitivity
level equal to or greater than 15000V.(3)
The maximum safe shockcurrent levels for DC and AC currentsup to 2000 Hz are
defined as 1.01.tAapplied internally and 50 I.tA applied externally to the body.(3)
Functional Requirement:
Electrical Circuits De-energizing: Spacecraft electrical systems shall be
designed so that all necessary mating and demating of connectors can be
accomplished without producing electrical arcs that will damage connector
pins or ignite surrounding materiels or vapors.(3)
Electrical Power Overload Protection: Maximum operating temperatures for
electrical power distribution circuit elements of the circuit.(3)
Protective Devices for Solid-State Circuits: Protective devices used in critical
electronic circuits to protect solid-state circuit elements shall be verified as
ready to function.(3)
Engine Shutdown Circuitry: Design of circuitry for automatic shutdown of
launch vehicle engine(s) shall include protection against possible engine
shutdown coincidental with, or immediately after, launch vehicle release.(3)
Electronic and electrical equipment, electrical connectors and wiring
unctions to connectors shall be protected from moisture by methods which
Lre demonstrated by test or analysis to provide adequate protection to prevent
open and short circuits.(3)
Unless connectors are specifically designed and approved for mating or
demating in the existing environment under the loads being carried, they
shall not be mated or demated until voltages have been removed from the
powered side(s) of the connector.(3)
Device hardening r circuit fault tolerance_ shielding.(3)
-x..j
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2.3 Fluid Issues
Guidelines"
Fluid System Service Point Protection: Service points for spacecraft fluid systems
shall be designed with positive protection by location, connector size, or type to
prevent connection to incorrect fluid service lines.(3)
Ground Service Points: Ground service points for fluid systems, including those
for filling, draining, purging, or bleeding, shall be accessibly located external to
the vehicle. Gas purge or bleed fittings shall exhaust external to the vehicle.(3)
Fluid Line Separation Provisions: Fluid lines that are required to be disconnected
or severed on separation of space-vehicle modules shall be designed such that any
breakage resulting from failure of the disconnecting device to function will
occur on the side of the disconnect that is 1) the least hazardous and 2) the most
easily repairable.(3)
Fluid Line Installation: Routing and installation of all fluid lines, including
pressure-sensor lines, shall be specified in detail. Special precautions shall be
taken to prevent the installation of such lines where they would be exposed to
extreme temperature conditions. An adequate design analysis shall be made for
each such line installation to show that the temperature extremes to which the
line will be subjected are within limits acceptable for the fluid involved.(3)
Fluid System Component Protection: All ends of tubing, fittings, and components
used in fluid systems shall be protected against damage and entry of contaminants
in each step of the spacecraft manufacturing process and subsystem buildup.(3)
Fluid System Cleanliness: After manufacturing and after any subsequent
exposure to the probable entry of contaminants, all spacecraft fluid systems and
their servicing equipment shall be cleaned by flushing to remove all
contaminants which could be detrimental to the system.(3)
Fluid System Flushing and Draining: Spacecraft fluid systems and related
servicing equipment shall be designed to permit complete flushing and draining
during ground and in-orbit servicing operations.(3)
Design drawings and/or process specifications shall designate the method of
complying with this requirement. The degree of protection provided shall be
compatible with the cleanliness requirement of the manufacturing
specification.(3)
The flushing fluid shall be compatible with the system materials and the working
fluid to be used in the system. Cleanliness levels of the flushing fluid and the
maximum allowable contamination shall be specified.(3)
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Functional Requirement:
M.J
Flow Restrictions Pressurized Sources: Where pressurized gas lines could fail
in such a way that the total gas supply dumped directly into a compartment
would be greater than the relief valve or venting could handle without
overpressurization of the compartment, necessary flow restrictions shall be
incorporated at the pressure source to restrict the mass flow to a level that can
be handled by the relief valve and/or venting.(3)
The flow restriction must not interfered with the normal operation of the
system.(3)
The check valve for shutoff valve, used on the retained side of the disconnect
for preventing loss of fluid after disconnection, shall be a type that will
function; i.e., that will close in spite of such a failure.(3)
The systems shall be free of dead-ended piping or passages through which
flushing fluid cannot be made to flow. Drain and bleed ports shall be provided
for attitudes anticipated during ground servicing of the systems.(3)
2.4 Mechanical/Structural Issues
Guidelines."
Each type of pressure vessel must be qualified prior to acceptance of the design
for program use by tests designed to demonstrate that the selected design factors
were achieved. Each pressure vessel accepted for program use shall pass
acceptance tests designed to demonstrate its freedom from latent manufacturing
defects or handling damage.(3)
Qualification tests shall include provisions to demonstrate the ability of this
equipment to operate without significant wear or damage for a minimum of
double the maximum number of cycles expected to occur during fabrication,
testing, and flight. Qualification tests for parts, such as seals, that are intended to
be replaced prior to launch shall demonstrate the capability of the part to operate
without significant wear or damage for a minimum of double the maximum
number of cycles expected during prelaunch checkout and flight.(3)
Threaded devices shall be applied in a manner to preclude the release of particles
or foreign material where interference with proper operation of system
components could occur. Devices such as self-tapping screws and bolts shall not
be used.(3)
A fracture mechanics analysis shall be performed for each configuration of glass
structure. A proof acceptance test consistent with the type of loading shall be
conducted to screen flaws in each glass structural flight item based on the results
of the fracture mechanics analysis. All proof testing will be performed in a
suitable environment to limit flaw growth during the proof testing.(3)
1) Doors shall be used only if no other practicable methods exists to perform the
desired function.(3)
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3) Spacecraft systems requiring thermal protection doors shall be designed so
that if a door fails, the spacecraft can make a safe ascent and reentry.(3)
Pressure Vessel Design: Each pressure vessel must be designed using a factor of
safety selected to accommodate the most severe combination of environmental and
pressure conditions expected in use.(3)
Hatches: Spacecraft hatches and associated hardware (hinges, latches, seals,
actuators, etc.) shall be designed for repeated operation and inspection and shall
be repairable or replaceable in orbit.(3)
Threaded Fittings: Threaded fittings and fasteners, such as nuts, nut plates, and
bolts, used in manned spacecraft or spacecraft equipment shall be designed to
minimize the generation of metallic particles or foreign material.(3)
Exposed Sharp Surfaces and Protrusions: Exposed sharp surfaces or protrusions
which could injure crew members of damage equipment shall be eliminated or
guarded so as to avoid accidental contact.(3)
Windows and Glass Structures: The design of all spacecraft windows and other
glass structures shall include evaluation of flaw growth under the design stress
and environment.(3)
Penetration of Inhabited Compartments: Inhabited spacecraft compartments
shall be so designed that all penetrations shall take advantage of normal
pressure-induced forces to aid in maintaining vessel structure and cabin pressure
integrity.(3)
Functional Doors: Doors in the structure of the spacecraft or heat shield that open
and close during flight must be designed such that a single-point failure will not
cause the loss of crew or vehicle.(3)
Functional Requirement:
Pressure Vessel Relief: Pressure relief capability shall be provided for vessels
where the contents, system design, or operation may cause an increase in
internal pressure above the maximum designed operation pressure. Portions
of fluid systems, that trap fluids (become locked-up) should be considered
pressure vessels and should be evaluated for the need of relief capabilities.(3)
All flight vessels shall be protected during servicing, either on the ground or
in flight, by relief valves in the servicing equipment. The relief valves shall
be sized for sufficient mass flow to protect the vessel in the event of servicing
pressure regulator failure. Such as failure shall not cause the vessel to exceed
the maximum design operating pressure.(3)
The primary flight crew ingress/egress hatch used during ground operations
shall be designed to be outward opening from the pressurized spacecraft
compartment. For designs where it is impractical to have an outward opening
hatch, provisions will be made to rapidly equalize the pressure across the
match.(3)
-x_._j
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Reliable, redundant safety devices shall be provided to prevent inadvertent
opening or rapid depressurization on orbit.(3)
All mechanisms shall have manual overrides. All mechanisms used on
docking, berthing, and positioning systems shall have position indicators.
External (outside actuator) limit switches shall not be used in areas susceptible
to contamination.(3)
2) Doors shall be as small as practicable and shall be designedto cover only
the devices they protect; specifically, they will not be enlarged for use as
maintenance access doors. Designs requiring active vents will include
relief features to prevent catastrophic failures should the door fail to
operate. Vehicle aerodynamics and structural integrity will not be
catastrophically degradedby a failed door.(3)
4) For door operation that is not time critical with respect to survival of crew
and/or vehicle, an alternate manual means shall be provided if items 2 and
3 are not practicable.(3)
J
3. RELIABILITY
Guidelines:
All critical systems should be designed with known, highly reliable parts and
components. Overall reliability should be demonstrated and verified by appropriate
tests of components, subsystems, and systems. Risk analysis should be conducted to
identify ares of weakness or concern. Probabilistic risk analyses may be used to
assist in identifying problem areas or to rank risk levels in trade studies, but should
not be used in place of testing as a verification of overall design reliability.(1)
Safety analyses including logic trees, Fault Tree analyses, and Failure Modes and
Effects Analyses (FMEA) shall be employed to assess specific risks and determine how
to minimize them.(1)
...malfunction analysis, including failure-mode and failure-effect analyses to
minimize potential hazards to crew survival.(2)
...failure effects analysis (FEA) should include prelaunch operations within its
scope.(2)
The reliability of the data transmission is essential.(2)
...attention should be given to the following reliability factors:
a. Failure effects analysis.
b. Reliability improvement methods, including redundancy.
c. Design for long life...
d. Reliability design reviews.
e. consideration of the use of the pilot, where advantageous, in
ground support, operations, surveillance, and maintenance.
f. Quality assurance programs, training, etc.(2)
checkout,
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methods of promoting reliability are:
a. Reduction of the number of basic components or subsystems.
b. Simplification of components and systems.
c. Redundant design - duplication of functions through elements either
identical or different in form.
f. Application of fail-safe features modes of failure will not render the
engine unsafe or induce a noncorrectable condition.(2)
The history of reliability for components and subsystems over their complete life,
from first qualification through acceptance and system tests on to flight
tests .... (2)
All critical systems shall be designed with known high reliability parts and
components. Overall reliability shall be demonstrated and verified by appropriate
tests on components, subsystems and systems. Numerical reliability analyses may
be used to identify problem areas, however such analyses shall not be used to
verify design capability.(4)
For a basic launcher, identified for manned mission, which is also used for
unmanned missions, reliability of this vehicle is proven by previous unmanned
flights.(7)
Functional Requirements:
None
4. MANUFACTURING AND PROCUREMENT
Guidelines:
Only proven manufacturing processes and techniques should be employed.
Designers should avoid processes and approaches which are not well-understood for
the manufacture and fabrication of hardware. Designers should be included in the
approval loop for any .changes and improvements to the manufacture/fabrication
process. Prime contractors should be required to investigate manufacturing and
fabrication processes of their vendors for any unusual or new approaches which
may affect the man-rated status of components and materials being used.(1)
Inspection and tests shall be performed during the process and in the final product
to assure strict adherence to specified engineering or operational requirements.(1)
Use only proven manufacturing processes and techniques. (Designers should avoid
new processes and approaches for the manufacturing and fabrication of hardware.
They should be well acquainted with the processes to be employed and should be
included in the approval loop for any changes or improvements to such
processes.)(4)
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Functional Requirements:
Non
4.1 Parts/Materials Identification
Guidelines:
Parts and materials procured or designated specifically for use in manned
spacecraft shall be identifiable by an appropriate method and stored in controlled
access ares.(3)
Identification necessary to control parts until they are installed in an assembly is
required. The detailed methods for numbering and marking parts shall be
provided in documentation.(3)
Functional Requirements"
None
4.2 Pressure Vessel Documentation
Guidelines"
Manufacturing, processing, and pressurization histories shall be maintained on
each spaceflight pressure vessel considered to be critical to the safety and/or
success of the mission.(3)
Data required is:
1) Material certification and composition.
2) Actual fabrication and processing sequence.
3) Fluid exposure and temperature during fabrication and testing.
4) Actual chronological tests and checkout history including all proof, leak, and
cycling data along with the magnitude of pressure, type of pressurant, and
number of pressure cycles to which the tank was subjected.
5) Discrepancy history.(3)
Functional Requirements."
None
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5. QUALITY ASSURANCE
Guidelines."
A parts traceability program shall be established.(1)
The program/project should put a heavy emphasis on attaining a high level of
quality for all critical hardware and software. A quality awareness program should
be a primary feature of the quality plan for all critical hardware and software. The
plane should definitize the specific inspection and quality requirements for all such
hardware, including safeguards for handling and protecting the hardware during its
manufacture, assembly, testing, and shipment.(1)
Quality assurance...including the following mechanisms is necessary:
° Measurement of total vehicle effectiveness.
° Controlling manufacture and assembly.(2)
The program should put heavy emphasis on attaining a high level of quality for
hardware and software. (A quality awareness program should be a primary
feature of the quality plan).(4)
The responsible design element shall submit strength analysis and qualification
test reports which will verify the capability of hardware to meet design
requirements with factors of safety as specified herein.(6)
a. Margin of Safety - The responsible design element shall show by analyses
and/or tests that the hardware meets program design requirements with
sufficient margin of safety to assure adequate strength, service, life, rigidity,
and safety of personnel at all times.(6)
Hazard analyses shall be performed on system, subsystem, equipment and functional
levels with iterations between the prime contractor and all tier subcontractors.
Results shall be presented and assessed during all phased design reviews on all
levels.(7)
Quality assurance is maintained through appropriate personnel education and
training, appropriate component selection and testing, and through extensive
qualification testing.(8),
Functional Requirements:
None
5.1 Shipping/Handling Protection of Hardware
Guidelines:
Spaceflight hardware shall be suitably packaged or supported to provide
protection of the hardware from damage during handling and shipping.(3)
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Contractor or National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) personnel
will determine when shock-indicating devices are required. The use of such
devices must be approved by the appropriate program office or project office
prior to installation.(3)
Functional Requirement:
None
5.2 Reuse of Flight Hardware
Guidelines:
Flight hardware that has been previously used in flight may be reused in manned
flight if appropriate refurbishment, inspection, and testing have been
accomplished between flights.(3)
Any elements not replaced will be within all shelf-life and operational-life time
limits at the end of the mission. There shall be no evidence that the unit has been
stressed beyond specification limits during previous use.(3)
Functional Requirements"
None
6. TEST AND VERIFICATION
Guidelines:
A formal verification program should be conducted which demonstrates all
functional and performance design requirements and repair and maintenance
capability associated with man-rating. All redundant design features should be
completely demonstrated during such tests. Limits should be established and safety
margins determined by off-limits testing. The system should be fully demonstrated
unmanned prior to committing to manned operations. If this is not feasible, an
alternative plan may be considered which will completely exercise and demonstrate
the manned-safety aspects of the design.(1)
...final design must be based on full pilot-simulator tests with actual pilot-display
equipment.(2)
Man-controlled launch vehicles must eventually be simulated using man in the loop
of the simulation...(2)
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Extra testing will be required in that the EDS and shutdownprovisions must be
tested.(2)
...the astronaut must be trained in all aspectsof the systemsoperation....(2)
...all test proceduresthat are accomplishedmust be correct and formally revised
before the procedure is accomplished.(2)
A formal test and verification program shall be conducted which demonstrates
and verifies before manned launch all functional and performance design
requirements and maintenance capability associated with man-rating
requirements. All redundant design features shall be demonstratedand
exercised.(4)
Test, analysis, and inspection are common techniques for verification of design
features used to control potential hazards. The successfulcompletion of the safety
process will require positive feedbackof completion results for all verification
items associatedwith a given hazard.(5)
Test loads shall duplicate or envelopeall flight loads and include pressureand
temperatureeffects. When a separatequalification unit is used, the tests shall be
accomplishedat the yield and ultimate levels specified by the factors of safety.
a. Static Tests: In general, strength qualification testing shall be static.
b. Flight Article Simulators: If the componentto be tested is statically
determinant,it may be tested as a stand-aloneunit. If the componentto be
tested is not statically determinant, the interfacing structure through which
the loads and reactions are applied to the qualification unit must be simulated
in the test.(6)
The interfacing structure used in the test must simulate the stiffness and
boundary conditions of the corresponding flight hardware.(6)
c. Protoflight Tests: Protoflight testing and associatedtest factors may be
acceptedin lieu of static qualification testing with MSFC approval.(6)
The test factors will be limited to values which will not subject the protoflight
structure to detrimental deformations beyond the elastic limit.(6)
Functional Requirements:
The system should be fully demonstrated unmanned prior to committing to
manned operations.(1)
Prior to committing man to flight, the system shall be fully demonstrated in
flight, unmanned.(4)
Payload hazards being controlled by launch vehicle provided
services will
require post-mate interface test verification for both controls and
monitors.(5)
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76.1 Redundant Path Verification
Guidelines"
None
Functional Requirements."
The design of spacecraft
shall include a means of verifying satisfactory operation of each redundant
path at any time the system and/or subsystem is determined to require testing
prior to launch and during the mission.(3)
systems and subsystems incorporating redundancies
6.2 Adequate External Visibility Verification
Guidelines:
Simulations shall include mockups.(3)
Functional Requirements:
Visibility verification for manned spacecraft shall include tests, simulations, I
or analyses to verify that the crew will have adequate visibility during all[
anticipated phases and environmental conditions of the planned mission.(3) I
M.J
6.3 Verification Tests for Electrical and Electronic Supplies and Loads
Guidelines."
None
Functional Requirements:
nd support equipment, facilities, and other equipment to be connected to al
spacecraft system for operation, testing, checkout, or maintenance shall bel
designed to that routine verification tests can be conducted before eachl
connection is made, to ensure that each electrical and electronic input to the[
spacecraft is compatible with the spacecraft system.(3) J
6.4 Fluid Supply Verification
Guidelines:
Procedures to accomplish the verification tests shall be provided with the
equipment. Calibration fluids shall be furnished with analysis reports.(3)
Functional Requirements'
equipment
round Support equipment, facilities, fluid containers, and other
e connected to a spacecraft system for operation, testing,
aintenance shall be designed so that routine verification
onducted before each connection is made to ensure that each
he spacecraft will be compatible with the spacecraft system.(3)
t°1orbetocheckout,tests canfluid input
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6.5 Pressure Vessel Qualification
Guidelines:
The compatibility of pressure vessel materials with processing, inspecting,
testing, and flight fluids will be verified by data obtained under conditions
simulating the intended fluid-use environment.(3)
The scope of the program shall be sufficient to show compatibility of the fluid and
material for the anticipated temperature range, pressure range, pressure cycle
history of the vessel, and fluid composition range. The qualification program will
include tests on pressure vessels containing the flight fluids at the maximum
pressure allowed by the relief devices or maximum pressure expected for vessels
without relief devices. In addition, the conditions of the tests will include
exposure to the most deleterious operation temperature expected in use. The
vessels, while containing the flight fluid, shall be subjected to the above pressure
and temperature conditions for twice the expected pressurized life or for 1 year,
whichever is less. The flight duration shall include the time from initial
pressurization, with the flight fluid, and the anticipated launch pad hold times
under pressure. For testing of pressure vessels with decaying pressure, flight
duration can be taken as the time from initial pressurization with the flight fluid
including the anticipated launch pad hold times under pressure to the time at
which the internal pressure of the vessel reaches one-half the maximum
pressure allowed by the relief device or one-half maximum operating pressure,
whichever pressure is less.(3)
Functional Requirements."
None
7. MANAGEMENT REVIEW AND CONTROL
Guidelines:
Reporting of results by procedure/report number and date is required.(5)
Strength analysis reports shall be submitted to MSFC in support of the following
four design reviews: PDR, CDR, DCR, and FRR. These reports shall be current with
respect to loads and the design at the time of the review.
a. Strength Analysis: The responsible design element shall perform strength
analysis and document them so that it is clearly demonstrated that strength
requirements have been fulfilled.(
b. Documentation Content: The strength analysis reports shall be prepared in
accordance with standard aerospace industry practices for flight hardware.(6)
31
The analysis shall clearly identify such items as geometric description of each
component, identification of all applied loads, type of material and applicable
strength allowables, environments and effects, proper identification of
referencesfor all input into the analyses,and a summaryof all calculated
margins of safety.(6)
Quality control is maintained through extensive physical inspection, extensive
failure analysis, and through fully implemented corrective actions and the reporting
and documentationof all such actions. (8)
Functional Requirements:
None
7.1 Hardware/Software Failure and Corrective Action Reporting
Guidelines:
All failures are to be exhaustively investigated to assure that the cause is
reasonably understood and that all corrective actions have been implemented and
verified. This discipline should be enforced from the start of development and
continued throughout the operating life of the system.(1)
System requirements reviews, preliminary design reviews, critical design
reviews, design certification reviews, readiness reviews, and special safety/risk
assessment reviews.(1)
...malfunction analysis, including failure-mode and failure-effect analyses to
minimize potential hazards to crew survival.(2)
Translating the needs for higher safety into systems and components has been
and is being accomplished by starting with a review of the launch vehicle and a
failure effects analysis (FEA) .... Consequently, reliability and abort studies were
combined with test results and FEA's to make up the data necessary for defining
the vehicle modifications and abort systems.(2)
...attention should be given to the following reliability factors:
d. Reliability design reviews.(2)
Hardware/Software Failure and Corrective Action Reporting: Verification of
flight readiness - a) Where flight or flight-like equipment has failed, launch-to-
orbit of like equipment, either as an initial assembly or as an on-orbit
replacement, shall not be permitted unless a) an analysis of the failure has
established that the basic deficiency which caused the failure is not present in
the replacement equipment, and b) the basic deficiency has been Counteracted by
changes in operational procedures to a degree that eliminates it as a significant
threat to the success of the mission or the safety or the crew.(3)
The basic deficiency is determined to represent no significant threat to the
success of the mission and safety of the crew.(3)
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Hardware/Software failure and Corrective Action Reporting: All failures shall be
exhaustively investigated to assure that the cause is completely understood and
that corrective action is implemented and verified. This discipline shall be
enforced from the start of development and continued to mature operations.(4)
Management assessment and review of man-rating criteria and requirements
shall be conducted in conjunction with the various design reviews, special risk
assessment exercises, flight readiness reviews, etc.(4)
Hardware/Software failure and Corrective Action Reporting: All anomalies
during the previous payload missions must be assessed for safety impact.(5)
Those anomalies affecting safety critical systems must be reported and
corrected.(5)
The results of safety analyses and hazard close-outs are subject to each major
project review. This includes the review of safety assurance approaches, the
review of caution, warning, and fusing concepts, the review of the hazard close-
out status, and a safety "walk-through" of the engineering models. The approval
for parts and material processing should be strictly followed, involving all
contract tiers up to the prime contractor and the sponsoring government agency.
Any non-compliance has to be sanctioned by waiver.(7)
A technical acceptance for each launch vehicle shall be conducted, with the
scope of this review in sufficient detail to evaluate all test data, discrepancies and
corrective actions, and all problem encountered during fabrication, assembly and
testing. Any disagreement with the contractor's resolution shall result in non-
acceptance until further investigations and/or corrective actions have been
performed.(8)
Functional Requirements:
None
7.2 Documentation
Guidelines:
All documentation concerning formal test and verification, manufacturing,
configuration control, and related matters should be maintained under strict
management control. This shall include analyses related to critical issues
involving man-rating.(l)
Maintained as part of the official files of the program.(1)
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Extensive procedural documentation is required for...quality control during
fabrication stages or production stages.(2)
...a quality control program covers the operation from inception, through design,
to utilization.(2)
...a program including the following mechanismsis necessary:
• Critical evaluation of all deviations.
• Timely feedback of deviation information to responsible areas.(2)
Special ProcessesIdentified: Manufacturing, assembly, or installation drawings
for spacecraft, spaceflight equipment, experiments, and mission essential ground
support equipment shall identify on the appropriate drawings all special
processesrequired to manufacture, assemble, and install the equipment.(3)
Explosive Device Identification: Explosive devicesshall be identified as to source,
purpose, and operating characteristics.(3)
Identification of Flight and Nonflight Equipment: The status of flight and
nonflight equipment shall be identified and classified.(3)
Processspecifications shall be referenced,or the processesshall be specified in
detail on the respective drawings.(3)
The following information shall be furnished with each device:
1) Part name
2) Contractor
3) Manufacturer
4) Part, lot, and serial number
5) Date of manufacturer
6) Type of device and weight of explosive.(3)
Three types of classification:
Class I for equipmentacceptablefor flight use, Class II (Controlled Equipment) for
equipment acceptablefor use in ground tests or training in a hazardous
environment, Class III (Not For Flight) for equipment acceptablefor
nonhazardous training and display purposes.(3)
All documentationhaving to do with formal test and verification, manufacturing,
configuration control, etc., shall be maintained under strict management
control.(4)
Critical procedure/processsteps must be identified in the appropriate hazard
report.(5)
a) A payload safety verification tracking log is required.
b) The payload organization must provide a summaryof the hazards being
controlled by launch system services in a safety assessmentreport.
c) The payload organization must document in individual hazard reports those
launch vehicle interfaces used to control and/or monitor the hazards.(5)
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Functional Requirements:
None
7.3 Certification for Use
Guidelines:
The system should be certified for usage only after a review board is satisfied that
all verification requirements have been properly completed and that there are no
open issues or anomalies that have not been resolved.(1)
The review board will be charged with ensuring the system is man-rated.(1)
The vehicle shall be certified for flight only after the Safety/Certification Board
is satisfied that all requirements for verification have been satisfactorily
completed and that there are no open issues or anomalies that have not been
resolved.(4)
A payload shall be certified safe in the applicable worst case natural and induced
environments, as defined in the payload integration plan (PIP).(5)
a) Series payloads and reflown hardware must be recertified as safe.
b) The acceptance rationale for all deviations from previous flight procedures
and operations must be validated by the payload organization.(5)
Flight safety reviews shall include a complete vehicle history for flight readiness,
and a final technical evaluation.(8)
Functional Requirements:
None
8. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
Guidelines"
None
Functional Requirements:
None
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8.1 Safe Operations
Guidelines:
Space system hardware should not be operated beyond its design limits.
Subsystems should also not be operated in such a way as to compromise the safety
of other hardware of the system. Limits of safety for crew activities will be
determined and tested during mission simulations prior to the conduct of the
mission.(1)
Crewmembers shall provide input to all phases of the design, development,
testing, and evaluation of the system.(1)
Rescue operations after the initial emergency are as extensively planned as the
vehicle systems.(2)
On-the-pad emergency egress procedures are mandatory in manned space vehicle
operations.(2)
Range safety requirements have also been modified for manned launches .... with
man as a payload, destruction cannot be instantaneous: instead, a three-second
margin...allowed for abort and escape.(2)
...consider alternate missions...instead of destroying the entire launch vehicle and
aborting the crew.(2)
Test and Operating Procedures: Procedures developed for testing and operating
spacecraft or ground support equipment shall clearly indicate any step which, if
not correctly followed, would result in injury to personnel, damage to a system or
equipment, or an environmental impact.(3)
Pressure Venting System: Crew cabin module pressure venting systems shall be
designed such that the relief valves do not vent the crew cabin module
atmosphere into space through compartments or outlets that are used to vent
other fluids.(3)
Pressure Garments: .Systems which supply pressure to the crew's pressure
garments shall be designed so that a major failure of one crew member's garment
or garment pressure supply will not cause loss of life of other crew members.(3)
The cover sheet of the procedure should identify it as a safety-critical
operation.(3)
Payloads shall be designed to maintain fault tolerances or safety margins
consistent with the hazard potential without ground or flight services.(5)
a) During emergency conditions, power wilt be provided temporarily to payloads
for payload safing and verification if necessary.
b) All hazardous commands that can be sent to the payload shall be identified.
c) Monitoring shall be available to the launch site when necessary to assure safe
ground operations.(5)
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.a. Handling and transportation Factors for Flight Structures: As a goal, flight
structure design shall be based on flight loads and conditions rather than on
transportation and handling loads. Transportation equipment design shall
ensure that flight structures are not subjected to loads more severe than flight
design conditions.(6)
General Safety Factors for Metallica Flight Structures Yield
Verified by Analysis Only 1.25
Verified by Analysis and Static Test 1.10
Ultimate (6)
2.00
1.40
. General Safety Factors for Non-Metallica Flight Structures
Verified by Analysis and Static Test
Non-Discontinuity Areas
Discontinuity Areas and Joints
*Note: Structural Test Factor = 1.4
° General Safety Factor for Solid Propellants
Solid Propellant, Insulation, Liner, and Inhibitor 2.0
. Safety Factors for Pressures
a. Propellant Tanks:
Proof Pressure
Yield Pressure
Ultimate Pressure
b. Solid Motor Castings:
**Proof Pressure
Yield Pressure
Ultimate Pressure
= 1.05 x limit pressure
= 1.10 x limit pressure
= 1.40 x limit pressure
- 1.05 x limit pressure
= 1.20 x limit pressure
= 1.40 x limit pressure
c. Windows, Doors, Hatches, etc.
Internal Pressure Only:
Proof Pressure - 2.00 x limit pressure
Ultimate Pressure = 3.00 x limit pressure
d. Engine Structures and Components:
**Proof Pressure = 1.20 x limit pressure
Yield Pressure = 1.50 x limit pressure
e. Hydraulic and Pneumatic Systems, including reservoirs:
1. Lines and Fittings, less than 1.5 inches (38 mm) diameter:
ProofPressure = 2.0 x limit pressure
Ultimate Pressure = 4.0 x limit pressure
2. Lines and Fittings, less than 1.5 inches (38 mm) diameter:
Proof Pressure = 1.2 x limit pressure
Ultimate Pressure = 1.5 x limit pressure
3. Reservoirs:
Proof Pressure = 1.5 x limit pressure
Ultimate Pressure = 2.0 x limit pressure
4. Actuating Cylinders, Valves, Filters, Switches:
Proof Pressure = 1.5 x limit pressure
Ultimate Pressure = 2.0 x limit pressure
f. Personnel Compartments, Internal Pressure Only:
Proof Pressure -- 1.50 x limit pressure
Yield Pressure = 1.65 x limit pressure
Ultimate Pressure = 1.65 x limit pressure
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**Note: Proof factor determined from fracture mechanics service life analysis
must be used in if greater than those shown.(6)
All flight constraints and proceduresfor nominal and abort operations shall be
maintained. A thorough knowledge of the vehicle divergence characteristics is
necessary, in particular, of vehicle break-up or of exceeding crew physiological
limits.(8)
Functional Requirements:
...special testing to assure compatibility of the spacecraft with the launch
vehicle.(2)
..proper operation of emergency detection...systems(2)
...proper operation of...abort systems(2)
...all test procedures that are accomplished must be correct and formally
revised before the procedure is accomplished.(2)
Generally, on a manned launch, pad access is strictly controlled...(2)
GSE and ASE Protective Devices: Ground support equipment (GSE), airborne
support equipment (ASE), facility equipment, or test equipment used in ground
or flight operations shall be equipped with protective devices to preserve safe
operating margins of the spacecraft subsystems.(3)
Cabin Ventilation: Crew cabin module ventilation fans shall be protected by
creens or other devices to prevent entrance of debris that could damage or
am the fan blades during zero-gravity conditions. Such screens or other
levices shall be serviceable and/or replaceable.(3)
8.2 Periodic Check-Out and Maintenance
Guidelines"
The operating life of each critical subsystem should be conservatively
determined. A schedule for the periodic check-out of such subsystems should be
maintained. Periodic maintenance should be performed as required, to sustain
the safety margins of critical subsystems. Ease of access and maintainability
should be designed in.(1)
Control of Limited-Life Components: Appropriate documentation shall accompany
all time-critical and limited-life items and shall include the date of manufacture
of the item and of its most time-critical component. Realistic life limits shall be
assigned and documented for each item and shall be suitably altered as new data
and new evidence are obtained.(3)
Servicing/Testing Port Capping: Servicing and test ports shall be designed such
that they can be capped immediately after servicing or test in order to preclude
leakage in flight.(3)
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rVenting-Induced Forces: Sources of venting that could occur during the mission
shall be identified and an analysis made to ensure that the total vent condition is
designed to be compatible with vehicle and/or mission control capabilities.
Impingement of vent plumes on spacecraft elements shall be analyzed.(3)
Each time-critical or limited-life assembly, subassembly, component, and spare
shall be clearly and indelibly marked with a serial number.
Status records shall be maintained on all such items after installation in the
spacecraft.(3)
Special storage requirements shall be carefully defined and strictly observed.(3)
a) Limited Life Items: All safety critical age sensitive equipment must be
refurbished or replaced.
b) Refurbishment: Safety impact of any changes, maintenance or refurbishment
made to the hardware or operating procedures must be assessed and reported
in safety assessment reviews.(5)
Functional Requirements:
A history of system performance shall be maintained and monitored to detect!
possible degradations over time. Fail-operational/fail-safe subsystems shall
allow maintenance to upgrade the subsystem without being degraded below
fail-safe during maintenance actions.(1)
Prelaunch Nozzle/Vent Protection: All nozzles and vents used in manned
spacecraft systems, such as those of the reaction control system and
environmental systems, shall be protected from entrance of rain, debris, or
other contaminants prior to launch.(3)
Electrical and fluid-handling subsystems shall include checkout test points
which will permit checkout tests to be made without disconnecting tubing or
electrical connectors normally connected in flight.(3)
These ports will not utilize permanent closure methods.(3)
Nonpropulsive vent concepts, opposed venting, operational procedures, or
eliminate the undesirable effects ofsimilar methods • shall be used to
perturbing forces resulting from such vents.(3)
Protective covers for nozzles or vents located within the payload by shall be
designed to be readily removable during the countdown prior to launch or
prior to final closure of the Orbiter payload bay doors.(3)
8.3 Repairability
Guidelines:
Components of critical subsystems _hould have sufficient accessibility for
replacement or repair during extended-duration missions. Spare requirements
should be determined from detailed analysis of subsystem performance and life
test data. The mission duration of a quiescent system should include the time it is
dormant.(1)
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Spare critical componentsshould be available for the replacementduring the
missions.(l)
Equipment Accessibility: Systems,Subsystems,equipment, and componentsshall
be designed with features that contribute to the ease and rapidity of maintenance
by both humans and robots.(3)
Equipment expected to require servicing, replacement, or maintenance shall be
accessiblewithout the removal of other equipment, wire bundles, and fluid lines.
This should include accessibility during ground operations as well as on
orbit.equipment expected to require servicing, replacement, or maintenance
shall be accessiblewithout the removal of other equipment,wire bundles, and
fluid lines. This should include accessibility during ground operations as well as
on orbit.(3)
Electrical connectors and cable installations shall permit disconnection and
reconnection without damage to wiring or connectors.(3)
Payloadsshall be designed such that any required access to hardware during
flight or ground operations (e.g., maintenance,repair) can be accomplishedwith
minimum risk to personnel.(5)
Functional Requirements:
ne
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
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APPENDIX A
Functional Flow Block Diagrams
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1.4 Bsssz_I Dete_tlom an4 IlaflnG (24)
In sll cs:e=...the 4estt_ct coomaa4 signal is 41splay_l to the crew s: • light. (2)
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L.4 iasar4 Dotectloa snd fla_lng (2e)
d_ott, m_sglng co.and, mtsge sepatetl_ signal: sz_ c_n to a_l Ir,D4m, (2)
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1.4 I_ssr4 DetectLoa and I_fLng (:f)
_te: melectLoa of the senmor ram41e and _LtchLng event:, m44M_p_tm pyovlsLoum for _: failure _C be --de.
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1.4 hSa_ _te_tloa _ _ft_ (2g)
_el_ to: _tfe coatrol _/o: shut_m of cr£tlcsl elements by sutcQstLc or manual systl. (2)
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1.4 _sar4 Det_ctl_ and I_flnq ($a)
7£re Control, The capebilLty shall be pr_r£ded to 4erect say tire. Eeaa: tubal1 be p:ovLde4 for fLre-
roslst_mt storage of all Items tJ_t ate not sel_-oztla4_lsh£ng when they sro not In uae. (3)
lnterLo: _lls aa4 secoa4ary str_ctures shall be selt-eztLaqu£shtag. A11 ¢cabust/blen shall be self-
extLn_lshlag In t_s a_st severe oxl41siaq eaviroaaeat to _lch t3_¥ _111 be expose4. The aat_rLel uJed to
extin_lsh fl:es _t be _tox/a _ _apeblo of being easily cleave4 up st_r ume. (3)
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1.4 Basar4 DeteetJ.cm sad 8sfing (Sa)
Jt_propw181:4 £'L'_tJ.mUJ, _ _lel_at.e4, s]1_11 be capable of ]l)elnG tested for pz'opew olp0rlltl_ d_t'J.nG both
gro_md and flight phases. (S)
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1.| ]ted_ (1,2a)
I_rmteaa should be 4emlgne4 _ that thl Interrupt1•• of gas fl_, fluid, o: electrical current should not, by
Itself, caume • critical ¢oa_Ltloa. Illngle polnt fsllutos a_l credLblo sLngle failure ao4em shall be guarded
sgstnat thresh mepsratloa of teduadant paths, failure pto_gati_ o_t_l, and x_4undancy nsnage_nt.
_•ly redun4ant eye•earn or ¢oqxmeate should be prohibited ftol perforalnG theLr functLoa _ualese
• lte_ whlch ere n_-operatlve untll they are switched Late
the mub_rmtei upo_ failure of the prlmsz7 ele_nt. (1)
Luto_tlc detection and swltchLnG must be u_d for the violent ¢oat:ol malfunction type of •allure... (2)
_'tabllsh • llst of posstblo fllght f•llute modem •_1 analytically 4etonalne the pro]_lllt¥ of failures. (|)
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1.7 Materials (3a)
Panctiomal _z_maat. laeludinq, but not li_it_ to, load 4Ltstributloa_sm_t_, touporat_t_, 11re, and
ue of mrpomure eavlroaaont, ,issll be mot by coaBi4eratloa ot ._ch mterisl properties 8s mJchsnlcal strength,
fatigue, Chorlsl ,_111ty, ttsct_ure tougha4mm, sad flsw propagatLoa rates.
• sterlsl comi_tiblllt¥ _z_mJate .bell be sac by coas14er, tioa of po4mlble 4_Tra4_tivo mmcbenlsmm Including
, but not limited Co, mtremm corromloo, gaZvaalc or41eelmllar--Cal cor_loa, hy4rogeu eabrlttlemont, creep,
cycl. _ thors_l Zattg_e, oxldstloa, vscu_l stability, Im4 ra41.tloa ezl_osure. (3)
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Z.? atotials (3b)
IIl_tri_l wire lnJit_atLoa, vitlnq aCcesmorleJ, _um orl_lJ _n GO41_Gt IrLth olo_t_cal tubal1 DOt
enviro_uant to be onc_ntetod during
[operation*
1) fter reaovsl of the £gnltioa source.
2) I'ollm_.ng noltlnq of the electrl_tl conductor by high currents, such as tho_ resulting frm8 short
circuits or equlgmeat u_lf_mctloam. ())
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1.7 Ma_r£als (3_)
2_tcttyl
_;_-_ _rlng. noa-m_llic mcertsls usod viCh£n crmr com_z_mnts s_ll not prov_ao a cc_c
scmospl_ro. (3)
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1.7 Natertale (S)
s) rot hazardot_ --tor£sle that "_'t be contained, each level of c_talnaent w111 be free ofleeks un4er
uxlama ume coa41tio_s. Docunsat_tioa of all chea/¢als uJed s:4 their --thod of coa_£z_sut w111 be
smlntain_i.
b) payloads shall not ccaJtLtut_ sa uncontrolled fire _asa:4, and • flam_b£1Lty assesa_snt shall be
4ocumante4.
c) _torlal: _ In the cz_w csb£n and other habitable areas aust be tested under worst-case cabin
env£ronaant coadLttloal. Ot£gaeeLng tests shall be coaducto4. (S)
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1.| Display1 and Ooatrols (ls, _b, 28)
Dlsplaym and eoattolm should be provided to the ©roy for ooaltor£ng aymt4m itamtu4m amd fa£1ure slerts. (1)
licit be s_lls]ble, accessible, _ r_ctable in emBrgen_r BltuattoAs. C_t_lJ for ©ritlcal f_tio_m m_t
not be able to be sctLvsted 05" 4eactlvste4 Lnadvectently. (1)
...a comblMtl_ of aut_tl© sad pLlot o_trol is faired. ¢_ _rr£4e should be provide4 _re sl_lm
may be erroneou-. (2)
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1.e DLopla¥I _ _ttolm (2c)
_oro _rt is _ altto_ut c_, • clear cILcat£on ci1 It o_et for a_ce _ recover. (2)
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1.0 Dtsplays sad _trole (2d)
...the computer shou/4 have all po4sLble alternate nlsaloaJ pteptcgta:mo4 so ch4t the optJJsm alte_te
nloslom co:be melocte4. The_, nev commanAm can be supplied to the flLght control system, snd Illuminated
display 110hts oa the ©:ev,s co_Jole tells them ot the 81_z_ate mlmm_oa snd the hey lP4r_ters that require
resetting, 1: spp11¢ablo.(:)
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1.0 Dlaplays u_d C_t:oll ($a)
(Z_/¢Jtioa of I_£1uz_)s
Tbo_l _m_l_emmntl lyltm _L©h AqJplay ct£tLcal flight inforlllti¢_ to tho troy oil pin*l i_ULclto:! Jhlll b*
demLgnod mo that vlbea nuch a systea fs:L_s, £t mhould provLde -- indLcatLcm of its faLIuro. (3)
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1.| _lLmplayn and coatro18 (3b)
(&ttLt_ coatrol &uthorLty}
spacecraft autmmtlo attltude e_trol ¢£rcultry shall be 6osigl6d so that the crew can assunJ uanuaX attltude
control at a11 t/ass. (3)
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2.8 Displays and Cootroll ($d)
(Oyroscopi¢ Porformln_e Yerlti©stl¢_
Gildince ill liviagaticm mubiymtemi, itiblilsaticm sibl_stell, ¢oat:ol suliiyateml, and any almllir lubiyiteill
u:ini triToscopel 2or guidance or stabllLzatioa of spacecraft during propulaloa s_dDsyatem operat£c_ shall
)rovide coutinuoul outputs for virl£icition and proper gyroscope rotational speed or drift rate. (3)
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1.8 DJ._iplays _ _GQtI"O],I ($e,_)
£ ground support servLcing equlpoent teqvlrLng storage of reactive flu14s (L.e.,
oxidiser, _oproipellants, ate.) sha2l be designed to 2ncIude dart©am for nm_£toring teaperature and pressure
to permit acc_ato dI_rKLnat1_ of the rates of actlve o_ loss of the oxldlsar conta£nod £n the£r
reactive _rstl. _3)
(Atmospheric PrQiJuro and ¢omp_ltl_ ¢oatrol)
provlsL_a shall be I-4o to mon'Ltor and castro1 ozygan, carbon moocz14e, atmospherLc presage, an4 trace
contsa/nants. Trace cont_taantm my be organ£c, £nergso£c, or bLologLcal. (3)
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1.8DisplaysendConUo4s(3h)(CriticalComponents)
Forcriticalcomponents,autometk:satingwithmanualoverrideonly shall be used.(3)
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1.0 D_spl&ys and coatrolJ ($c, 3£)
(Ir4paratiol lena£ng Jystem)
leparat£on sen_ing rjtrJtems used to detect se_ratLoa of stages or Imdulos of the spaco vehicle shall be
deltgned so that t©tuatioa of separatioa senmor8 w_11 not rsmult from structural _fomt£oa or v£btat£ons
lea8 severe than tho_ amsoc£ated with mtructural failure of the vshl¢lo. (3)
Ighete the sepa_ati _n senain4r r/Item LI u_ed to Initiate autcaat£cally subsequent, steps £n • sequence of
ovents, the menmLn(1 system shall be ©onf£gured ao that tctuatLom or falluto of • 8£ngle s@nsor will not
initiate the soq_nc6 of oventm. (3)
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1.0 DLJplaym sad ¢_atz_le (3J)
(Oyromcopi© I_fe-olpm Vorificstioa)
Znmodlately prior to _ino ig_Ltioe for launch, £ncl_ling £nflight la_nchea, the rotatLo_sl speed or drift
rtte o= a11 gyz_cope=, norls11¥ required to operate a launch, shall be verif£ed to be within required mste
ol;_ratLng 11alia.(:)
Rolste4
IP&rKJtotor j
1.0 IS
Zn_e©t Da_r_
1.o.oJ
r 79
O_t_t
1.0.93
1elated
Par&l_rm
I.O.OG
Znps©t
Ds_
1. OIJ.L-
IO
gi_d_t 11 xln4J
_tmu
Pro-launch
Bymt ea II_vl rcameat
f 70
- lam_h
8sfo Op4
Vorl fLoatlms
f
03 •
A11 _t_t
Ver4££esCioa
Xapaot
Ds_a
1.0.92
01
RoZatod
Psr---tots
1,(.00
lelsted
PalCxLut_l_OlCilt
1.0.07
_t_ls
_:te_
_ct Dsl_
• l|
ayro-A_vIie4
gys_
Output
1.0.9|
J
Output
2.8.J)4
lequlre4
Display
Oui:pul=
1.0.97
I D I_t_t vo:ielc.t£_j _q:.abe_
MR_l,8 11
System Architect
Thu Sep 10,1992 18:17
1.8 Displays and Controls (3L)
"Arm" and "fire" shall be separate functions and separately displayed. Arm and fire switches shall be guarded switchew.(3)
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l.gAborts(1)
Crediblefailuresforwhk:habortproceduresshouldbedevelopedshallinclude,ataminimum,onengineoutandlossofcabinpressure.
Allabortscenariosshallbe tested and the crew fully Veined in their execution.(1 )
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2. Design Practices (1)
a) Cryogenic systems, with sactk)n8 where cryogenic liquid may be trapped, should be designed to prevent line rupture
b) Cryogenic systems, with sech_)ns where cryogenic liquid may be trapped, shouid be designed to pcevent line rupture if relief valves
freeze. System shouid be provided with relief valves paralleled by burst discs.
c) Systems or materials, which are potentially hazardous if allowed to physically meet, shall be redundantly separated or shielded from one
another, or adequately spaced apart.
d) A detection system and an appropriate exhaust or neutralizing system should be provided where toxic or explosive gases may be
expected.
e) Oxygen flow limiters and/or monitoring devices should be required to insure against oxygen partial pressure build-up or decrese.(1)
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2. Design I_ac_:es (h)
Outer shells (i.e.. vacuum jackets) shell have pressure relief capal_lity to preclude rupture.(0)
Outer Shells
(Vacuum Jackets)
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2. Design Pratt|tee (k)
_V'nere pressure regulators, rebef devices end/or • thermal contro; system ere used to conUol pressure, coile_Uvely they must be two.
fault tolerant from causing pressure to exce4Ki MPO.{6)
Relief devices must be redundant and sized to permit full flow at MDP.(5)
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2.1 _meral Zs:_e8 ()a)
LZectrlcal _rlaG of re4_m44:t _ratemm, re4_4aat m_rfstelm, or z_d_tsnt xm_or eZ'_'Btl of m_baystexu
shaZl not be :oqted Ln the seas wire bua41e or though the mum con_tor w£thout vitlng of the othsr
redundant _ateam, =ublyot_s, or oub_sten ele_nt, P_dvadsnt syate_ sad redundant components should
be deaLgne4 mo se not to preclu4e coacurrent operat_LonJ. (3)
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2.1 OQn4=al Z::_: (3b)
Protective covers shall be pro_L4e4. The _se of psrtlculate-genlrattng nstorlals and surfaces Ls
prohibited. =f such nsterlal =n-t be u_e4 _ nut ol_be= be aosr_d, encased, or tal_d. Thl _ntllstlon
symtea shall lnclade 4ebwLs-oollectlom screeu _ el: lnlete. It_moval sad/or coatrol of btologl©e11¥ active
ccs_onents shall be c_14ore4 whoa specifying the m of 4ebris screeam or filters. (3)
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3.1 Oeaeral Zssues ()c)
_eslfa pl_Jblng to be IneenJlt£ve to the 1£qu14 leakage. Demlgu plvmb£_ or equLpmlnC coata£ntng the
liquid to lo_ste couplinGe, vents0 servLco po£nt=, and otho: It---- wt_ro leakage from th_s could not re4ch
the me_lClve equlpmont for leaksge 4urlng ground operaC£ou. Pro_Lde l--ulatlon to prevent condenmsCe eras
fa111_ on the eqUtl;mmnt. (3)
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2.2 ilectriotl Z-auel ()t)
(De-energisl_ IL_ectr_csl ¢irc_t_)
Spacecraft ole_&r£©sl s]rstea_ shall be _mi_ so t_mt all meces_m&-F mariaN; and 4emat£_ of connectors can
be acccs_lLmbed _rlt_out pz_d_£mg electrical ar_s that w£11 dmamge coanector pin8 or £_mit_ murro_u_ing
materiels or _l_rl. (3)
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2.2 Ii_trl_l Zssues ($b)
(i_ot_tl_ Devtce8 _or IIoXl4-11tate
Ci_uLta)
I?_t_tl_ 4evlceB m_e4 in crltLcal el_t=onl¢ clr©ults to p_t_t _114-state cL_Lt elmnts sh_11
be verifie4 as m_r to f_tioa. ($)
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2.2 Ilectrlcal Issues (3c)
(Ib:Gine _ut4mm C*rcultry)
Design of circuitry for aut_sstlc shut4own of launch _lclo engine(s) shall inclu4e protectloa
against polsLble engine shut4own coinci4eatal with, or J_mo41ately stter, launch vehicle rele4se. (3)
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2.2 ILlectrL_l Zssues (]d)
Ir_ectto_L¢ aad ele_tt/c_l eq_lLpRent, electtLcal connx_tors and utrLng J_nct£o_J to con_ectors shall be
protected froa u_lsture by -_tho4m vt_L©h are 4emonattsted by toet or snalysLe to prov_Ld4 a44quate
,:otectloa to preveat open and short ¢Ltculte. (3)
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2.2 IlocttLcal Zssuem (3e)
Oal_sl (:_tors awe ape_lflca11¥ 4oslgl_4 and appx_ve4 for aatLaG or d_mating In tJ_ ezlatl_
envtz_ed_nt under the lo6d_ beln4J carried, they s]_11 not be imtod ot 4olmte4 unr.4tZ voltages havo been
fz_m the p<mor_l o£de(o) ot the co_e_tor. (3)
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;I.2 ILloctrical Zssuos (3f)
Device ha_ion_lla, ¢Lz-clLtt fauZt toZerance, shLol(Ltn_. (3)
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3.3 fluid Zesue: (3e,b)
Flov lentrLetLonm - I_rol:_rlse4 so_wco:: Where p:eu_rLso4 gas 1Lne: ©cmld fsil Ln such a way that the
total ga: Jul_ly 4umDe4 41:oatly Into • coa_srtasnt vould be greater than the teller vll_e or _mtlng could
haaAle wlUbout ovez_z_ss_,_lsaticm of the c_:tammt0 _eamsz_/ flow :estri©tioa: mhall be l_=oz_orate4 at
the prosmlure a_uz_e to reotrlct the --:: £1ow to • level that cam be handled by t3bo relief valve mind/or
venting. (3)
The £1ow reetrLctl_ murat not Lnterfo:e with the norms1 operstioa of the mTst_m. (3)
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2.3 Fluid Zs:ues (34)
t°_e _s_ m_'ll bo fz_e of 4esd-onde4 piping o: paessgea through vStLLch fluJh£a41 fluid cannot be umde
to fl_. D_sln sml bZeed poz_o shaZ1 be prov£464 for att£tudee anticipated during g_o_=d servicing of
the _-stems. (3)
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2.4 Mechanical/Structural issues (3a)
Pressure Vessel Relief:. Pressure relief capability shall be provided for vessels where the conbmte, system design, or operation may
cause an increase in Interred pressure above the maximum designed operation pressure. _s of fluid systems that trap fluids
become kx:ked-up) should be considered pressure vessels and should be evaluated for the need of relief capabilities.(3)
kll flight vessels shell be protected during servicing, either on the ground or in flight, by relief valves in the sMvicing equipment. The
relief valves shall be sized for sufficient mass flow to protect the vessel in the event of servicing pressure regulator failure. Such as
failure shall not cause the vessel to exceed the maximum design operating pressure.(3)
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2.4 lleGba_teal/Ittuct_rsl Zuuee ()¢)
pr4u-ry fILght trey Ingrejs/egz_sJ hatch tu_d during grom_l operstLoa= lha11 be designed to be outward
O_bD_D(/ fL_Rt_be p_iSUJr£SOd i_41eOCtlt coaBatt/l_nt. I_)r 4eiL_uwbowe It 1= J_Brsct£cal to have u outvstd
opening hatch, pz_rLmlcma v111 be is4e to :sp141¥ eq_liso _ho prs=l_ro sc:oll the mst©h.())
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2.4 ldJchan_l/Jtz_tursl Yeeuee ($d)
Itel_able, redu_Jant _fety 6ov_Lo6n sha31 be prov_de_l to pZ_JvolJt Lnadvoz_ont oponAng or rapid
d_ptess_rlzstloa oa orbit. (3)
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:t.4 Me_l_l/gtz_t_sl Zsm_m ($e)
All meaha:lmbs s]_11 have as:_l over:14em. A11 _lml_ _m4 oa 4oc_Lng, bert_Lao, sn4
po=ltlm_L_/ _'mt_ si_11 _ve pomlt£oa £n41cstoz'm. Ilxt6_l (out=£4e tct,_tot) 11mlt mrLtclml
_11 not be v_e4 £n s_s n_=eptLble to ¢cata_LMt£oo. (3)
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I. _mt _ Veri£ioatimm (1,1)
systum should be f_ly 4k_m_tratod _ prior to ooaitti_l to _ ol_ratioas. (1)
Prior to coil&triM m to flight, t_l I_stm s_ll be f_ll¥ demoostrat_ in flight, _mma6d.(4)
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6. Test sad Vorlflcatlo8 (S)
Psyload hasaz_iJ being c_trolled by Itmh _Lcle p:ovldod sez-71cos v111 z_Nlz_ post-mete Lnterface
test verlflesttoo for bor_ eoetwols and u_nltor-. (5)
Peyloe4
u-t_4i
To v_m_h
Vehicle
J'lvld xnt,.erfaco Psi:4
ftQ,!
Jl_:h_d._tl Xnter£aoe Dsl:4
4.0.J
ILtectrlcus2 Zaterface Data
4.0.10
f
f
f
ol_:atloa
_rltorla
4.0.12
r
Znl:erfaoe
1_14t
Verl fleatlos
_tlea
sm_re4
Xnterface Databaso
_trola
u-sard_
Dst4
4.0.11
M081tofs &
DI_LaT8
L ;
_J
10.611
System JL_.hl_A_t
I_p 08, lj92 0t044
6.1 II,o4unMiamt Psth Ver£tlostloa (3)
Tho delLgB of ipacoertft _,st_ and s_st_ LncorporatLng r_lundancLee shall £ncludo • u,nuuw of
v_r_LtytmG satlsfa©toty operatt_ o£ each :ed_n4ia_t path at say ttsa the myst-- and/or s_bsysten Is
4etomLa_d to re, z_ro testlaq pr£or co lsuncb _ durJ, ng t_ mlso£on. (3)
l
BiNc_raft
Coacept
Jl_Je.am
z_t
6.1.1
)O0
IIystea
_mlg_
Plrocemm
verL t71aG
6.1.2
_t_s_actory
ol_ratlca
ii
System
Input
R4t
b
Resulting
Data
6.1.1.t
r _.2
P4.1
Health
Verification
Evalua_on
Criteria I D
ill _1_2
Health Database
r P4.9
Status
Data
1.1.1.10
Status
Data
11_1_11
Status
Data
1,1.9
1=4.3
"N" kl W
"N_" is BAD
_44_
__.4.4A
Health Monitoring
for "N"
Health Monitodng
fix "N+I"
r 1=4.6
HeathI¢or_odng
for "N+2"
Status t
t
r
Status
of
"N_I"
f
Status
of
"N+2"
"N"
Response
e.t.1_t:
_.e
Subsystem
Procese "N"
P4.7
Subsystem
Redundancy "N._I"
P4.11
Subsystem
Redundance "N+r
J
"N+!"
Response
6.1.1.13
Operation Verifying
Process
I
I
"N+2"
Response
$.1.1.t4
Verifying
Data
6.1.2_
_(2 1
_at_ Jk_t
T_o Jep 0|, 2112 01m4|
6.2 aaoquato IIz_eml V£s£b£1tt¥
Ver£f£cat£oa (3)
V£iLb:LI£t¥ vor£f£©at£oa for intoned Sl_COCraft _11 L_lude tests, s£aulat£o_l, or mlymos to vet£_ that
the crow v£11 havo a&Nl_ato v£s£b£1_Lt¥ dur£_ all ant£cLi_t_ pha_ss and emv£roaneatal con&ttLo_ of the
_lann_l s_tssLoa. (3)
Teitl
Anal¥1ei
_at
f,2.1
IJlJmlat_o8
_ta
1.2.]
$
c_m
v_o£bll£ty
vor£f_t£om
1,2.k
6o|o_
v£s£b£1£ty
Adeq_te
_o_
A_oept_Lt)l e
t..7
Hot
_t,e
_ 4 3 1
_ ° _
Bep 0|, lfH)2 olts3
G.$ Vsr:LflcatJ.cm Tests fo4r K_ectr£cal and
r_ectroa_c _aplPlJ.os _ld Lo_d8
Ormu_ sU4plpOrt eq_LlleXt, fac/1LtLss, _d otl_r 4_Llpmm4st to 1_ comsected to a SlpmCecratt system for
ol_ratLoa, tostLa41, c_c]cout, oz" matnteMnce shall be 4_sL_mm4 to that toutLno v_rtfLcat/cm tests cnn be
conducted beforQ each ©caamct/oa Ls -_dm, to ensure tl_t each electrical and electroaLc £aput Co the
Sl_cecrs£t Is c_tlble with the SlNCeCraft system. (3)
and Pa©11£Ces
IUL_t ;lcaZ
Xa] ut
I_rfo_e
_.'lt4brJ.a
6.. _ .2
7
VQrl£1c_tLoa
q_stLs_
I°1
• IJ •
Pors4_llmZ
Oom_acted
Rv_l_at4om
_mt_m
_ccept_bll
G.3.4
ilo
xn_r£aoe
_ 0 I 1
By,m_ JL&"C]&Ite4:t
Jel) 00, 1002 0|#S7
0.1 _fe _tmtl_ (_,b,©,d)
• • .m_lal _etl_ to almm ©_t4blXlty o£ the m_a_=:aft _ _ lsu_=h _clo. (2)
• ..proper operstl_ of ... short system:(2)
. ..sl1 test pro_edu=og that sre scc_118_ _t be correct _d formslXy _ _fore _ proc_uro 10
scc_lla_. (2)
Xnlpelt
0.1.1
_fe
_ratA_
ZN_t
Znpa&
F
• 1 •
81_¢ocraft/LV
¢os_8tlblllty
_ta_tl_
_084
3 •
_eU
_J8
Itempo_
0.1.d
M'I_MMJ
IWal_
aespcaJe
0.1.0
_umn_
l_'ocedilurem I
8.1._ .____.
I
_tem
_tlN
sad
Yet1 flcstl_
) I _gtl_ _--_Je
gatlmfactory
Pot foru_nce
I JWcep_bloO.1.|
_ _ccept_ble
8.1.9
_tlsfactory
IPerformmn_e
JI_l. 1_]
_rste8 Az_L tect
1_o Jep OI, 1D92 01151
1.1 _to O_ertt_I (31)
Geaerelly, (m a _ lav_ch, _d access 1e strictly
coutto1114... (2)
_lty
ZDfrsst_t_
PIII_I!
1.1.1a
A44111_1
_t_tloI
II|OItll
1.1.11
F
_ON
to &_oe_8
_4
_unch _rla
1.1.13
A_t_I
ae4ulre4
1.1.1|
Ac¢oms i)mta]_lo
Comt_1114
_4
% L
J
!i41_11.1_3
lystem Jkrchltect
5P_o I_p 01l, 1992 10801
0.1 lafo ODeratlo_I (3a)
0411 sn4 JUUl Protecttvo ID,o'vlcoso Orommd support equlpmont (oml), 81rborne support eq_Ll_ont (UI),
fa©Lllt¥ eqvllpmont, or test eq_Lpmont ueed In ground or £11ght operstLoea sTl_11 be equlppe4 vLth
=ote_t2vo devt©oo to preserve Safe operst£ng msrgt_I of _bo 8pac_rsft m_d_¥ntemg. (3)
GII Oil
Protective
Dovl©og
A/I
• _tect_
011
0,1,16
O81
Operst_Lom
IhPocegm
8.1.14 0.1.17
Per Zormsn_4
I.l.|i
IPaa_Llltlom
• Toot
r4_Dmsnt (P55)
• |
155
Operatlca
155
_tlvo
Dovloem
IItl.|!
lTotectlom
1.1.21
_tsl_Se
F
Aml
iqPotect lye
Dov4L©es
f
7
I
Opmrst_Lam
Przm_eml <---
IPzotec t loa
I_t_I
I.l.lfl
IIpQoe_rs ft
xml
performance
I.l.t14
vim 8.1_4
Bystem Az_hl tect
Tuo kp Oil, 11_2 10,0S
o.1 Jste ODoratLceutJ (]b)
C_b_n VeBtllat_emm CZ_W a_b_Ltt m:_lulo vene.llltt_Loa _8D8 _l_tll 11)0 p_o_te41 by IH:L'O6IUI Or Ot_hOr _JeViCOg
to prevent eatraA¢_ ot debr:Le that could damage or :Jam the fan blades during seto-_avtty co_kLtLonm.
Such _=z_enl or o_r de_Laoe mhall be serviceable aa41or replaceeklo. (3)
kreen_/
DebrLs
Preventlo_
Devices
cab£n
op4 fll_tt_
QL1.Zg
SOrO- gray/ty
CaadULtl_u
i.l.|J
r
Criteria and Procedures
11
kz_Lcla4
_OB8
Pz_l_ct£ol
0.1.20
10 •
veltllstloo
pzw_egg J_tlom
1.1.31
Jerv£c£ng _ta]bQ_
Ilatis£scCory
VeotLZati_
= •
_8 2 1
8yatem JLtcbl tect
T_e gep 011, _992 10t00
8.2 Per£o41© _ock-out andL u_£ntenan_e (1)
A hlsto_r of gystam perforaa_:o shall be msln_£nod and mo_Ltored to detect IL_4e£blo degredatLon_ ovor
tin.. Ipall-opor_tlo6al/fall-t_fo s_ystemJ shall sllov ms£ntenan_e to _g_a4o tho s_stem without being
4ogra4od belov tall-ss£e d_lng msintenanee ect£oaJ. (1)
Tho
system
CZ_V
Per fonJsl_e
Da_
|,2.1
_ D_Lsplaye4
to C1_
A 0.2.d
_q_
12
gystem
Per fOZTMU_e
IWslu_tl_
IPer £01"mAD_O
_:LterJ., [ D [
_dr 0.1.2
13
crew
_mltoring
]Pro_J4g
Perforno:_o
Ds_
0.2.$
PorZ_o
Data
|.:t.S
_p_
gylte18 _lo
Per £ozzmsJ_o
LILJt_y
J
ML_| • 3_ 5
mys_ AZ_hl tec t
5_0 kp 01, 1992 10,10
0.2 Perlo41a _k-out and usintenanco (3a)
_-_m_h _sslo_t _tL_, _1 noszlom _ vents _ Ln I_ s_cecratt _s_, ouch a8
ol _ _©tLos o_t_ syetem a_d on_roamon_l _s_, s_11 _ pz_tec_ fz_m entrsn_e o:
rain, deb_in, o= o_sor coatamlnnantg prior _o launch. (3)
It2ttu
- lsm_k
_l_amsnt
I
|_tum
0._.7
F
14
_t108
C_ltrOl
• 1I •
II_nt
_am4
crl_r18
0.1.11
aomt_stLnsnt
_t108
¢c_sn4:
I_orlor'imioe
Data
l.l.l|
_ssloa
ad
veat4
_/nant
Dar_baso
Type-of- _te_t£_
DatoJ_a_
Prs-lsunch
_lIle
V@ntPro_tlon
% /
v
Nit II.2_3
?ue 8ep 01, 1992 10#13 |
8.2 Perio41_ Chock-out sad Ilat:te_e(3b)
zleGtrl©el aa4 |luld-haa411aG sv_rist_ shall £nc3.udo cb_kout test points _sJ.ch v111 pernlt checkout
tests to be u,4o _t_ut dL_omno_tl_ t_l_ or ole_trlosl ©oBDectorg Dozlslly ©oDnecte4 in flight. (3)
Lleotr£cel
IvI_ystam
Ea_Lz_m_ut
rl_t4
_atem
Bavtzmu_nt
8tat_ at
_gt I_£nt
|_tu at
Teot Pola_
17
Ble_t:lc_l
_rZstm
C_eGkout
_t
triter1&
(Mo Dl_oane_t) J D J |le©ttl©el Ilymt_
|. 2.11 U Tomtl_ Znto
|.2.1D
D_ta le OK
|.Z.I|
Dst4 11
I,],lU, dl
m_
CJU,alnmlt
'll4wt
I
Dmtm ls ]Ik)tOK
f
Data 18 _ OK
1.2.20
Criteria
(llo _Lsecmaect)
0.2.17
_etem
Is
Uk_lnal
f
Imb4_
Zn41aat_s
Aa_mly
rl_Ld Syst._*
'L'omt1_ zn£o
k_
%_J
mr_i). 2_4
system JUrchltect
gep Oe, lll: 10#16
0.2 Perlo41c Check-out sn4 Islntenance($d)
Teoe ports vlll not utilize perlsnent cloture mothoda. (3)
lSoa_ropulalvo vent concepts, opposed vontlng0 operatic1 prooe4urem, or elmllsr noth_lJ shall be
to ollm/nate tJ_ vmdeglraJble effects o£ pert_rb_Lng toz_odJ res_ltlnq fz_s much veatj. (3)
opermtlo_tl
-- I°1I.S,|S Vent OlPm Da_ba_
vsRta
PortmrbJ.ag
Iroz_e
_t4
8.2.22
(_aoop&m
col_opt
DIt4
8._t._t3
Vent
Jlalntenaa_e
]hro_ollll
J_mro._
Dsta
ll.2.a4
Pel_ublne
Po_eg
Ktlmln8_4
|.2.24
ktlstactory
V_t
O_ratlom
mr_8.2_S
Itylt48 JLL'r_ te¢ t
Tue kp Oi, 11|:1 10,18
I.;I PerlcxLt© Chock:-oqt sad Nitlatenance(3e)
IPToto_tlo aovors for noslle8 or venta locsted vitbLn th6 ixL¥1oa4 by ad_12 be deel_d to be really
rommmblo 4luring the oomst6mm prior to la_h or prlolr to final cloa_z_ of the orbiter pey2c.sd bty
doors. (3)
0
_yl_d
EOll II 10/voa, r.
Btatu
gl.2.lf
IFTote_t l_m
Oover
Remov_
0.2.27
f
r :J0
Ihlnt_mmae
MoJslo8
Ihrotea_Lve
C_V_r
nemov_
0.2.20
Vent_J

,4
ADVANCED TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM STUDY
Manned Launch Vehicle Concepts for Two Way
Transportation System Payloads to LEO
Learning Curve Analysis
of Orbiter Processing
Research Report
June, 1992
Contract NAS8-39207
Prepared by: M.D. Heileman
(___ Rockwell International
Space Systems Division
Huntsville Operations
555 Discovery Drive
Huntsville, AL 35806
J
v
Space Systems Division
Rockwell International
July 1992
Learning Curve Analysis of Orbiter Processing: A
Research Report
By Mark D. Heileman, P.E.*
Darrell G. Linton, Ph.D., P.E. and Soheil Khajenoori, Ph.D.**
ABSTRACT
This paper shows how learning curve analysis can be applied to Space
Shuttle orbiter processing in preparation for launch. Learning curve theory
can be used to estimate ground processing time at the main orbiter facilities on
the Kennedy Space Center. Results of this analysis indicate that future orbiter
turn-around processing times will allow additional processing capacity which
may result in an increasing Space Shuttle launch rate.
INTRODUCTION
A learning curve is the phenomenon whereby, as the number of cycles
(or process flows) increases, the time per cycle or the cost per cycle decreases
for a large number of cycles. Learning that occurs while an organization
produces many units of a particular product is represented by the "production
progress function" [1]. It is recognized that learning is time dependent. The
learning curve is an accepted management tool for determining expected
manpower requirements, evaluating training programs, estimating the costs
of future production, and scheduling shop labor, particularly when
performance time dedreases as a result of learning through repetition [2].
The theory of learning curve is based on the assumption that as the total
quantity of units produced doubles, the cumulative average time per unit
declines at some constant rate known as the learning efficiency. Since it is
unlikely that this same rate will hold every time production is doubled, the
actual learning efficiency is estimated by an average [2].
v
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J MATHEMATICS OF LEARNING
Learning equations generally take the form of
y= Kx-A (1)
where Y = the time per cycle
K = the time for the first cycle
X = the number of cycles
A = a constant, the value which is determined by the learning rate.
If we take the log of both sides of equation 1, we get a straight line.
log Y=logK-AlogX (2)
Thus if we plot the equation on log-log paper, A will be the slope and K will be
the intercept. One of the useful properties of this equation is that every time X
(the number of cycles) is doubled, Y (the time per cycle) decreases by a fixed
percentage. This is the source of the commonly used term "percent learning
curve." For example, every time the units double, the value of Y for a 90%
curve is 90% of the previous value. Suppose the first unit had a cycle time of
10 hours; then we would get the results shown in Table 1 by successively
doubling the number of units [1].
Table 1 An example of the cycle times for a 90%
Number ofUnits(X)
1
2
4
8
16
32
64
1oR
258
512
Cycle Time (Y)
10.0
9.0
&l
7.3
6.6
5,9
53
4.8
4.3
3.9
curve
Figure 1 is a plot of a 90% curve using Cartesian coordinates and Figure
2 is the same equation plotted on log-log paper. Using the conditions of Table
1, where K = 10 hours and a 90% learning curve, we could determine the value
of A (logarithmic slope) using equation 1 and any value of X except 1. From
Table 1 with X = 2 and Y = 9.0, equation 1 becomes as follows.
9 = (10)(2) -A
log9=log 10-A log2
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A = (log 10- log 9) / log 2 = 0.1520
The learning rate or efficiency (L) is the percentage by which the cycle (or
processing) time is reduced every time the cumulative production output is
doubled. From the above solution, L can be derived as follows.
A = (log 1 - logL)/log2
A= -logL/log2
log L=-A log2
L = 2-A (3)
Substituting A = 0.1520 for a 90% learning curve into equation 3, we get the
following verification.
L = 2-0.1520 = 0.9000
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Figure l Plot of 90% curve (arithmetic)
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ORBITER PROCESSING DATA
Historical data concerning Space Shuttle orbiter processing time in
preparation for a launch was obtained from the Mission Planning Office at the
Kennedy Space Center [3]. Table 2 shows the number of work days spent
preparing Shuttle orbiter vehicles (OV's) for missions at their major
processing facilities. Those facilities are the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF),
the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), and the launch pad. The first column in
this table contains the vehicle flow number (which is the number of times an
orbiter has been processed at the Kennedy Space Center facilities), and the
next five columns contain the orbiter tail number and name along with the
cumulative processing times at the major facilities. The sixth column has the
average cumulative orbiter processing time per flow. The orbiter processing
times up to and including mission STS-51L, the tenth flow of OV-099
Challenger, are shown boxed in Table 2.
Table 2 Sum and average per flow of orbiter processing times at
the OPF, VAB, and launch pad
OV-O_J9 OV-10_ OV-103 OV-lO4 OV-105 OV
Flow # Challenger Columbia Discovery Atlanlis Endeavour Average
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
244
6O
55
80
53
8O
132
75
53
63
668 210 132 I
I187 58 46
gr ss T
77 73 133
ICQ 58 153
128 56 110
143 _
T 14) 125
129 162 101
300 128 1G3
114 140 88
136 180
113
105
272 3O5
87
111
91
g2
94
211
144
111
148
117
158
113
105
J
The orbiter vehicle average processing time was calculated because
many flight preparation flows tend to have similar requirements and
characteristics. For example, the first flow includes factory check-out testing
and the fifth flow usually requires vehicle structural inspections.
Additionally, personnel assignments are often made by OV and not by facility;
and open work may be carried from one facility to the next facility in the
processing flow.
After the mission STS-51L accident, significant changes were made in
the rules and procedures for orbiter ground turn-around launch preparation
activities at their major processing facilities. Numerous inspection points and
safety procedures were added to the standard procedures. Many hardware
modifications were incorporated. The Space Shuttle program went through a
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stand-down of over two-and-one-half years, interrupting the continuous
production flow assumed for learning curve purposes. This implies that there
are two different distributions for orbiter processing. Therefore the orbiter
processing times through preparation for mission STS-51L were segregated
from the orbiter processing times subsequent to STS-51L. The processing data
through mission STS-51L preparation are shown in Table 3. The orbiter
processing times after STS-51L are shown in Table 4. The first post STS-51L
vehicle flow number for each orbiter was reset to one in Table 4 because the
launch preparation production progress function essentially was started over
from the beginning.
Table 3 Through STS-51L sum and average per flow of orbiter
processing times at the OPF, VAB, and launch pad
0V-099 0V-102 UV-103 0V-104 OV
Flow # Challenger Columbia Discovery Atlanlis Average
1 244 668 210 132 314
2 60 187 56 46 87
3 55 g7 56
4 80 77 73 77
5 53 102 58 71
6 80 128 56 88
7 132 143 138
8 75 75
9 53 53
10 63 63
Table 4 - Post STS-51L sum and average per flow of orbiter
processing times at the OPF, VAB, and launch pad
QV-102 0V-103 0V-104 UV-106 OV
Flow # Columbia Discovery A_lnCs Endeavour Average
1 227 322 236 272 254
2 129 140 133 137
3 300 162 153 205
4 114 126 110 117
5 1_ 149 245 176
6 180 125 153
7 113 101 107
8 106 103 104
9 _
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DATA ANALYSIS USING PROCESSING AVERAGES
Figure 3 is an arithmetic plot of the orbiter vehicle processing data
through STS-51L contained in Table 3. The vehicle flow average processing
times are shown by the dark solid line in the plot. Figure 4 is an arithmetic
plot of the post STS-51L orbiter processing times contained in Table 4. The
average processing times per flow are also shown by the dark solid line in this
plot. The dark solid lines in Figures 3 and 4 indicate an exponential curve with
some variation. The exponential production progress function is apparently
valid for application to orbiter launch preparation processing.
M.J
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Figure 3 - Plot of individual and average orbiter processing times
at the OPF, VAB, and launch pad through STS-51L (arithmetic)
360
30O
250
20O
150
I00
50
0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Row number
: OV-102
OV-103
& OV-104
O 0V-106
OV Average
Figure 4 - Plot of individual and average orbiter processing times
at the OPF, VAB, and launch pad post STS-51L (arithmetic)
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-x,_.y As previously stated above in Section II, a log-log plot of the exponential
production progress function will yield a straight line. It is desired to find a
"best fit" straight line to a log-log plot of the average orbiter processing times
in order to determine the learning efficiency. For a straight line fit by the
method of least squares, the values of a (slope) and b (y-intercept) are
obtained by solving the normal equations.
y = ax + b (4)
a = (nT,xiY i - (Y_,xi)(F,yi) ) / (nF, xi2 - (F,xi) 2) (5)
_.....j/
b = (Ey i / n) - (aF, x i / n) (6)
For an exponential curve fit by the method of least squares, the values of log a
and log b are obtained by fitting a straight line to the set of ordered pairs {(log
x i, log Yi)}. An exponential curve is described by the following equations.
Y = bx a (7)
or
log y=log b+a logx (8)
The derivation of appropriate parameters and the calculation of the
logarithmic "best fit" straight line to the average orbiter processing times
through STS-51L are shown in Table 5. The first column contains the flow
number. The second column shows the average orbiter processing times. The
next five columns contain necessary manipulations and summations of the
logarithms of the flow number and average processing time. The last two
columns contain the predicted log of the processing times and the logarithmic
"best fit" straight line for average processing times.
Table 5 ThroUgh STS-51L average orbiter processing times at
OPF, VAB, and launch pad
Flow # OV Avg. _IDd Best Fit
(X) (Y) logX logY (logX)(IogY) (logX_2 (logY_2 logY Average
1 314 0.00 2.50 0.00 0.00 6.,33 2.26 184
2 87 030 1.94 0,58 0.09 3.76 2.12 132
3 69 0.48 1.84 0.88 0.23 338 2.04 109
4 77 0.60 1,89 1.14 0.36 3.58 1.98 96
5 71 0.70 1.86 1.29 0.49 3.43 1.gO 86
6 88 0.78 1.94 1.51 0.61 3.78 1.89 78
7 138 0.85 2.14 1.81 0.71 4.58 1.86 72
8 75 0.90 1.88 1.69 0.82 3.52 1.83 58
9 53 0.95 1.72 1.55 0.91 2.97 1.81 64
10 53 1.00 1,80 1.80 1.00 3.24 1.78 61
6.56 19,50 12.36 522 38.45
I
the
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The slope and y-intercept are determined by appropriately solving equations 5
and 6.
a = ((10)(12.35) - (6.56)(19.50)) / ((10)(5.22) - 6.562) = -0.482
b = (19.50 / 10) - (-0.482)(6.56 / 10) = 2.26
The learning rate is then determined by solving equation 3.
L = 2a = 2-0.482 = 0.716 = 72%
A logarithmic plot of the average orbiter processing times and the "best fit"
straight line prediction for the learning curve applied to orbiter processing
through STS-51L is shown in Figure 5.
The sample correlation coefficient (r) of the "best fit" straight line is
defined as follows.
r = a sx I $y
where
(9)
sx = ((Xxi 2 - (Xxi) 2 / n) / (n - 1)) 1/2 (10)
Sy = ((I;yi2 - Cgyi)2 / n)/(n - 1))I/2 (II)
Substitutingthe appropriate parameters into equations 9, I0, and II and
solving for r we get the correlationcoefficient.
sx = ((5.22- 6.562/I0)/9)I/2= 0.319
Sy = ((38.45 - 19.502 / 10) / 9) 1/2 = 0.217
r= (--0.482)(0.319/0.217)= -0.709
A "best fit" line which correlated perfectly to the data would have a
correlation coefficient (r) equal to 1.0 for a positive slope or -1.0 for a negative
slope.
Similar calculations were made for the post STS-51L orbiter processing
times. The appropriate data is shown in Table 6 and the corresponding
logarithmic plot of average orbiter processing times and the "best fit" straight
line are shown in Figure 6.
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K._.j Table 6 Post STS-51L average orbiter processing times at the OPF,
VAB, and launch pad
Flow # OV Avg. PnKl¢l_w:l BestFd
(X) (Y) log X kxj Y (log X)(Iog Y) (log X_2 (log Y_2 logY Average
1 354 0.00 2.42 0.00 0.00 5.86 2.39 247
2 137 0.30 2.14 0,64 0.09 4.57 2.28 188
3 205 0.48 2.31 1.10 023 5.34 2.21 161
4 117 0.60 2.07 1.25 038 423 2.16 144
5 176 0.70 2.25 1.57 0.49 5.04 2.12 132
6 153 0.78 2.18 1.70 0.61 4.77 2.09 122
7 107 0.85 2.03 1.72 0.71 4.12 2.06 115
8 104 0.90 2.C_ 1.82 0.82 4.07 2.04 109
9 88 0.95 1.94 1.86 0.91 3.78 2.t_ 104
5.56 19.36 11.66 4.22 4i.83
The slope and y-intercept are determined by appropriately solving equations 5
and 6.
a = ((9)(11.65) - (5.56)(19.36)) / ((9)(4.22) - 5.562) = -0.395
b = (19.36 / 9) - (-0.395)(5.56 / 9) = 2.39
The post STS-51L learning rate is then determined by solving equation 3.
L = 2a = 2-0.395 = 0.760 = 76%
Substituting the appropriate parameters into equations 9, 10, and 11 and
solving for r we get the correlation coefficient.
sx = ((4.22 - 5.562 / 9) / 8) 1/2 = 0.313
Sy = ((41:83 - 19.362 / 9) / 8) 1/2 = 0.152
r = (-0.384)(0.313/0.152)= -0.791
- j
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Figure 5 - Plot of average and best fit orbiter processing times at
the OPF, VAB, and launch pad through STS-51L (logarithmic)
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Figure 6 - Plot of average and best fit orbiter processing times at
the OPF, VAB, and launch pad post STS-$1L (logarithmic)
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DATA ANALYSIS USING SEQUENTIAL PROCESSING CYCLES
Another method for determining the learning efficiency of processing
orbiters through their main Kennedy Space Center facilities is by sequential
processing cycle, rather than by the orbiters' cumulative average flow time as
was done above. The data necessary for this modelling methodology is shown
in Table 7. This data was obtained from the Mission Planning Office at the
Kennedy Space Center [3]. The first column in this table shows the STS mission
number. The next column contains the cycle number and the third column
shows the actual orbiter processing time. The work days in Table 7 are the
same processing times shown in Table 3. The next five columns contain
necessary manipulations and summations of the logarithms of the flow
number and average processing time. The last two columns contain the
predicted log of the processing times and the logarithmic "best fit" straight
line for predicted processing times. The data in Table 7 starts with the very
first Space Shuttle processing flow and is inclusive of STS-51L (also known as
STS-33), twenty five cycles later.
Table 7 - Through STS-S1L orbiter processing times at the OPF,
VAB, and launch pad by cycle number
Cycle # work Days PreOcteO Best Ptt
STS # (X) ('i') logX log Y (log X)(log Y) (log X_2 (log Yp2 log Y Work Days
1 1 668 0.00 Z82 0.00 0.03 7.98 2.43 257
2 2 187 030 2.27 0.68 0.09 5.16 2.29 195
3 3 97 0.48 1._ 0.95 023 3.95 2.21 162
4 4 77 0.60 1.89 1.14 036 3.56 2.15 142
5 5 1(12 0.70 2.01 1.40 0.49 4.03 2.11 19R
6 6 244 0.76 2.30 1.86 0,61 5.70 2.07 118
7 7 60 0.85 1.76 1.,50 0.71 3.16 2.04 110
8 8 55 O.go 1.74 1,5"/ 0.82 3.06 2.01 103
9 9 198 0.95 2.11 2.01 0.91 4.44 1.90 98
11 10 80 1.00 1.gO 1.90 1,00 3.62 1,97 gO
13 11 53 1.04 1.72 1.80 1.08 2.97 1.95 89
14 12 210 1.(38 232 2.51 1.16 5.39 1,gO 86
17 13 80 , 1.11 1.90 ?_12 1.24 3.62 1.62 63
19 14 55 1.15 1.75 2.00 131 3.06 1.90 80
20 15 55 1.18 1.75 2.06 1,38 3.06 1.89 78
23 16 73 1.20 1.68 2.24 1.45 3.47 1.56 75
24 17 132 123 2.12 2.61 1.51 4.,50 1.87 73
25 16 55 1.26 1.76 2.21 1.58 3,11 1.85 71
25 19 75 128 1,88 2.40 1.64 3.52 1.84 70
27 20 55 130 1.75 227 1.69 3,03 1.83 68
2B 21 132 _.32 2,12 280 1.76 450 1.52 67
30 22 53 134 1.72 2.31 1.eo 2.g7 1.81 65
31 23 46 136 1.66 226 1.86 2.76 1.81 64
32 24 143 1.38 2.16 2.97 1.go 4.66 1.80 63
33 25 63 1.40 1.80 2.52 1.95 3.24 1.79 61
25.19 49.17 48,11 28.53 9850
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The slope and y-intercept are determined by appropriately solving equations 5
and 6.
a = ((25)(48.11) - (25.19)(49.17)) / ((25)(28.53) - 25.192) = -0.456
b = (49.17 / 25) - (-0.456)(25.19 / 25) = 2.43
The learning rate through STS-51L by cycle order is then determined by
solving equation 3.
L = 2a = 2-0.456 = 0.729 = 73%
Substituting the appropriate parameters into equations 9, 10, and 11 and
solving for r we get the correlation coefficient.
sx = ((28.53 - 25.192 / 25) / 24) 1/2 = 0.362
Sy = ((98.50- 49.172/25)/24)I/2= 0.272
r= (-0.456)(0.362/0.272)= -0.607
-- S?X (S
Table 8 contains sequential processing cycle data, similar to Table 7, for
cycles occurring after STS-51L. Data in Table 8 was obtained from Kennedy
Space Center's Mission Planning Office and is current through STS-50, which
was launched on 25 June 1992 [3]. There have been twenty three orbiter
processing cycles completed to date since STS-51L. The work days shown in
Table 8, column three are cumulative times for the OPF, VAB, and launch pad.
These work days are the same processing times shown in Table 4.
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Table 8 - Post STS-51L orbiter processing times at the OPF, VAB, and
launch pad by cycle number
Cycle # Work Days PreOcted Be_t'Frt
STS # (X) (Y) log X log Y (log X)(Iog Y) (log X_2 (log Y)A2 log Y Work Days
25 1 322 "" 0.00 2.51 0.00 0.00 6.29'" 2.40 251
27 2 236 0.30 2.37 0.71 0.09 5.63 2.33 215
29 3 149 0.48 2.17 1.04 0.23 4.72 2.29 197
30 4 133 0.60 2.12 1.28 0.36 4.51 227 185
28 5 227 0.70 2.36 1.6S 0.49 5,55 2,24 176
34 6 153 0.78 2.18 1.70 0.61 4.77 2.23 169
33 7 162 0.86 22.1 1.87 0.71 4.88 2.21 163
32 8 129 0.93 2.11 1.91 On 4.45 2.20 158
38 9 110 O.g6 2.04 1.95 0.91 4.17 2.19 154
31 10 135 1.00 2.10 2.10 1.00 4.41 2.18 151
41 11 149 1.04 2.17 2.26 1.06 4.72 2.17 148
38 12 245 1.G8 2.39 2.58 1.16 5,71 2.16 145
35 13 300 1.11 2.48 2.76 1.24 6.14 2.15 142
37 14 125 1.15 2.10 2.40 131 4.40 2.15 140
39 15 180 1.18 226 2.65 1.38 5.09 2.14 138
40 16 114 1.20 206 2.48 1.45 4.23 2.13 136
43 17 101 1.23 2.00 2.47 1.51 4.02 2.13 134
48 18 113 1.26 2.06 258 1.58 4.22 2.12 132
44 19 1_ 1.28 2.01 2.57 1.64 4.05 2.12 131
42 20 105 130 2.02 2.63 1.6G 4.09 2.11 129
45 21 88 1.32 1.94 2.57 1,75 3.78 2.11 135
49 22 2"/'2 1.34 2.43 3.27 1.80 5,93 2.10 127
50 23 135 136 2.13 2.90 1.85 4.54 2.10 125
22.41 50.23 48.32 24.57 110,29
i
Once again, the slope and y-intercept are determined by appropriately solving
equations 5 and 6.
a = ((23)(48.32) - (22.41)(50.23)) / ((23)(24.67) - 22.412) = -0.222
b = (50.23 / 23) - (-0.222)(22.41 / 23) = 2.40
The learning rate post STS-51L by cycle order is then determined by solving
equation 3.
L = 2a = 2-0.222 = 0.857 = 86%
x,,....,/
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Finally, appropriate parametersare substituted into equations 9, 10, and 11 and
r is solved for the sample correlation coefficient.
sx = ((24.67 - 22.412 / 23) / 22) I/2 = 0.359
Sy = ((110.29 - 50.232 / 23) / 22) 1/2 = 0.164
r = (-0.222)(0.359 / 0.164) = -0.485
Figure 7 is a plot using Cartesian coordinates of cumulative orbiter
processing times at the OPF, VAB, and launch pad for data through STS-51L.
The solid line in Figure 7 is a "best fit" exponential curve with a learning
efficiency of 73% and a sample correlation coefficient of -0.607. A curve that
correlated perfectly to the sample data would have a correlation coefficient of
1 for a positive slope or -1 for a negative slope.
Figure 8 is a plot using Cartesian coordinates of cumulative orbiter
processing times at the OPF, VAB, and launch pad for data post STS-51L. The
solid line in Figure 8 is a "best fit" exponential curve with a learning
efficiency of 86% and a sample correlation coefficient of -0.485.
Figure 9 is a log-log plot of Figure 7 and Figure 10 is a log-log plot of
Figure 8. An exponential curve will plot as a straight line on log-log paper.
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Figure 7 Plot of orbiter and best fit processing times by cycle at
the OPF, VAB, and launch pad through STS-51L (arithmetic)
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Figure 8 - Plot of orbiter and best fit processing times by cycle at
the OPF, VAB, and launch pad post STS-$1L (arithmetic)
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Figure 9 Plot of orbiter and best fit processing times by cycle at
the OPF, VAB, and launch pad through STS-51L (logarithmic)
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Figure 10 - Plot of orbiter and best fit processing times by cycle at
the OPF, VAB, and launch pad post STS-51L (logarithmic)
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",.._j Table 9 contains the same information as Table 8, but with four
maverick data points removed in order to obtain better correlation to an
exponential curve. Solid rationale is required when data points are eliminated
from the analysis if the learning curve model is to be used to forecast future
processing times. For this model, all post STS-51L Space Shuttle roll-backs
from the launch pad, as well as the first flow of OV-105 Endeavour, were
eliminated from the data set. This is sound rationale if future roll-backs are
not expected and new orbiter vehicles are not planned to be introduced to the
Kennedy Space Center.
Table 9 - Post STS-51L orbiter processing times at the OPF, VAB, and
launch pad by cycle number without maverick data points
Cycle # Work Days Preclmted Best Fit
STS # (X) (Y) log X log Y (log X)(Iog Y) (log X)_2 (log Y)A2 logY Work Days
I .'_ o.oo z51 o.oo o.oo r:_ z_ z_
;Y 2 236 030 2.37 0.71 01_ SI_ _
29 3 140 0.48 2.17 1.04 023 4.72 229 194
30 4 133 0.60 Z12 128 0.36 4.51 224 175
aa s _ 0.7o 2._ 1.ss 0.49 s_ 221 152
34 6 153 0.78 2.18 1.70 0,61 4.77 2.18 152
33 7 162 0.86 221 137 0.71 4,88 2.16 144
32 8 129 0.90 ?-11 1.91 0.82 4.45 2`14 138
36 9 110 0.g6 ?-04 1.96 0.91 4.17 2.12 132
31 10 129 1.00 ?-10 ?-10 1.00 4.41 2.11 128
41 11 140 1.04 2.17 2,28 1.0e 4.72 2`09 123
37 12 125 1.(28 ?-10 228 1.16 4.40 2.08 120
40 13 114 1.11 2.06 229 1.24 423 2.07 116
43 14 101 1.15 2.00 2.30 1.31 4.(32 2.06 113
48 15 113 1.18 2.05 2.41 1.38 422 2.04 111
44 16 1013 1.20 ?-01 2.42 1.45 4.05 2`(_ 108
42 17 105 123 ?-02 ?-49 1.51 4.09 2`03 106
45 18 88 128 1.94 ?-44 1.58 3,78 2.02 104
50 19 135 128 2.13 2.72 1.64 4.54 2`01 1(32
17.09 40.67 35.80 17.58 87.43
I
, The slope and y-intercept are determined by appropriately solving equations 5
and 6.
a = ((19)(35.80) - (17.09)(40.67)) / ((19)(17.58) - 17.092) = --0.348
b = (40.67 / 19) - (-0.348)(17.09 / 19) = 2.45
The learning rate post STS-51L by cycle order is then determined by solving
equation 3.
L = 2a = 2-0.348 = 0.786 = 79%
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Substituting the appropriate parameters into equations 9, 10, and
solving for r we get the correlation coefficient.
s x = ((17.58 - 17.092 / 19) / 18) 1/2 = 0.351
11 and
Sy = ((87.43 - 40.672 / 19) / 18) 1/2 = 0.142
r = (-0.348)(0.351 / 0.142) = -0.863
Figure 11 is a plot using Cartesian coordinates of cumulative orbiter
processing times at the OPF, VAB, and launch pad for data post STS-51L with the
four maverick data points removed. The solid line in Figure 11 is a "best fit"
exponential curve with a learning efficiency of 79% and a sample correlation
coefficient of -0.863. This is significantly better than the sample correlation
coefficient of -0.485 obtained from Table 8 and plotted in Figure 8. Figure 12
is a log-log plot of Figure 11.
x,.../
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Figure 11 Plot of orbiter and best fit processing times by cycle at
the OPF, VAB, and launch pad post STS-51L without maverick data
points (arithmetic)
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Figure 12 - Plot of orbiter and best fit processing times by cycle at
the OPF, VAB, and launch pad post STS-51L without maverick data
points (logarithmic)
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CONCLUSIONS
The learning model using average cumulative orbiter processing times
for the OPF, VAB, and launch pad is the methodology with the greatest sample
correlation coefficient using all the relevant data (r = -0.791 from Table 6). At
the current learning rate for average orbiter processing, there will be
capability for significant launch rate increase in the future as processing
experience is gained. Table 10 shows the expected cumulative orbiter
processing times at the OPF, VAB, and launch pad after the orbiter vehicle has
experienced the number of flows shown in the first column. Table 10 is based
on the calculated post STS-51L learning rate curve of 76%. The second column
is the log of the flow number. The third column is calculated using equation 4
with a = -0.395, b = 2.39, and substituting log X for x and log Y for y. The final
column in Table 10 is calculated by taking the antilogarithm of y.
Table 10 Predicted cumulative orbiter processing times by
average at the OPF, VAB, and launch pad for future launch
preparation flows
Flow # Predicted P_
Po_S Time
((X) 1L) IogX IogY (Work Days)
10 1.00 200
20 130 1.88 75
30 1.48 1.81 65
4O 1.60 1.76 57
60 1:78 1.6Q 40
"-...j
On average, the sum of orbiter processing times at the OPF, VAB, and
launch pad is expected to be reduced about 150 days from the first flow to the
tenth flow of a vehicle. By the fortieth flow of an orbiter, processing time is
expected to be better than achieved at the time of STS-51L (which was 61 work
days predicted for the tenth flow and 63 work days actually observed from
Table 5). Cumulative orbiter processing time can be expected to be reduced
another 50 days per flow on the sixtieth flow of the vehicle at the current
learning efficiency. This reduced cycle time will allow additional processing
capacity that may lead to an increasing Space Shuttle launch rate.
Observation of Table 10 shows that turn-around ground processing
times of less than 50 days at the Kennedy Space Center's main Space Shuttle
orbiter facilities can be achieved well within the design life of an orbiter
(which is 100 missions). At that point in time, orbiter turn-around processing
times would surpass, on average, the best turn-around times achieved before
STS-51L. Several other launch vehicle studies have analyzed new types of
personnel vehicles that could achieve this order of ground turn-around time.
However, associated with any new vehicle program is development risk.
Continued, uninterrupted launching of Space Shuttles at current learning
efficiency can reach desired launch rates of some new launch vehicles under
study without incurrifig development risk. This analysis is independent of
orbiter and new vehicle development cost examination.
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The learning model using sequential processing cycle of cumulative
orbiter processing times for the OPF, VAB, and launch pad, excluding maverick
data points (which were defined in Section VI), is the methodology with the
greatest sample correlation coefficient (r---0.863). However, great care and
solid rationale must be used when data points are eliminated from the analysis.
For this model, all post STS-51L Space Shuttle roll-backs from the launch pad,
as well as the first flow of OV-105 Endeavour, were eliminated from the data set.
This is sound rationale if future roll-backs are not expected and new orbiter
vehicles are not planned to be introduced to the Kennedy Space Center.
Table 11 shows the expected cumulative orbiter processing times for the
total number of cycles shown in the first column. Table 11 is based on the
calculated post STS-51L learning rate curve of 79%. The second column is the
log of the cycle number. The third column is calculated using equation 4 with
a = -0.348, b = 2.45, and substituting log X for x and log Y for y. The final
column in Table 11 is calculated by taking the antilogarithm of y.
Table 11 -
at the OPF,
Predicted cumulative orbiter processing times by cycle
VAB, and launch pad without maverick data points for
future launch preparation flows
Time
( ) log X log Y (Work Days)
80 1.gO 1.79 e2
go 1.g6 1,77 5g
100 2.00 1.76 5B
120 2.08 1,73 54
140 2.15 1.70 50
Observation of Table 11 indicates that cumulative orbiter processing
time at the OPF, VAB, and launch pad is expected to be about the same as the
processing time of STS-51L by the time of the eightieth total orbiter processing
cycle (61 work days predicted for the twenty-fifth cycle and 63 work days
actual from Table 7). Cumulative orbiter processing time can be expected to
reach 50 days at the Kennedy Space Center's main Space Shuttle orbiter
facilities by time of launch number 140 since STS-51L.
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